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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
PART 1:  INTRODUCTION BY CHAIRMAN KOVACIC 
 
A few years from now, the FTC will reach the one hundredth anniversary of the 
statute that gave it life.  How well is the agency fulfilling the destiny that Congress 
foresaw for it in 1914?  What type of institution should the FTC aspire to be when the 
agency’s second century begins in 2014? 
 
Over the past seven months, the FTC has conducted a self-assessment to consider 
these and other basic questions about the agency’s future direction.  Two aims motivated 
this initiative.  The first is to ask what we must do to continue the valuable work that the 
agency performs today and to identify steps we must take to do still better in the future.  
The focus of this exercise is an agency that is one of the great success stories in the 
modern history of public administration. 
 
The progress of the Federal Trade Commission in its modern era has built heavily 
upon the willingness of its people to assess their work critically and explore possibilities 
for improvement.  The FTC at 100 self-assessment is the latest element of that tradition, 
and the exercise has yielded valuable insights about strengthening the agency.  Several 
areas stand out.  The inquiry has helped identify what resources – personnel, facilities, 
equipment – the FTC will need to perform its duties in the future.  Nothing is more vital 
to the success of the Commission than its human capital.  A second result is to suggest 
how the FTC might improve its approach for choosing strategies for exercising its 
powers.  No task of administration is more important than selecting priorities.  A third 
product of this self-assessment has been to identify how the FTC can strengthen its 
processes for implementing its programs.  The manner in which an agency organizes its 
operations deeply shapes the quality of its substantive initiatives and affects the costs that 
firms bear in complying with the agency’s commands.  Finally, the inquiry has pointed to 
how the FTC can better fulfill its duties by improving links with other government bodies 
and nongovernment organizations. 
 
 The consultations for this project have identified seven general characteristics of 
good administrative practice that the FTC should strive to achieve in its work in the 
coming years.  The successful competition agency of the future is one that: 
 
x Formulates and clearly communicates well-specified goals to its staff and to 
external constituencies. 
 
x Establishes and refines internal planning mechanisms that devise a strategy and 
programs for accomplishing its goals. 
 
x Employs a problem-solving approach that uses the full range of the agency’s 
policy tools to correct apparent market or government failures that impede the 
attainment of competition and consumer protection objectives. 
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x Creates internal quality control systems that test the soundness of proposed 
initiatives. 
 
x Emphasizes the recruitment and retention of skilled administrative staff, 
attorneys, and economists. 
 
x Makes regular, substantial capital investments in building knowledge, in 
developing relationships with collateral public agencies and academic research 
centers at home and abroad, and in improving physical infrastructure assets. 
 
x Establishes processes for the routine evaluation of programs, agency organization, 
and procedures. 
 
In these and related measures, the FTC will prosper if it embraces an ethic of continuous 
self-assessment and improvement. 
 
PART 2:  INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL FTC PERFORMANCE 
 
 This self-study dwelled extensively on the basic question of what criteria serve to 
separate good performance from adequate or weak performance.  The definition of 
standards is fundamental to the study of the performance of the Commission or any other 
public body, yet the need clearly to specify criteria frequently gets less attention than it 
deserves.  One of the central aims of this self-study was to identify institutional features 
that beget good substantive outcomes over time. 
 
I. Agency Mission 
 
 A. Clearly Articulating the Mission 
 
A fundamental characteristic of a good institution is the clarity with which it 
understands its purpose and defines its “mission.”  The FTC’s mission has two 
dimensions: one related to the substance of policy and the other related to the process by 
which policy is formed.  The substantive dimension consists of the public policy goals 
that the Commission should accomplish on behalf of the American people.  The process 
dimension involves the means that Congress placed at the Commission’s disposal to 
address economic policy issues. 
 
 As a threshold matter, agency leaders must clearly articulate the agency mission 
so that staff and external constituencies have a firm grasp of what the agency is trying to 
achieve.  In its most recent strategic plan, the FTC has defined its mission in the 
following manner:  “To prevent business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive 
or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public understanding 
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of the competitive process; and to accomplish these missions without unduly burdening 
legitimate business activity.”1 
 
There appears to be widespread understanding that the FTC’s current mission 
focuses on consumers and that the improvement of consumer welfare is the proper 
objective of the agency’s competition and consumer protection work.  The improvement 
of market outcomes for consumers, and not the status of specific firms or collections of 
enterprises, is seen the reason to challenge fraud, deceit, and related forms of unfair 
practices, and to police anticompetitive mergers and other practices that improperly 
suppress rivalry in the marketplace.  This perspective appears to enjoy broad support 
within the community of competition policy and consumer protection agencies. 
 
A vital aspect of the FTC’s mission is to exercise the unique mix of institutional 
capabilities Congress has entrusted to it.  The FTC’s powers are genuinely 
multidimensional.  The Commission best fulfills its destiny when it uses a problem-
solving approach that applies the most effective mix of the agency’s portfolio of policy 
instruments, which include law enforcement, administrative adjudication, advocacy, the 
collection of data, the preparation of reports, and rulemaking.  A certifying characteristic 
of good performance for the Commission is its demonstrated capacity to employ this full 
panoply of capabilities to address important public policy issues. 
 
 B. Measuring Outcomes Rather than Outputs 
 
In addition to a clearly articulated mission, there should be a close nexus between 
the mission and outcomes for the public that can be measured.  That is, a mission ideally 
should be defined in a manner that lends itself to meaningful measurement of whether the 
agency carries it out successfully.  In the case of a competition or consumer protection 
agency, it should develop a mission that is focused on outcomes for the public (for 
example, preserving competitive markets or preventing fraud), rather than agency inputs 
or outputs (for example, number of staff employed or cases filed).  It is typically easier to 
identify and measure government agencies’ outputs rather than outcomes.  Thus, agency 
leaders should articulate a mission that lends itself to developing outputs that enjoy a 
close nexus with desired outcomes.  Beyond emphasizing outcomes rather than outputs, a 
mission that focuses on measurable outcomes has several advantages for an agency’s 
pursuit of its goals. 
 
C. Internal and External Support for the Mission 
 
Finally, for an agency to thrive, its mission should enjoy support from key 
internal and external constituencies over time.  For the FTC, one core constituency is its 
own staff of administrative professionals, attorneys, and economists.  The Commission 
derives significant advantages from building widespread internal agreement upon and 
endorsement of its mission.  Among other benefits, such support enables managers to 
                                                 
1 FTC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2006-2011, at 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/spfy06fy11.pdf. 
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economize on resources.  When the FTC’s staff understands and embraces the agency’s 
stated aims, managers need spend less time to create incentives for staff to pursue the 
mission and can reduce the effort devoted to monitoring whether staff’s efforts are 
consistent with the FTC’s mission. 
 
Beyond mobilizing its own employees, an agency also must enjoy support for its 
mission among external constituencies.  Lack of external support for the mission can 
erode the perceived legitimacy of the agency’s individual actions, cause Congress to 
withdraw part of its jurisdiction, and, in extreme circumstances, call into question its 
continued existence.  In addition, although support for a mission is crucial to any agency, 
it is important to distinguish between support for a mission among internal and external 
constituencies over time, on the one hand, and unanimous support for specific agency 
actions, on the other.  The former is necessary for a successful agency; the latter is not. 
 
II. Agency Structure 
 
The structure of an administrative agency such as the FTC deeply influences the 
skill with which it carries out its responsibilities.  The structure and organization of a 
competition and consumer protection agency can affect the performance of its priorities 
directly, for example, by having operational units dedicated to bringing specific types of 
cases or examining individual economic sectors, and indirectly, for example, by 
facilitating communication and coordination among agency components or having 
sufficient flexibility to address changes in rapidly transforming markets.   
 
Consumer protection and competition agencies around the world have a variety of 
structural designs.  Some agencies have only competition or consumer protection 
enforcement authority.  Others, like the FTC, combine the functions to meet a broader 
mission of protecting the marketplace for consumers.  Among agencies with both 
functions, some organize their work along industry lines, while others divide along 
competition and consumer protection lines.  Some agencies have a single commissioner 
or director, while others are led by a collegial body. 
 
 A. Current Agency Design  
   
 Since the early 1970s, the FTC has had a bureau structure that includes the 
Bureau of Competition (“BC”), Bureau of Consumer Protection (“BCP”), and Bureau of 
Economics (“BE”).  On the whole, the FTC’s structure of operating units has worked 
well.  External consultations revealed many instances in which other countries have 
emulated major elements of this structure.  Further, the FTC’s administrative structure 
and its organization of bureaus have proven to be highly adaptable and flexible.  New 
divisions or other subunits can be, and have been, created in response to changes in 
marketplace conditions or perceived agency needs.   
 
Consider two examples of how the agency has, in recent years, altered its 
structure to better address its mission.  In 2007, the agency altered BCP to form the 
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection out of the Division of Financial Practices, 
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which has enabled the FTC to better address consumer-related financial-privacy 
concerns, while also improving the focus on the other issues that remained in the 
Division of Financial Practices.  In 2008, the Bureau of Economics developed a research 
unit to oversee BE research that will have impacts across all areas of enforcement.   
 
B. Looking Ahead:  Significant Issues Involving the FTC’s Structure and 
Operations 
 
The FTC’s self-study consultations demonstrated that organizational adaptability 
and an ethic of continuous institutional improvement are major characteristics of good 
agency performance.  Several structural attributes of the FTC affect its success.  One 
involves the integration of competition and consumer protection missions within a single 
agency.  A related issue, which the dual mission especially implicates, is communication 
and coordination across agency components.  This is particularly important for the 
nonenforcement activities of the agency, which can be effective tools to shape policies 
across practice disciplines.  Another structural issue is the placement of economists 
within the agency.  A further significant structural issue is the proper role of 
administrative adjudication in the agency.   
 
Shared authority is a common condition of the FTC’s competition and consumer 
protection missions.  There are other federal agencies that address aspects of these 
missions, such as the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Food and Drug Administration, 
and the Federal Reserve Board.  However, the dual missions that fall under the “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” and “unfair methods of competition” standards within the 
FTC Act make this agency particularly well suited to address the interplay between 
consumer protection and competition.  The Commission’s capacity to meld expertise in 
economics, competition, and consumer protection is a conscious element of its 
institutional design and a major reason for its existence. 
       
A longstanding concern of students of public administration is the skill with 
which the individual components of an institution share information with each other and 
otherwise coordinate their activities.  The need to achieve effective intra-agency 
information flows and cooperation is a matter of particular importance for the FTC.  
Among other reasons, this is a function of the Commission’s dual-purpose mission and its 
portfolio of research capabilities and other policy instruments that may be used by 
multiple agency units.  Whether the agency is consistent in communicating the central 
tenets of the competition and consumer protection missions to agency staff and to outside 
stakeholders is an indicator of its likely success in achieving its mission. 
 
 Panelists and other commentators discussed ways to integrate the agency’s 
disciplines by means of nonenforcement resources.  Panelists and commentators have 
observed that the FTC can improve its performance by building stronger links among the 
bureaus and other offices, such as between competition and consumer protection staff, as 
well as by more completely integrating economists in all aspects of the agency’s work.2  
                                                 
2 Competition agencies routinely include economists on their staffs, and there are different ways to 
incorporate economists’ input into agency decision making.  Until recently, the FTC’s Bureau of 
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Some panelists suggested that a policy office could play a useful role in improving these 
links and disseminating important insights throughout the agency. 
 
Finally, under Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission may challenge unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition through administrative 
adjudication.  Roundtable panelists shared a variety of opinions about the administrative 
adjudicatory process, and many suggested modifications to modernize and make the 
system more effective.  Former General Counsel Stephen Calkins observed that 
elimination of the administrative adjudication feature would undermine the 
Commission’s special role.  Calkins explained:  “[O]ne of the alleged comparative 
advantages of the Commission is that it can be an adjudicative body.  And I do think that 
it is – it’s important for this agency to get it right, to make it work, because it’s one of the 
reasons we have a Federal Trade Commission.”3   
 
Other panelists suggested that federal courts are the proper forum for the FTC to 
pursue cases, as the process of having the FTC both issue the complaint and then become 
the appellate tribunal in the outcome creates an appearance problem.  Another criticism 
of FTC administrative adjudication involves the time it takes to complete the 
proceedings.  Panelists also discussed ALJ expertise in handling the types of 
administrative cases before them.4  Looking ahead, the agency should determine what 
role Part III adjudication should play in advancing competition and consumer protection 
law enforcement and policy.  In particular, the agency should consider when 
administrative adjudication is most appropriate, as well as ways to improve the 
adjudicatory process.5 
                                                                                                                                                 
Economics had a relatively unique position vis-à-vis economists at many other competition and consumer 
protection agencies in that the BE Director reports directly to the Chairman of the agency and makes 
recommendations directly to the full Commission.  As a result, economist input into enforcement and other 
decisions is not merely subsumed into recommendations controlled by attorneys or case handlers, as is the 
case at many other agencies.  More recently, a number of competition agencies have been adopting the BE 
organizational model and giving the office of the chief economist a direct reporting line to the agencies’ top 
leadership. 
3 Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 105-06.  Throughout this report, citations to “Tr.” refer to the various FTC at 100 
roundtable transcripts.  Participants are identified by last name; roundtables are identified by location. 
The agendas, biographies, transcripts, and other information relating to the FTC at 100 roundtables are 
available on the FTC’s website at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/index.shtm.  In addition, 
Appendix 1 to this report provides the identity and affiliation of the roundtable participants.  Appendix 2 
provides a list of the agencies, organizations, and individuals participating in FTC at 100 external 
consultations. 
4 It bears noting, however, that the ALJ selection process is dictated by government-wide requirements and 
not by FTC rules or policy. 
5 Presently, the rules governing Part III proceedings are in the process of being revised to address concerns 
over the speed of certain types of cases.  The proposed revised rules and comments are available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/P072104nprmpt3.pdf. 
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III. Agency Resources 
 
The FTC’s ability to achieve its mission depends in significant part on its 
allocation and management of personnel, capital, and information resources.  
 
A. Personnel 
 
How the FTC approaches recruiting, training, and retention of talented and 
competent personnel bears significantly on the agency’s ultimate success.  Given the 
evolution of competition and consumer protection policy, and changes in the tools of 
economic analysis, any agency self-assessment should consider how the agency can 
recruit and retain well-trained personnel in relevant areas of expertise, as well as how the 
agency trains and educates its existing staff to remain current in such areas.  External 
consultations yielded several recommendations on how to improve the recruiting, 
training, and retention of skilled professionals at the FTC.  For example, to offset the 
government/private sector pay disparity and recruit talented professionals, many panelists 
suggested that the FTC employ a combination of first-rate training and ample 
opportunities for staff to apply their skills and knowledge in interesting and innovative 
legal and policy areas. 
 
B. Capital Resources 
 
 In several respects, an agency’s budget dictates the deployment of its resources 
and thus dictates its ability to achieve its mission.  A well-planned and effective budget 
policy, including allocations within that budget, is essential for the success of any agency.  
The FTC’s budget must be able to strike a balance that both reflects agency priorities, as 
expressed to staff and external stakeholders, and is sufficiently flexible to respond to 
circumstances that require a shifting of budgetary priorities.  For example, allocation of 
BCP resources among the many tools with which it pursues its mission – including 
enforcement actions, rulemaking, consumer and business education, policy R&D efforts, 
and promotion of industry self-regulation – has shifted at different times to meet different 
agency needs. 
 
C. Information 
 
The Commission needs information to detect problems, investigate them, and 
then, through litigation or otherwise, address them.  The FTC’s effective use of personnel 
and capital resources is largely dependent on the information the agency is able to obtain 
regarding marketplace conduct, mergers and other transactions, and legal, economic, and 
technological developments. 
 
The agency, through its Consumer Response Center, receives and responds to 
thousands of consumer and business complaints or inquiries each week.  Complaints are 
made available to FTC staff and other law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and 
worldwide through the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, a secure online database that 
includes not only complaints received by the FTC, but also by other selected government 
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agencies and nongovernmental entities.  On the competition side, the agency gathers 
information about transactions and ongoing conduct in the marketplace primarily through 
specific statutory reporting requirements, including those established by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act.  The FTC also gathers information to detect and investigate possible law 
violations through complaints from, and inquiries directed to, competitors, suppliers, and 
consumers.  
 
Further, in both the competition and consumer protection areas, the agency gathers 
relevant industry and marketplace information by convening conferences, workshops, and 
hearings to address current and emerging issues in these areas.  Such events have become an 
important means through which the Commission and its staff identify problems and develop 
appropriate responses.  The agency also obtains information from other competition and 
consumer protection agencies, both foreign and domestic. 
 
 Of course, like other enforcement agencies, the FTC also has enforcement-related 
authority to issue compulsory process, such as subpoenas and civil investigative 
demands.  Apart from a particular investigation, however, the FTC also has unique 
powers to obtain information – in both competition and consumer protection matters – 
pursuant to Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, which enables it to conduct wide-ranging 
economic studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose.  Whether the FTC 
uses its 6(b) authority in a particular context depends on whether there are important 
policy topics that require investigation that could not be done with publicly available or 
voluntarily submitted data. 
 
IV. The Agency’s Relationships 
 
The FTC has important relationships with several types of outside entities.  These 
relationships impact the agency’s performance in various ways, and each requires a 
slightly different approach by the FTC to maintain the relationship.  Some relationships – 
such as those with Congress, consumers, and industry – involve interaction and 
communication regarding how the agency pursues its mission.  Some relationships – such 
as those with domestic and international agencies – involve coordination in law 
enforcement efforts.  Some relationships – such as those with domestic and international 
agencies and the academy – involve efforts by the FTC to research, develop, and promote 
sound competition and consumer protection policy.  In any case, the FTC can benefit 
from, and improve its effectiveness with, input from each of these stakeholders. 
 
Congress.  As an independent agency created by Congress, the FTC has an 
important relationship with Congress as an institution and with individual members of 
Congress.  Primarily through its Office of Congressional Relations, the FTC works 
closely with congressional committees and subcommittees, individual members, and their 
staffs, responding to inquiries regarding competition and consumer protection matters, 
testifying before congressional panels on FTC policies and programs, and preparing 
reports for Congress. 
 
 viii
A number of panelists stressed the importance of the FTC managing carefully its 
relationship with Congress.  One way to envision the FTC’s work is that its activities 
involve either accumulating political capital or spending political capital.  In choosing 
new programs, the agency must be attentive to the balance of its political capital account.  
An agency that chronically runs major deficits is likely headed for trouble. 
 
 Other Federal Agencies.  Due to the wide breadth of the FTC’s activities and 
overlapping jurisdiction in certain substantive areas of the law, the FTC has numerous 
policy and enforcement relationships with other federal government entities, including 
the Department of Justice, the federal banking regulators, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, and the United States Postal Inspection Service.  For example, relations 
with other federal agencies are important to the FTC’s consumer protection mission 
because of the overlapping jurisdiction that exists in certain areas (for example, the 
shared jurisdiction over consumer credit with the federal banking agencies) and the 
statutory law enforcement relationships in others (for example, the FTC’s dependence on 
the DOJ to pursue civil penalty cases). 
 
In the competition area, the FTC’s most central interagency relationship on the 
federal level is with the DOJ Antitrust Division.  The FTC and DOJ have significant 
overlapping jurisdiction with respect to antitrust enforcement and policy.  For example, 
the agencies share antitrust jurisdiction over most mergers and business conduct.  Given 
these overlaps, the two agencies have developed premerger and enforcement clearance 
and communication procedures to avoid duplicative enforcement in competition matters.  
For those within the ambit of both the FTC’s and DOJ’s enforcement jurisdictions, 
comity and consistency of views between the agencies is important because it provides 
certainty for consumers and market participants.  Also, it can allow the agencies to 
operate more efficiently.  Thus, as the FTC works to improve its performance, it should 
consider how to improve its relationship with the DOJ to enhance the clarity, 
transparency, and consistency of antitrust enforcement. 
 
 Through its advocacy program, the FTC advises other federal agencies across a 
wide array of areas, such as food labeling, lending practices, and energy regulation.  FTC 
staff also frequently consults informally with other federal agency staff.  Through these 
formal and informal consultations, the agency has been able not only to coordinate efforts 
with these agencies but also to influence their work – and secure assistance in the FTC’s 
work – in ways that benefit consumers and competition. 
 
 State Agencies.  As with federal agencies, the FTC engages with state enforcers 
and other state institutions to address overlapping issues in competition and consumer 
protection enforcement, as well as policy matters.  Comity with state antitrust and 
consumer protection agencies has become increasingly important given state involvement 
in many federal enforcement actions.  Today, the FTC often conducts investigations 
jointly with state attorneys general because both have an interest in the particular merger 
or conduct at issue.  On broad policy matters, the FTC often advises state legislatures and 
agencies through advocacy filings. 
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International Enforcement Agencies.  Building and maintaining strong bilateral 
relationships with foreign agencies is a critical element of the FTC’s programs, including 
its enforcement program.  Given the many important FTC cases involving foreign parties, 
foreign-located evidence or assets, or parallel review with other agencies, effective 
cooperation with agencies outside the United Sates is a necessity.  Strong personal 
relationships facilitate case cooperation and dialogue, making contact at a personal level 
an important factor in international cooperation. 
 
The Commission’s engagement with foreign governments on policy matters 
serves to inform the policy of other nations.  By describing how the U.S. agencies 
approach various issues, the FTC hopes to provide useful information for other nations to 
consider as they make their own choices regarding market-based or regulation-based 
approaches to policy questions.  In addition, given the importance of the exchange of 
ideas and strategies, these interactions with foreign counterparts can inform an agency’s 
domestic agenda and practices. 
 
Another important way in which the Commission works with foreign counterparts 
is by providing technical assistance to both younger and more mature competition and 
consumer protection agencies.  Technical assistance projects and programs can allow an 
agency to improve its relationships with foreign counterparts and provide a significant 
opportunity to engage in the type of export and import activity that promotes cooperation 
and convergence. 
 
Consumers and Consumer Groups.  Consumers are, of course, one of the key 
constituencies for the FTC.  How the agency relates to consumers – either directly or 
through various consumer and advocacy groups – is thus a significant factor in the 
agency’s ultimate success.  The agency’s direct interactions with consumers are largely 
limited to receiving complaints from consumers and issuing educational materials for use 
by consumers.  A significant means for relating to consumers is therefore through 
interactions with various consumer groups. 
 
Panelists stressed the importance of ensuring that the means by which the FTC 
provides its consumer information remain up-to-date.  This means understanding the 
different gradations or demographics of consumers, the information media on which they 
rely, and preparing the FTC message such that it can be understood in the appropriate 
format for the targeted consumer.   
 
In addition to getting its message out to consumers, the FTC must consider its 
(two-way) interactions with consumers and consumer groups.  Panelists discussed how 
greater transparency of agency decision making and the inclusion of interested groups in 
the process would help in making FTC actions more effective.  Panelists suggested that 
having liaisons within the agency to facilitate communication with consumer groups and 
industry would be a sensible step toward building relationships with these constituencies. 
 
Market Participants.  Industry stakeholders rely on the FTC for information and 
guidance on competition and consumer protection enforcement, regulation, and policy.  
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In turn, the agency can benefit in its work from the insight, expertise, and cooperation of 
industry groups.  Panelists discussed whether the FTC offers useful guidance, whether it 
gathers industry views and suggestions – for example, through public workshops and 
hearings – and whether it coordinates effectively with industry, where appropriate.  
 
Academia.  Finally, several panelists stressed the importance of reaching out to 
the academic community to spur research in areas of interest to the FTC, which can 
expand the agency’s research resources as well as benefit the participating academics.  
Although outside academics have been useful in certain agency initiatives, panelists 
expressed some concern that FTC issues are either little known or underappreciated by 
the larger academic community.  Thus, research and work that is valuable for purposes of 
the agency’s enforcement efforts may not be appreciated by all members of the academic 
research community. 
 
V. Agency Leadership, Strategic Planning, and Policy R&D 
 
Agency leadership must motivate the staff to pursue the agency’s mission, both 
by clearly communicating that mission to staff and by listening to staff’s input on how 
best to achieve the mission.  Strategic planning allows the agency to identify competition 
and consumer protection problems on the horizon, as well as determine which tool or 
tools with which to address such problems.  Policy R&D is a necessary foundation for 
tackling the challenging competition and consumer protection policy issues that the 
agency has been tasked with addressing.  The FTC’s efforts in these three areas – 
leadership, planning, and research – significantly impact the agency’s ability to deploy its 
resources in an effective manner. 
 
A. Leadership 
  
Effective leadership at the top of the agency sets the tone for how the staff 
executes the agency’s mission.  Effective leadership involves not only understanding the 
agency mission, structure, and the interests of key stakeholders, but also communicating 
the mission and priorities to agency staff to motivate them to carry out the mission of the 
agency effectively over time.  Agency leadership also affects employee morale, which 
often dictates agency success.   
 
B. Strategic Planning 
 
Strategic planning at a government agency involves more than just a 
determination of how insightfully to identify and understand problems that arise, but also 
a determination of how to pick the right tool or right collection of tools (or even the right 
sequencing of tools) to use to address such problems.  In the case of the FTC, the agency 
must decide, for example, whether to issue guidelines, bring a case, create rules, or hold 
public consultations to address the various competition and consumer protection 
problems that it faces. 
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External consultations confirmed the importance of strategic planning to the 
success of this, or any other, agency.  Former Chairman Timothy Muris explained that it 
is insufficient to have a core mission and to define it well; the agency needs a strategy to 
implement it.  That strategy requires continual new thinking and innovation.6  In addition 
to innovation, roundtable panelists identified policy continuity as another important goal 
of strategic planning.  Former General Counsel Debra Valentine framed the relevant 
inquiry as follows:  “How can you keep an acute sense of the past and the evolving trends 
so that you can try to keep some strategies going through time, notwithstanding the 
inevitable impulse of the next gang to really want to leave their mark?”7  U.K. Office of 
Fair Trading (“OFT”) Chief Executive John Fingleton explained that the governance 
structure of the OFT provides “a certain type of continuity,” as the OFT’s Board is 
responsible for setting long-term strategy for the agency, rather than making individual 
enforcement and policy decisions, which is left to the Executive.8 
 
The goal of policy continuity, however, does not imply inflexibility in strategic 
planning.  Several panelists emphasized the importance of building flexibility into any 
strategic planning efforts.  The Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission, Peter 
Freeman, characterized the need for flexibility as follows:  “[A]s the Duke of Wellington 
has said, ‘time spent on reconnaissance was seldom wasted.’  Also, I think he said words 
to the effect of ‘all plans collapse on first contact with the enemy.’”9  Strategic planning, 
Freeman continued, “cannot be too rigid and it cannot be too binding.  [B]ut everything 
we do should take place . . . against a background of priorities and policy 
consciousness.”10 
 
The Commission’s strategic planning efforts include specific enforcement and 
policy agendas brought to the agency by Chairmen, Commissioners, and senior staff; the 
strategic planning done pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act and 
various other reporting requirements; and senior staff retreats that the Commission has 
held for more than a decade.  Other examples of strategic planning include “policy 
review sessions,” which were used in the 1970s and 1980s to permit the Commission 
members and staff to discuss significant policy issues.  The Commission recently revived 
this custom in 2008 to discuss how the Commission might address various issues 
concerning the financial crisis. 
 
Recommendations for future FTC strategic planning offered by roundtable 
panelists addressed, among other things, the level at which such planning should take 
place.  Former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein recommended that the FTC engage in 
agency-wide – not just bureau-by-bureau – strategic planning because it would 
“energize” both BCP and BC by letting each bureau see what the other’s ideas are.  This 
                                                 
6 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 20-21. 
7 Valentine, London Tr. at 85. 
8 Fingleton, London Tr. at 86. 
9 Freeman, London Tr. at 80. 
10 Id. at 83-84. 
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would address the concern Bernstein has with the Balkanization of the agency into 
bureaus or even divisions that do not communicate with each other.11  Further, several 
panelists stressed the importance of including outside entities – including state agencies, 
congressional staff, consumer groups, and industry – in the planning process in order to 
anticipate where the next controversy will be, get relevant information from key 
stakeholders, and gauge how much support the agency will have to take action in a given 
area. 
 
External consultations revealed several examples of strategic planning undertaken 
at other competition and consumer protection agencies.  For example, the U.K. OFT has a 
dedicated “strategy and planning team,” which is engaged in all parts of strategic 
planning development and implementation to help ensure consistency across the agency.  
The European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition implements its 
strategic planning in part through the use of a peer review system designed to foster intra-
agency debate concerning particular matters.  The Canadian Competition Bureau recently 
has engaged in a process that involves an environmental scan – including a review of 
sector and marketplace developments to identify potential problems relevant to each of its 
branches – that feeds directly into the agency’s agenda setting. 
 
C. Policy Research and Development 
 
Policy research and development plays an important role at the FTC.  An agency 
that intends to be thoughtful and to consider its policy actions seriously must have some 
ability to analyze the trade-offs inherent in any policy choice.  That capability can be 
developed through, among other means, academic-style research, information gathering 
and report writing, and conferences and workshops that bring together elements from 
business, government, consumer representatives, and the bar to discuss issues related to 
competition and consumer protection policy and law.   
 
The FTC has a mandate to undertake certain forms of research based on Section 6 
of the FTC Act and the historical report-writing activity of its predecessor entity, the 
Bureau of Corporations.  That mandate differentiates the FTC from most other antitrust 
or consumer protection agencies in the world.  From its inception, the FTC carried on a 
general investigative function that complemented its law enforcement activities.  The 
results of the investigations were compiled in reports that were intended to shed light on 
various questionable business practices of the day.  That activity was the precursor of 
what is now thought of as research and policy R&D at the FTC. 
 
1. Goals Served by Policy R&D 
 
Apart from the primary purpose of answering specific research questions, the 
FTC, including its several components, undertakes research for a number of reasons.  
Research and policy R&D is undertaken to improve agency decision making in specific 
areas, such as law enforcement, rulemaking, and competition and consumer protection 
                                                 
11 Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 43. 
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advocacy.  Research activities often allow the agency to develop ways to better analyze 
problems that can be used in antitrust or consumer policy settings.  Doing such analysis 
in a law enforcement or litigation environment often is difficult or impossible; doing it in 
a research environment is thus necessary. 
 
Research topics often allow the agency to gain a better understanding of 
industries, including those, such as energy and health care, which feature prominently in 
the agency’s law enforcement agenda.  For example, the agency’s gasoline and diesel 
price monitoring project allows the agency to track changes over time in price-cost 
margins and to notice anomalies in prices in various cities or regions.  Although checking 
for such anomalies is now routine, this effort initially was a policy R&D project.  Other 
R&D projects are designed to gain information about industries that the agency expects 
to be important in its future enforcement and policy efforts. 
 
Policy R&D efforts at the FTC also serve the important purpose of scanning the 
horizon for future competition and consumer problem areas.  The agency gathers relevant 
industry and marketplace information by convening conferences, workshops, and 
hearings to address current and emerging competition and consumer protection issues.  
Such events have become an important means through which the Commission and its 
staff identify problems and develop appropriate responses. 
 
  2. Setting a Research Agenda 
 
Given the prominent role of policy research and development at the FTC, having 
a systematic means for identifying and planning relevant research is imperative.  
Historically, ideas for research topics from within the FTC have come from many 
sources.  Several studies have been essentially staff-initiated; many have been projects 
promoted by the agency Chairman or the Commission; and others have been sponsored 
by multiple bureaus.  It is often difficult to identify a single source of a research idea.  
Often the specific ideas come from staff, but with encouragement from agency leaders 
who may have identified general areas for investigation.  Other times, ideas for studies 
follow from previous projects.  In other instances, congressional interest, if not a direct 
congressional request, might instigate a study. 
 
FTC research ideas have come from a variety of sources.  During the past few 
years, a large portion of the research work has been generated by presidential or 
congressional requests for examinations of various competition and consumer protection 
issues.  Beyond these external requests, much recent FTC research has been initiated or 
developed by the agency’s Chairs, by non-Chairman Commissioners, and, as has been 
true throughout the history of the FTC, by the staff. 
 
There are several steps in the research process, including defining the broad topic 
areas of interest for research, generating interesting, policy-relevant, and achievable ideas 
within a topic area, and producing and monitoring the research.  In the recent past, these 
tasks largely have been handled within each economic or legal organization within the 
agency.  In principle, these tasks could be accomplished either in such a decentralized 
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manner or through a more systematic, centralized process involving the simultaneous 
collection of research ideas from multiple sources, coordination of topic choices, and then 
monitoring of output. 
 
Some roundtable panelists discussed the policy R&D process and suggested rather 
different approaches.  Former BE Director Michael Salinger, for instance, argued that 
combining the agency’s policy groups might be sensible, but that the Bureau of 
Economics research work should remain independent of the legal policy shops and that 
the research process should remain decentralized.12  In contrast, two former heads of 
legal policy shops, Susan DeSanti13 and Joseph Kattan,14 favored a more centralized 
approach under which ideas from a wide variety of sources would be vetted early and 
production would be centrally controlled through an agency-wide committee.  The goals 
of such an approach would be better to control the chosen topics – for example, to select 
projects that relate more closely with current enforcement or advocacy priorities – and to 
coordinate resource deployment across several relatively autonomous groups. 
 
VI. Deployment of Agency Resources 
 
A. General Issues Involving Resource Allocation 
 
An agency’s allocation of its scarce resources undoubtedly is one of the most 
significant determinants of its ultimate success.  Once it identifies a desired outcome – 
for example, a reduction in the number of deceptive weight-loss claims – a successful 
agency will make optimal use of its tools to achieve that outcome.  The FTC has several 
tools available to pursue its mission.  These tools include law enforcement, first and 
foremost; however, they also include many other options – such as advocacy, education, 
policy research and development, and rulemaking – that can be more effective than 
enforcement in many circumstances.  Resource allocation, then, is to a large extent a 
matter of picking the right tool or tools from the FTC’s existing arsenal – or adding new 
tools to that arsenal – to best address the matter at hand. 
 
B. The FTC’s Many Resource Deployment Options 
 
1. Law Enforcement/Litigation 
 
The FTC’s law enforcement authority encompasses both consumer protection and 
antitrust.  In allocating resources to its law enforcement efforts, the agency should first 
consider the goals that underlie such efforts.  Among the most important goals of the 
FTC’s law enforcement mission are providing guidance to industry, developing sound 
law, and obtaining consumer redress.  Deterrence of unlawful conduct, however, is the 
lodestar of the agency’s law enforcement efforts. 
 
                                                 
12 Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 168-69. 
13 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 128-31, 153. 
14 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 167-68. 
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Perhaps the most important consideration in evaluating the enforcement efforts of 
the FTC is its case selection.  Such evaluation should consider where the agency decides 
to focus its enforcement efforts.  For example, should that focus be where potential 
consumer benefits and/or redress are largest?  Should the focus be on areas involving the 
greatest amount of commerce?  How much of the agency’s enforcement efforts should be 
devoted to developing or clarifying competition and consumer protection doctrine? 
 
Another relevant factor in selecting cases is the litigation risk attendant to 
pursuing any given case.  In the various external consultations, there was a fairly uniform 
view that the agency ought to be less risk-averse in bringing cases.  Other considerations 
in evaluating the agency’s law enforcement efforts include the amount and type of case 
generation in which the agency engages, the appropriate number of cases to pursue at any 
given time, and the proper forum – administrative or judicial – for bringing cases. 
 
2. Policy Research and Development 
 
As discussed above, policy research and development at the FTC includes a broad 
array of activities designed to inform the agency’s pursuit of its competition and 
consumer protection missions.  These activities include workshops, hearings, studies, 
reports, and ex post assessments of agency initiatives and actions.  Consultations with 
various outside parties and representatives from other competition and consumer 
protection agencies identified significant support for the FTC’s allocation of resources to 
its policy R&D efforts. 
 
3. Advocacy 
 
As an important complement to its law enforcement mission, the FTC engages in 
competition and consumer protection advocacy before other policymakers, including 
state legislatures, regulatory boards, and officials; state and federal courts; other federal 
agencies; and professional organizations, such as bar associations.  In response to 
requests or where public comments are sought, the FTC issues advocacy letters, 
comments, and amicus briefs, providing policymakers with a framework to analyze 
competition and consumer protection issues raised by pending governmental actions or 
ongoing judicial disputes.  Advocacy can play a particularly important role in addressing 
governmentally imposed restraints on competition, where other tools may be unavailable.  
There was strong support among those consulted for the FTC’s advocacy efforts. 
 
4. Rulemaking 
 
 The Commission’s strongest policymaking tool, in addition to litigation, is 
rulemaking.  In 1975, Congress granted the Commission express authority to issue 
substantive rules, referred to as Magnuson-Moss rulemaking, which requires more 
complex procedures than those needed for rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).  During the past 15 years, 17 rules have been promulgated by 
the Commission, and several existing rules have been amended.  In addition, three new 
rulemaking proceedings are in progress.  Most new rules have been enacted based on 
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specific statutes that authorized the use of APA rulemaking procedures.  Also during the 
past 15 years, the Commission has made regulatory review and reform a high priority.  
Recognizing that over time some rules may become obsolete or unnecessary or simply 
need updating in light of new technologies and marketing techniques, the FTC initiated a 
program to review its rules at least once every 10 years. 
 
5. Guidelines, Guides, and Advisory Opinions 
 
To promote transparency and encourage compliance with the law, the FTC issues 
guidelines, typically in conjunction with the DOJ Antitrust Division, to provide guidance 
regarding the application of the U.S. antitrust laws.  These guidelines explain competition 
policy in specific areas, such as horizontal merger review, collaborations among 
competitors, licensing of intellectual property, and health care. 
 
A central issue involving agency guidelines is one of timing – including the 
appropriate times at which to issue and, if necessary, update any given set of guidelines.  
Former BC Project Director for Intellectual Property Hillary Greene identified the 
“central tension” in formulating guidelines as follows: waiting until there is a sufficient 
consensus in any particular area of the law, on the one hand, and providing certainty and 
guidance in such area of the law, on the other hand.15 
 
 Industry guides, which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, or 
C.F.R., have become a vehicle to inform businesses how the Commission would apply 
Section 5 of the FTC Act in specific situations.  Industry guides are advisory in nature – 
that is, they are not an independent basis for enforcement actions, and violations do not 
give rise to civil penalties.  However, they serve to inform businesses about practices that 
could be considered unfair or deceptive.  Industry guides typically focus on particular 
problematic practices in advertising, marketing, or labeling.  Promulgation of guides does 
not require formal rulemaking proceedings, but, in recent years, the Commission has 
solicited public comments, and may hold a hearing or workshop, before adopting or 
substantively amending guides.  Like rules, industry guides are subject to review every 
10 years.   
 
The FTC’s efforts at providing guidance to industry also include advisory 
opinions concerning proposed conduct provided in response to requests for advice.  On 
the competition side, BC staff render so-called advisory opinions, which often involve 
issues in the health care field.  On the consumer protection side, BCP staff render so-
called staff opinion letters, which typically address proposed interpretations of FTC rules 
and regulations.  Commission advisory opinions, which are issued relatively infrequently, 
are intended to address substantial or novel questions of fact or law or subjects of 
significant interest. 
                                                 
15 Greene, Boston Tr. at 31. 
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6. Consumer and Business Education 
 
During the past 20 years, educating consumers and businesses about their rights 
and responsibilities in the marketplace has become an increasingly important part of 
fulfilling the agency’s consumer protection mission.  Enforcement efforts to combat fraud 
are enhanced by informing consumers how to recognize and avoid becoming victims of 
fraudulent marketing practices.  For example, educating consumers not to respond to 
emails that “phish” for financial account information can be a more effective tool to 
combat this practice than bringing successive enforcement actions against numerous 
perpetrators.  Educating businesses about their legal obligations under a variety of FTC 
rules enhances compliance, and to that end, the Commission issues clear, plain-language 
guides – in print and on video – that pose numerous examples of required or prohibited 
conduct.  External consultations yielded widespread expressions of support for the 
agency’s consumer and business education efforts in the consumer protection area. 
 
7. Encouragement of Appropriate Industry Self-Regulation 
 
Meaningful self-regulation is an important complement to the Commission’s law 
enforcement efforts – particularly in the area of deceptive marketing practices.  For 
example, the program administered by the National Advertising Division/National 
Advertising Review Council arm of the Council of Better Business Bureaus has worked 
well to obviate the need for Commission action in some instances.  In cases where the 
process does not reach a successful conclusion, the matter is referred to the Commission 
with much of the underlying investigative work already accomplished.  In addition, self-
regulatory programs have been helpful in areas – such as food and entertainment products 
– where the Commission has advocated seller restraint in promotions directed to children. 
 
8. Partnership and Outreach with Domestic Agencies 
 
Another important tool available to the FTC is outreach to domestic agencies.  
The Commission’s engagement with domestic agencies involves efforts on both the 
policy level, including advocacy, as well as enforcement cooperation, facilitated by the 
Commission’s broad authority to share with domestic law enforcement agencies 
nonpublic information otherwise subject to prohibitions on disclosure.  Enforcement 
cooperation can facilitate the Commission’s own investigation, where a federal or state 
agency shares expertise or provides investigative assistance.  It also can leverage the 
Commission’s limited resources, by enlisting other agencies in undertaking efforts that 
advance the FTC’s mission.  The FTC often seeks to maximize its enforcement impact on 
the consumer protection side by coordinating “sweeps” – multiple legal actions filed at or 
near the same time by multiple authorities.  Cooperation with domestic (and foreign) 
enforcement agencies is an integral component of these sweeps. 
 
9. International Partnerships and Outreach 
 
The FTC recognizes that a competition and consumer protection agency cannot 
limit its activity or vision to its own borders, and thus devotes significant efforts to 
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international activity, coordinated by its Office of International Affairs.  As with the 
Commission’s dealings with domestic agencies, these efforts include engagement on 
policy initiatives and practices as well as enforcement cooperation.  An important 
component of the policy engagement, mentioned above, is the FTC’s technical assistance 
program. 
 
To obtain the most results from its engagement with foreign enforcers, both in 
bilateral and multilateral contexts, an agency with an effective international program 
develops short-, medium-, and long-term strategies that guide participation in these fora, 
with a clear idea about when the agency wants to take a leadership role and when the 
agency plans to take a more passive or “importing” role.  The best-designed program 
identifies areas for teaching, and those for learning, recognizing that the two roles are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
On the enforcement side, the Commission’s work with its foreign counterparts 
facilitates its ability to obtain meaningful and timely cooperation from foreign 
counterparts for FTC-generated investigations and litigation matters.  Another critical 
dimension is the agency’s ability to influence the enforcement agenda and priorities of a 
foreign agency through notifications, consultations, and other bilateral mechanisms.  A 
third dimension is the FTC’s capacity to provide assistance, in appropriate cases, to 
foreign authorities when they request the FTC’s assistance or refer complaints involving 
U.S. businesses. 
 
PART 3:  MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FTC ACTIONS 
 
VII. Measuring Agency Effectiveness 
 
When assessing the characteristics of agency output, the FTC should stay focused 
on how its actions impact consumer welfare.  Unlike agencies that produce a readily 
measurable output directly to consumers, however, the vast majority of FTC actions are 
not aimed at consumers directly, but rather toward parties – typically business and 
sometimes government – in an effort to stop conduct and mergers that threaten to harm 
consumers.16  For example, the FTC sues businesses for taking actions that violate the 
consumer protection and competition laws and engages in advocacy with governments to 
discourage anticompetitive regulation.  Thus, there is an indirect link between FTC action 
and changes in consumer welfare: the FTC helps consumers primarily through its ability 
to reduce the occurrence of conduct that violates consumer protection or antitrust laws or 
otherwise reduces consumer welfare. 
                                                 
16 Consumer education is an exception to this characterization.  Unlike in the case of antitrust violations, 
consumers can take actions to reduce the probability of becoming a victim of fraud and deception.  Thus, 
targeting messages directly to consumers to inform them of these actions can reduce the occurrence of 
fraud and deception.  
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A. Direct Measurements of Welfare 
 
Given widespread acceptance of the FTC’s consumer-focused mission, direct 
measurement of the increase in consumer welfare as a result of FTC actions would be 
ideal.  As a practical matter, direct measurement of welfare effects entails comparing 
price and output in the relevant markets before and after the FTC action.  For example, 
consumers pay higher prices and purchase fewer goods or services than they otherwise 
would in the case of an antitrust violation.  As a result, consumers suffer direct financial 
losses, and also forego the satisfaction they could have received from additional 
purchases, had the price been set at the competitive level.  Of course, events unassociated 
with FTC actions also affect cost and demand conditions and, hence, observed prices.  To 
isolate welfare changes resulting from the FTC’s competition and consumer protection 
actions, it is important to control for other factors that also affect market outcomes and 
that occurred during a similar time frame. 
 
Several panelists addressed the promise and problems associated with direct 
measurement of market outcomes after FTC action in the context of merger 
retrospectives.  Because mergers make up a large portion of the FTC’s competition 
caseload, the ability to evaluate the effect of mergers on consumers would go a long way 
toward direct evaluation of the FTC’s competition program.  Panelists, however, spoke 
extensively about the limitations of such studies, identifying significant methodological 
and data constraints.  Proponents of merger retrospectives argued that they need not all be 
price-focused, state-of-the-art empirical projects, but rather they can be useful if they 
provide replicable measures of postmerger performance on any of several dimensions. 
 
B. Proxies for Direct Welfare Measurements 
 
When direct measurement is not feasible, it is necessary to look for proxies for the 
impact of FTC actions on consumers, such as the outcome of enforcement actions; the 
direct impact, deterrent effect, and precedential value of these actions; the FTC’s 
intellectual leadership; the guidance and transparency provided by the FTC to businesses 
and consumers; and the burdens the FTC places on industry.  
 
Some proxies have a closer nexus with welfare changes than others.  The raw 
number of cases brought is at best a limited metric to evaluate FTC enforcement actions.  
Further, a focus on the number or percentage of wins is likely to be similarly 
uninformative – a large number of wins, for example, is likely to signal that the 
Commission is bringing only easy cases and that more problematic conduct remains 
underdeterred.  Rather, evaluators should pay attention to the extent to which the FTC is 
bringing the proper mix of cases to maximize its positive impact on consumer welfare.  
This mix will include cases in large markets that vindicate substantial consumer interests 
in the short run and also include cases that are likely to have large, long-run deterrent and 
precedential value.  Determining the optimal mix of cases to use as a benchmark for the 
actual mix of cases is likely to be somewhat subjective. 
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Empirical study of the relationship between FTC enforcement (and other) actions 
and market outcomes may guide this endeavor.  For example, evaluating the deterrence 
effects of enforcement actions targeting anticompetitive conduct may yield useful 
information to guide future enforcement efforts.  Because consumers can take actions to 
reduce the incidence of fraud and deception, consumer education can be an effective 
adjunct to enforcement in promoting consumer protection.  Evaluating the success of 
consumer education in reducing fraud and deception may be difficult in every 
circumstance, but a few carefully designed studies may provide valuable information.   
 
 FTC actions also should be evaluated to determine whether they demonstrate 
intellectual leadership in the areas of competition and consumer protection policy.  
Commission cases can lead the way in developing legal norms.  Further, it is important 
for the FTC to engage in competition and consumer protection policy R&D to calibrate 
the fit between FTC actions and consumer welfare and to inform courts and policymakers 
in their decisions.  The extent to which courts, policymakers, and academics follow the 
FTC’s lead in these areas is an important evaluative criterion.  Educating the public and 
policymakers on the benefits of competition also is important.  Thus, any evaluation 
should measure the extent to which consumers use FTC competition-promoting materials 
and the extent to which FTC advocacy influences policy outcomes.   
 
The external community values guidance from the FTC, and the agency should 
strive to make decisions more transparent to improve policy determinations.  The FTC  
can provide such guidance and transparency through guidelines, industry guides, 
advocacy, speeches, and other domestic and international outreach that inform the 
relevant external constituencies about the FTC’s current thinking in certain areas.  Any 
evaluation of FTC actions should ask whether the FTC adequately publicizes its actions 
and whether it effectively conveys policy norms to industry, the courts, and other 
constituencies. 
  
Evaluations of FTC output also should measure the extent to which FTC actions 
place unreasonable costs on the business community, both in terms of money and time.  
Such measurement will inform Congress, industry, and the public and also likely will 
enhance internal incentives to reduce burdens the FTC places on businesses.  When 
developing a metric, it is important to develop appropriate benchmarks for both financial 
and time burdens, which are likely to vary by action.  For example, it should consider the 
appropriate time to process investigations or from filing an administrative complaint until 
a final Commission decision. 
 
 C. Responsiveness to Core Constituencies 
 
Finally, being open and responsive to core constituencies’ concerns is crucial.  
Absent external support for its mission over time, the FTC cannot operate effectively.  At 
the same time, it is important to distinguish between cultivating external support for the 
mission by demonstrating a willingness to take seriously constituency concerns, and 
attempting to garner unanimous support for every agency action.  Further, the agency 
should be cognizant of the potential tension between intellectual leadership and 
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responsiveness to constituency demands.  When these circumstances arise, the FTC can 
ameliorate this tension by engaging in outreach to develop support from its constituencies 
for its policies.  
 
PART 4:  CHAIRMAN’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The report concludes with a set of recommendations for consideration by future 
leaders of the FTC.  The recommendations correspond to the review of the institutional 
arrangements by which the Commission performs its responsibilities (discussed in 
Chapters I-VI), as well as the means for measuring the effectiveness of the agency’s 
performance (discussed in Chapter VII).  It is hoped that the process used for this self-
assessment not only has illuminated ways to improve the Federal Trade Commission but 
also has supplied a template for future self-assessment exercises. 
PART 1:  INTRODUCTION BY CHAIRMAN KOVACIC 
 
The Rationale for a Self-Assessment 
 
Albert Cummins was one of the chief sponsors of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act of 1914.  In the weeks before the passage of the legislation that would create the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), Cummins predicted that the new 
agency “will be found to be the most efficient protection to the people of the United 
States that Congress has ever given the people by way of a regulation of commerce.”1  A 
few years from now, the FTC will reach the one hundredth anniversary of the statute that 
gave it life.  How well is the agency fulfilling the destiny that Congress foresaw for it in 
1914?  What type of institution should the Commission aspire to be when the agency’s 
second century begins in 2014? 
 
Over the past seven months, the FTC has conducted a self-assessment to consider 
these and other basic questions about the agency’s future direction.  Two aims motivated 
this initiative.  The first is to ask what the FTC must do to continue the valuable work 
that the agency performs today and to identify steps the agency must take to do still better 
in the future.  The focus of this exercise is an agency that is one of the great success 
stories in the modern history of public administration.  In the late 1960s, the 
Commission’s performance attracted scalding criticism that raised doubts about its 
continued existence.2  Forty years later, the agency stands in the front ranks of the 
world’s competition policy and consumer protection institutions.   
 
None of this happened by chance.  One crucial ingredient was the tireless 
commitment and strenuous labors of our attorneys, economists, and administrative 
professionals.  Another was superior leadership that saw the way to greatness.  Yet even 
more significant was the acceptance, in the face of crisis and in moments of success, of a 
culture that understood that the development of a superior institution demanded a 
willingness to ask the hardest questions about the agency’s purposes and performance.  
Good policy results are not suspended in air.  They emerge from and rest upon a structure 
of institutional arrangements that are the product of statutory design and administrative 
implementation.3  These arrangements encompass the organizational form of the FTC, 
formal rules that govern its operation, and informal customs or norms of behavior that 
                                                 
1 51 CONG. REC. 14,770 (1914). 
2 This episode is recounted in William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional 
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: An Historical Perspective, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A 
VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 63 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds., 1987). 
3 Recent decades have featured major contributions to the literature that focus on the role of institutions in 
shaping economic policy results.  Much of this work has been developed by Douglass North and other 
scholars associated with what is known as the “New Institutional Economics” (NIE).  See DOUGLASS C. 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
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have developed within the agency.4  The FTC learned long ago that it is impossible to 
deliver the equivalent of broadband quality policy content over dial-up institutions. 
 
The urgency to revisit fundamental questions about the possibilities for 
institutional improvements stems from several sources.  The policymaking challenges to 
the Commission grow ever more demanding.  In carrying out its competition and 
consumer protection responsibilities, the agency confronts some of the most difficult 
issues of economic policy.  The FTC’s success in a variety of initiatives – whether in 
protecting the privacy of the home through the Do-Not-Call Rule, striking down 
unnecessary barriers to rivalry in professional services, preparing reports that shape 
public debate or legislative deliberations about intellectual property, or contributing to the 
formation of networks that help promote international agreement on superior techniques 
– has created high expectations about the Commission’s capacity to respond to these 
challenges.  The agency’s experience in undertaking these and other measures has shown 
that the pursuit of sensible policy solutions requires an unrelenting search for better 
practices. 
 
 A further motivation to revisit basic questions is the example of our foreign 
counterparts.  The world today is a vastly different place than it was when the FTC 
opened its doors nearly one hundred years ago.  To be effective, an agency must account 
for the ever-growing international dimension of commerce.  The intensification of cross-
border economic integration has deeply affected consumer and business behavior and 
significantly influenced how the Commission and its foreign counterparts seek to 
accomplish their competition and consumer protection missions.    
 
This is an unparalleled era of institutional experimentation and reform in the 
fields of competition policy and consumer protection.  We have much to learn from what 
happens outside our borders.  Within the past decade, some of our more experienced 
counterparts – for example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(“ACCC”), the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) in the 
United Kingdom, the Directorate for Competition (“DG Comp”) and the Directorate for 
Health and Consumer Affairs (“DG SANCO”) in the European Commission (“EC”), the 
Conseil de la Concurrence in France, the Cabinet Office in Japan, and the Competition 
Bureau of Canada – have undertaken a basic examination of key elements of their 
authority, organization, and operations. 
 
For example, in the consumer protection area, two of the most striking examples 
are Australia’s efforts to restructure its entire consumer policy framework and Japan’s 
ongoing examination and reorganization of governmental consumer protection 
                                                 
4 “Norms” are consensus views about how members of an organization or group ought to behave.  Robert 
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 215, 218 (1994).  Unlike commands embodied in formal legal rules, norms consist of customs 
that members of a group develop voluntarily and follow.  See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 
49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177 (1999) (providing survey of modern legal and economic literature on norms).  The 
role of norms in determining how public officials enforce legal commands is examined in Dan M. Kahan, 
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
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institutions.  In Australia, the Productivity Commission, an independent research and 
advisory body, released a comprehensive report in May 2008 – based on nearly two years 
of consultations and analysis – on ways to improve the consumer policy framework to 
empower consumers, harmonize and coordinate consumer policy across Australian 
federal, state, and territorial jurisdictions, and avoid unnecessary duplication and 
increases in regulation.5  The Productivity Commission recommended the introduction of 
a single generic consumer law applying across Australia as well as the transfer of 
regulatory responsibility in several areas, including consumer credit, to Australia’s 
federal regulators.  In October, the Council of Australian Governments (“COAG”) 
adopted many of the Productivity Commission’s recommendations, and implementation 
is underway.6  In Japan, following a spate of consumer food safety incidents, a 
governmental panel delivered a report to the Prime Minister in June 2008 that 
recommended transferring overall responsibility for consumer protection matters from 
several different agencies to a new consumer agency that will come under the auspices of 
the Cabinet Office.7  Since then, the government submitted a bill to the Japanese Diet to 
establish a new Consumer Affairs Agency, which is currently under review. 
 
Over the past decade or so, several of the member states of the European Union 
(“EU”) have undertaken major programs of institutional renewal.  In the United 
Kingdom, the government engaged in extensive legal reform starting with the 1998 
Competition Act, which introduced EC-style competition prohibitions into U.K. law, and 
the 2002 Enterprise Act, which created, among other things, a new governance structure 
for the OFT involving a board comprised of executive and nonexecutive directors.  
Following these legal changes, the OFT established a unit to engage in market studies 
and advocacy in 2002.  In 2006, informed by outside evaluations, the OFT dismantled the 
division of labor along competition and consumer lines into sectoral market-facing areas, 
supported by specialist teams such as strategy and planning and evaluation, and internal 
back-of-house areas.  As the result of an extensive review of its competition policy 
system, France soon will implement structural reforms that will establish a single 
competition authority from the two French agencies that currently share competition 
policy responsibilities. 
 
The European Commission’s DG Comp also has engaged in a major restructuring 
effort in this decade.  Several losses in merger cases in 2002 inspired DG Comp to 
examine itself and undertake widespread reforms.  The changes focused on defining 
activity by market concepts and industry knowledge, introducing more transparency and 
reducing hierarchy, providing for more flexibility in staff movement around the agency, 
                                                 
5 The Productivity Commission’s report is available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport.  A summary of the key points is 
available at http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/consumer/docs/finalreport/keypoints.  
6 A communiqué dated October 2, 2008 from the COAG describing these developments is available at 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2008-10-02/index.cfm#regulat. 
7 Consultation with Cabinet Office of Japan, Sept. 19, 2008.  See also Policy Speech by Prime Minister of 
Japan Taro Aso to the 170th Session of the Diet (Sept. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/asospeech/2008/09/29housin_e.html. 
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and engaging case teams in internal peer reviews to improve the quality of enforcement 
actions.  DG SANCO has conducted several forward-looking workshops and simulations 
to identify the key challenges it will face in the future, and to identify what skills, tools, 
internal processes, and working methods it needs to develop to meet those challenges.8 
 
Newer agencies in such countries as Brazil, El Salvador, Hungary, Mexico, 
Singapore, South Africa, and South Korea also are exploring major institutional 
improvements.  Two interesting examples in the consumer protection area are El 
Salvador and South Korea.  In El Salvador, the consumer agency, the Defensoría del 
Consumidor, prepared a report that elevated consumer issues to the equivalent of 
“Cabinet-level” by developing a National System for Consumer Protection, composed of 
the Defensoría and representatives of the executive branch and other government 
institutions, to coordinate consumer protection issues.9  In South Korea, the Korean 
Consumer Protection Board, which was a quasi-governmental entity, has merged with the 
Korean Fair Trade Commission, a governmental competition authority, enhancing the 
state’s support for consumer policy and enforcement missions and linking consumer and 
competition issues structurally.  On the competition side, the Netherlands Competition 
Authority (“NMa”) has engaged in a more sophisticated balance of its various tools and 
enforcement instruments, focusing on risk-oriented enforcement action on a proportional 
scale and more on market studies, with less engagement in markets in which there are 
little or no problems and in which none are expected to arise, as well as additional efforts 
directed at informational campaigns, guidance, and compliance programs. 
 
The determination of our foreign counterparts, old and new, to benchmark 
themselves with their peers and to incorporate superior techniques into their own 
operations is well worth emulating.10  In the international arena, one hallmark of a good 
agency always has been its capacity to influence views of what constitutes sound 
competition and consumer protection policies by “exporting” ideas, mainly through the 
example of its own policy work and enforcement practice.  Today, as the FTC’s overseas 
consultations for this project demonstrated, the difference between an agency with a good 
international program and one with an excellent international program may be the 
agency’s skill in importing ideas, as well.  This demands close attention to the experience 
of other jurisdictions and the willingness to embrace superior practices from the rest of 
                                                 
8 A description of the project and the resulting paper are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/events/future_challenges_en.htm. 
9 See OECD, COUNTRY STUDIES: EL SALVADOR – PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 22 
(2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/49/41597078.pdf. 
10 See, e.g., U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS. ENTER. & REGULATORY REFORM (“BERR”), BENCHMARKING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE UK FRAMEWORK SUPPORTING CONSUMER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH COMPARISON 
AGAINST RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL COMPARATOR COUNTRIES (2008) (report prepared for BERR by the 
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia), available at  
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47653.pdf. 
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the world.  The exchange of ideas and strategies in consumer protection and competition 
is increasingly “a two-way street.”11 
 
If the FTC is to exert effective leadership in forming policy at home and abroad, 
we must be no less driven than our foreign counterparts to examine and enhance our own 
institutional framework and operations and have procedures in place to respond 
effectively to new commercial phenomena and to learn from developments taking place 
within established and emerging competition and consumer regimes around the world.  
What has emerged globally is a form of competition by individual jurisdictions to achieve 
superior regulatory frameworks.  This rivalry reflects awareness that the attainment of 
superior frameworks – systems that achieve sound policy outcomes at the lowest cost to 
society – can be a valuable source of national economic advantage.  That is a competition 
worth having, and the FTC means to be a successful participant in the contest. 
      
Another reason for the FTC to conduct this self-assessment is to ingrain in the 
agency a habit of periodic self-evaluation to illuminate the way to future improvements.  
To a large extent, the chief means for evaluating the performance of public institutions in 
the United States has consisted of convening from time to time (often in the face of crisis) 
blue ribbon panels of outside experts.12  So it has been with the Federal Trade 
Commission.13  To a point, these blue ribbon studies are helpful, but they have severe 
limitations.  Among other weaknesses, the blue ribbon panels tend too often to glide over 
basic questions about the appropriate standards for measuring agency performance. 
 
Reviews of agency performance also take place through the work of committees 
assembled to facilitate the transition from one presidential administration to another.  
Presidential transition reports suffer from their own frailties.  The imperative to turn them 
out in a short time – often a few weeks or months – sometimes imbues a transition 
report’s analysis and recommendations with glibness and superficiality.  Because their 
drafters lack the time to place events in a larger historical context, policy prescriptions in 
these documents often focus myopically on the short term.  Because their assessments of 
past performance set a benchmark against which future innovations can be assessed, the 
drafters may tend to devalue past accomplishments. 
 
The FTC at 100 project seeks to overcome these limitations by encouraging 
acceptance of a norm of periodic self-assessment and creating a template for the agency 
to engage regularly in an analysis of its performance.  There is no substitute for the 
agency’s own sustained efforts to get things right.  As George Stigler observed in a blue 
                                                 
11 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2008 TRANSITION REPORT 18 (2008) [hereinafter 
ABA TRANSITION REPORT], available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/11-
08/comments-obamabiden.pdf. 
12 On the use of blue ribbon panels as public administration evaluation mechanisms, see William E. 
Kovacic, Blue Ribbon Commissions: The Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems, in ARMS, POLITICS, AND 
THE ECONOMY – HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 61 (Robert Highs ed., 1990). 
13 The use of blue ribbon panels to evaluate the FTC is recounted in William E. Kovacic, The Federal 
Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 592-602 (1982) [hereinafter Kovacic, 
Oversight]. 
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ribbon study of defense procurement in 1970, “[n]o organization can achieve or maintain 
efficiency in structure or operation by having a critical review made by expert outsiders 
once each five or ten years. . . .  A good organization must have built into its very 
structure the incentives to its personnel to do the right things.”14 
 
The FTC at 100 project also has attempted to decouple the process of self-
assessment from any single electoral cycle and to put the focus on adjustments that will 
improve the agency over the long term.  By focusing on the Commission’s centennial, 
this exercise has sought to achieve a longer-term perspective and engage the agency in 
the valuable process of considering the goals that animated the agency’s creation and 
assessing how well the FTC has attained them.  The aim is to identify approaches for 
improvement that are not only good today but will be good in the decades to come.  
 
Focal Points and Means 
 
The FTC self-assessment has focused on two broad issues.  First, when we ask 
how well the Commission is carrying out its responsibilities, by what criteria should we 
assess its work?  The scholarly literature and popular commentary on the FTC is replete 
with rough assessments of whether the Commission is performing “well.”  Far more often 
than not, the definition of “good performance” that presumably underpins such judgments 
is poorly specified.  It is impossible to form conclusions about an agency’s performance 
without some basic understanding of what the agency ought to do.  This, in effect, 
requires the construction of an agency report card.    
 
Second, by what techniques should we measure the agency’s success in meeting 
the normative criteria by which we determine whether the agency is performing well?  
Once standards for assessing performance are chosen, it is necessary to decide how to 
apply them.  How, in other words, are grades to be calculated?  A major aim of this 
element of the self-assessment is to identify the best means for measuring the effects and 
quality of what the FTC has done.    
 
We addressed these questions through a mix of internal deliberations and external 
consultations.  We asked difficult questions of ourselves and sought to see ourselves as 
others see us.  The external consultations took two forms.  We conducted extensive 
interviews and convened 12 workshops (including seven outside the United States) at 
which expert observers from academia, business groups, consumer organizations, and 
government bodies discussed the Commission’s programs, operations, and organization. 
 
The self-assessment yielded three basic products.  One is a consideration of the 
agency’s likely resource needs over the next five to six years.  The second was a 
collection of observations from our external consultations about the quality of individual 
substantive and procedural measures that the FTC has undertaken.  The third is a review 
of the institutional arrangements by which the Commission performs its responsibilities. 
                                                 
14 BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 198 (1970). 
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This report presents the third of these products.  Although the report does not treat 
all topics addressed in our deliberations, or examine some matters in complete detail, 
many of the proceedings have been posted on the FTC’s website for fuller study.  We 
hope that the process used for this self-assessment not only has illuminated ways to 
improve the FTC but also has supplied a template for future self-assessment exercises. 
 
Conclusion: The Engineering of Competition and Consumer Protection Policy 
 
The progress of the Federal Trade Commission in its modern era has built heavily 
upon the willingness of its people to assess their work critically and explore possibilities 
for improvement.  Critical self-study and external consultations not only have helped 
identify paths to achieving greatness, but also have renewed the institution’s commitment 
to fulfill the destiny that Congress in 1914 wished it to achieve. 
 
The FTC at 100 self-assessment is the latest element of that tradition, and the 
exercise has yielded valuable insights about strengthening the agency.  Several areas 
stand out.  The inquiry has helped identify what resources – personnel, facilities, 
equipment – the FTC will need to perform its duties in the future.  Nothing is more vital 
to the success of the Commission than its human capital.  A crucial reason for the 
agency’s improvement in recent decades is a progressive strengthening of the quality of 
its administrative professionals, attorneys, and economists.  A second reason is the 
farsighted investment the agency has made in information technology to improve the 
productivity of its employees.  Nothing will be more vital to our future success than 
seeing that the modern historical trend toward assembling an ever more capable staff and 
ever more powerful technological tools to support them continues.  This inquiry also has 
helped identify steps the agency should take, once it has attracted talented individuals, to 
make the workplace a most satisfying experience.   
 
A second result is to suggest how the FTC might improve its approach for 
choosing strategies for exercising its powers.  No task of administration is more 
important than selecting priorities.15  Everything the Commission does flows from its 
process for deciding which pursuits are most worthy of its attention.  The setting of 
effective strategies calls for the agency to use its litigation and nonlitigation tools.  
Among other features, this exercise involves deciding how to set the agenda for the 
FTC’s research program.  From the start, the Commission was intended to undertake 
studies and to supplement and undergird its enforcement efforts with a broad research 
agenda.  Today, in a world of multiple competition and consumer protection decision 
makers, intellectual leadership assumes an ever-increasing role in determining the ability 
of an individual agency to shape policy developments.  Identifying the best possible form 
and application of our research activities is indispensable to the FTC’s ability to exercise 
intellectual leadership. 
 
                                                 
15 See William E. Kovacic, The Importance of History to the Design of Competition Policy Strategy: The 
Federal Trade Commission and Intellectual Property, 30 SEATTLE L. REV. 319 (2007). 
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A third product of this self-assessment has been to identify how the FTC can 
strengthen its processes for implementing its programs.  The manner in which an agency 
organizes its operations deeply shapes the quality of its substantive initiatives and affects 
the costs that firms bear in complying with the agency’s commands.  Finding better ways 
to organize our operations not only will improve the Commission’s own efficiency but 
also can reduce the compliance costs for business operators without diminishing the 
effectiveness of the agency’s substantive programs. 
 
Finally, the inquiry has pointed to how the FTC can better fulfill its duties by 
improving links with other government bodies and nongovernment organizations.  
Cooperation among government bodies within and across jurisdictions is one of the most 
important frontiers for improving the productivity and effectiveness of public competition 
and consumer protection authorities.  The broad decentralization of authority within the 
United States, the emergence of multiple regulatory authorities around the world, and the 
awareness of heightened interdependence among regulators and national regulatory 
regimes underscore the need for stronger interagency networks and intensified 
collaborative projects.  The gains from greater cooperation also extend to the FTC’s 
relationships with nongovernment bodies, such as academic research centers, consumer 
groups, and professional societies.  
 
The emphasis throughout the study is institution-building.  Discussions about 
competition law and consumer protection tend to focus heavily on conceptual issues of 
doctrine and large questions about the appropriate substance of public policy.  The 
attention given to these unquestionably important matters – the “physics” of competition 
policy and consumer protection – obscures the importance of how to engineer institutions 
and programs that can transform theory and concepts into effective programs.  This study 
is about the “engineering” of competition and consumer protection policymaking.  It 
recognizes that successful public policy outcomes are the product of good physics and 
good engineering.  It takes faith in the proposition that has guided generations of 
successful athletes and musicians: over time, good technique begets good performances.     
 
 The orientation of this study also is long-term in nature, at least by the customs of 
national policymaking in the United States.  The measures suggested here generally do 
not lend themselves to instant accomplishment but instead require sustained, incremental 
effort.  The five-year focus seeks to draw attention to institution-building activities that 
demand a continuity of effort across administrations and across the tenure of individual 
chairmen.  The public policy environment in the United States does not tend to nurture 
this perspective.  In the eyes of many observers, the reputations of individual agency 
officials are set by observable events that transpire during the individual’s tenure.  This 
point of view discourages investments in activities with long-term, capital qualities that 
generate benefits to the agency well beyond a single manager’s time in office.     
 
Fred Hilmer, the President of the University of New South Wales and a major 
figure in the modern development of Australia’s competition policy and consumer 
protection system, tells his executive MBA students that the success managers enjoy 
today probably has roots in decisions taken by their predecessors five or more years ago.  
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Professor Hilmer poses the following inquiry to his manager-students: what are you 
doing today to improve the lot of your successors five years hence?  This report seeks to 
answer that challenge for the FTC by encouraging acceptance of a norm that gives proper 
attention to building and enhancing the institutional foundations on which good policies 
must stand. 
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PART 2:  INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL 
FTC PERFORMANCE 
 
One cannot make sensible judgments about whether an agency is performing 
skillfully or poorly without first defining the criteria by which the agency will be tested.  
It is a meaningless exercise to say that an agency today is good or bad, doing better or 
worse, or surpassing other institutions without identifying the grounds for the assessment.   
 
By what criteria are we to decide whether the FTC is a good institution?  The 
definition of standards is fundamental to the study of the performance of the Commission 
or any other public body, yet the need to clearly specify criteria frequently gets less 
attention than it deserves.  The literature on the FTC underscores the point.  There is a 
massive body of commentary that evaluates the programs, operations, and structure of the 
FTC.  Two flaws weaken many of these accounts.  Some commentators offer broad 
qualitative judgments without a clear statement of standards.  In the course of trying to 
increase the gravity of their own assessments by discerning longstanding trends, other 
authors mechanically invoke the conclusions of earlier assessments without carefully 
studying the criteria employed by previous analyses. 
 
This self-study dwelled extensively on the basic question of what criteria serve to 
separate good performance from adequate or weak performance.  One of its central aims 
was to identify institutional features that beget good substantive outcomes over time.  
Public policy is delivered through an infrastructure of institutional arrangements.  The 
quality of a jurisdiction’s institutional infrastructure shapes substantive policy results.  
Presented below are the institutional arrangements whose attainment ought to be the 
FTC’s objective. 
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I. Agency Mission 
 
 A fundamental characteristic of a good institution is the clarity with which it 
understands its purpose and defines its “mission.”  The FTC’s mission has two 
dimensions.  One is related to the substance of policy, and the other deals with the 
process by which policy is formed.  The substantive dimension consists of the public 
policy goals that the Commission should accomplish on behalf of the American public.16  
The FTC functions well as an institution when it clearly defines what it means to do and 
spells out how it will go about its duties.17  A well-defined conception of the agency’s 
aims helps facilitate the choice of projects by which the agency implements its authority.  
To do these tasks well, the Commission needs to understand what problems Congress 
created it to solve.18 
 
The second dimension of the FTC’s mission involves the means that Congress 
placed at its disposal to address economic policy issues.  Congress gave the Commission 
a distinctive collection of institutional endowments.  These include law enforcement 
powers, a collegial governance structure, special information gathering tools, the 
authority to issue reports, the combination of competition policy and consumer protection 
responsibilities, an elastic substantive mandate, rulemaking powers, and the authority to 
use administrative adjudication to articulate standards of business conduct.  The 
Commission’s application of this portfolio of policy instruments is no less an ingredient 
of its mission than the attainment of substantive policy goals entrusted to it.  If the agency 
cannot produce superior policy outcomes by reason of this combination of policymaking 
attributes, the rationale for the FTC’s very existence comes into question. 
 
Both dimensions of the FTC’s mission ideally should be defined in a manner that 
facilitates meaningful measurement of whether the agency is achieving its substantive 
aims and using its distinctive institutional capabilities effectively.  Measurement is the 
final element in a public administration lifecycle that begins with the definition of aims, 
proceeds with the selection of implementing programs, and concludes with the 
assessment of results.  In measuring how well the agency uses its capabilities to 
formulate competition policy or consumer protection policy, the Commission should 
focus on the economic outcomes it achieves for the public (for example, reducing 
economic losses that result from fraud), rather than focusing on the inputs the FTC 
dedicates to a task (for example, the number of staff assigned to address activities in a 
certain sector) or the program outputs it generates (for example, the number of cases filed 
                                                 
16 In discussing the performance of government bodies, James Q. Wilson refers to “critical tasks,” which, if 
achieved, will deal with the agency’s “key environmental problem.”  See JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 25-26 (1989).  This section of 
the report uses mission and goal interchangeably. 
17 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 167 
(2005) [hereinafter Muris, Principles]; Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 6-7.   
18 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 15 (“[H]igh-performing organizations have a clarity of their purpose . . . .  
[W]ithout that clarity and understanding of the problem to be solved, you really can’t move on.”).   
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or the number of studies completed).  Practical difficulties associated with directly 
measuring economic outcomes account for the frequency with which the Commission 
and other authorities fall back upon agency inputs or outputs as proxies for economic 
impact. 
 
Once the agency has defined the substantive and process elements of its mission, 
the Commission must articulate these elements clearly to enable its own staff and 
external constituencies to understand what the agency is trying to achieve and how it is 
seeking to do so.19  The FTC’s clear articulation of its mission is a vital means by which 
it attains the necessary objective of building support for its work from internal and 
external constituencies over time.   
 
In this section, we address these and related issues concerning the Commission’s 
mission.  In doing so, we draw upon various views of the FTC’s mission that were 
presented during the public consultations of the self-assessment.  Some concepts, 
particularly the challenges of measuring successful completion of the mission and 
gaining external support, also will be discussed in greater detail later in the report. 
 
A. Clearly Articulating the Mission 
 
 As a threshold matter, agency leaders must clearly articulate the agency mission 
so that staff and external constituencies have a firm grasp of the organization’s 
objectives.20  As one leading public administration scholar has explained: 
 
Everyone in the organization needs to understand the big 
picture.  Thus, the leaders of the organization need to 
proclaim, clearly and frequently, what the organization is 
trying to accomplish. . . .  If the agency’s leaders want 
everyone in the organization to take the mission seriously, 
they need to reiterate its fundamental points at every 
opportunity.21 
 
For some administrative agencies, statutes clearly specify the mission.  For 
example, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is required by law to send monthly 
checks to eligible persons.  Accordingly, the SSA easily has discerned its mission – to 
pay benefits on time and accurately – from its statute. 
 
                                                 
19 See MARK A. ABRAMSON ET AL., THE OPERATOR’S MANUAL FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 25 (2008) 
(explaining that Robert Behn recommends that agency heads “proclaim – clearly and frequently – what the 
organization is trying to accomplish”).  
20 See id. at 25-26.  
21 ROBERT D. BEHN, PERFORMANCE LEADERSHIP: 11 BETTER PRACTICES THAT CAN RATCHET UP 
PERFORMANCE 8-9 (2006).  See also ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 19, at 7 (explaining how one key 
component of the Veterans Health Administration’s transformation was clearly articulating its vision).  
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The clarity found in the Social Security example is not ubiquitous.  Most 
government agencies “are likely to have general, vague or inconsistent goals, about 
which clarity and agreement can only occasionally be obtained.”22  The urgency to 
achieve clarity and coherence in policymaking is especially acute for the FTC, to which 
Congress has given responsibility for implementing over 50 statutes.  Given the array of 
policy impulses that motivated the enactment of these measures, it may not be possible to 
identify a single unifying principle that links all legislative commands within the 
Commission’s policymaking domain.  Nonetheless, continuous FTC efforts to identify 
and reinforce common aims across the span of its jurisdiction serve the important end of 
building a coherent portfolio of projects that address the most serious competition and 
consumer protection problems while minimizing inconsistencies or contradictions that 
reduce its effectiveness. 
 
A vital starting point for this endeavor is the Commission’s principal statutory 
mandate.  Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and bars 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”23  The key operative terms of these commands are 
not self-defining, and it is difficult to derive an operational mission directly from their 
text.24  In these circumstances, the FTC and other agencies with comparatively open-
ended substantive mandates must define and develop an operational mission.  The 
Commission’s leadership should ensure that the mission derived from broad statutory 
commands is sufficiently specific in identifying what the FTC does to guide agency 
action.   
 
From time to time, Congress has amended the FTC Act to define more fully some 
of the statute’s most general commands.  For example, Section 5 of the FTC Act today 
provides that the Commission cannot find an act or practice to be unfair unless it “causes 
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”25  Reflecting these provisions, the Commission has defined its mission as 
follows:  “To prevent business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to 
consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public understanding of the 
competitive process; and to accomplish these missions without unduly burdening 
legitimate business activity.”26 
 
                                                 
22 WILSON, supra note 16, at 26. 
23 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
24 Some have observed that the FTC’s organic statute – calling for it to prevent “unfair” and “deceptive” 
business practices – is too vague to define a mission.  See WILSON, supra note 16, at 59; Muris, 7/29 DC 
Tr. at 19 (“the statute is way too broad in providing any sort of rigorous guidance”).  But see Ellig, 7/30 DC 
Tr. at 32 (“I think that the FTC’s organic statute is more focused than the mandates that some federal 
agencies have, where at least there’s clearly a focus on the consumer which in some cases is specific 
enough to guide action.”).   
25 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
26 FTC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2006-2011, at 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 FTC STRATEGIC PLAN], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/spfy06fy11.pdf.   
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There appears to be widespread understanding that the FTC’s current mission 
focuses on consumers and that the improvement of consumer welfare is the proper 
objective of the agency’s competition and consumer protection work.27  An important 
consequence of this focus is that Commission policy does not seek to enhance or degrade 
the position of individual market participants as an end in itself.  For example, the 
improvement of market outcomes for consumers, and not the status of specific firms or 
collections of enterprises, is the reason to challenge fraud, deceit, and related forms of 
unfair practices, and to police anticompetitive mergers and other practices that 
improperly suppress rivalry in the marketplace.28  This perspective appears to enjoy 
broad support within the community of competition policy and consumer protection 
agencies.  During his tenure as the first Chief Economist in DG Comp, Lars-Hendrik 
Röller punctuated this concept with his habit, in the course of discussions about proposed 
enforcement initiatives, of asking case handlers, “What is the theory of consumer harm?”   
 
To say that the well-being of consumers, rather than individual producers, is the 
appropriate concern of competition and consumer protection policy does not by itself 
determine exactly what an agency with these responsibilities should do.  Modern 
commentary and the consultations for the FTC self-study display extensive discussion 
about what specific competition and consumer protection initiatives best serve consumer 
interests in the immediate term and for the long run.  How much weight, respectively, do 
efficiency effects and distributional consequences deserve in the decision to intervene?  
Are the efficiency gains realized by producers cognizable only if producers pass those 
gains largely or entirely to consumers in the relatively short term? 
  
The FTC self-study did not try to resolve these debates, but several informative 
observations concerning the issue emerged from the proceedings.  The first is that 
modern FTC programs designed to address improper collusive or exclusionary 
restrictions on output, price, or quality commonly have positive distributional effects as 
well as efficiency consequences.29  The same can be said of the agency’s consumer 
protection programs.  For example, many initiatives undertaken as part of the 
Commission’s program to combat serious fraud have special significance for 
economically disadvantaged populations or other social groups that, for various reasons, 
                                                 
27 Former Chairman Robert Pitofsky has observed that the FTC’s competition and consumer protection 
activities share the overriding mission of improving consumer welfare.  More than Enforcement: The 
FTC’s Many Tools – A Conversation with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 780-81 
(2005) [hereinafter, Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky].  See also Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 33-35 (arguing 
that, although the competition (and consumer protection) laws are relatively broad, there is a consensus 
among the Commission and the antitrust community generally that consumer welfare is the focus of the 
antitrust laws).  
28 As former Chairman Timothy Muris made the point, since the 1970s there has been agreement that the 
FTC’s core mission is to protect the competitive process:  “The FTC is an umpire.  It’s not one of the star 
players.”  Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 20.   
29 A representative illustration can be found in FTC efforts to challenge unjustified public and private 
restrictions on the provision of professional services.  See William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, 
Consumer Protection, and Economic Disadvantage, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 109-10 (2007) 
(discussing FTC decision in 2004 to strike down certain limits on the use of dental hygienists to provide 
fluoride treatments to public school children). 
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might be especially vulnerable to fraudulent sales schemes.30  In general terms, it is 
difficult to find instances in which the pursuit of the programs that have formed the core 
of the FTC’s modern competition and consumer protection programs have featured a 
tension between the attainment of efficiency and distribution-related goals, respectively. 
 
Second, many roundtable panelists commented on the disciplining role that a 
focus on consumer welfare provides.  For example, one panelist noted that focusing on 
consumer welfare, rather than also on potentially countervailing, and less measurable, 
interests like “fairness,” provides “clarity of objective.”31  In the context of the FTC’s 
efforts to apply its authority to forbid unfair methods of competition and to ban unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices, an emphasis on preventing and redressing consumer harm 
provides a valuable means for ensuring that the application of the agency’s powers will 
make markets work better for consumers. 
 
In addition to the broad substantive reach of its mandate, the FTC has a broad 
sectoral reach.  The Commission’s enforcement jurisdiction extends to conduct “in or 
affecting commerce” in most sectors of the economy.32  However, the FTC Act (and 
sometimes other laws) imposes certain limits on the Commission’s sectoral reach, 
including limits applicable to common carriers and financial sectors.33  Some panelists 
expressed the view that the FTC’s mission should be extended to encompass areas of 
commerce currently subject to limits on the agency’s jurisdiction.  For example, one 
panelist advocated expanded FTC law enforcement jurisdiction to “represent the 
consumer interest at the federal level” in areas such as banking and mobile phones.34  
Similarly, another panelist noted that, in the wake of the current financial crises, the FTC 
should play a major role when Congress reforms the current regulatory oversight scheme 
for financial services companies currently beyond the scope of FTC jurisdiction.35  These 
suggestions were consistent with the basic articulation of the agency mission to protect 
consumers in the marketplace.   
 
 The concern about the modern suitability of longstanding jurisdictional limits 
underscores an important point about the FTC’s mission.  The definition of aims is 
inherently evolutionary.  Technological innovation and other commercial phenomena call 
for periodic reassessment of assumptions that guided the establishment of exemptions 
and other restrictions on the Commission’s authority.  More generally, dynamism in 
                                                 
30 Id. at 114-15 (discussing, among other FTC programs, the development earlier this decade of a program 
to address fraud directed toward Spanish speakers in the United States). 
31 See Humpherson, London Tr. at 24-25 (the “clarity of objective” that comes from a focus on consumer 
welfare is “one of the great strengths” that competition authorities enjoy); Bloom, London Tr. at 23 (“I 
would be cautious about adding something like fairness.  If you did widen it, what happens if you satisfy 
the fairness one but it reduces welfare?  So you could have a tension if you have more than one 
objective.”).  
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
33 See id. § 45(a)(2) (exclusions applicable to common carriers and financial institutions). 
34 See T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 52-54.  
35 See Swire, NY Tr. at 203-04, 209.  
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commerce and in public administration call for the FTC to revisit from time to time the 
reason for its existence and to ask how its goals best can be realized.  The question of 
implementation – how the FTC should carry out its consumer-focused mission – will be 
explored throughout the remainder of this report.   
 
B. Measuring Outcomes Rather than Outputs 
 
In addition to a clearly articulated mission, there should be a close nexus between 
the mission and outcomes for the public that can be measured.36  Missions focused on 
agency outputs (such as cases) rather than outcomes (such as increased consumer 
welfare) may not lend themselves to meaningful measurements of public benefits.37   
 
It is typically easier to identify and measure government agencies’ outputs rather 
than outcomes.  Thus, agency leaders should articulate a mission that lends itself to 
developing outputs that enjoy a close nexus with desired outcomes.38  For example, in the 
context of public health, an agency might confidently assume that increased output of 
immunizations will advance a mission focused on the outcome of a healthier 
population.39  As one roundtable panelist explained with regard to the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services: 
                                                
 
One of the things that they’re trying to do is improve the 
safety, quality, affordability and accessibility of healthcare; 
prevent and control disease, injury, illness and disability; 
protect the public from infectious occupational, 
environmental and terrorist threats. . . .  [I]f you listen to 
that carefully you could think, gosh, measures darn near 
fall right out of that. . . .  [T]hey look at things like 
percentage of the population with prescription drug 
coverage.  That’s something that’s verifiable, tells you 
whether they’re achieving some of their mission or not.  
The number of people and percent of people in the country 
with ongoing access to healthcare.  The percentage of the 
population with immunization coverage.  These are all 
things that are either health outcomes or closely related to 
health outcomes that fall right out of their mission.40 
 
 
36 Measurement of outcomes may be direct or via output proxies.  See infra Chapter VII for a more detailed 
discussion of this topic.  
37 See Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 23-24; Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 25-26.  
38 See BEHN, supra note 21, at 10-12.  See also Sanderson, Ottawa Tr. at 23 (stressing importance of 
focusing on outcomes rather than outputs). 
39 See BEHN, supra note 21, at 12.   
40 Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 18-19.  
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In some cases, theoretical analysis or empirical research can provide a confident 
basis for determining that certain types of outputs – for example, prohibitions on 
agreements by rivals to restrict truthful advertising or rules forbidding sellers to make 
unsubstantiated claims about the efficacy of weight-control products – ordinarily serve to 
improve consumer welfare.  Even for these policy presumptions, it is appropriate for 
public officials to consider from time to time whether the assumptions that support 
investments in certain types of outputs remain sound.  A further matter for continuing 
observation and analysis is whether adjustments in the specific mix of outputs might 
achieve better policy results.  For example, the initiation of cases to prosecute serious 
marketing fraud properly can rest upon the assumption that serious fraud ordinarily 
diminishes consumer welfare, typically enjoys no legitimate business justifications, and 
warrants categorical condemnation.  At the same time, the FTC and other consumer 
protection agencies might consider supplementing anti-fraud cases with consumer 
education programs that encourage precaution taking by potential victims.  Over the past 
decade, this type of examination has led the Commission to increase outlays for 
consumer education and to hold occasional workshops to explore enhancements in its 
program to deter fraud.41  In this area and in other matters, an outcome-focused policy 
perspective helps ensure that the Commission’s existing programs are not simply a 
consequence of adhering to custom and that the FTC remains alert to possibilities for 
improving results for consumers by adjusting the mix of its policy initiatives. 
 
Several foreign enforcement agencies that also have responsibility for both 
consumer protection and competition matters have mission statements that are focused on 
outcomes and reflect such agencies’ dual roles.  The mission of the U.K. Office of Fair 
Trading, for example, is “making markets work well for consumers.”42  The Canadian 
Competition Bureau’s vision is “to be an organization of excellence that produces high 
impact outcomes and is flexible in order to meet the challenges of the marketplace today 
and in the future.”43  The purpose of the New Zealand Commerce Commission “is to 
promote dynamic and responsive markets so that New Zealanders benefit from 
competitive prices, better quality and greater choice.”  New Zealand’s statement of aims 
identifies three strategic goals: (1) “markets are dynamic and all goods and services are 
provided at competitive prices”; (2) “consumers are confident of the accuracy of 
information they receive when making choices”; and (3) “regulated industries are 
constrained from earning excess profits, face incentives to invest appropriately and share 
efficiency gains with consumers.”44  
 
                                                 
41 The FTC’s Fraud Forum scheduled for late February 2009 is an example of this type of initiative.  See 
FTC Press Release, FTC to Host “Fraud Forum” (Oct. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/fraud.shtm. 
42 U.K. Office of Fair Trading Home Page, http://www.oft.gov.uk/. 
43 Canadian Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Priorities At-a-Glance 2008 to 2010, 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/priorities-en.pdf/$FILE/priorities-en.pdf.  
44 New Zealand Commerce Commission, 
Overview, http://www.comcom.govt.nz/TheCommission/Overview.aspx.  The Commerce Commission, 
unlike the FTC, has primary responsibility for regulated sectors.   
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Beyond emphasizing outcomes rather than outputs, a mission that focuses on 
measurable outcomes has several advantages.  First, it can provide staff with information 
on how their actions affect achievement of the agency’s goals.  This information can 
allow the agency and its staff to better calibrate actions against goals, which can improve 
effectiveness.  If the agency can define a mission for which it can identify measurable 
outcomes, managers can more easily understand where they are successful and where 
they must improve.  Second, a measurable outcome-focused mission can motivate 
improved performance by allowing staff to know when they are performing their job 
well.  Third, when missions focus on outcomes rather than inputs or outputs, the agency 
more readily can adjust the allocation of its resources better to achieve desired policy 
results while continuing to focus on the agency goals.45  Alternatively, if the mission is 
not defined in a readily measurable way, an agency can expend scarce resources engaging 
in activities that do not advance its goals. 
 
 The consultations with the Canadian Competition Bureau (“Bureau”) revealed a 
promising approach to incorporating the measurement of outcomes into the definition of 
its mission and its selection of individual projects.  In recent years, the Competition 
Bureau has moved toward pressing its operating units to state, when proposing new 
investigations, cases, or other measures, how the effectiveness of a chosen initiative 
might be measured as the initiative unfolds.46  The Bureau’s practice seems worthy 
emulating.  By asking its project teams to address from the beginning “how will we know 
this initiative is working” seems a useful way to assist the Commission in deciding which 
matters to pursue and to monitor progress toward the accomplishment of the agency’s 
goals. 
 
A further advantage of emphasizing the measurability of outcomes involves the 
FTC’s external constituencies.  Measurability of outcomes allows political decision 
makers, nongovernment constituencies, and the general public better to estimate the 
particular level of public benefits associated with a given outlay of public funds.  In this 
manner, measurable outcomes will allow Congress to allocate more efficiently scarce 
government resources to maximize benefits per dollar spent.  The Commission’s capacity 
to define its mission in terms of measurable outcomes has assumed greater importance at 
a time of financial crisis in the United States and overseas.  To some observers, the crisis 
has raised doubts about the utility of competition and consumer protection policies that 
rely principally on market-based, decentralized economic choice as the way to organize 
economic affairs.  In such an environment, the FTC and its counterparts overseas cannot 
expect those outside their walls to accept the value of their competition policy and 
consumer protection programs as a matter of faith.  Quantitative and qualitative measures 
of effectiveness necessarily will assume greater prominence.  With growing frequency, 
                                                 
45 See BEHN, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that when target outputs do not further the mission, which is 
focused on an outcome, agency leaders need to adjust target outputs); Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 18 (“[When] the 
focus is on the goal rather than the means of the goal . . . [y]ou can dispose of the way of doing things or a 
means if it doesn’t work, but the focus on the goal remains.”).  
46 Consultation with Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008. 
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competition and consumer protection authorities can expect to hear variants of the 
aphorism that says:  In God we trust.  All others provide data.    
 
Chapter VII of this report examines more fully how best to measure the FTC’s 
effectiveness in general and the impact of its programs on consumer welfare.  As a 
general matter, the FTC since the late 1970s has devoted growing attention to the 
question of how to measure the effects of its policy choices.  In this endeavor, the 
agency’s Bureau of Economics and its data gathering and reporting powers have supplied 
a valuable foundation for devising approaches to measure the economic effects of FTC 
decisions to intervene and not to intervene.  As one panelist noted, this form of economic 
expertise provides a vital tool for measuring whether actions had positive effects on 
consumer welfare:  “[A]lthough consumer protection and competition laws are relatively 
broad, there is a consensus among the Commission and the antitrust community generally 
(e.g., courts, academics, practitioners) that consumer welfare is the guiding principle for 
antitrust laws, and economic analysis, in turn, is the proper method for determining what 
advances consumer welfare.”47  Another panelist noted that the FTC consumer protection 
mission’s market-based approach is conducive to measurement because, like the 
competition mission, it is intended to protect and promote consumer welfare.48    
 
C. Internal and External Support for the Mission 
 
A successful agency must enjoy support for its mission from core constituencies 
inside and outside the institution.  For the agency to gain and maintain such support, 
these constituencies must understand the mission and be able to determine whether the 
agency is carrying out its responsibilities successfully.   
 
For the FTC, one core constituency is its own staff of administrative 
professionals, attorneys, and economists.  The Commission derives significant 
advantages from building widespread internal agreement upon and endorsement of its 
mission.  Among other benefits, such support enables managers to economize on 
resources.  When the FTC’s staff understands and embraces the agency’s stated aims, 
managers need spend less time to create incentives for staff to pursue the mission and can 
reduce the effort devoted to monitoring whether staff’s efforts are consistent with the 
FTC’s mission.49   
 
Some foreign agencies, such as the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, the Canadian Competition Bureau, and the U.K.’s Office of Fair Trading, 
build support among staff for the agency’s mission by devoting extensive effort to 
                                                 
47 Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 33.  
48 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 134-35 (“[The FTC] really sweats the details about the effect on competition 
and the economic effect of what it’s doing. . . .  [I]f you apply a market-based approach to consumer 
protection . . . that helps you in assessing the measurements.”).   
49 See WILSON, supra note 16, at 95.  
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articulate principles or values to guide staff in carrying out the agency’s mission.50  These 
agencies make recurring efforts to relate these principles and values to the routine of 
selecting and implementing projects.  These and other agencies have used a variety of 
innovative means to communicate their goals to their staff.  Some involve regular 
communication through internal information conduits.  Others take the form of special 
agency-wide events.  Canada’s Competition Bureau and the OFT hold annual “town 
halls” attended by all of their personnel.  Among other activities, these town halls provide 
an opportunity for senior management to review recent events and to spell out their vision 
for the way ahead.  In 2008 the European Commission’s competition directorate held an 
“away day” in Brussels that assembled its entire staff for a similar event. 
 
The FTC today uses a variety of means to communicate its goals to its staff.  
These include regular announcements on the Commission’s intranet, periodic retreats for 
individual operating units, a yearly state of the Commission address delivered by the FTC 
Chairman, an annual awards ceremony, and other occasions that provide opportunities for 
senior leadership to explain the agency’s aims.  Staff can watch Commission meetings in 
person, by teleconference, and over the Internet, and these provide guidance about the 
agency’s aims.  Several times each year, the Commission holds meetings and seminars in 
Washington for smaller groups of its staff.  Given the size of the FTC’s workforce and 
the distribution of staff geographically across the country, there would be considerable 
cost involved in following the practice of some foreign counterparts and having annual 
meetings of all personnel in Washington.  Nonetheless, given the positive results that 
other agencies seem to achieve with their larger gatherings, the Commission might 
consider convening an agency-wide gathering every few years, or assembling all 
members of one of its principal operating groups (e.g., all administrators, attorneys, and 
economists who work, respectively, on competition or consumer protection matters). 
Short of these measures, ongoing efforts by the FTC to study innovations in internal 
communication undertaken by peer organizations promise to yield useful ideas for 
adoption inside the Commission. 
 
Beyond mobilizing its own employees, an agency also must enjoy support for its 
mission among external constituencies.  Lack of external support for the mission can 
erode the perceived legitimacy of the agency’s individual actions, cause Congress to 
withdraw part of its jurisdiction, and, in extreme circumstances, call into question its 
continued existence.  James Q. Wilson explains that for any agency leader, “a good 
strategy is one that identifies a set of tasks that are both feasible and supportable – 
                                                 
50 See AUSTRALIA COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION, CORPORATE PLAN AND PRIORITIES 2008-09, at 
2 (2008), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/845527 (“We produce results in 
the public interest by: being accessible, transparent, independent and fair in our dealings with the 
community – including consumers, business and governments[; and] performing our role in a timely, 
effective, efficient and consistent manner that respects the confidentiality of information provided to assist 
us.”); Canadian Competition Bureau, Operational Principles, 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/h_00126e.html (identifying confidentiality, 
fairness, predictability, timeliness, and transparency as operational principles); U.K. OFFICE OF FAIR 
TRADING, ANNUAL REPORT AND RESOURCE ACCOUNTS 2006-07, at 67 (2007), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/annual_report/438243/hc532.pdf (identifying passion, trust, courage, and 
openness as organizational values). 
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activities the organization has the capacity to engage in and that will elicit the support of 
important constituencies.”51  Political adroitness in building such support is every bit as 
important to the success of the FTC’s programs as technical proficiency. 
 
It is important to distinguish between support for a mission among internal and 
external constituencies over time, on the one hand, and unanimous support for specific 
agency actions, on the other.  The former is necessary for a successful agency; the latter 
is not.52  As former Chairman Muris explained, “I think that what you need is some 
understanding of the core mission that has support amongst that constituency [staff, 
business, courts, academics, and peers in government], not just today, but over long 
periods of time and through electoral cycles.”53  Another way for the Commission to 
envision its work is that each of its initiatives accumulates political capital, expends 
political capital, or does both.  To succeed over time, the FTC must monitor its political 
capital account.  Ideally, the balance usually will be positive.  The agency can function 
effectively with temporary, limited deficits – such as when it undertakes a program that 
initially involves serious political risks but promises to generate substantial positive 
economic returns to the economy.  Substantial, chronic deficits are dangerous. 
 
From the external consultations for the self-study and from other assessments of 
the agency’s work, the FTC today appears to enjoy substantial support for its mission.  
As noted earlier, there appears to be widespread agreement that the FTC is properly 
focused on protecting consumers and promoting competition.54  Even those who have 
questioned whether the agency’s organic statute clearly defines the agency’s mission55 
agree that the mission – as currently interpreted – has broad, bipartisan support.56  
Further, several panelists expressed the view that the FTC’s vague statutory language 
provides it with the flexibility to allocate resources to accomplish its mission of 
protecting consumers.57  The Commission’s modern custom of engaging in regular, 
extensive public consultations about a wide variety of its competition policy and 
consumer protection programs has provided an important, useful way to identify 
preferences of external groups and to build a consensus for its initiatives. 
 
To maintain a positive balance of political capital requires continuous effort from 
administrative agencies such as the FTC.  As one political scientist has made the point, 
“each agency must constantly create a climate of acceptance for its activities and 
                                                 
51 WILSON, supra note 16, at 208. 
52 See Muris, Principles, supra note 17, at 167 (having support of external constituencies for an agency’s 
mission “does not mean that the agency’s mission must be ‘popular’ or that the constituents must support 
every particular agency action”).  
53 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 20. 
54 See supra notes 28-27 and accompanying text.  
55 See supra note 24. 
56 See Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 61 (remarking on the “continued bipartisan nature of this agency” and shared 
“sense of the core mission of the agency”). 
57 See Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 17; Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 24; T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 30-31. 
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negotiate alliances with powerful legislative and community groups to sustain its 
position.  It must, in short, master the art of politics as well as the science of 
administration.”58  How the FTC can identify its core constituencies and continue to 
build support for its mission is discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of the 
report. 
 
* * * 
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 A key foundation for the FTC’s success is to articulate its mission clearly and to 
state its mission in terms that focus on the outcomes the Commission seeks to achieve for 
consumers.  The ability to tie outcomes back to the mission facilitates the development
reliable performance measures.  The FTC’s staff can be more effective when th
relate the results of their actions to the agency’s mission.  When the FTC staff 
understands and supports a stated mission, Commission managers need spend fewer 
resources to motivate staff to pursue the agency’s aims.  Even if a mission is outcome-
oriented and enjoys in
a
These observations point to an important criterion by which we can determine 
whether the FTC is a “good” administrative body.  Good performance begins with clar
and coherence in defining the Commission’s very purpose.  The FTC is likely to be a 
more effective institution when it adopts a regular habit of asking itself the followin
questions:  Has the Commission clearly defined its mission?  Has the Commission 
defined its mission in a manner that focuses on the outcomes it hopes to achieve for 
consumers, rather than simply identifying the policy outputs – such as cases, reports, and 
rules – it intends to produce?  Does the Commission’s definition of its mission le
to the formulation of measurable outcomes?  Is the Commission’s mission well 
u
 
 The exercise laid out above is not a one-off event but an enduring imperative.  
From its formation in 1914, the Commission has operated in a dynamic environment.  By
giving the Commission a broad, elastic charter and related powers, Congress anti
that the agency would evolve in the face of changing economic conditions, new 
commercial phenomena, shifting political currents, and developments in legal tho
and industrial organization economics.  To perform this inherently evolutionary 
policymaking role, Congress gave the agency a distinctive collec
a
By embracing a routine habit of examining itself and its operations to defi
redefine its purpose, the Commission can engage in what two scholars of public 
administration, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, have called “thinking in time strea
which consists of applying “the kind of mental ability that readily connects discrete 
                                                 
58 FRANCIS ROURKE, BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 2 (1979). 
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phenomena over time and repeatedly checks connections.”59  For the Commission, the 
connections that warrant close scrutiny are the links between its goals, its implementin
measures, and the outcomes that such measures produce for consumers.  By checking 
those connections intensely, the FTC puts itself in the best possible position to answer
three basic questions that Neustadt and May single out as the core concerns of public
agency dec
g 
 the 
 
ision-making: “‘Will it work?’  ‘Will it stick?’  ‘Will it help more than it 
urts?’”60 
 
                                                
h
 
 
59 RICHARD NEUSTADT & ERNEST MAY, THINKING IN TIME 252-53 (1986).  Neustadt and May call this type 
of thinking “a special style of approaching choices, more the planner’s or the long-term program manager’s 
than the lawyer’s or judge’s or consultant’s or trouble-shooter’s.”  Id. 
60 Id. at 270. 
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II. Agency Structure 
 
The structure of an administrative agency such as the FTC deeply influences the 
skill with which it carries out its responsibilities.  Jurisdictions can achieve important 
gains in economic performance by pressing themselves to achieve an optimal regulatory 
design.  There is growing recognition within the community of competition policy and 
consumer protection authorities that jurisdictions that improve the quality of regulatory 
outcomes at the lowest possible cost to society can realize a valuable source of economic 
advantage.61 
 
Structure and organization can affect the performance of an agency’s priorities 
directly, for example, by having operational units dedicated to bringing specific types of 
cases or examining individual economic sectors, and indirectly, for example, by 
facilitating communication and coordination among agency components or having 
sufficient flexibility to address changes in rapidly transforming markets.  Consumer 
protection and competition agencies around the world have a variety of structural 
designs.  Some agencies have only competition or consumer protection enforcement 
authority.  Others, like the FTC, combine the functions to meet a broader mission of 
protecting the marketplace for consumers.  Among agencies with both functions, some 
organize their work along industry lines, while others divide along competition and 
consumer protection lines.  Some agencies have a single commissioner or director, while 
others are led by a collegial body.  Competition agencies, in particular, routinely include 
economists on their staffs, and there are different ways to incorporate economists’ input 
into agency decision making.   
 
This chapter examines how the design of the agency, integration of competition 
and consumer protection missions, communication, and the dual enforcement and 
adjudication functions affect achievement of the agency’s mission.   
 
A. Current Agency Design  
   
 The significant connection between institutional design and agency effectiveness 
has led many of the FTC’s counterparts overseas to undertake major efforts to determine 
whether adjustments in existing administrative structures and operational processes might 
yield superior results and whether the agencies have the components needed to serve their 
missions.  As discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, this inquiry entails an assessment 
of whether the agency has the necessary human and physical resources to accomplish its 
mission. 
 
 For the FTC, a logical starting place for the analysis of structure is the 
composition of the FTC’s core leadership.62  The FTC is governed by a college of five 
                                                 
61 This was a recurring theme in the comments of leaders of the FTC’s foreign counterparts.  See, e.g., 
Fingleton, London Tr. at 53-62; Consultation with DG Comp, Oct. 23, 2008; Consultation with Conseil de 
la Concurrence, Oct. 23, 2008. 
62 Agency leadership is discussed in more detail in Chapter V.A. 
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Commissioners, no more than three of whom may be members of the same political 
party.63  A fundamental legislative assumption supporting the FTC’s creation was that 
collective decision making would yield policy results superior to those attained by 
institutions governed by one official. 
 
From 1914 to 1950, the Commissioners selected their own Chairman, and from 
1916 to 1950 they rotated the position annually.64  In 1950, pursuant to Reorganization 
Plan Number 8, the President became responsible for designating a Chairman from 
among the sitting Commissioners.  The Reorganization Plan contemplates an important 
allocation of labor among the members of the FTC and other administrative agencies.  By 
this measure, the board is responsible for setting policy through, among other means, the 
selection of cases and the promulgation of rules.  The Chairman serves as the agency’s 
executive and administrative head.65  The FTC was one of the first multimember federal 
agencies, and its model has since been adopted for numerous other federal agencies, as 
well as a significant number of foreign competition and consumer protection agencies.66   
 
The literature on the FTC and other administrative bodies identifies a number of 
conceptual benefits to multimember decision making.  These include the application of 
diverse backgrounds to problem solving, the capacity of collective discussion to yield 
deeper insights into specific issues, and an increase in political legitimacy from having 
decisions taken by a board with varied political affiliations.  It is also conceivable that, 
for purposes of performing various policy functions and reaching external constituencies, 
a multimember body can enjoy a form of multiplier effect.  If a board can reach common 
cause concerning the agency’s mission and means of implementation, each member of 
the board can serve as a spokesperson and can reach audiences that a single administrator 
might not be able to address. 
 
How much the FTC and other administrative agencies have realized these and 
other benefits in practice is a matter of continuing debate.  In the public consultations for 
this self-study, many participants spoke favorably about the multimember government 
structure.  Former Chairman Robert Pitofsky endorsed the five-commissioner design in 
these terms:   
 
You could argue theoretically in favor of a single 
Commissioner structure, or perhaps three Commissioners, 
or five, or even seven.  The advantage of a multi-
Commissioner structure, and the limitation that only three 
may come from the same political party, generally ensures 
a variety of views.  Beyond theory, my impression is that in 
                                                 
63 15 U.S.C. § 41. 
64 See generally Marc Winerman, History through Headlines, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 871, 873 (2005).   
65 Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175. 
66 Competition and consumer agencies with a collegiate structure include, among others, the Australia 
Competition and Consumer Commission, the Competition Commission of Singapore, the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, and the Japan Fair Trade Commission. 
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recent years (maybe not before 1970) the FTC has been a 
collegial body in which members worked together well and 
profited from their colleagues’ views.  I would leave the 
arrangement as it is.67 
 
Panelists expressed the view that the nature and political balance of the body of 
Commissioners fosters discussion of new ideas and provides restraint on the political 
agenda of the agency.  Former Commissioner Thomas Leary emphasized the benefits of a 
collegial body and urged more discussion among Commissioners: 
 
I think [the FTC] can make and should make greater use of 
the ability of the Commission to function collegially 
because the Commissioners ultimately are the people who 
are going to have to set policy and make these decisions. . . 
.  In [the Office of Policy Planning] operation [] there were 
these background papers being prepared which were going 
to be used in support of the Commission’s advocacy role. 
And we met simply to discuss these various drafts of 
positions that the Commission might take on important 
matters of competitive policy, the extent of the state action 
exception and things of that kind.  And it was not in the 
discussion of a particular case or it was not in the 
discussion of a particular Congressional hearing, it was 
simply to see if we could agree among ourselves on what 
the Commission’s policy ought to be ultimately when these 
things arise.  And I thought that that was tremendously 
innovative and a very useful way of making use of the 
collective wisdom, if you will, of the people who have been 
appointed to run this place.68 
 
As the remarks of these former Commission members indicate, the logic of 
multimember governance assumes extensive interaction among the members of the 
board.  Communications among Commissioners may take place informally or, more 
formally, through meetings.  The Sunshine Act imposes significant restrictions on how 
these gatherings can take place and what number of Commissioners can participate.69  In 
general terms, the Sunshine Act imposes constraints on actions by a quorum of 
Commissioners.  These limits normally apply to communications among three or more 
Commissioners.  When a combination of vacancies or recusals leaves only three 
Commissioners eligible to participate in a matter, the Sunshine Act limits 
communications between any two members.   
 
                                                 
67 Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 849. 
68 Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 38-39. 
69 5 U.S.C. § 552b. 
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 The Sunshine Act has major implications for how Commission members interact.  
Consider the circumstance where all five members of the board are eligible to participate 
in a matter.  In effect, the Sunshine Act forestalls all spontaneous discussion by more 
than two members of the Commission about most matters of agency business, including 
such items as pending law enforcement matters.  For example, if two Commission 
members who happen to be engaged in a conversation about a proposed case are joined 
by a third Commissioner, the discussion about Commission business must cease. 
Discussions involving three or more Commissioners concerning agency business can take 
place only if notice of such gatherings is made public in advance.  The noticed meetings 
must be opened to the public unless the subject matter satisfies one of several Sunshine 
Act exceptions (which allow, for example, the closure of meetings involving proposed 
law enforcement measures).  As a consequence, much communication among 
Commissioners about agency business takes the form of seriatim, two-by-two 
conversations.  These are prone to all of the difficulties in comprehension and 
interpretation that accompany the sequential transmission of information from one person 
to a second, and then to another.  The Sunshine Act’s limits do not apply to agents of the 
Commissioners.  It is common practice for advisors of the Commissioners to meet as a 
group to discuss matters of agency business and, in many cases, to formulate common 
understandings on behalf of their principals. 
 
 Officials from foreign agencies with the multimember commission governance 
structure find the Sunshine Act restrictions astonishing.  Their intuition is that limitations 
severely impede the application of the collaborative decision-making processes that are a 
major rationale for the design of a multimember governance system.  They raise a 
fundamental question about administrative practice in the United States:  It is not evident 
how the benefits of collective governance that appeared to animate the creation of the 
FTC can be realized if the existing limits of the Sunshine Act are unchanged.  The FTC’s 
experience, especially compared to that of its foreign counterparts, leads one to ask 
whether the costs to the quality of deliberation among Commissioners exceed the benefits 
of public transparency.70  The possible modification of the statute would appear a worthy 
topic for discussion between the Commission and the Congress in the years to come.         
 
Within the constraints of the Sunshine Act, the Commission has used a number of 
approaches to discuss larger issues of policy that arise outside the context of specific law 
enforcement actions.  The Commission recently revived a practice, used from 1977 to 
1982, of holding “policy review sessions,” at which the Commission, with the help of 
staff, gathers and discusses how the Commission wants to proceed on particular issues.71  
Even with this method of discourse, the agency must place an account of the discussions 
in the public domain, subject to the redaction of material involving certain law 
enforcement matters.  The effort among Commissioners to discuss sensitive topics in this 
format can be challenging. 
 
                                                 
70 Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 39.  See also Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 42-43. 
71 See Kovacic, 7/29 DC Tr. at 45-46 (discussing earlier sessions). 
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  Panelists in the consultations for the FTC self study did not discuss the 
qualifications of the individuals selected to be Commissioners and other senior agency 
officials.  Commentators have focused extensively on this issue throughout the FTC’s 
history.72  Most recently, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law’s 2008 Transition Report 
recommended that the incoming administration appoint competition officials who have 
relevant substantive antitrust expertise and who seek involvement in the administration’s 
shaping of economic policy.73  In a discussion that addressed appointments to the FTC 
and to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division, the ABA Transition Report 
stated:  
 
[T]he continued appointment of such knowledgeable 
individuals, who will be best positioned to gain the respect 
of the career staff at the agency, the private bar, [and] the 
business community . . . can lead to better [staff] morale, 
more credible enforcement decisions, and a greater ability 
for the agencies to engage with the private sector regarding 
substance and process in ways that improve enforcement 
overall.  Such officials also would have the stature and 
reputations necessary to gain the respect of, and engage 
effectively with, enforcers around the world. . . .  With such 
credibility, agency leadership also may have some success 
in obtaining opportunities to provide valuable input 
regarding antitrust and consumer protection to economic 
policymakers in the new Administration.74  
 
 The discussions with foreign competition and consumer protection agencies 
identified a noteworthy respect in which the pattern of appointments to the FTC departs 
from the practice of appointments overseas.  Many of the heads of foreign competition 
and consumer protection agencies are economists.  Only once in the FTC’s history has an 
economist (James C. Miller III) served as the Chairman.  Only three individuals with 
doctorates in economics (Miller, George Douglas, and Dennis Yao) have been FTC 
Commissioners.  Accounting for trends in international practice and reflecting on the 
substantial economic dimension of the FTC’s charter, it is reasonable to ask whether the 
agency is well served by such infrequent participation by economists at the top 
management level of the agency. 
 
Below the Commissioner level, the FTC has three bureaus broadly divided along 
mission lines,75 seven regional offices (one of which has two branches), and several other 
                                                 
72 This commentary is reviewed in William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of 
the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915 (1997) [hereinafter Kovacic, Quality]. 
73 ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 11-12. 
74 Id.  
75 By comparison, the Australia Competition and Consumer Commission, which enforces consumer 
protection and competition laws and also has regulatory responsibilities for national infrastructure 
industries such as telecommunications, energy, water, and transportation, organizes some of its work along 
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offices, most prominently, in terms of size, the Office of the General Counsel and the 
Office of the Executive Director. 
 
The Bureau of Competition (“BC”) focuses primarily on enforcement of the FTC 
Act’s prohibition of unfair methods of competition in the realm of antitrust and other 
competition laws.  BC is divided into nine divisions: four divisions, organized around 
sectoral lines, specialize in merger enforcement; one handles health care-related 
competition concerns, including but not limited to mergers; one focuses on 
anticompetitive practices; one oversees compliance with orders issued in administrative 
or court cases brought by the Commission; one focuses on premerger notification; and 
one focuses on competition policy.   
 
The Bureau of Consumer Protection (“BCP”) attends to the FTC’s mission 
concerning the FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.  BCP has seven divisions, five of which focus on direct law 
enforcement and compliance.  Those divisions work in the areas of national advertising; 
financial practices; deceptive marketing of goods and services; privacy and identity 
protection; and enforcement of outstanding Commission and judicial orders, certain trade 
regulations and rules, and other targeted initiatives, such as green marketing.  The other 
two divisions focus on support for BCP programs.  One provides litigation support, data 
sharing (through the Consumer Sentinel Network) and analysis, and management of the 
Consumer Response Center, which responds to consumer complaints; the other division 
implements the Commission’s expansive consumer and business education programs. 
 
The agency’s seven regional offices engage in consumer protection and 
competition enforcement under BCP and BC oversight.  One of those offices, the 
Western Regional Office, has branches in two cities (Los Angeles and San Francisco).   
 
The Bureau of Economics (“BE”) supports both the competition and consumer 
protection enforcement work of the bureaus and carries out much of the agency’s 
research mission.  BE has two groups that focus on antitrust matters and one that focuses 
on consumer protection matters.  It also has an office of applied research and outreach, 
which coordinates BE’s policy R&D, advocacy, and international activities, as well as an 
office of accounting and financial analysis, which focuses on mergers and other 
competition issues.  The Commission has always assigned its economists to a separate 
unit and, from that unit, the economists provide independent economic advice to the 
Commissioners. 
 
The Office of General Counsel represents the Commission in appellate matters 
and certain types of court actions, consults with or advises the bureaus on other court 
actions, and assists the Justice Department in representing the Commission in cases 
within the DOJ’s purview.  The office includes a Policy Studies shop that prepares 
comprehensive reports on vital legal issues and on major sectors of the American 
                                                                                                                                                 
industry lines (such as the work related to regulated sectors and price surveillance).  Similarly, the 
European Commission’s DG Comp has engaged in a widespread reorganization into sector-specific project 
groups (excluding cartels). 
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economy, as well as a Legal Counsel shop that provides legal services to the entire 
agency concerning such matters as agency jurisdiction, rulemaking authority and 
procedures, employment law, government ethics, agency regulatory obligations, and 
information disclosure. 
  
 Several other offices perform additional functions that support the Commissioners 
and bureaus.  These include the Office of International Affairs (“OIA”); the Office of 
Policy Planning (“OPP”); the Office of Public Affairs and the Office of Congressional 
Relations (both attached to the Chairman’s office); the Office of the Executive Director; 
and the Office of the Secretary.  The Office of the Administrative Law Judges includes 
the Commission’s Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”), who preside at trials at the 
direction of the Commission.  The Office of the Inspector General (“IG”), an independent 
office within the Commission, conducts audits and investigations relating to the programs 
and operations of the FTC.  The IG conducts audits to find and prevent fraud, waste, and 
abuse and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the agency.   
 
From approximately 1954 to 1960, the FTC divided its staff into bureaus along 
functional lines, one consisting of investigational staff and the other consisting of trial 
staff.76  After 1960, the agency was reorganized into, among other units, a Bureau of 
Restraint of Trade and a Bureau of Deceptive Practices.77  In 1970, under the leadership 
of Chairman Caspar Weinberger, the agency renamed the operating bureaus to their 
current titles of the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
respectively.78  Divisions within BC and BCP have both investigative and litigation 
responsibilities in particular subject matter areas.79  Following the structural changes in 
the early 1970s, a number of commentators have noted that the budget for the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection substantially increased and BCP focused more heavily on matters 
of greater importance to consumers.80  Likewise, the restructured Bureau of Competition 
is regarded as having become more effective and made great inroads in antitrust 
enforcement.81  Also, one commentator stated that, after the restructuring of the early 
1970s, the FTC was able to recruit more skilled attorneys than it had previously.82 
 
 On the whole, the FTC’s current structure of operating units has worked well.  
The external consultations with foreign agencies revealed many instances in which other 
                                                 
76 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND 
ANTITRUST POLICY 113 (1980); FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1954, at 7-8 (1955), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1954.pdf. 
77 KATZMANN, supra note 76, at 113. 
78 Id. at 114-15. 
79 Id. 
80 KENNETH W. CLARKSON & TIMOTHY J. MURIS, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: 
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR 63 (1981). 
81 Id. at 61-62. 
82 KATZMANN, supra note 76, at 116. 
 30
countries have made organizational changes that directly have emulated features of the 
FTC’s existing organization or have been influenced by the FTC’s experience.   
 
More important than the FTC’s organization at any one time has been the 
development of a healthy custom that promotes reassessment and adjustment of existing 
organizational arrangements in light of past experience and emerging needs.  When this 
process has identified possibilities for useful modifications, the FTC’s administrative 
structure and its organization of bureaus have proven to be highly adaptable and flexible.   
New divisions or other subunits can be, and have been, created in response to changes in 
marketplace conditions or perceived agency needs.   
 
Four recent examples illustrate how the agency has upgraded its structure in order 
to carry out its mission more effectively.  In 2004, BCP established a Criminal Liaison 
Unit (“CLU”) to work with federal and state law enforcers to facilitate criminal 
prosecution of pernicious forms of fraud.  In 2006, the Commission established the 
Office of International Affairs, mentioned above, to improve the coordination of 
international matters within the agency and to provide a clearer focal point for contact by 
the FTC’s foreign counterparts.  In 2007, the agency altered BCP to form the Division of 
Privacy and Identity Protection out of the Division of Financial Practices.  This move has 
enabled the FTC better to address consumer-related financial-privacy concerns, while 
also improving the focus on the issues that remained in the Division of Financial 
Practices.  In 2008, the Bureau of Economics established a research unit to oversee BE 
research that will have impacts across all areas of enforcement.  Short-term needs, 
moreover, can be met without restructuring, such as when attorneys from one BC 
division are assigned to work on another division’s projects when the ebb and flow of 
work calls for such assignment. 
  
 One roundtable panelist expressed a cautionary note for any agency considering 
changing its structure, observing that when agency restructuring takes place, the agency 
should seek to resolve existing problems, rather than relocating problems from one 
division to another.  He explained:   
 
What you’re striving for, I think, in terms of performance is 
more about building capacity and capacity to do the old 
things in very new, different, agile and better ways.  So, I 
think you have to think about it in those terms.  And in 
some cases, it’s going to be about doing new things that 
need to be done, as well, things you may not have done in 
the past.  But, again, traditional restructuring is not going to 
eliminate those problems.  It’s not going to prevent them 
from reoccurring. The restructuring kind of remedy, again, 
simply relocates problems from one division or one bureau 
or one segment to another.  It really is not the solution.83  
 
                                                 
83 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 14. 
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This comment correctly points out that reorganization by itself cannot solve deeper 
systemic problems that afflict an organization.  Reorganization for its own sake also can 
breed cynicism among career professionals who have watched a long series of new 
agency managers alter the organization chart in ways that yielded few enduring 
improvements in the FTC’s performance. 
 
At the same time, attentiveness to possibilities for structural enhancements can 
lead an agency to solve problems that are rooted in organizational flaws and can help turn 
even good programs into great programs.  This is another area in which the 
Commission’s efforts to benchmark itself with other agencies at home and abroad can be 
highly useful.  Conversations with other federal regulatory commission officials during 
the course of the FTC self-study revealed that, even though the federal commissions 
confronted many of the same operational challenges, sharing across commissions about 
past experience was unusual.  This is an area in which interagency cooperation, either 
informally or within the framework of a memorandum of understanding, could help the 
FTC and other federal commissions share know-how that would improve the 
performance of all. 
 
The same can be said of foreign competition and consumer protection agencies.  
Many foreign authorities are engaged in exciting experiments with new forms of 
organization and new techniques for operational practice.  Careful study of the 
experiences of foreign agencies with comparable mandates could enable the FTC to 
identify potentially useful modifications to its own arrangements.  The potential benefits 
from interagency information sharing warrant the FTC’s efforts to see that multinational 
organizations that address competition or consumer protection issues expand the attention 
they give to questions of agency organization and operations. 
 
B. Looking Ahead:  Significant Issues Involving the FTC’s Structure and 
Operations 
 
The FTC’s self-study consultations demonstrated that organizational adaptability 
and an ethic of continuous institutional improvement are major characteristics of good 
agency performance.  As the discussion above indicates, a useful way to strengthen the 
agency’s effectiveness is to sustain the modern custom of refining the agency’s structure 
and operations.  As they have in the past, the Commission and its operating units can best 
achieve needed refinements through a regular, continuous process of assessment through 
which the Commission and its operating units – using such means including budgeting 
exercises, leadership retreats, and benchmarking with other institutions – seek to identify 
possibilities for improvement. 
 
In this section we present several focal points for refinement.  One involves the 
integration of competition and consumer protection missions within a single agency.  A 
related issue, which the dual mission especially implicates, is communication and 
coordination across agency components.  This is particularly important for the 
nonenforcement activities of the agency, which can be effective tools to shape policies 
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across practice disciplines.  A further significant structural issue is the proper role of 
administrative adjudication in the agency. 
 
1. Integration of Competition and Consumer Protection  
 
Because the core mission of the FTC is to protect consumers by ensuring that 
markets work well, the agency must assess how a government agency can aid consumers 
and the market through its actions.  The ABA Transition Report recently observed, 
“Given our free market economy, antitrust and consumer protection should be recognized 
as critical parts of any administration’s economic policies, and new agency officials 
should not be shy about contributing to discussions surrounding such policies.”84 
 
Shared authority is a common condition of the FTC’s competition and consumer 
protection missions.  The Department of Justice has jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust 
laws, and agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal 
Reserve Board have jurisdiction over some consumer protection laws.  However, the dual 
missions that fall under the “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and “unfair methods of 
competition” standards within the FTC Act make this agency particularly well suited to 
address the interplay between consumer protection and competition.85  The 
Commission’s capacity to meld expertise in economics, competition, and consumer 
protection is a conscious element of its institutional design and a major reason for its 
existence.86   
       
Former Chairman Muris has described the dual missions as complementary 
elements of the same mission:  “The policies that we traditionally identify separately as 
‘antitrust’ and ‘consumer protection’ serve the common aim of improving consumer 
welfare and naturally complement each other.”87  This is because “competition presses 
                                                 
84 ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 12. 
85 Foreign authorities that have a dual competition and consumer protection mandate include the Australia 
Competition and Consumer Commission, the Korea Fair Trade Commission, Colombia’s Superintendence 
of Industry and Commerce, the Jamaican Fair Trade Commission, Peru’s National Institute for the Defense 
of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property, Poland’s Office for Competition and Consumer 
Protection, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission, and the U.K. Office of Fair Trading. 
86 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 134. 
87 Timothy J. Muris, The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection, Prepared Remarks at The 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and 
Policy, at 3 (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/ 021031fordham.pdf.  With 
reference to the Commission’s unfairness jurisdiction, traditionally the most expansive part of its consumer 
protection jurisdiction, Muris gave some examples that show how a choice analysis can work:  “The 
primary purpose of the Commission’s unfairness authority is to protect consumer sovereignty by attacking 
practices that impede consumers’ ability to make informed choices.  Consumer sovereignty may be 
frustrated ex ante if, for example, important information is not provided.  See Labeling and Advertising of 
Home Insulation, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 44 Fed. Reg. 50218 (1979).  It may be frustrated ex post 
if sellers do not honor their contracts with consumers.  See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263 
(1986), aff’d sub nom, FTC v. Orkin, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988).  The three-part unfairness test – the 
injury must be (1) substantial, (2) without offsetting benefits that outweigh the harm, and (3) one that 
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producers to offer the most attractive array of price and quality options,” and “consumer 
protection works to ensure that consumers can make well-informed decisions about their 
choices and that sellers will fulfill their promises about the products they offer.”88  
Former Commissioner Leary has described the two missions as complementary missions 
that address distortions to the supply side of the market in the case of competition and 
distortions to the demand side in the case of consumer protection.89 
 
The FTC self-study consultations abroad revealed similar perspectives.  Sir John 
Vickers, the former Chief Executive of the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, observed, 
“Consumer policy and competition policy are logically and institutionally intertwined.”90  
Vickers described consumer policy as addressing issues of consumer duress and undue 
pressure, prepurchase information problems, and undue surprises postpurchase, and he 
described competition as a means to mitigate these problems.91   
 
A recent symposium on the interplay between competition and consumer 
protection policies also focused on the integration of these two disciplines.92  The 
interplay between the two is widely recognized and takes many forms.  For example, 
some authors have suggested that competition benefits consumers by driving all 
information (including adverse information) out into the open under what has historically 
                                                                                                                                                 
consumers cannot reasonably avoid – specifically is designed to provide a rational, empirical means to 
determine whether the challenged acts or practices interfere with consumers’ ability to make choices.”  Id. 
at 5 n.10. 
88 Id. at 3, 4 (“Competition cannot work effectively unless customers are reasonably well informed about 
the choices before them.  Uninformed choice is not effective choice, and without that there will not be 
effective competition.  Informed choice has two elements í knowing what alternatives there are, and 
knowing about the characteristics of alternative offerings.  In particular, what matters is the ability of 
customers to judge the prospective value for money, for them, of the alternatives on offer.”). 
89 Thomas Leary, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law: Two Wings of the Same House, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1147, 1148 (2005). 
90 John Vickers, FBA, Economics for Consumer Policy, British Academy Keynes Lecture, at 1 (Oct. 29, 
2003), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0403.pdf.  Vickers observed: 
Competition is pro-consumer for the simple reason that rivalry among 
suppliers to serve customers well is good for customers.  In such 
rivalry, the suppliers who serve customers best will prosper and those 
that serve them poorly will not.  By the incentives that this process 
gives to all firms, and by selecting the better from the poorer, efficiency 
and productivity in the economy as a whole are promoted.  This is 
productivity in the properly consumer-oriented sense of Adam Smith: 
“Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the 
interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be 
necessary for promoting that of the consumer.” 
Id. at 4-5 (citing Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations). 
91 Id. at 2-4. 
92 See Paul A. Pautler, Consumer Protection Policies, Economics, and Interactions with Competition 
Policy, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 83 (2008). 
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been called the unfolding principle.93  This happens only if the information is not too 
expensive and if consumers demand it.94   
 
Discussion today about dual-purpose agencies with competition and consumer 
protection portfolios focuses heavily on what form of intervention serves to maximize 
consumer welfare.  One author observes that, although competitive markets generally 
provide consumer protection solutions without government intervention, in some markets 
consumer welfare is not maximized despite a high level of competition.95  For example, 
markets in which some groups of consumers bear the costs of other consumers being 
either over- or underinformed, as well as competitive markets in which additional 
competitors bring new information that adds to consumer search costs in sifting both new 
information and avoiding deceptive claims, may be instances in which competition does 
not actually maximize overall consumer welfare.96  The author suggests that public 
intervention could require certain disclosures that would foster price and quality 
transparency and correct for identified information gaps.97  He qualifies this policy 
suggestion with the admonition that any such policy should be implemented only after 
rigorous study and cost-benefit analysis confirms that such intervention would benefit 
consumers.98 
 
 In asserting that competition and consumer protection policy serve the same 
purpose, former BCP Director William MacLeod has explained the distinction as being 
one of technical form: competition policy seeks to maximize consumer choices while 
consumer protection “seeks to ensure that customer choices . . . are not distorted by 
deception, misstatements or mistreatment of customers.”99  This presents challenges in 
aligning the two policy areas, and agencies need to make the effort to ensure that 
competition and consumer protection policy actions do not run counter to one another.100 
MacLeod states that this ultimately can be achieved when both disciplines place emphasis 
first on consumer interests, without taking away the primary focus of competition policy 
as protecting competition and not competitors.101 
 
                                                 
93 Id. at 87 (citing Howard J. Beales, III, Consumer Protection and Behavioral Economics: To BE or not to 
BE?, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 149 (2008); Paul H. Rubin, Regulation of Information and Advertising, 4 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 169 (2008)). 
94 Id. 
95 Mark Armstrong, Interactions between Competition and Consumer Policy, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
97, 102-12 (2008).   
96 Id. at 112. 
97 Id. at 112-25. 
98 Id. at 144. 
99 William MacLeod, The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies, Contribution from BIAC, 
OECD Global Forum on Competition, at 3 (Feb. 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/56/40080545.pdf. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 6-7. 
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Roundtable panelist Sir Jeremy Lever suggested that consumer protection follows 
as a result of competition policy, and although competition and consumer protection are 
not the same discipline, competent competition agencies may enforce both laws.102  
Lever cited Muris, who has written that the same government agency need not 
necessarily handle competition and consumer issues; “[c]ompetition and consumer
protection agencies, however, should recognize the complementary nature of their 
missions.  Around the world, this recognition is growing.”
 
ote 
ssion 
                                                
103  A recent background n
for an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) discu
examined the tension that exists in comparing the intellectual underpinnings of 
competition and consumer protection policies: 
 
That consumer protection policy and competition policy are 
largely interdependent instruments of economic policy, 
both aimed at serving a common purpose of enhancing the 
efficiency with which markets work, has been stated on 
many occasions and is widely accepted.  It is also widely 
recognized that there can be, and at times are, tensions 
between those policies.  Moreover, as a practical matter, 
there are differences in how those policies work, and in the 
nature of the process by which decisions are taken and 
implemented.  Recognition of these interdependencies and 
of the differences leads naturally to a consideration of the 
institutional arrangements for these policies and 
specifically, of how they should be coordinated.104 
 
A key inquiry for an FTC self-assessment is what level of integration of 
competition and consumer protection activities should exist to best achieve the agency’s 
overall mission.  On this question, a former bureau director and a former deputy director 
both suggested that the FTC has a way to go and that the bureaus are too much like 
“silos” – that is, they operate side by side, but do not interact with each other 
sufficiently.105  To resolve this, former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein suggested that BE 
take the lead in identifying issues that may involve both of the other bureaus and that an 
ad hoc group could be formed to address such issues and come back to the Commission 
with a recommended course of action.106  Similarly, former OPP Director Susan DeSanti 
urged that the Commission establish a centralized structure, such as a policy office, to 
coordinate the research and policy development taking place in the three bureaus.107  In 
 
102 Lever, London Tr. at 137. 
103 Muris, Principles, supra note 17, at 174. 
104 Henry Ergas, The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies, OECD Background Note, 
OECD Global Forum on Competition, at 3 (Jan. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/28/39890230.pdf. 
105 Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 43; T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 90. 
106 Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 37-38. 
107 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 128-30. 
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2007, the FTC did this for international work, integrating the international competition, 
consumer protection, and technical assistance functions into the Office of International 
Affairs.108 
 
The experience of foreign counterparts with integration of competition and 
consumer protection functions may prove useful for the FTC.109  At least 30 agencies 
worldwide have a mix of these duties.  Compared to the FTC, some dual-mandate 
agencies have undertaken more expansive organizational measures to integrate the 
competition and consumer functions more completely.  The most notable is the U.K.’s 
Office of Fair Trading, which in 2006 restructured itself to integrate the agency’s 
competition and consumer protection investigative and policy divisions, with staff 
responsible for both competition and consumer protection matters.  Consultations with 
the OFT suggest that the integration of functions has led to greater consistency in 
outcomes and better use of available tools, with clear benefits in the areas of market 
studies and behavioral economics in particular.110  Other agencies such as the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission integrate competition and consumer policy in 
divisions with specific sector responsibilities.  The Canadian Competition Bureau 
integrates competition and consumer protection by rotating staff between the competition 
and consumer protection divisions.  Equally important is to examine the agencies moving 
away from integration, including the experience of the European Commission, France, 
India, and Japan, where the agencies separated (or are in the process of separating) their 
consumer protection and competition functions, maintaining linkages only at a policy 
level rather than at an operational level.111   
                                                 
108 OIA was established on January 2, 2007.  It brought together the functions and personnel formerly in the 
International Antitrust Division of the Bureau of Competition, the Division of International Consumer 
Protection of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the International Technical Assistance Office of the 
Office of the General Counsel.  The OIA Director reports directly to the Chairman and works closely with 
all of the FTC’s component organizations.  OIA has three Deputy Directors, who are responsible for the 
international antitrust, consumer protection, and technical assistance functions. 
109 The FTC took a leadership role in the multilateral discussion on this topic at a February 2008 OECD 
meeting.  Submissions for this discussion are available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/34/40898016.pdf.  In-depth FTC submissions to earlier OECD programs 
on the linkages between competition and consumer policy are available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/US%20FTC%20paper%20on%20identifying%20and%20tackling
%20dysfunctional%20markets.pdf and http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/Comp-
ConsumerPro%20jnt%20rndtbl_2003%20Oct_US%20paper.pdf.  At the Paris roundtable, Zoltan Nagy 
encouraged the FTC to do more technical assistance in the area of the interface of competition and 
consumer policy.  Nagy, Paris Tr. at 45. 
110 Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008. 
111 For example, as noted above, the European Commission has separate directorates for competition (DG 
Comp) and consumer protection (DG SANCO).  This largely reflects the underlying arrangements in most 
member countries, in which the consumer and competition authorities are separate.  The two directorates 
do, however, coordinate on policy issues, including issues such as e-commerce and consumer redress.  See, 
e.g., Hon. Meglena Kuneva, European Commissioner for Consumer Protection, Consumer and Competition 
Policies – Both for Welfare and Growth, Address before OECD Global Forum on Competition (Feb. 22, 
2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/95&format=HTML&aged=1&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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 Regardless of the variety of arrangements throughout the world, the FTC’s dual-
function structure is a core component of its existence.  The FTC in some ways may be a 
leader in both of these areas.  Continuing, useful focal points of the agency’s attention in 
the years ahead include (1) whether the dual missions are adequately integrated among 
the leaders and staff of the agency, and (2) ways to improve such integration.  In 
additional to its own internal review, there will be much for the FTC to learn from the 
experience of agencies such as Canada’s Competition Bureau and the OFT, both of which 
have undertaken ambitious measures to integrate the two functions.   
 
2. Coordination and Communication throughout the Agency 
 
A longstanding concern of students of public administration is the skill with 
which the individual components of an institution share information with each other and 
otherwise coordinate their activities.  The need to achieve effective intra-agency 
information flows and cooperation is a matter of particular importance for the FTC.  
Among other reasons, this is a function of the Commission’s dual-purpose mission and its 
portfolio of research capabilities and other policy instruments that may be used by 
multiple agency units.  Whether the agency is consistent in communicating the central 
tenets of the competition and consumer protection missions to agency staff and to outside 
stakeholders is an indicator of its likely success in achieving its mission.  
 
Foreign counterparts to the FTC have developed innovative mechanisms to 
encourage internal information sharing.  For example, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading 
has a central “Know-How” team to disseminate agency research, policy efforts, and other 
work.  The OFT also uses a “knowledge sharing board,” which consists of a public folder 
in all staff inboxes where staff can post inquiries to determine who at the agency has 
worked in particular areas or to obtain sample work product from their colleagues.112 
 
 Panelists identified industry self-regulation as an area in which competition and 
consumer protection interests will inevitably intersect and where cross-bureau 
communication may considerably help in obtaining beneficial policy results.113  
Assessment of the competitive restraints that may flow from self-regulation often turns 
on the legitimacy and importance of the consumer protection interest that produced the 
self-regulatory initiative.  The FTC – given the dual nature of its mission – is in a unique 
position to balance the competing interests and promote self-regulation that fulfills the 
consumer protection need without unnecessarily harming competition. 
 
 Panelists also discussed ways to integrate the agency’s disciplines through 
bureaus and offices outside the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection.  For example, former BCP Deputy Director Teresa Schwartz recommended 
that the role of economists in the area of consumer protection should be more pronounced 
                                                 
112 Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008. 
113 See MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 190-93; Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 166, 193-94. 
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in practice, if not in the structure of the agency.114  She also suggested that the FTC 
would benefit from improving its economic tools and analysis with respect to consumer 
behavior and the application of behavioral economics.115   
 
These suggestions are consistent with those made by other commentators who 
encourage more integration of economists in agency activities.  In a recent article, former 
BE Director Luke Froeb, current BE Deputy Director Paul Pautler, and former EC Chief 
Competition Economist Lars-Hendrik Röller discussed the importance of integrating and 
employing BE’s tools in agency decision making at all levels.116  They note that the FTC 
is a functional organization, meaning that it is divided by certain subject areas to 
maximize economies of scale.117  The FTC hires specialized econometricians to analyze 
specific problems and relies on staff economists to provide critiques and assessments of 
cases, as well as to undertake ongoing research.118  The authors posit that the 
disadvantage of this design is in its potential impact on coordination between lawyers and 
economists, which can be fixed with stronger horizontal contacts across practice areas.119  
They concluded that including economists in communication throughout the agency is 
essential in coordinating enforcement and policy decisions.120  Much as Bernstein and 
Schwartz said, Froeb, Pautler, and Röller also suggested that incorporating economists 
into the mainstream workings of the agency both fosters high-quality economic analysis 
and promotes better communication of that analysis to the agency decision makers.121   
 
 Panelists also addressed the diversity of policy offices across the agency.  Susan 
DeSanti, former Director of Policy Planning and then Deputy General Counsel for Policy 
Studies within the Office of General Counsel, explained that there are reasons for the 
existence of each policy office and that each one does slightly different things.122  For 
example, some decentralization may ensure that policy work is more directly related to 
                                                 
114 T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 54-56. 
115 Id. 
116 See Luke M. Froeb, Paul A. Pautler & Lars-Hendrik Röller, The Economics of Organizing Economists 
(Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-18, 2008) (forthcoming 2009 in Antitrust Law 
Journal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155237. 
117 Id. at 8-9. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 12. 
120 Id. at 4-5. 
121 Id.  Until recent years, the FTC’s Bureau of Economics had a relatively unique position vis-à-vis 
economists at many other competition and consumer protection agencies in that the BE Director reports 
directly to the Chairman of the agency and makes recommendations directly to the full Commission.  As a 
result, economist input into enforcement and other decisions is not merely subsumed into recommendations 
controlled by attorneys or case handlers, as is the case at many other agencies.  More recently, a number of 
competition agencies have been adopting the BE organizational model and giving the office of the chief 
economist a direct reporting line to the agencies’ top leadership. 
122 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 152-53. 
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the needs of the agency’s operational units.  DeSanti, however, suggested that the agency 
consider merging all the policy shops together into one.123 
 
 In sum, panelists and other commentators have observed that the FTC can 
improve its performance by building stronger links among the bureaus and other offices, 
such as between competition and consumer protection staff, as well as by including 
economists in all aspects of the agency’s work.  Some panelists suggested that a policy 
office could play a useful role in improving these links and disseminating important 
insights throughout the agency. 
 
3. Placement of Economists within the Agency 
 
As part of the FTC’s functional organization, discussed above, the FTC’s Ph.D. 
economists are organized together within its Bureau of Economics.124  Except for a six-
year period beginning in 1954, the Commission has had a separate economic unit since 
the agency opened its doors,125 and almost all of the economists have been located in that 
organization.  It is only since the 1970s, however, that the unit has been staffed primarily 
with Ph.D.-level economists.126 
 
There are now over 100 competition agencies in the world, many of which have 
Ph.D.-level economists on staff.  The mix of Ph.D.s and undergraduate degree 
economists varies substantially across the organizations.  The larger and more prestigious 
agencies tend to have a more Ph.D.-intensive mix.  In some instances, the economists 
work for attorneys, and in others they are combined in their own subgroup and report to 
economist managers.  Economic resources also can be organized in a hybrid form, in 
which several economists are located in a head office, but economists also are sprinkled 
among the attorney staff with attorney review of economic work.  Variants of this hybrid 
                                                 
123 Id. at 153.  See also Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 136 (questioning the existence of multiple policy shops at 
the FTC). 
124 This does not include a few attorneys in other offices who have a doctorate in economics as well as a 
law degree.  In addition, a few attorneys have substantial graduate training in economics short of a Ph.D.  
125 In 1954, following the transition to the Eisenhower administration, the FTC underwent a reorganization 
and the economists were rearranged along with the rest of the agency.  Chairman Edward Howrey moved 
the subset of economists who worked on mergers out of the Bureau of Economics and into the Bureau of 
Investigation, which put them under the supervision of attorneys working on cases.  This organizational 
structure lasted for six years until Chairman Paul Rand Dixon and incoming BE Director Willard Mueller 
returned to the previous structure.  While they were under the supervision of attorney/managers, the 
economists chafed at being supervised and having their recommendations filtered by attorneys.  For a 
discussion of this period, see FTC Workshop, FTC History: Bureau of Economics Contributions to Law 
Enforcement, Research, and Economic Knowledge and Policy: Roundtable with Former Directors of the 
Bureau of Economics, at 19-20, 24-26, 73-76 (Sept. 2003) (transcript of roundtable) [hereinafter BE 
History Roundtable], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/directorsconference/docs/directorstableGOOD.pdf#page=1. 
126 Jesse Markham has noted that Ph.D.s at the FTC numbered as few as five in the 1940s and 1950s.  See 
Jesse W. Markham, The Federal Trade Commission’s Use of Economics, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 406 
(1964).  The move toward a Ph.D.-intensive staffing model began when Willard Mueller became BE 
Director in 1961.  The transition was largely complete by the latter 1970s. 
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form exist at the Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, and the EC’s DG Comp. 
 
 As at other agencies with staff economists, economists at the FTC provide case 
support; as at some of these agencies, economists at the FTC also provide case evaluation 
and litigation support, and work on competition advocacy and policy-related research.  
To a considerable extent, the Commission has come to rely on BE to serve as the 
principal quality control agent with respect to the assessment of proposed enforcement 
measures.  BE very capably analyzes the economic strengths and weaknesses of proposed 
cases, but it is not well disposed by training and experience to assess litigation risk.  The 
Commission would be well advised to consider broader use of devil’s advocate panels 
within the Bureau of Competition, a device the agency has used from time to time to test 
the quality of suggested enforcement matters.  
 
Some agencies separate the case evaluation function to be done by a stand-alone 
set of reviewers (sometimes called a “second pair of eyes”).  These “scrutiny panels” 
ordinarily involve peer review internally by a team of economists and attorneys.  Variants 
of this approach are employed by DG Comp and the Office of Fair Trading.  In others, 
like the FTC, the case support and case evaluation are combined in a “two hats” approach 
in which case evaluation and case support are both done by the same individual.127 
 
Froeb, Pautler, and Röller note that the optimal form of economist organization 
depends in large part on what the decision makers want and what the task is.  Team 
organization, which provides the strongest links among the various members, is clearly 
optimal for litigation support, where intense focus and speed are often required and 
policy analysis is a secondary goal at best.  In that situation, the goal is simply to win the 
litigation game, which explains why attorney-led teams typically have been used for 
litigation. 
 
For case analysis, decisions about bringing cases, and policy R&D, however, the 
FTC’s existing model is more likely to provide the ultimate decision makers with high-
quality economic analysis and relevant information focused on questions of interest to 
those decision makers.  For these purposes, subordinating the economists to attorney 
managers is likely to improve the coordination and agreement between the economist and 
her manager, but it is also likely to have deleterious long-run effects of at least four 
forms: (1) the loss of influence or “voice” of economics on policy and case selection, (2) 
loss of an alternative information flow to the decision makers, (3) poorer staff skill 
retention, and (4) inefficient use of economists with specialized skills or knowledge.   
 
The existence of specialized skills – for example, expertise in vertical theory, 
game theory, dynamic factors, econometrics, and specific industries – implies that 
                                                 
127 The DG Comp approach (and that of the U.K. OFT) is sometimes a bit more nuanced.  The Chief 
Economist’s office might assign one of its economists to the case team.  In that instance, that individual 
would wear both hats; but the staff economist on the case team would wear only the case support hat. 
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economist staff should not be assigned to individual shops.  Centralization allows the 
agency to make better use of specialized skills across the alternative uses.128 
 
4. Administrative Adjudication   
 
Under Section 5(b) of the FTC Act, the Commission may challenge unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition through administrative 
adjudication.129  When the Commission determines that there is “reason to believe” that a 
law violation has occurred, the Commission can vote to issue a complaint setting forth its 
charges.  If the respondent elects to contest the charges, the complaint is adjudicated 
before an ALJ in a trial-type proceeding conducted under the Commission’s Rules of 
Practice.  The matter is prosecuted by FTC “complaint counsel,” which consists of staff 
from BC, BCP, or a regional office.  Upon conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ issues an 
initial decision setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
recommending either entry of an order to cease and desist or dismissal of the complaint.  
Either complaint counsel or respondent, or both, may appeal the initial decision to the full 
Commission. 
 
Upon appeal of an initial decision, the Commission receives briefs, holds oral 
argument, and thereafter issues its own final decision and order.  The Commission’s final 
decision is appealable by any respondent against which an order is issued.  The 
respondent may file a petition for review with any court of appeals within whose 
jurisdiction the respondent resides or carries on business or where the challenged practice 
was employed.  If the court of appeals affirms the Commission’s order, the court enters 
its own order of enforcement.  The party losing in the court of appeals may seek review 
by the Supreme Court.130 
 
 Panelists shared a variety of opinions about the administrative adjudicatory 
process, and many suggested modifications to modernize and make the system more 
effective.  Former General Counsel Stephen Calkins observed that elimination of the 
administrative adjudication feature would undermine the Commission’s special role.131  
Calkins explained: 
 
[O]ne of the alleged comparative advantages of the 
Commission is that it can be an adjudicative body.  And I 
do think that it is – it’s important for this agency to get it 
                                                 
128 One way to try to overcome some of the costs caused by scattering the economists would be to have a 
centrally run economist office responsible for hiring, evaluation, and training, but still retain the assignment 
of individuals to legal shops.  (This is a part of the OFT’s approach.) 
129 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).  Under Section 13(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), the Commission also can seek 
relief in court.  Section 13(b) allows the Commission to seek either a preliminary injunction (in aid of 
administrative litigation) or a permanent injunction (in lieu of administrative litigation).   
130 Additional information regarding FTC administrative adjudication is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm. 
131 Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 105-06. 
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right, to make it work, because it’s one of the reasons we 
have a Federal Trade Commission.132   
 
 Former BC Director Susan Creighton stated that administrative litigation is 
particularly well suited for the most difficult and challenging cases the Commission 
faces.133  Darren Bowie, former BCP Assistant Director, echoed this sentiment, stating:  
 
I think, as technology evolves and consumer protection 
continues to evolve, there are new areas that do require . . . 
thoughtful application of the Commission’s expertise.  
Now, that also assumes that there are ALJs with the 
expertise along the lines of some of the earlier discussion.  
But I do think there is a place for Part III in consumer 
protection in these new areas.134   
 
Some panelists suggested that administrative adjudication is not the proper forum 
for the FTC to pursue cases, as the process of having the FTC both issue the complaint 
and then become the appellate tribunal creates an appearance problem.  For example, 
former BC Director William Baer suggested that there is an inherent problem when the 
process appears tilted as there is a reduction of the deference that a court would 
eventually pay to the FTC on appeal.135  Former BC advisor Thomas Krattenmaker said 
he generally favors administrative adjudication but is concerned about the system’s 
general effectiveness not only to assess critical facts but also to shape competition 
policy.136  He pointed out that there sometimes is an appearance that outcomes are 
predetermined because the Commission acts as judge and jury relative to the complaint 
that the Commissioners themselves issued.137   
 
Another criticism of FTC administrative adjudication involves the time it takes to 
complete the proceedings.  Janet McDavid said that the slow pace of the proceedings 
undermines the effectiveness of administrative adjudication.138  Baer suggested that the 
process needs to become faster – by eliminating steps, making the Part III process more 
focused, and reaching final agency decisions in a more timely fashion.139  Thomas 
Campbell echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the process “takes forever” to yield 
                                                 
132 Id. 
133 Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 77-79. 
134 Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 106. 
135 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 102-03.  Baer emphasized this issue in the context of appointing a Commissioner to 
serve in the capacity of an ALJ.  Although Baer recognized that the Administrative Procedure Act and the 
FTC Rules of Procedure permit this practice, he expressed the concern that a Commissioner who has had a 
role in evaluating the case serving as an ALJ adversely affects the perception of impartiality.  Id. 
136 Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 100. 
137 Id. at 100-01. 
138 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 103-04. 
139 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 99-100. 
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results.140  Bowie, however, pointed out that federal court consumer protection litigation 
also can be very slow for nonfraud cases.141  Furthermore, despite the time it takes, Baer 
stated that Part III as a process is helpful and does affect business practices, regardless of 
outcomes.142  Krattenmaker suggested that the agency modernize Part III adjudication by 
adopting a policy of issuing narrow complaints with several determinations of fact 
already in place, setting strict instructions to ALJs to resolve specific disputes on facts, 
and keeping the process on a tight time frame.143  Krattenmaker offered that modifying 
the system by narrowing the scope of the factual questions in cases may make it a more 
useful policy device.144   
 
The Commission recently has adopted wide-ranging amendments to its rules of 
practice intended, in part, to expedite administrative litigation.  Among other things, the 
new rules set a default time line (subject to modification in appropriate cases), 
anticipating that cases will go to trial within eight months of the Commission’s 
complaint, with merger cases in which the Commission sought a preliminary injunction 
going to trial within five months.  The rules also set a timetable for the Commission to 
decide cases within the former scenario within 100 days after the ALJ’s initial decision, 
and the latter within 50 days.145 
  
Panelists also discussed ALJ expertise in handling the types of administrative 
cases before them.  Baer explained that the selection process is not designed to choose 
experts in competition or consumer protection law, but rather to appoint independent fact 
finders that may actually have little expertise in the areas of FTC enforcement.146  
Campbell expressed concern that the lack of relevant expertise on the part of the ALJs 
created a lack of confidence in their findings by the Commission.147  He claimed that, 
unlike a federal or state court judge who is given deference on findings of fact, ALJs are 
not necessarily afforded such deference, as there have been several cases in which the 
Commission has outright rejected the ALJ’s findings of fact.148  This observation 
supports the sentiment expressed by other panelists that the issues presented to ALJs 
should be narrow questions of fact rather than expansive legal and policy questions.149  
Former BC Director Richard Parker echoed concern over ALJ selection and offered a 
                                                 
140 Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 110. 
141 Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 105-06.     
142 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 100 (explaining that despite the adverse result in FTC v. Schering-Plough, pursuing 
the action was important for policy reasons). 
143 Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 101-03. 
144 Id. at 101. 
145 The proposed revised rules and comments on such rules are available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/P072104nprmpt3.pdf. 
146 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 100. 
147 Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 112-13. 
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149 Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 101. 
 44
solution to improving the ALJ ranks by drawing on antitrust and consumer protection 
attorneys to act as ALJs.150  It bears noting, however, that the ALJ selection process is 
dictated by government-wide requirements and not by FTC rules or policy.    
 
Looking ahead, the agency should determine what role Part III adjudication 
should play in advancing competition and consumer protection law enforcement and 
policy.  In particular, the agency should consider when administrative adjudication is 
most appropriate, as well as ways to improve the adjudicatory process. 
                                                 
150 Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 103-04.  In this vein, in its 2008 transition report, the American Antitrust Institute 
(“AAI”) has called for the next administration to select ALJs with prior experience in economics and 
antitrust, and recommended that the agency include ALJs in training efforts to build their knowledge in 
these and consumer protection areas.  See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE 
AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 185 (2008) [hereinafter AAI TRANSITION REPORT], available at 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/transitionreport.ashx. 
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III. Agency Resources 
 
The FTC’s ability to achieve its mission depends in significant part on its 
allocation and management of personnel, capital, and information resources.  As one 
commentator recently observed, “The failure to maintain adequate financial and human 
resources impedes the [FTC’s and DOJ’s] activities on a number of fronts.”151  This 
chapter examines how these three factors can broadly affect agency performance.   
 
A. Personnel 
 
How the FTC approaches recruiting, training, and retention of talented and 
competent personnel bears significantly on the agency’s ultimate success.  As roundtable 
panelists and commentators have discussed, a recurring topic in agency assessments is 
the caliber of the agency’s professional staff.152  One panelist emphasized the importance 
of having a competent staff153 and observed that the agency needs to be “on top of [its] 
game” in hiring.154  FTC leadership has made recruiting highly competent staff a high 
priority for the agency.155  In recent years, the agency also has established new programs 
to provide individual career development counseling to enhance the skills of its attorneys, 
economists, and administrative professionals. 
 
A related issue is determining by what criteria one should assess candidates for 
FTC employment.  There does not appear to be any single objective criterion to 
determine whether or not staff is highly competent and skilled, although the factors likely 
include some combination of educational background, relevant industrial or practical 
experience, willingness to receive training, and a strong interest in the subject matter of 
the agency’s work.  Determining the ideal balance of these criteria has been the focus of 
recruiting efforts at various times in the FTC’s history, and it has been altered at times to 
                                                 
151 ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 12. 
152 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION 32-34 (BNA 1969) [hereinafter 1969 ABA REPORT].  In evaluating the agency 40 years ago, 
the ABA expressed concerns about hiring practices at the FTC when a director in the Bureau of 
Competition explained that he sought to hire attorneys “[w]ho had been out in the world for ten years or so 
and had come to appreciate that they were not going to make much of a mark – because they tended to be 
loyal and remain with the FTC.”  The ABA recommended that the hiring process be dramatically 
overhauled.  Id. 
153 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 39 (explaining: “You’ve really got to have the people and the capabilities, with the 
right skills and the right experience in the right place here to get on with those outcomes.  And that’s a huge 
challenge that is affected by, in many cases, limited FTE[s] or limited dollars.”). 
154 Id. 
155 See, e.g., Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 850 (Pitofsky discussing responses of 
the agency to the concerns raised by the 1969 ABA Report); Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 30-31.  This theme was 
echoed in the 2008 AAI Transition Report, which raised a concern relative to lawyers and other 
professionals and suggested that, as many senior career people approach retirement, given the income 
disparity between government and private sector employment, the agency needs to be cognizant of how it 
will recruit talented professionals in the future.  See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 150, at 188. 
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address specific needs relative to the agency’s agenda.156  Given the evolution of 
competition and consumer protection policy, and changes in the tools of economic 
analysis, any self-assessment should consider how the agency can recruit and retain well-
trained personnel in relevant areas of expertise, as well as how the agency trains and 
educates its existing staff to remain current in such areas. 
 
One challenge to the agency’s ability to recruit and keep professional staff is that 
the FTC, as a government agency, faces significant competition from private sector 
employers who typically can offer higher wages.  The agency should continue to engage 
Congress in a discussion about the possibility for augmenting the existing federal pay 
scale to enable the FTC to make salary-based departures to the private sector less 
frequent.  There is serious question about whether the Commission’s capacity, and that of 
other public agencies in the United States, can be sustained at acceptable levels if 
compensation levels are not increased substantially. 
 
To offset this pay disparity and recruit talented professionals, many panelists 
suggested that the FTC employ a combination of first-rate training and ample 
opportunities for staff to apply their skills and knowledge in interesting and innovative 
legal and policy areas.  Former BCP Deputy Director Teresa Schwartz discussed how it is 
important to encourage staff to learn new things and to afford them opportunities to apply 
their skills.157  Staff exchanges, as discussed in Chapter IV.D, are an extremely effective 
tool to exchange best practices, solidify bilateral relationships, and strengthen 
enforcement cooperation with foreign counterparts, as well as add to an employee’s 
knowledge base and skills.  Many foreign counterpart agencies use staff exchanges 
extensively as a way to promote staff development.158 
 
Likewise, former BC Director Molly Boast suggested that creating a strong 
training and development program will not only help the FTC recruit talent, but it will 
also serve to improve staff morale and retain talented attorneys and economists at the 
agency.159  The Commission has an extensive training program, including an agency-
wide annual training program for new attorneys and economists.  BCP also has 
implemented its own annual two-day training for new BCP attorneys to help them 
                                                 
156 See Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit, Oral History Project: Robert Pitofsky, 
Esquire 125 (Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Pitofsky Interviews], available at 
http://www.dcchs.org/RobertPitofsky/robertpitofsky_complete.pdf (“I wanted to educate a generation of 
competent lawyers, and I thought bringing in outsiders was the wrong way to do that.  So that’s senior staff.  
Junior staff – we were extremely active in reaching out to the law schools and to young people at law firms 
for exceptional people, and since there was the greatest merger wave in the history of the country going on, 
and much interest in what consumer protection could do about unwelcome phone calls, spam, deception 
and unfairness in the sale of computers, and so forth, it became quite an attractive place for young 
people.”); see also Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 82. 
157 T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 83. 
158 At the U.K. Office of Fair Trading, for example, in Fall 2008 there were 24 individuals visiting the 
agency on staff exchanges, and 17 OFT employees at other agencies.  Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 
2008. 
159 Boast, NY Tr. at 36-37. 
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understand everything they need to know to bring successful BCP cases.  Annually, BCP 
also conducts a two-day litigation seminar at which staff discuss topics such as recent 
cases, litigation developments, electronic discovery, ethics, and other significant 
litigation topics.  BCP management also encourages staff and management to take 
additional courses as needed.  Additionally, BCP established a specialized “training 
academy” for staff that work on financial practices matters to teach topics such as the role 
of federal and state regulators of financial institutions, the mortgage business, 
fundamentals of credit reporting and credit scoring, payment cards and payment systems, 
and the legal framework of credit discrimination.  Similarly, the Bureau of Competition 
sponsors ongoing annual classes for training staff attorneys, which are led by BC 
attorneys, economists and accountants from the Bureau of Economics, and private 
attorneys from around the country.  The coursework includes classes on substantive 
topics such as the merger guidelines, statistics, and accounting, as well as intensive two-
to-four-day practice sessions on depositions, evidence, and trial advocacy.  BE has a 
seminar series that brings in academics doing work on topics of interest to the 
Commission, as well as occasional intensive courses for its staff, such as a recently held 
econometric course.  Also, BE staff are encouraged to pursue research on topics of 
interest to the Commission and to present that work in professional settings, both of 
which serve to enhance staff skills.   
 
 Former BCP Assistant Director Paul Luehr projected that, over time, the 
importance of technical expertise for FTC staff will become more pronounced.160  In 
particular, Luehr foresees an increased demand for attorneys with technical expertise: 
 
I think it’s going to be more technical in terms of the level 
of skills that’s going to be required of the investigators and 
attorneys.  That’s where the marketplace is going and that’s 
going to be a requirement despite all those kids who went 
to law school to avoid math.  I think they’re all going to be 
numerically and technically oriented.161    
 
Luehr forecast that the FTC will grow both in size and stature as a neutral broker with 
respect to consumer data and market analysis, likely resulting in better overall regulation 
and enforcement.162  Another panelist encouraged the agency to direct resources to 
ongoing training to inform staff about complex issues of consumer protection as well as 
technological advances, to stay current on new scams, and to improve investigative 
skills.163 
 
 In the same vein of ensuring staff keep their skills current, former BC Director 
William Baer encouraged better use of the performance evaluation process, suggesting 
                                                 
160 Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 101. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Brauch, Chicago Tr. at 84-85. 
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that the agency consider whether it is a meaningful way to promote the knowledge and 
skill development of staff.164  He favored using the process not solely to reward excellent 
performance but also as an opportunity to promote development in areas in which staff 
performance is “sub-excellent.”165 
 
 The London roundtable involved much discussion about developing talent within 
the agency.  Former General Counsel Debra Valentine advocated that, rather than relying 
too heavily on outside academics to pursue research relevant to the FTC’s mission, “it is 
the agency’s obligation to develop a lot of that talent in-house and not farm it out.”166  
Having economic strength in-house is critical, as former OFT Chief Executive Sir John 
Vickers suggested, for no other reason than to have the ability to appraise critically the 
economic theories brought before the agency by outside parties.167 
 
 External consultations yielded several recommendations on how to improve the 
recruiting, training, and retention of skilled professionals at the FTC.  How the agency 
meets the ongoing challenge of recruiting and retaining talented professionals will be a 
key factor in the agency’s success.  An important step toward meeting this challenge is to 
confront the tension that arises when managers are told to achieve strong short-term 
operational results – for example, winning the case of the moment – and to invest in the 
long-term development of personnel they supervise.  The top leadership of the 
Commission must ensure that incentives for managers related to salaries, promotions, and 
various agency awards reflect the importance to be paid to the career development of the 
professional staff. 
 
B. Capital Resources 
 
 In several respects, an agency’s budget dictates the deployment of its resources 
and thus dictates its ability to achieve its mission.  Assessing an agency’s central 
budgeting concerns and operating principles is an essential component of understanding 
agency policy.168  As one panelist phrased it, “The budget often does . . . associate 
outputs to dollars.  Frankly, that’s okay because there is a relationship there and that 
works.”169 
 
Bernard Martin has examined how federal agency leadership pursues an agenda 
that comports with the expectations of major stakeholders (for example, the executive 
branch) and communicates the agency’s agenda to staff and other stakeholders through 
                                                 
164 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 92. 
165 Id. 
166 Valentine, London Tr. at 76. 
167 Vickers, London Tr. at 78. 
168 See Bernard H. Martin, Office of Management and Budget, in GETTING IT DONE: A GUIDE FOR 
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES 70 (Mark A. Abramson, Jonathan D. Breul, John M. Kamensky & G. Martin 
Wagner eds., 2008). 
169 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 23. 
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the budget process.170  Federal funding resources are limited, fiscal pressures are 
significant, and the sources for agency funding have become broader and more complex.  
Martin makes the point that, despite these pressures and complexities, to be successful, 
any agency leader must recognize that the budget – either one set by Congress or one 
managed within the agency – and policy are inseparable.171  For these reasons, a well-
planned and effective budget policy, including allocations within that budget, is essential 
for the success of any agency.172    
 
 The budget process is one tool with which to highlight a particular type of agency 
activity, such as policy research and development.  Former Commissioner Thomas Leary 
discussed how various programs have greater priority if given greater prominence in the 
agency’s budget.  In advocating for a greater emphasis on agency R&D, he stated:  “I’ve 
always thought if we could rejigger the budget process to make [research and 
development] part of our core mission, I’d do it, just to emphasize how important it 
is.”173  Another panelist echoed this sentiment when he discussed making a priority of 
internal program reviews and evaluations.174  He explained that the success of such 
internal evaluations and their relevance to understanding what the agency has 
accomplished and their impact on future conduct will be directly linked to the budgeta
emphasis they receive.
ry 
ot 
aders.    
                                                
175  Former Chairman Timothy Muris agreed with such sentiments, 
but noted that the budget process is a tool within the Commission that historically has n
been used “effectively” by agency le 176
 
 If, as Bernard Martin has suggested, agency budgets and policies are 
inseparable,177 the FTC’s budget must be able to strike a balance that both reflects agency 
priorities, as expressed to staff and external stakeholders, and is sufficiently flexible to 
respond to circumstances that require a shifting of budgetary priorities.  For example, 
allocation of BCP resources among the many tools with which it pursues its mission –
including enforcement actions, rulemaking, consumer and business education, policy 
R&D efforts, and promotion of industry self-regulation – has shifted at different times to 
meet different agency needs.  Muris discussed how under his leadership privacy-related 
issues required additional resources, and flexibility to deploy budgetary assets to address 
these growing concerns enabled the agency to be on the forefront of many privacy 
issues.178  Baer similarly explained that when he joined the agency in 1995, the FTC had 
 
170 Martin, supra note 168, at 70.  
171 Id. at 71-72. 
172 Id. 
173 Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 27. 
174 Korsun, NY Tr. at 139. 
175 Id. 
176 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 50. 
177 See Martin, supra note 168, at 71-72. 
178 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 41-42, 54-55. 
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suffered a string of defeats in court; he thus sought to shift budgetary funds toward hiring 
specialized lawyers and training more attorneys to improve litigation skills.179   
 
The Commission also can adjust its program priorities rapidly, as needed, to 
address new problems in the marketplace triggered or exacerbated by external events.  
For example, as the crisis in the housing market deepened, various businesses emerged 
with false promises that they could stop foreclosure or obtain a loan modification in 
exchange for a large upfront fee; in 2008, the Commission moved quickly to take legal 
action against several such operations, and developed needed educational materials to 
warn consumers how to avoid being victimized by rescue scams and how to obtain 
assistance from legitimate and reliable sources.  Former Director of Policy Planning 
Susan DeSanti also discussed how budgetary resources could be focused to foster better 
sharing of information within the agency to avoid redundancy and ensure that research 
and enforcement resources are utilized most effectively.180 
 
 Drawing from the comments of roundtable panelists and commentators more 
generally, an analysis of the allocation of capital resources must extend beyond the 
simple question of “how much is our budget?”  It needs to assess how the agency 
identifies areas for policy and enforcement emphasis, how leadership sets the policy 
through its budget allocation, and how the agency can adjust to meet challenges presented 
when political, social, and economic changes affecting the agency and its stakeholders 
occur. 
  
C. Information 
 
The Commission needs information to detect problems, investigate them, and 
then, through litigation or otherwise, address them.  Decisions concerning how to allocate 
personnel and capital resources are largely dependent on the information the agency 
obtains regarding marketplace conduct, mergers and other transactions, and legal, 
economic, and technological developments.  How well the agency obtains information, 
the quality of the information it gets, and how it analyzes this information also must be 
considered in connection with the FTC’s effective use of personnel and capital resources.   
 
By the end of the twentieth century, the volume of information coming to the FTC 
regarding potential enforcement targets or areas of concern for consumer protection had 
increased dramatically.181  With the proliferation of telemarketing fraud in the 1980s and 
Internet fraud in the 1990s, the task of receiving and responding to complaints had 
become too large to be handled by attorneys and investigators, whose time was largely 
committed to conducting investigations and bringing enforcement actions.  At the same 
                                                 
179 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 82. 
180 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 130. 
181 Information-related concerns often are framed in terms of whether the agency is getting enough 
information.  One roundtable panelist, however, described the situation today as one of information 
overload, in which agencies have too much information and need to sort through it to determine which is 
useful and which is not.  Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 40. 
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time, the advent of electronic databases enabled information tracking in a way never 
before possible, and the Commission became more active in seeking out information 
about new trends or potential problems before they emerged in the form of consumer 
complaints.   
 
In response to the changes in the form, substance, and volume of marketplace 
information, the FTC opened its Consumer Response Center to fulfill increasingly 
important information gathering functions.  Today, the agency receives and responds to 
thousands of consumer and business complaints or inquiries each week.  Complaints are 
made available to FTC staff and other law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and 
worldwide through the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, a secure online database that 
includes not only complaints received by the FTC, but also by other selected government 
agencies and nongovernmental entities.  The Consumer Sentinel Network is accessible 
only to law enforcement agencies, and about 1,700 such agencies worldwide are 
members.   
 
 Additionally, the advent of the Internet not only expanded marketing venues, but 
also has greatly facilitated advertising monitoring, particularly with the use of search 
tools that can focus on particular products or claims.  Internet “surfs” are now a regular 
activity for BCP investigators, particularly with regard to claims for dietary supplements 
and other health-related products.182  BCP’s investigative leads also come from 
monitoring other media, competitor complaints, referrals by self-regulatory bodies, and 
other sources. 
 
 The Bureau of Competition gathers information about transactions and ongoing 
conduct in the marketplace primarily through specific statutory reporting requirements.  
Its main source of information comes from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act183 requirement that 
merging companies file certain data in advance of consummation.  In general, a filing 
party is required to identify the parties involved and the structure of the transaction as 
well as provide certain documents, such as balance sheets and other financial data, and 
copies of documents that have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
In addition, the parties are required to submit certain planning and evaluation documents 
that pertain to the proposed transaction.  To evaluate such proposed transactions, BC 
often gathers information not only from the merging parties but also from competitors 
and other industry players to discern the competitive status of the industry affected by the 
merger.  Also, on a much smaller scale, the FTC receives information about certain 
settlements between brand-name drug manufacturers and generic drug applicants 
pursuant to Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003.184   
                                                 
182 See also Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 789-90 (“Another creative use of 
technology devised by the Bureau staff was the Internet “surf,” a way to search the online marketplace for 
deceptive practices.  Over my term as Chairman, FTC staff, often in collaboration with many other 
enforcement agencies, conducted dozens of surf days, uncovering and following up on thousands of Web 
sites found to be engaged in deceptive practices.”). 
183 15 U.S.C. § 18a. 
184 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.  
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Apart from statutorily required filings, BC also gathers information to detect and 
investigate possible law violations through complaints from, and inquiries directed to, 
competitors, suppliers, and consumers.185  It is not uncommon for lawyers in the antitrust 
bar to contact the agency on behalf of clients – sometimes in relation to nonreportable 
mergers or other conduct of concern to their clients – and identify conduct that may 
violate the antitrust laws.  (One panelist cautioned against discounting or categorically 
ignoring complaining competitors as a source of case generation, explaining that, 
although not all competitor complaints are legitimate, they are a source of potentially 
useful information.186)  Similarly, members of Congress send constituent complaints to 
BC regarding possible anticompetitive conduct observed in their jurisdictions.  BC also 
uses an email notification system (Antitrust@ftc.gov) and a complaint phone line to 
gather complaints that may warrant BC inquiry.  FTC staff also have created a program to 
monitor competitive conditions in the gasoline industry, and they receive data regularly 
regarding prices and other conditions in the industry.187  In addition, staff can glean 
relevant information from public sources.188 
 
Further, in both the competition and consumer protection areas, the agency gathers 
relevant industry and marketplace information by convening conferences, workshops, and 
hearings to address current and emerging issues in these areas.  Such events have become an 
important means through which the Commission and its staff identify problems and develop 
appropriate responses.  In particular, they have allowed the FTC to solicit the views of 
experts and interested parties outside the agency – including those from industry, consumer 
groups, academia, and other federal, state, or local agencies – to help the Commission better 
understand its role and formulate the most appropriate responses in particular problem 
areas.189 
  
The FTC also obtains information from other competition and consumer 
protection agencies, both foreign and domestic.  Mutual sharing is facilitated by the 
                                                 
185 At one time, the FTC also gathered industry data through other programs, including most notably annual 
line of business program reporting that collected data on the economic performance of large U.S. firms.  
See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 
476-83 (1990).  This program was stopped in the mid-1980s because agency leadership determined that the 
costs of the program outweighed the benefits.  Id. at 480-85. 
186 First, NY Tr. at 61. 
187 BE staff receives daily data from the Oil Price Information Service, a private data collection company.  
Staff receives information weekly from the Department of Energy’s public “Gas Price Hotline,” and also 
reviews other relevant information that might be reported to the FTC directly by the public or by other 
federal or state government entities.  An econometric model is used to determine whether current retail and 
wholesale prices each week are anomalous in comparison with historical data.  Additional information 
regarding this program is available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/gas_price.htm. 
188 For example, former BC Director Richard Parker identified trade press and trade association bylaws as 
sources of potentially relevant information.  Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 74-75. 
189 The FTC’s policy research and development efforts, including the use of such events, are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter V.C. 
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Commission’s broad authority to share information (including most materials subject to 
limits on public disclosure) with domestic law enforcement agencies.190  
 
As to sharing with foreign agencies on competition matters, the FTC shares and 
obtains information from foreign counterparts pursuant to formal and informal 
arrangements that are consistent with the FTC’s statutory obligations of confidentiality.  
Formal arrangements include bilateral cooperation agreements,191 informal arrangements 
under an OECD Recommendation,192 and agreements pursuant to the terms of the 
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (“IAEAA”).193  Absent an 
IAEAA agreement (and the Commission has entered into an IAEAA agreement only with 
Australia) or the consent of the submitter (which is usually forthcoming),194 the 
Commission cannot share most of its nonpublic submissions with foreign enforcers.  
Nevertheless, in addition to publicly available information that the FTC may share with 
foreign agencies, it also shares relevant information that it is empowered but not 
mandated to keep confidential.  Such information can include the fact that an 
investigation is taking place, its subject matter, and agency analysis.   
 
In addition to international information sharing through Consumer Sentinel, the FTC 
shares and obtains information from its foreign counterparts in consumer protection and 
privacy matters both informally and pursuant to formal bilateral cooperation agreements, 
bilateral and multilateral memoranda of understanding and other agreements, and through 
networks such as the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network and the 
London Action Plan.  In 2006, the Commission’s ability to cooperate with its foreign 
counterparts was enhanced by the U.S. SAFE WEB Act,195 which amended the FTC Act.  
This law includes provisions that enable foreign law enforcement authorities and private 
entities more easily to provide information to the FTC in cross-border matters, including 
matters involving assets located in foreign jurisdictions that are subject to recovery by the 
                                                 
190 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 46(f).  Absent the consent of the submitter, however, the Commission cannot share 
submissions under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act with domestic agencies. 
191 The United States has entered into bilateral agreements on antitrust cooperation that provide for 
information sharing with Germany (1976), Australia (1982 and 1999), the European Communities (1991 
and 1998), Canada (1995 and 2004), Israel (1999), Japan (1999), Brazil (1999), and Mexico (2000).  See 
FTC Office of International Affairs, International Antitrust and Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Agreements, http://www.ftc.gov/oia/agreements.shtm. 
192 OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER 
COUNTRIES ON ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1995), available at 
http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/C(95)130. 
193 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212.  The IAEAA allows the FTC (and DOJ) to enter into bilateral antitrust mutual 
assistance agreements with foreign governments that authorize the FTC (and DOJ) to share confidential 
information obtained in investigations and to use its investigatory powers to gather evidence on behalf of 
the other party to the agreement.  See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES 114 (2005).   
194 See International Competition Network, Waivers of Confidentiality in Merger Investigations, § 2.A., at 
3-4, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/NPWaiversFinal.pdf. 
195 U.S. SAFE WEB Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-455, 120 Stat. 3372 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Commission.  The U.S. SAFE WEB Act also enables the FTC to obtain information for 
foreign consumer protection agencies and to share with such agencies most information 
otherwise subject to prohibitions on disclosure.196 
 
 Of course, like other enforcement agencies, the FTC also has enforcement-related 
authority to issue compulsory process, such as subpoenas and civil investigative 
demands.  Apart from a particular investigation, however, the FTC also has unique 
powers to obtain information – in both competition and consumer protection matters – 
pursuant to Section 6 of the FTC Act.197  Specifically, Section 6(b) empowers the 
Commission to require the filing of “annual or special . . . reports or answers in writing to 
specific questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about “the organization, 
business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations, 
partnerships, and individuals” of the entities to whom the inquiry is addressed.198  The 
Commission’s 6(b) authority enables it to conduct wide-ranging economic studies that do 
not have a specific law enforcement purpose.  Section 6 also authorizes the Commission, 
subject to applicable confidentiality constraints, to “make public from time to time” 
portions of the information that it obtains, where disclosure would serve the public 
interest.199  Such disclosure typically takes the form of a report issued by FTC staff or the 
Commission. 
 
The FTC used its 6(b) authority in several recent competition research efforts.  
For example, former Chairman Robert Pitofsky signed the 6(b) orders in April 2001 that 
led to a 2002 report on generic drug entry.200  Other studies in which 6(b) orders were 
used include the 2005 study of pharmacy benefit managers and the impact, if any, of 
mail-order pharmacy ownership,201 and a 2006 report on gasoline pricing manipulation 
                                                 
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(f)(2) (confidentiality of material obtained from a foreign source); id. § 57b-2(b) 
(exemption from liability for voluntary provision of information); id. §§ 46(f), 57b-2(b)(6) (authorizing 
certain sharing with foreign authorities); id. § 46(j)(4) (international agreements). 
197 15 U.S.C. § 46. 
198 Id. § 46(b). 
199 Id. § 46(f).  Section 6(b) also allows the Commission to obtain answers to specific questions as part of 
an antitrust law enforcement investigation, where such information would not be available through 
subpoena because there is no document that contains the desired answers.  Id. § 46(b).  Confidentiality 
constraints often can be satisfied by publishing data in aggregated or anonymized form. 
200 FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.  See Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra 
note 27, at 777 (“In 2000 Bob reinvigorated the use of Section 6(b) authority and began the FTC’s 
influential study of entry by generic drugs.  The study helped generate cases and resulted in a report . . . 
whose recommendations received a highly public endorsement from the President, induced regulatory 
reforms at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and inspired legislative amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act.”). 
201 FTC, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER PHARMACIES (2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf. 
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and post-Hurricane Katrina gasoline price increases.202  In addition, the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection recently used such 6(b) special orders to obtain data from 44 food 
producers to measure the extent of food marketing to children and adolescents,203 and 
from 12 alcohol suppliers to examine the placement of alcohol ads in various media.204 
 
Whether the FTC uses its 6(b) authority in a particular context depends on 
whether there are important policy topics that require investigation that could not be done 
with publicly available or voluntarily submitted data.  Certainly, responding to 
compulsory process requests (or even voluntary requests) may be a costly process for the 
respondent firms, and using the process can be time-consuming for the agency.  It is, 
therefore, not undertaken lightly.  Although recent use of the technique has been valuable 
to the agency in gathering relevant information, the benefits of any particular study are 
hard to estimate.  As a result, any cost-benefit analysis involving the use of the agency’s 
6(b) powers necessarily involves a careful consideration of the burdens imposed on 
recipients of 6(b) orders, as well as the appropriate amount of agency personnel and 
capital resources to devote to such efforts. 
 
Roundtable panelists provided several observations and recommendations regarding 
the FTC’s information collection efforts.  Beyond the formal methods discussed above, 
panelists identified other means to obtain relevant information and data on emerging issues in 
support of potential enforcement actions.  Former OPP Director Susan DeSanti described 
how, following a staff meeting at which an information gap in an area under investigation 
was identified, one staff member simply reached out to another federal agency (outside the 
FTC’s traditional jurisdiction) and forged an agreement to gather the necessary information, 
thus allowing the FTC to pursue a particular item on its enforcement agenda.205  Former BC 
Assistant Director Joseph Kattan suggested improving information analysis by linking more 
closely the enforcement mission with the research mission, and tapping economics 
departments outside the agency to help produce this work.206  Rebecca Fisher from the Texas 
Attorney General’s office discussed how information is shared between the state attorneys 
general and liaisons at the FTC, which has helped both entities learn about conduct and share 
research and insights relative to issues important to both groups’ constituents.207 
 
                                                 
202 FTC, INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICE MANIPULATION AND POST-KATRINA GASOLINE PRICE 
INCREASES (2006) [hereinafter FTC POST-KATRINA REPORT], available at 
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204 FTC, SELF-REGULATION IN THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 ALCOHOL SELF-REGULATION REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/06/080626alcoholreport.pdf. 
205 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 132. 
206 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 140. 
207 Fisher, 7/29 DC Tr. at 194. 
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Information is one of the essential resources of the agency, and, as discussed 
above, the Commission has several methods to gather and analyze information needed to 
establish and pursue its priorities.  Given the ongoing shifts in technology and data 
creation, however, the agency must continually evaluate its methods of obtaining the 
information necessary to maintain its effectiveness. 
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IV. The Agency’s Relationships 
 
The FTC has significant relationships with various types of external entities, 
including stakeholders and enforcement partners.  The Commission is subject to 
oversight by Congress, which can legislate particular tasks, obligations, or limits on its 
activities.  In part because of concurrent jurisdiction or related interests, the FTC 
interacts, in various ways, with federal, state, and foreign authorities.  In addition, the 
FTC’s broad jurisdiction over consumer protection and competition matters affects a 
wide array of industries and actors, making quite diverse the interests of consumer and 
business groups – and individual consumers and businesses – affected by the agency.  
Finally, relations with academia can substantially assist the Commission in fulfilling its 
mission.    
 
Former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein explained that maintaining relationships 
with state agencies, congressional committees, consumer groups, industry groups, and 
others is essential to ensuring that stakeholders in the FTC have access to the agency.208  
Panelist Jonathan Breul also observed that networking and relationship building is an area 
of growing importance, and the degree to which an agency incorporates good networking 
into its practices may signal its ultimate success.209  Breul also suggested that these 
relationships can help the agency anticipate surprises and that the FTC should have the 
ability to identify the stakeholders on any given issue.210   
 
 Three major policy considerations dictate extensive and augmented efforts by the 
FTC to build better links to other agencies.  The first is that problems in economic 
performance that the FTC observes sometimes may be rooted in the policy choices of 
other government bodies.  The first-best solution to an observed problem may be an 
adjustment in another policy regime.  Closer relations with the relevant agencies can 
assist the FTC in encouraging other government bodies to make the desired policy 
change. 
 
 A second consideration involves the fact of shared or concurrent authority for 
specific forms of intervention.  For the sake of clarity in public policy and predictability 
for business managers, it is helpful for agencies with shared responsibilities to converge 
on superior analytical techniques and to adopt procedures that minimize compliance 
costs. 
 
 The third consideration is that collaboration among agencies may achieve results 
that initiative by a single body cannot attain.  For example, cooperation among 
                                                 
208 Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 56-57. 
209 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 41-42.  See also ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 173-76 (2004) 
(discussing networks and competition policy); Fox, NY Tr. at 107 (same). 
210 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 41-42; see also Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 56-57 (“I think it is probably implicit 
that it is absolutely essential for the Commission to have, I think, ongoing consultations with state agencies, 
with Congressional committees, staff and so forth, and with consumer groups and industry groups as 
well.”). 
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government bodies, particularly in matters of international commerce, may be essential to 
address phenomena that cross the boundaries of authority imposed on any single agency.  
Information sharing and common planning also may enable government bodies to pool 
resources and undertake more ambitious efforts to detect and prosecute improper 
conduct, or to diagnose the causes of apparent shortfalls in economic performance.  
Effective cooperation can be a major source of improved productivity among regulatory 
authorities and may be a necessary means for such bodies to meet the demands they face 
today amid intense pressure to achieve more with the same amount of resources. 
 
This chapter examines how the agency can work with all of these actors, as well 
as what steps the FTC may undertake to improve and enhance relationships that can build 
and maintain support for the FTC’s mission, leverage the agency’s resources by enlisting 
others to advance the Commission’s mission, and draw on others to help the Commission 
detect competition and consumer protection problems and conduct its own investigations.   
 
A. Relationship with Congress  
 
As an independent agency created by Congress, the FTC has an important 
relationship with Congress as an institution and with individual members of Congress.  
Primarily through its Office of Congressional Relations, the FTC works closely with 
congressional committees and subcommittees, individual members, and their staffs, 
responding to inquiries regarding competition and consumer protection matters, testifying 
before congressional panels on FTC policies and programs, preparing reports for 
Congress, and providing congressional staff with the FTC’s free consumer publications 
for distribution to their constituents. 
 
A number of panelists stressed the importance of the FTC managing carefully its 
relationship with Congress.  One way to envision the FTC’s work is that its activities 
involve either accumulating political capital or spending political capital.  In choosing 
new programs, the agency must be attentive to the balance of its political capital account.  
An agency that chronically runs major deficits is likely headed for trouble. 
 
Panelist Jerry Ellig explained that the success of the FTC lies in maintaining 
strong congressional relationships, which can be forged through the FTC explaining to 
members of Congress that the success of the FTC’s mission is good politics for the 
members.211  Anna Davis, the former Director of the FTC’s Office of Congressional 
Relations, agreed with Ellig regarding the need to inform members of Congress that FTC 
success is their success.  Davis noted that one of the challenges the FTC faces is 
educating congressional stakeholders on the value to consumers of the agency’s 
competition mission.  Fundamental consumer protection concepts – such as stopping 
deception and fraud – are straightforward and their value to constituents is more 
obvious.212  As Davis noted, however, the ways in which consumers benefit from 
competition in the marketplace is not always readily apparent: 
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One of the favorite calls I ever took when I was in the 
Congressional Relations Office was a [congressional] staff 
person called up and said, I heard from a constituent and he 
is very upset about gas prices.  And I said, yes, ma’am, I 
know there is a lot of that going around.  And she said, 
well, he is complaining because he has to drive around all 
over the place, all of the gas stations in his city have 
different prices and he has to drive around to find the 
lowest.  Can’t you make them all the same?  So, it was sort 
of hard to know how to answer that and sound respectful.  
But that is a piece of it . . . .213 
  
Davis also explained that nurturing congressional relationships also requires 
managing staff turnover.  Her office took active steps to establish and maintain regular 
communication with congressional offices to mitigate the possible adverse effects of 
disruptions arising from staff and congressional turnover.214  As an example of the need 
to maintain ongoing relationships with Congress, Davis pointed to the efforts her office 
made on the U.S. SAFE WEB Act, which involved many years of work with several 
congressional staffs to get the bill passed.215 
 
 The maintenance of good relationships with key legislators and committees can 
be complicated by the dynamic nature of the political process.  Changes in aggregate 
congressional preferences over time may mean that the legislators who currently review 
and critique the Commission’s projects are not the legislators who encouraged the FTC to 
pursue the projects in the first place.216  Past experience suggests the need for the 
Commission to carefully monitor adjustments in legislative preferences and to test the 
agency’s assumptions about the degree of congressional support for specific initiatives or 
programs. 
 
B. Relationships with Other Federal Agencies  
  
 Most of the FTC’s dealings with other federal agencies – like most of the 
Commission’s dealings with state and international agencies – fall into two broad 
categories: policy matters and enforcement cooperation.   
 
Due to the wide breadth of the FTC’s activities and overlapping jurisdiction in 
certain substantive areas of the law, the FTC has numerous policy and enforcement 
relationships with other federal government entities, including the Department of Justice, 
the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the federal banking regulators, 
                                                 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 197-98. 
215 Id. 
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the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.  
 
Referring to the importance of relationships with other national agencies, a 
panelist at the Ottawa roundtable stated: 
 
[Another relevant criterion] is the effectiveness of the 
relationships between the antitrust authority or authorities 
and other government authorities, especially those in 
overlapping sectors, be it telecom, transportation, energy 
and so on.  It is critically important, in my view, looking at 
not just our jurisdictions, Canada and the United States, but 
evolving jurisdictions – and China is but one that you will 
know quite well – to try to avoid unnecessary duplication 
and decisions that may be at odds, in whole or in part, [and] 
different processes and uncertainties that result from 
parallel government bodies looking at similar conduct or 
the same transaction.  Ameliorating those differences and 
uncertainties is a sign of great success that an authority 
should recognize.  It is very important to investors and 
business communities and stakeholders at large.217   
 
Through its advocacy program, the FTC advises other federal agencies across a 
wide array of areas, such as food labeling, lending practices, and energy regulation.218  
FTC staff also frequently consults informally with other federal agency staff.  Through 
these formal and informal consultations, the FTC has been able not only to coordinate 
efforts with these agencies but also to influence their work – and secure assistance in the 
FTC’s work – in ways that benefit consumers and competition.219   
 
Relations with other federal agencies are important to the FTC’s consumer 
protection mission because of the overlapping jurisdiction that exists in certain areas (for 
example, the shared jurisdiction over consumer credit with the federal banking agencies) 
and the statutory law enforcement relationships in others (for example, the FTC’s 
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dependence on the Justice Department to pursue civil penalty cases).  The relationship 
between the FTC and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is an example of a 
relationship that is critical for both entities, as well as for each entity’s stakeholders.  
Both the FDA and FTC are committed to protecting consumer welfare and promoting 
competition in the food and drug industries.  The agencies thus have a longstanding 
agreement whereby they coordinate their efforts with respect to the food and drug 
markets.220 
 
 A recent example of effective coordination with another federal regulatory agency 
was the initiation of parallel actions by the FTC and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) against a company charged with deceptive credit card marketing 
targeted to consumers in the subprime lending market.221  The two agencies worked 
together closely, sharing information during their investigations and each using its 
respective authority to address the consumer protection law violations uncovered.  Both 
agencies challenged the practices of the primary credit card marketer (which contested 
the jurisdiction of both agencies).  In addition, each agency also challenged the conduct 
of related entities subject to its particular jurisdiction – banks that issued the credit cards 
were charged by the FDIC and a debt collection subsidiary of the credit card marketer 
was charged by the FTC.  The two agencies coordinated their separate legal proceedings 
and ultimate settlements of the cases.  
 
 The FTC’s Criminal Liaison Unit is another important aspect of the agency’s 
coordination with other government authorities.  The program was created in 2003 to 
spur an increase in consumer fraud prosecutions through more systematic coordination 
between the FTC and criminal law enforcement authorities.  The FTC’s CLU reviews 
current investigations and recent FTC litigation to select those cases that involve clearly 
criminal behavior, provides the relevant information to criminal investigators and 
prosecutors, and coordinates joint investigations and prosecutions.  Since the creation of 
the CLU, prosecutors have indicted 281 FTC defendants, their associates, or others 
investigated by the FTC for consumer fraud.  To date, 191 of these defendants have pled 
guilty or been convicted.  Of the 150 defendants who have been sentenced, 38 have 
received prison sentences of more than seven years.  Moreover, in Fiscal Year 2008, six 
FTC defendants have received sentences of more than 20 years.   
 
 Participants in the international consultations at the OECD Committee on 
Consumer Policy emphasized that collaborative relationships with other governmental 
agencies are critical to developing sound consumer protection policies.  Many of the 
OECD member countries coordinate consumer policy initiatives across their domestic 
government ministries and agencies.  For example, Finland, Japan, and Korea have 
intergovernmental working groups that consult on consumer policy issues and develop 
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multiyear programs.222  Other participants from foreign consumer protection agencies 
emphasized the importance of coordination among agencies that have jurisdiction over 
consumer-related matters from the consumer’s point of view – after all, to a consumer, 
“government is government is government.”223  Participants in the international 
consultations in Mexico City expressed interest in having the FTC serve as an 
intermediary with respect to other U.S. federal agencies (including banking agencies, the 
Federal Aviation Administration, and the FDA) due to the existence of multiple agencies 
in the United States that deal with consumer protection issues.224  These types of issues in 
the international arena point to the importance of strong relationships with other 
consumer-related regulators and law enforcement agencies within the United States. 
 
In the competition area, the FTC’s most central interagency relationship on the 
federal level is with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.  The FTC and 
DOJ have significant overlapping jurisdiction with respect to antitrust enforcement and 
policy.  For example, the agencies share antitrust jurisdiction over most mergers and 
business conduct.225  Given these overlaps, the two agencies have developed premerger 
and enforcement clearance and communication procedures to avoid duplicative 
enforcement in competition matters.226   
 
 The history of the relationship between the two agencies has been marked by both 
agreement and times at which the agencies differed on competition policy.  As a recent 
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example of the former, the FTC and DOJ jointly conducted a workshop, drafted a report, 
and pursued enforcement actions in the real estate brokerage area.227  Similarly, the two 
agencies conducted hearings and issued a joint report relating to conduct in the health 
care industry.228  Other examples of the agencies seeking to identify common ground in 
overlapping enforcement areas include the creation of joint guidelines, such as those 
addressing horizontal mergers, collaborations among competitors, and the licensing of 
intellectual property.229  These reports and guidelines were all prepared jointly by the 
FTC and DOJ and reflect symmetrical thinking with respect to the best enforcement 
policies and practices in these antitrust subject areas. 
 
 There also have been areas of disagreement, which have not only become sources 
of tension between the agencies, but also have created some uncertainty among other 
agency stakeholders.  For example, FTC/DOJ discord arose in 2006, when the U.S. 
Solicitor General, with the assistance of the Antitrust Division, advocated in an amicus 
curiae brief that the Supreme Court deny the FTC’s petition for certiorari in the FTC v. 
Schering-Plough matter.230  More recently, in 2008, after working jointly for several 
months in conducting workshops, the two agencies could not reach agreement on a report 
relating to Sherman Act Section 2 enforcement.  DOJ independently released a report,231 
which the FTC did not join.232    
 
The international consultations focused on the FTC’s relationship with the DOJ, 
and there was consensus that the different approaches (or perceived differences in 
approaches) by the FTC and DOJ significantly reduced the ability of the U.S. agencies, 
individually or together, to be influential in the international arena.233  Regarding the 
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Section 2 report, for example, while a few observers praised the willingness of the 
agencies to air differences of opinion, the vast majority viewed the divisiveness as 
damaging the efforts of the U.S. antitrust agencies to exercise international leadership.234 
 
 For those within the ambit of both the FTC’s and DOJ’s enforcement 
jurisdictions, comity and consistency of views between the agencies is important because 
it provides certainty for consumers and market participants.235  Also, it can allow the 
agencies to operate more efficiently.236  Thus, as the FTC works to improve its 
performance, it should consider how to improve its relationship with the DOJ to enhance 
the clarity, transparency, and consistency of antitrust enforcement.237   
 
C. Relationships with State Agencies 
  
 As with federal agencies, the FTC engages with state enforcers and other state 
institutions to address overlapping issues in competition and consumer protection 
enforcement, as well as policy matters.   
 
On broad policy matters, the FTC often advises state legislatures and agencies 
through advocacy filings.238  Additionally, the Commission sometimes participates in or 
helps organize meetings with the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) 
to address issues of policy.  The first of a series of annual meetings, for example, was 
held on September 21, 2006, when the FTC joined with NAAG to sponsor a workshop, 
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attended by more than 50 representatives of state attorney general offices, on key issues 
in the petroleum industry. 
 
On the enforcement side, comity with state antitrust and consumer protection 
agencies has become increasingly important given state involvement in many federal 
enforcement actions.  Former Chairman Robert Pitofsky described his experience in this 
area as follows: 
 
Building on relations with the state attorneys general that 
Janet Steiger had strengthened as Chairman, we recruited 
partners for dozens of sweeps targeting such frauds as 
bogus scholarship referral services, phony prize 
promotions, worthless diet aids, business opportunity 
scams, so called “credit repair” services, scams targeting 
small businesses, and work-at-home schemes.239 
 
Offering a state enforcer viewpoint, Rebecca Fisher of the Texas Attorney General’s 
office stated that in her experience the FTC has placed significant emphasis on 
developing these relationships to the benefit of the states and the FTC.240  Fisher 
explained that, although communication between the federal and state agencies was weak 
20 years ago, she now has good communication with the FTC, which helps in her state’s 
enforcement work.241   
 
Other roundtable participants stated that the FTC has worked to build 
relationships across boundaries with other enforcement agencies – a natural role for a 
federal consumer protection agency.242  One panelist stated that although the states and 
the FTC are to a large degree doctrinally consistent in their enforcement approaches, in 
his view, the biggest problem is that antitrust enforcement at the state level has become 
more interesting to the attorneys general themselves, which means that decisions about 
enforcement are made at a “political” level rather than an antitrust staff level.243  This can 
make coordination on substantive law more difficult.   
 
Today, the FTC often conducts investigations jointly with state attorneys general 
because both have an interest in the particular merger or conduct at issue.  One panelist 
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endorsed the benefits of such joint investigations on the ground that state AGs are 
uniquely positioned to recover money on behalf of injured consumers.244  Such joint 
investigations may give rise to two possible sources of conflict, however.  First, the FTC 
and the state AGs may disagree on the substantive law and economic analysis that may 
apply to the merger or conduct.  Second, the existence of multiple enforcers may result in 
procedural conflicts or differences that raise the costs for the parties as well as the 
agencies.245  There are ways to minimize conflict, however.  One panelist, a senior 
attorney in the Illinois AG’s office, explained that although FTC attorneys involved in 
joint investigations are not always experienced in working with states, the FTC usually 
makes strong efforts to have someone with experience on such investigations help 
coordinate the matter.246   
 
Some commentators have stated that more should be done to develop FTC-state 
relationships.  The ABA Transition Report described the present state of these 
relationships in competition enforcement as one that “generally works well.”247  
However, the ABA also called for the FTC, DOJ, and the states to place greater emphasis 
on coordinating competition and consumer protection enforcement to avoid redundancy 
and inconsistent enforcement.248  The ABA recommended that the agencies make it a 
greater priority to establish formal coordination protocols and to resolve differences in 
operational procedures, particularly related to merger review.249 
 
Fisher explained that there are opportunities for the agency to work with state 
AGs in consumer and business education and advocated that the FTC take the lead in this 
area in the future.250  The Commission has in fact done so, working both with NAAG as 
well as individual states.251  A New York AG official suggested that potential areas for 
future collaboration between the FTC and the states include green marketing, alcohol 
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marketing, and scrutiny of the relief obtained in private consumer class actions.252  
Former BCP Assistant Director Paul Luehr maintained that there are also new areas in 
which the FTC sometimes should allow the states to “move out in front” and bring the 
first cases; the FTC could then follow the state actions with a federal injunction to ensure 
that there is “a kind of federal bar set across the country.”253 
 
William Brauch of the Iowa AG’s office suggested that the BCP division directors 
make greater efforts to coordinate with AGs’ staff in particular substantive areas.254  
Brauch also discussed how, with respect to specific enforcement actions and general 
policy themes, there is a desire to have state agencies brought into the mix earlier, 
especially when these matters involve overlapping parties.255  In this vein, former BCP 
Deputy Director Teresa Schwartz also suggested that FTC staff receive training and 
broader exposure to other law enforcement agencies, particularly in the area of criminal 
law.256  Fisher also noted that the states have a liaison at the FTC on competition-related 
matters, which has been useful for coordination and planning, and suggested that a 
designated liaison for the states on consumer protection matters may be useful.257 
 
 Disagreements between government bodies will inevitably arise,258 but the 
Commission’s relations with state agencies, like its relations with federal and foreign 
agencies, provide a basis to develop better competition and consumer protection policies 
and to advance enforcement through specific cases.  
 
D. Relationships with Foreign Enforcement Agencies   
 
The FTC has dealt with cross-border commerce for over 90 years; it had an 
Export Trade Division in 1918.259  In recent years, though, building and maintaining 
relations with foreign authorities has become an increasingly critical element of the 
FTC’s programs, including its enforcement program.  In addition to bilateral relations 
with foreign counterparts, the Commission has developed and expanded multilateral 
relations through such organizations as the OECD, the International Competition 
Network (“ICN”), the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and regional organizations such 
as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.  This work has been coordinated through 
international shops devoted to competition and consumer protection, previously located 
                                                 
252 Feigenbaum, NY Tr. at 153, 155-56, 202-03. 
253 Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 41. 
254 Brauch, Chicago Tr. at 78. 
255 Id. 
256 T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 83. 
257 Fisher, 7/29 DC Tr. at 194-95. 
258 Perhaps the starkest divergences between the FTC and states arise in cases involving state regulatory 
bodies that are restraining competition, but may be protected by the state action doctrine. 
259 See FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 
30, 1918, at 37 (1918), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1918.pdf. 
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in the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection and the General Counsel’s 
Office, and, since 2007, consolidated in the Office of International Affairs.260 
 
Among other functions, the former Export Trade Division monitored competition-
related developments in other countries and responded to complaints alleging misconduct 
by domestic firms doing business overseas.261  Today, the Commission engages foreign 
counterparts on policy and enforcement matters.  As the recent ABA Transition Report 
noted, “The importance of international cooperation between antitrust agencies in 
ensuring the effective and coherent enforcement of antitrust laws around the world has 
never been greater or more complex to achieve.”262  The Commission’s strong personal 
relationships with foreign counterparts facilitate international cooperation efforts,263 
which are important because, as one roundtable participant noted, contact at a personal 
level is “a factor that should not be underestimated in how the whole international 
cooperation process works.”264  
 
Given the importance of competition as an organizing principle for economies, 
and given such developments as the spread of competition-based regimes around the 
world, the growth of international fraud in the era of the Internet, and the increasing 
transmission in legitimate international commerce of sensitive data for business purposes, 
creating international questions of privacy and data security, the Commission’s 
engagement with foreign governments on policy matters serves to inform the policy of 
other nations.  By describing how the U.S. agencies approach various issues, the FTC 
hopes to provide useful information for other nations to consider as they make their own 
choices regarding market-based or regulation-based approaches to policy questions.  
 
In addition, given the importance of the exchange of ideas and strategies, these 
interactions with foreign counterparts can inform an agency’s domestic agenda and 
practices.  Consultation participants articulated a belief that agencies become better at 
                                                 
260 See supra note 108. 
261 Among other things, the Export Trade Division monitored foreign developments and investigated 
foreign complaints against American merchants, reporting 50 such complaints in its 1921 annual report.  
FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1921, 
at 63-64 (1921), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1921.pdf. 
262 ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 16.  Indeed, in June 2008, OECD member countries at the 
ministerial meeting in Seoul on the future of the Internet economy recognized the importance of 
international engagement and cooperation and agreed to “[i]ncrease cross-border co-operation of 
governments and enforcement authorities in the areas of improving cyber-security, combating spam, as 
well as protecting privacy, consumers and minors.”  OECD, THE SEOUL DECLARATION FOR THE FUTURE OF 
THE INTERNET ECONOMY 9 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/28/40839436.pdf. 
263 Bourgeois, Brussels Tr. at 95-96.  The management of the Canadian Competition Bureau emphasized 
the importance of this point, given the close relationship between the United States and Canada that affects 
both the competition and consumer protection missions.  Consultation with Canadian Competition Bureau, 
Sept. 17, 2008. 
264 Brandenberger, Brussels Tr. at 91. 
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what they are doing by participating internationally.265  Close relationships often 
encourage both the import and export of best practices.266 
 
Many of the overseas consultations highlighted the need for agency leadership to 
have “empathy” or “emotional intelligence.”267  Jorge Padilla, for example, explained 
this capacity as being able to articulate a message in a way that overcomes the audienc
confirmation bias;
e’s 
                                                
268 Rachel Brandenburger described it as knowing when to lead and 
when to step back and encourage initiatives behind the scenes, stepping on and off the 
gas.269  There was general consensus that when the leadership of the agency has high 
emotional intelligence, is personally, directly, and visibly involved, and is willing to deal 
with international peers one-on-one, it contributes substantially to the effectiveness of an 
agency’s international efforts.   
 
Beyond matters of broad policy, many important FTC cases involve foreign 
parties, foreign-located evidence or assets, or parallel review with other agencies.  Thus, 
effective cooperation with agencies outside the United Sates is a necessity.  Mergers and 
business conduct frequently have adverse effects on competition and consumers in more 
than one jurisdiction.  Cooperation among the affected jurisdictions avoids conflicts in 
enforcement and leads to effective coordination of measures to eliminate such effects.270  
In the competition area, enforcement cooperation between the FTC and foreign agencies 
has occurred most frequently in merger cases;271 while less frequent, there have been 
significant instances of case cooperation in conduct (for example, monopolization) 
matters as well.  In the consumer protection area, the agency has cooperated with foreign 
 
265 See Bourgeois, Brussels Tr. at 94.  Many other participants suggested that agencies, including the FTC, 
must focus resources on imports as well as exports, taking note of better ideas and practices from the rest of 
the world.  See, e.g., Aitman, London Tr. at 140; Whish, London Tr. at 147; Fox, NY Tr. at 99; 
Consultation with Israeli Antitrust Authority, Aug. 19, 2008.  In addition, roundtable panelists suggested 
international ties across agencies in the research area might be useful to produce new knowledge and to 
spread knowledge about the research results that already exist, but are not well disseminated.  See, e.g., 
Sanderson, Ottawa Tr. at 62-64. 
266 Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 120.  See also ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 16 (“A key 
objective of international cooperation between antitrust agencies is to achieve convergence as far as 
possible (taking into account differences that might exist in each jurisdiction), in rules and standards of 
review and remedies in order to facilitate the conduct of business in the marketplace.”).  
267 See also SLAUGHTER, supra note 209, at 4 (“In a world in which their ability to use hard power is often 
limited, governments must be able to exploit the uses of soft power: the power of persuasion and 
information.”). 
268 Padilla, Brussels Tr. at 108-09. 
269 Brandenberger, Brussels Tr. at 95.  See also Bourgeois, Brussels Tr. at 125; Koponen, Brussels Tr. at 
126. 
270 See supra Chapter III.C for a more detailed discussion of the FTC’s efforts to gather information from 
foreign authorities. 
271 Recent matters in which the Commission cooperated with foreign authorities include the 
Google/DoubleClick and Owens Corning/St. Gobain merger cases.  See FTC, THE FTC IN 2008: A FORCE 
FOR CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION 59-60 (2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/ChairmansReport2008.pdf. 
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authorities on a variety of cases involving cross-border issues, including consumer fraud.  
One area in particular – telemarketing fraud – has resulted in considerable cooperation 
between the FTC and Canadian authorities.272  International cooperation also has 
emerged as a critical tool for investigations involving spam, spyware, and other online 
threats.273  The FTC has cooperated with foreign counterparts on a number of matters 
implicating consumer privacy and data security issues and continues to develop its 
relationships with foreign authorities to enhance cooperation in such cross-border 
matters.274 
 
As indicated above, the level and quality of interaction is determined in part by 
the rapport agency heads and staff have with their counterparts.  Building relationships 
that facilitate cooperation and exchange, however, can be complex.  As John Fingleton, 
Chief Executive of the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading, explained, “The 
benefits [of relationships with foreign counterparts] are so diffuse, because they arise in a 
case here, a case there[.]  [T]hey turn out to be enormously valuable, but in actual fact it 
is very difficult ex ante to identify that.”275  Moreover, these relationships require 
significant investment.  Fingleton continued, “[A] lot of the work that goes on is not just 
about best practice and importing that, but actually having that infrastructure [of agency 
relationships].  You need more lattices than the bare essentials to deal with the fact that 
people change, and the number 2s and the number 3s need to know each other because 
they will be the number 1s in many instances later.  So you do need to overinvest I think 
in [the] capacity for that, and that is a difficult thing to justify.”276   
 
Another important way in which the Commission works with foreign colleagues 
is by providing technical assistance to both younger and more mature agencies.  
Technical assistance projects and programs can allow an agency to improve its 
relationships with foreign counterparts and provide a significant opportunity to engage in 
                                                 
272 The FTC is a participant in six mass-marketing fraud enforcement partnerships with other federal, state, 
provincial, and local law enforcement agencies from the United States and Canada.  One recent example of 
effective cooperation among U.S. and Canadian authorities involved 180 law enforcement actions brought 
by authorities in both countries, including the FTC, which targeted deceptive telemarketing practices.  See 
FTC Press Release, FTC Announces “Operation Tele-PHONEY,” Agency’s Largest Telemarketing Sweep 
(May 20, 2008), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/telephoney.shtm. 
273 One example is the FTC’s recent lawsuit against an international spam e-mail network, which involved 
cooperation from law enforcement authorities in Australia and New Zealand.  See FTC Press Release, FTC 
Shuts Down, Freezes Assets of Vast International Spam E-Mail Network (Oct. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/herbalkings.shtm. 
274 For example, in 2007, through an OECD Recommendation, the FTC and its foreign partners called for 
strengthening cooperation among privacy regulators and law enforcement authorities to promote greater 
protection for personal information.  See OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS PROTECTING PRIVACY (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf. 
275 Fingleton, London Tr. at 161. 
276 Id. at 158-59.  Similar statements were made at the consultation with the Canadian Competition Bureau, 
stressing the importance of strong relationships at the case handler level.  Consultation with Canadian 
Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008. 
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the type of export and import activity that promotes cooperation and convergence.  The 
FTC has provided technical assistance to countries in the developing world since the 
early 1990s, primarily using funds provided by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.277  Much of the FTC’s 
assistance has taken the form of placing long-term advisors with newly established 
competition and, in a few cases, consumer protection agencies.  Through the use of long-
term advisors, FTC staff have been able to build professional rapport and be present at 
“teachable moments” and provide assistance in the context of real cases.  In other cases, 
FTC assistance has been in the form of workshops in which we have led officials through 
simulated investigations of competition cases typical of those encountered in developing 
countries or by sharing the FTC’s experience in the application of market-based 
consumer protection law.  In many cases, these seminars are coupled with side meetings 
that allow experts and recipients to interface and delve deeper into significant issues.  The 
technical assistance program serves the agency’s mission by promoting sound practice 
and policy with other agencies to improve multijurisdictional investigations and actions 
and forge better relations at the staff level. 
 
The Commission also participates in exchanges in which staff from one agency 
spend several weeks or months at a counterpart agency, and the international 
consultations highlighted the value of such exchanges.278  Staff exchanges were 
perceived as an extremely effective tool to share best practices, solidify bilateral 
relationships, and strengthen enforcement cooperation with foreign counterparts, as we
as adding to an employee’s knowledge base and skills.
ll 
 
xchanges 
ion.   
                                                
279  Many foreign counterpart 
agencies use staff exchanges extensively as a way to promote staff development, and, as
noted in Chapter IV.D, development of its own staff is another value of such e
to the Commiss
 
E. Relationships with Consumers and Consumer Groups 
 
Consumers are, of course, one of the key constituencies for the FTC.  How the 
agency relates to consumers – either directly or through various consumer and advocacy 
groups – is thus a significant factor in the agency’s ultimate success.  The agency’s direct 
interactions with consumers are largely limited to receiving complaints from consumers 
and issuing educational materials for use by consumers.  A significant means for relating 
to consumers is therefore through interactions with various consumer groups. 
 
277 For Fiscal Year 2008, Congress appropriated additional funds to the FTC, with the recommendation, for 
the first time, that the agency consider funding technical assistance efforts with a portion of the funds.  See 
154 CONG. REC. H16054 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=H16054&dbname=2007_record. 
278 See, e.g., Bloom, London Tr. at 169; Sanderson, Ottawa Tr. at 55. 
279 See, e.g., Nagy, Paris Tr. at 44.  The U.S. SAFE WEB Act enhanced the FTC’s ability to host staff from 
foreign counterpart agencies.  Pursuant to this new authority, the FTC established a formal International 
Fellows Program that allows staff from counterpart agencies to spend up to six months at the FTC, working 
with FTC staff on policy and enforcement matters, and for FTC staff to spend time at counterpart agencies.  
In 2007 and 2008, staff from Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Israel, Australia, and Turkey participated in the 
program, and the FTC sent a staff member to the United Kingdom. 
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FTC advocacy, policy, and education efforts (discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter VI) aid consumers directly and often aid nonprofit and other consumer groups 
advancing similar policies at local levels.  Panelists offered various perspectives on 
consumer-focused information provided by the FTC.  For example, Michael Kaiser of the 
National Cyber Security Alliance (“NCSA”) discussed how his organization benefits 
from the “constant flow of information from the FTC.”280  Kaiser remarked how the 
FTC’s policy and advocacy efforts in the identity theft area have benefitted NCSA’s 
work with local enforcement agencies, particularly with communicating the serious 
consequences of identity theft, which is an issue some other enforcement agencies have 
been slower to address.281  Beau Brendler of Consumers Union stated that his 
organization relies on the FTC for information it communicates to its members and 
clients, be it through websites, blogs, or other publications.282  Panelist Peter Swire, in his 
written comments, also echoed this sentiment and advocated that the FTC continue its 
efforts of preemptive advocacy to prevent harm to consumers – especially in technology 
areas – before they occur.283   
 
Kevin DeMarrais, a newspaper journalist, explained how his column – which 
relies in part on information from the FTC – is not necessarily meant to solve consumer 
problems, but rather to point consumers in the direction of information sources that can 
help solve their problems.284  He sees himself as a conduit both for reporting consumer 
problems and communicating the FTC message to consumers.285  DeMarrais explained 
that his readers follow consumer protection issues, but do not necessarily rely on one 
particular source for information or particularly care what the source of the information 
is.  This makes it incumbent upon the FTC to communicate its message through as many 
outlets as possible.286  Kaiser added that many consumers seem to access the FTC only 
after something bad happens to them (such as identity theft), and therefore for the agency 
to help consumers stay in front of issues, the FTC needs to keep the advocacy groups and 
media meaningfully informed.287   
 
Panelists also stressed the importance of ensuring that the means by which the 
FTC provides its information remain up-to-date.  Brendler explained that websites 
already are becoming passé, and that to remain relevant the agency must not only be in 
front of issues, but be present in the media on which people rely for information.288  This 
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means understanding the different gradations or demographics of consumers, the 
information media on which they rely, and preparing the FTC message such that it can be 
understood in the appropriate format for the targeted consumer.289  Brendler suggested 
that the agency consider social networking because consumers – especially younger 
consumers – obtain their information from newer and nontraditional sources.290  Panelist 
Jerry Cerasale suggested that the FTC continue to evaluate ways it can use up-to-date 
technology, such as Twitter-type services, to monitor current topics directly from 
consumers.291  Other panelists stated that the FTC is effective in getting its message out, 
but cautioned that it needs to be cognizant of the ever-changing media landscape, as it is 
easy to fall behind.292   
 
In addition to getting its message out to consumers, the FTC must consider its 
(two-way) interactions with consumers and consumer groups.  Panelist Ari Schwartz 
opined that the FTC’s outreach to consumer groups has been mixed, at best, and should 
be improved.293  Schwartz went on to discuss how greater transparency of agency 
decision making and the inclusion of interested groups in the process would help in 
making FTC actions more effective.294 
 
 Despite the time and costs such collaboration may require, former BCP Deputy 
Director Lee Peeler suggested that successful enforcement results have significant 
impacts, including profound long-term effects on relationships with nongovernment 
stakeholders who may not even be involved in a particular enforcement action.295  
Similarly, DeMarrais cited instances in which he has seen FTC and private litigation over 
certain issues that expand the exposure of a given consumer problem, and thereby give 
the issue greater prominence, staying power, and ultimately more meaning to 
consumers.296 
 
 Cerasale discussed how consumers can be incorporated directly into FTC policy 
and information gathering through consumer surveys, which not only gather information 
regarding potential fraud and other deceptive practices, but also assess how FTC 
messages are received.297  Doing so in collaboration with consumer groups enables the 
agency to focus on issues that are priorities to consumers. 
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 Panelists suggested that having liaisons within the agency to facilitate 
communication with consumer groups and industry would be a sensible step toward 
building relationships with these constituencies.298  For example, Ari Schwartz endorsed 
the notion of having an “outreach coordinator” to facilitate communications between 
consumer groups and the relevant staff at the FTC.299 
 
The overseas consultations yielded discussions of diverse methods for eliciting 
back-and-forth communication and collaboration with consumer groups and other 
nongovernment organizations.  For example, three times a year, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission convenes a meeting of its Consumer 
Consultative Committee, which includes representatives from 14 consumer organizations.  
The ACCC rotates the location city and pays participants a “sitting fee” as well as 
transportation costs.300  Similarly, the Netherlands consumer agency, the 
Consumentenautoriteit, holds stakeholder consultations twice a year, with consumer 
groups and others, to consult on its annual agenda.301  Japan uses an innovative approach, 
employing approximately 1,100 official “registered consumer monitors” who are hired to 
assist the Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”) in understanding public opinion on 
consumer protection issues.302 
 
In many countries, the government provides financial and other types of support 
for consumer NGOs, which play an important role in shaping consumer policy, helping 
consumers solve problems, and bringing consumer-related legal actions.  For example, 
the U.K. provides substantial financial support to Consumer Focus (a new NGO that 
merged the former National Consumers Council, Energywatch, and Postalwatch), which 
plays an active role in studying and formulating consumer policy, as well as providing 
advocacy on specific issues such as open markets, consumer services, and disadvantaged 
consumers.303  New Zealand’s Ministry of Consumer Affairs organizes and provides 
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training for a network of consumer representatives and also sources nominations for 
consumer representatives to join the boards of other government agencies and 
committees to promote consumer input into policymaking.304  It also has published 
guidelines on consulting consumers.305  This level of involvement on both policy and 
enforcement issues among government entities and consumer groups is a common model 
in Europe as well as Asia and Latin America. 
  
F. Relationships with Market Participants   
 
Industry stakeholders rely on the FTC for information and guidance on 
competition and consumer protection enforcement, regulation, and policy.  In turn, the 
agency can benefit in its work from the insight, expertise, and cooperation of industry 
groups.  Panelists discussed whether the FTC offers useful guidance, whether it gathers 
industry views and suggestions, and whether it coordinates effectively with industry, 
where appropriate.  
 
Brussels panelist Luc Gyselen reported that DG Comp devotes significant 
resources to maintaining relationships to conduct industry-sector research and learn more 
about industry and anticipate potential competition-related issues.306  Along these lines, 
OFT Chairman Philip Collins suggested that the FTC consider having a liaison with 
industries with which it has significant interaction.307  For example, the ACCC maintains 
in its organization business liaisons drawn from outside the agency.  The ACCC 
organizes these liaisons into six specialized consultative committees: consumers, small 
business, franchising, health, infrastructure, and energy.  The committees provide 
feedback on the ACCC’s performance and other issues within each relevant industry, as 
well as a means for the ACCC to communicate with the industries regarding its 
enforcement decisions.308 
 
 One key means of coordinating with marketplace participants is through public 
workshops and hearings.  These events have proved beneficial in collecting relevant 
industry information, establishing enforcement priorities, and influencing policy 
development.309  Workshops in a wide range of areas – from spam e-mail to childhood 
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306 Gyselen, Brussels Tr. at 17. 
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309 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 168; MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 169. 
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obesity – not only provided means to coordinate with industry and consumer 
stakeholders, but also allowed the FTC to take a leadership role in resolving concerns 
affecting its constituents.310 
 
 Industry stakeholders can provide useful information to the FTC regarding 
marketplace conduct and developments.  Former BCP Director William MacLeod 
emphasized the use of workshops as an effective way to collaborate with industry and 
learn “how the marketplace is working in different areas . . . [to] get a much better idea of 
where [the agency’s] resources ought to be.”311  Further, as panelist Jack Calfee pointed 
out, competitors are usually quick to provide information about a counterpart’s fraud or 
deception.312  MacLeod also discussed an instance in which the gathering of marketplace 
information led to further enforcement action.  In the early 1980s, the FTC launched a 
survey to assess Truth in Lending compliance among automobile dealers.313  The agency 
subsequently brought several enforcement actions, after which the agency learned that by 
simply surveying and warning businesses the level of compliance in the industry had 
improved substantially.314   
 
 As discussed in more detail below in Chapter VI.B.7, another important facet of 
the FTC’s relationship with market participants is the promotion of appropriate industry 
self-regulation, which can serve as an important complement to the agency’s law 
enforcement efforts.  As Lee Peeler discussed, relative to law enforcement, industry self-
regulation can provide businesses with much quicker issue resolution mechanisms.315  In 
the advertising area, Peeler described the FTC’s encouragement and support for self-
regulation as essential to the success of the system now in place.316  
 
G. Relationship with Academia 
  
Finally, several panelists stressed the importance of reaching out to the academic 
community to spur research in areas of interest to the FTC, which can expand the 
agency’s research resources as well as benefit the participating academics.317  North 
America has the world’s premier academic infrastructure in disciplines related to 
competition law, consumer protection, and economics.  Tapping this remarkable asset 
more effectively – and availing the agency of the extraordinary collection of superb 
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academic departments and research centers around the world – through formal and 
informal cooperation can be a source of great advantage to the FTC. 
 
Although outside academics have been useful in certain agency initiatives,318 
panelists expressed some concern that FTC issues are either little known or 
underappreciated by the larger academic community.  Former BE Director Michael 
Salinger explained: 
 
One of the challenges is, particularly if you are looking to 
the economics profession to do a lot of this analysis, 
because a lot of it has to be done by economists in my 
view, the academic wing of the profession is not all that 
interested in the policy issues that the agency faces.319 
 
Thus, research and work that is valuable for purposes of the agency’s enforcement efforts 
may not be appreciated by all members of the academic research community.320 
 
By having its own research agenda, the FTC can potentially stir interest in these 
topics by those in the academy.  Salinger explained that he saw great value in bringing in 
members of the academic community for various events, such as workshops, as a way to 
prompt academics both to notify their students and colleagues about FTC issues and to 
inspire research into areas in which the FTC is interested.321  In that vein, one purpose of 
the recently established FTC/Northwestern University Annual Microeconomics 
Conference is to introduce more academics to the FTC and its areas of interest.322  The 
partnership with Northwestern is a prototype for what could prove to be deeper 
integration between the FTC and other academic research centers. 
 
 New York roundtable panelist Eleanor Fox suggested that the FTC, as have other 
competition agencies, build its relationship with academics to improve analysis of FTC 
research and policy positions and to recruit talented lawyers and economists.323  Former 
General Counsel Debra Valentine suggested a greater role of independent academic 
experts in developing and analyzing FTC policy.324  Panelist Nancy Rose observed that 
often the attraction for academics to engage with any government agency is to obtain 
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access to interesting data.325  She suggested that in the academic climate today, industrial 
organization research has been focused on complex econometric modeling that may not 
be ideally targeted to the types of issues facing the agency: 
 
You have to find some way to convince scholars that there 
are significant rewards to them as researchers from 
undertaking this kind of analysis when it’s not the style 
that’s perhaps perceived to generate the greatest rewards 
just within academia.  I think we’re very driven in 
academics by the availability of data and particularly new 
data that hasn’t been analyzed and so something like . . . 
[the] suggestion that we have some idea about where cases 
were in the ranking or what determined which cases were 
over the threshold that would let us then look at how 
moving that line affects outcomes might be something that 
would move researchers in that direction.  And it might be 
even institutionalizing something like a periodic conference 
that really focuses on questions like this.  Sometimes that 
convinces somebody to jump-start a research project 
because they know they’ll be able to present their work at a 
hearing, maybe influence policy and have an outlet for it.326 
 
 Former OPP Director Susan DeSanti, echoing many of the sentiments expressed 
by other panelists relative to FTC relationships with academia, suggested that to build 
relationships with the academic community the agency needs to designate an office to 
maintain these relationships.327  She explained that traditional academics are often 
communicators of ideas, and the agency should be thinking about building the 
relationships from that perspective as well.328  She suggested that these relationships need 
constant monitoring and maintenance, but when they work they can be extremely 
valuable.329  
 
In some jurisdictions, the consumer protection agency has its own agenda but 
commissions research from outside academics as well as internal specialists.  For 
example, DG SANCO, the European Commission’s Directorate for Health and Consumer 
Affairs, often puts out formal tenders for studies in consumer-related areas that are then 
conducted by academic researchers.  The U.K.’s OFT also has commissioned academics 
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to prepare studies on certain topics.  This approach, of course, may be limited by an 
agency’s resources to fund such research. 
 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission has concluded that to pursue competition 
policy effectively requires an active interaction between the academic community and 
practitioners, such as the JFTC.  To promote this interaction the JFTC established in 2003 
the Competition Policy Research Center (“CPRC”) within its General Secretariat to 
provide a functional and continuous collaborative platform between outside researchers 
and the JFTC staff and to strengthen basic ideas on implementing Japan’s Antimonopoly 
Act.  The CPRC promotes interaction on four fronts – between academic knowledge and 
policy implementation, between academics and policymakers, between law study and 
economics, and between Japanese researchers and those overseas.  Since 2003, the CPRC 
has produced many international symposia, open seminars, reports, and discussion 
papers.330 
 
* * * 
 
The FTC has important relationships with several types of outside entities.  These 
relationships impact the agency’s performance in various ways, and each requires a 
slightly different approach by the FTC to maintain the relationship.  Some relationships – 
such as those with Congress, consumers, and industry – involve interaction and 
communication regarding how the agency pursues its mission.  Some relationships – such 
as those with domestic and international agencies – involve coordination in law 
enforcement efforts.  Some relationships – such as those with domestic and international 
agencies and the academy – involve efforts by the FTC to research, develop, and promote 
sound competition and consumer protection policy.  In any case, the FTC can benefit 
from, and improve its effectiveness with, input from each of these stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
330 Additional information regarding the CPRC is available at 
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V. Agency Leadership, Strategic Planning, and Policy R&D 
 
The three related topics discussed in this chapter – agency leadership, strategic 
planning, and policy research and development – each have a direct and significant 
impact on the successful functioning of the FTC.  Effective leadership at the top of the 
agency sets the tone for how the staff executes the agency’s mission.  Strategic planning 
is instrumental to effective deployment of the agency’s resources.  Policy research and 
development, including the setting of a research agenda, allows the agency to make well-
informed enforcement and policy decisions. 
 
In recent decades, the Commission has used a variety of techniques to set plans 
for the use of its resources.  These include budgeting and policy planning exercises at the 
Commission level, bureau-level strategic planning, and the extensive use of public 
consultations – workshops, seminars, hearings, and town hall proceedings – to identify 
promising subjects for the agency’s attention.  The agency has related what it learns to a 
framework that identifies the full range of agency policy instruments and seeks to devise 
integrated programs that employ all of these capabilities.  For example, the agency’s anti-
fraud program in this decade has featured coordinated enhancements of the FTC’s 
consumer education program to encourage precaution taking, a bolstering of cooperation 
with government prosecutors to encourage criminal prosecution of serious wrongdoers, 
improvements in the agency’s Consumer Sentinel database to speed the detection of 
fraud, and the use of the U.S. SAFE WEB authority to ensure effective treatment of 
cross-border misconduct.  In this and other areas, the agency consciously has attempted 
to develop integrated strategies to increase the likelihood that misconduct will be detected 
promptly, that misdeeds will be prosecuted effectively, that strong sanctions will be 
imposed, and that potential victims can increase their capacity to avoid injury. 
 
A. Leadership 
  
“Leadership can make all the difference in determining whether [an agency will] 
accomplish [its] goals and objectives.”331  Effective leadership involves not only 
understanding the agency mission, structure, and the interests of key stakeholders, but 
also communicating the mission and priorities to agency staff to motivate them to carry 
out the mission of the agency effectively over time.332  Agency leadership also affects 
employee morale, which often dictates agency success.  This section discusses areas for 
consideration in evaluating how leadership impacts the agency.   
 
Former Chairman Timothy Muris explained that the FTC “either runs with a 
strong chairman or it does not run.”333  Commentators have emphasized the important 
leadership role of the Chairman in determining key appointments and setting the 
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enforcement and research agendas for the agency.334  In an interview after his tenure was 
complete, former Chairman Robert Pitofsky explained how leadership by his predecessor, 
Janet Steiger, included not only standing up to powerful interests in the private sector, but 
also a willingness to listen to original and innovative proposals that challenged 
conventional thinking.335  Pitofsky also noted that every Commissioner must bring to 
bear his or her own experience, focus, and insights, which for him involved an 
appreciation of past agency failures and an understanding of how to get things done 
through the agency’s structure.336  Muris likewise explained that the Chairman must work 
with the other Commissioners to achieve the mission, which means balancing different 
and sometimes competing interests.337  This can mean making a priority of interests 
promoted by other Commissioners to persuade them to follow the Chairman’s vision for 
the FTC.338 
 
 Commentators also have identified continuity as another important factor in 
effective leadership, both at home and internationally.  Pitofsky posited that competition 
leadership is stronger in general due to a decrease in variation from administration to 
administration because policymakers have arrived at a “fairly widespread agreement on 
premises,” particularly in antitrust enforcement.339  OFT Chief Executive John Fingleton 
described continuity of leadership as important to maintaining strength and credibility 
among competition agencies.  He recounted a comment by Mario Monti, the former 
Commissioner for Competition at the European Commission, that the American system 
has a revolving door and that the leadership transitions much too quickly.340  As change 
of personnel is inevitable, leaders’ commitment to relative continuity in policy may ease 
some of the concerns over personnel changes and make agency leadership more 
effective.341  However, when those new to enforcement emerge in leadership positions, 
there can be delays in getting things done until people are known and trusted in the 
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competition community, which is a consequence any organization must face in 
transition.342    
  
 Complementing leadership at the top, some panelists suggested that the FTC is 
effective because staff, possessing both the expertise in competition and consumer 
protection law and the relative freedom to explore innovative ways to make progress in 
these areas, drive the agency toward stronger leadership.  Former BCP Assistant Director 
Paul Luehr described this as a culture and management style that focuses on bottom-up 
integration of leadership.343  Luehr said the culture of the FTC involves “taking good 
ideas from the staff level and letting those percolate to the top, especially with regard to 
the enforcement mission.”344  Recognition of this bottom-up style of management was 
echoed by Teresa Schwartz, who described how former BCP Director Jodie Bernstein 
used her staff as a resource, not just to fulfill the mission as she directed them, but to 
identify ways to fulfill the mission based on their experience.345  Schwartz explained that 
it took managerial leadership to listen to staff, value their input, and encourage them to 
generate ideas on how best to address problems.346 
 
Effective leadership advances the agency’s mission and positively impacts agency 
morale.  Greater continuity of leadership can strengthen the agency’s ability to perform 
its mission both in the shorter term and as senior leadership of the Commission changes 
across administrations. 
 
B. Strategic Planning 
 
Strategic planning at a government agency involves more than just a 
determination of how insightfully to identify and understand problems that arise, but also 
a determination of how to pick the right tool or right collection of tools (or even the right 
sequencing of tools) to use to address such problems.  In the case of the FTC, the agency 
must decide, for example, whether to issue guidelines, bring a case, create rules, or hold 
public consultations to address the various competition and consumer protection 
problems that it faces.347 
 
This section addresses several issues regarding strategic planning and how the 
FTC goes, and should go, about doing it.  First, what dictates the agency’s planning?  
Does it depend entirely on having wise Chairs, Commissioners, and bureau directors?  
That is, is the agency’s planning principally a function of who happens to inhabit these 
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positions at different times?  Second, what is the proper scope of the agency’s strategic 
planning?  Should it involve bureau-by-bureau planning, or should it be an agency-wide 
exercise?  Third, should the planning be centralized within the agency?  For example, 
should there be a research panel or board within the agency to oversee such planning?  
Fourth, should there be specific procedures in place to develop strategy?  For example, 
should the Bureau of Economics take the lead in identifying issues, with ad hoc groups 
within the bureaus gathering to address these issues and ultimately going to the 
Commission with proposals?348  Finally, how does the agency ensure the proper 
implementation of its chosen strategies? 
 
1. Importance and Goals of Strategic Planning 
 
The consultations confirmed the importance of strategic planning to the success of 
this, or any other, agency.  Former Chairman Muris explained that it is insufficient to 
have a core mission and to define it well; the agency needs a strategy to implement it.  
That strategy requires continual new thinking and innovation.349  Jodie Bernstein echoed 
Muris’ comments, explaining that continual planning and innovation are necessary, citing 
as examples of such planning and innovation the expansion of the agency’s international 
efforts, the expansion of efforts targeting Spanish-speaking media, and the creation of the 
Criminal Liaison Unit.350  Another panelist succinctly characterized strategic planning as 
“absolutely vital.”351 
 
In addition to innovation, roundtable panelists identified policy continuity as 
another important goal of strategic planning.  Former General Counsel Debra Valentine 
framed the relevant inquiry as follows:  “How can you keep an acute sense of the past 
and the evolving trends so that you can try to keep some strategies going through time, 
notwithstanding the inevitable impulse of the next gang to really want to leave their 
mark?”  In other words, how does the agency “keep a thoughtful strategy that ties 
learnings and lessons of the past with sensitivity to trends of the future?”352  Valentine 
observed that, although each agency chair will want to set his or her own strategic 
agenda, policy continuity will provide such chair with “buy-in with the public and the 
consumer.”353  John Fingleton explained that the governance structure of the OFT, which 
has a board composed of a majority of nonexecutives, provides “a certain type of 
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continuity,” as the board is responsible for setting long-term strategy for the agency, 
rather than making individual enforcement and policy decisions, which is left to OFT 
executives.354 
 
The goal of policy continuity, however, does not imply inflexibility in strategic 
planning.  Several panelists emphasized the importance of building flexibility into any 
strategic planning efforts.  In discussing her efforts in the 1990s, Bernstein explained that 
her planning efforts “set out a roadmap so that I had a sense of where we were going.  
That didn’t mean that there was not flexibility built into the roadmap so that [when] 
things inevitably occur that are not anticipated . . . one would have the ability to deal with 
them.”355  Another panelist explained that “[b]eing able to shift, being able to move and 
being able to adjust to market changes and what’s next” is enormously important.356  An 
agency has to have “the agility to move around that may be a little uncomfortable, but 
gives [it] the ability to respond as the market and other conditions change.”357  The 
Chairman of the U.K. Competition Commission, Peter Freeman, characterized the need 
for flexibility as follows:  “[A]s the Duke of Wellington has said, ‘time spent on 
reconnaissance was seldom wasted.’  Also, I think he said words to the effect of ‘all plans 
collapse on first contact with the enemy.’  I think that neatly encapsulates the position 
certainly from our point of view.”358  Strategic planning, Freeman continued, “cannot be 
too rigid and it cannot be too binding.  [B]ut everything we do should take place . . . 
against a background of priorities and policy consciousness.”359 
 
2. Strategic Planning at the FTC 
 
The Commission’s strategic planning efforts include specific enforcement and 
policy agendas brought to the agency by Chairmen, Commissioners, and senior staff; the 
strategic planning done pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act and 
various other reporting requirements; and senior staff retreats that the Commission has 
held for more than a decade.  Other examples of strategic planning include “policy 
review sessions,” which were used in the 1970s and 1980s to permit the Commission 
members and the staff to discuss significant policy issues.360  The Commission recently 
revived this custom in 2008 to discuss how the Commission might address various issues 
concerning the financial crisis.  Former Commissioner Thomas Leary described how, 
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during the early 2000s, the agency used to circulate background papers on advocacy 
issues, such as the state action doctrine, that the Commission anticipated addressing.  
This was not done in the context of specific cases; rather, it was “simply to see if we 
could agree among ourselves on what the Commission policy ought to be ultimately 
when these things arise.”361 
 
Beyond these, perhaps the most intensive form of formal strategic planning at the 
FTC largely has taken place in the Bureau of Consumer Protection.  The FTC consumer 
protection mission has a broad reach, protecting consumers in the myriad ways they 
interact with various kinds of businesses.  These protections range from requiring that 
advertising claims have a reasonable basis of support to ensuring that consumers receive 
full disclosure of the terms of financial service transactions.  To accomplish its mission 
most effectively, BCP targets issues and leverages resources through strategic planning. 
 
 Bureau-wide strategic planning began in the mid-1990s, and the process has 
become an integral part of how BCP operates.  A strategic plan generally covers a 12- to 
18-month period.  It encompasses both BCP initiatives and matters that are not 
discretionary, such as reports or rulemaking proceedings mandated by Congress.  
Managers solicit ideas from staff members, who review complaint data, monitor 
advertising, survey market literature, and also obtain information from industry, 
consumer groups, and law enforcement partner agencies, among other stakeholders.  
Ideas also may be generated in connection with workshops or town hall meetings 
conducted by the Commission to explore emerging problems or areas of concern.  Staff 
from the regional offices, as well as the seven divisions of BCP, are included in the 
planning process.  Some projects cross program lines, requiring coordinated planning by 
staff from two or more BCP divisions.  Managers of each division develop a plan, and all 
of the plans are reviewed by all division managers who provide feedback to each other.   
 
 Plans are then submitted to and ultimately approved or modified by the bureau.  
They become a basis for allocation of resources, including contracts, travel, and staff 
time, and are reviewed during quarterly meetings involving bureau and division 
managers.  Plans are not inflexible, but can be revised, as needed, to respond to new 
issues or problems in the marketplace.  Evaluation and assessment takes place at the end 
of the planning period, and managers are accountable for their progress in accomplishing 
plan goals. 
 
Former Chairman Pitofsky recently described this BCP strategic planning as 
follows: 
 
Jodie Bernstein instituted the strategic planning process at 
the outset of her term as BCP Director.  She involved staff 
at all levels of the Bureau and regional offices, giving them 
an opportunity to think broadly about consumer protection 
issues and use their firsthand experience to propose new, 
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more effective ways of doing things.  This inclusive 
process made the final plan a team effort and one that 
reflected the best thinking of our talented staff.  The 
strategic plan’s benefits were striking.  Among them: the 
establishment of clear law enforcement priorities; the 
identification of the most pressing and the newly emerging 
consumer issues and the best approaches to tackling them; 
the ability to allocate resources to the most serious 
problems; and increased efficiency across the Bureau.362 
 
Turning to strategic planning undertaken elsewhere in the agency, former BE 
Director David Scheffman observed that, even taking into account the resources that must 
be devoted to merger review, the agency has “tremendous latitude” in how to allocate its 
resources, making strategic planning essential.363  Nonetheless, according to former BC 
Director Molly Boast, extensive strategic planning in BC during the late 1990s 
necessarily was a victim of the merger wave of that time and the resulting drain on 
bureau resources.  Even when an agency is not faced with such a significant workload, 
Boast observed, strategic planning does “consume considerable resources”; it has to be 
balanced against other uses of agency resources.  Nonetheless, ad hoc opportunities for 
strategic planning can be found in the potential cases that the agency confronts.  Boast 
cited the example of the pharmaceutical patent settlement cases that first arose in the late 
1990s as an opportunity for BC and the Commission to do an extensive analysis of a 
particular area of competition law and decide on a particular strategy – even if such 
strategy was not necessarily planned in advance.364 
 
Recommendations for future FTC strategic planning offered by roundtable 
panelists involved both the level at which such planning should take place and the inputs 
necessary for such planning.  Bernstein recommended that the FTC engage in agency-
wide – not just bureau-by-bureau – strategic planning because it would “energize” both 
BCP and BC by letting each bureau see what the other’s ideas are.  This would address 
the concern Bernstein has with the Balkanization of the agency into bureaus or even 
divisions that do not communicate with each other.365  Former BCP Deputy Director 
Teresa Schwartz echoed Bernstein’s recommendation that strategic planning should take 
place not only at the bureau level, but agency-wide as well.366   
 
Panelists identified both internal and external sources of information that are 
crucial to effective strategic planning.  Bernstein explained that for her one of the 
functions that it served was “to open up the Bureau so that I knew what the best thinkers 
were thinking, what their experience was and how I could build upon that to construct a 
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program that would make good sense . . . .”367  Schwartz concurred as to the importance 
of drawing on the experience and knowledge of staff, which knows “what’s bubbling out 
there.”368  Similarly, Nicholas Hill, Chief Executive of the Commerce Commission of 
New Zealand, explained:  “[T]he process we are going through at the moment is very 
much a bottom up one where essentially I’ve outlined as a new chief executive what I 
think the challenge for the organization is at a high level, but essentially put it back on the 
staff to say, so how should we deal with this?  At the end of the day, the Commission and 
[I] will make the calls.  But it is very much about engaging them, engaging their minds 
and their passion in the organization.”369 
 
  Several panelists, including Bernstein and Schwartz, stressed the importance of 
also including outside entities – including state agencies, congressional staff, consumer 
groups, and industry – in the planning process in order to anticipate where the next 
controversy will be, get relevant information from key stakeholders, and gauge how 
much support the agency will have to take action in a given area.370  Former BCP 
Assistant Director Paul Luehr argued that it is also crucial in doing strategic planning to 
look at relevant data and have that drive (at least in part) the agency’s agenda.  For 
example, with the Consumer Sentinel database, the agency can hear from “thousands of 
consumers” about what cases to bring, making the agency’s mission “much more 
coherent.”371 
 
3. Examples of Strategic Planning Efforts at Other Competition 
and Consumer Protection Agencies 
 
External consultations revealed several examples of strategic planning undertaken 
at other competition and consumer protection agencies.  The U.K. Office of Fair Trading 
employs several methods in planning and implementing its overall strategy, and has a 
dedicated “strategy and planning team,” which is engaged in all parts of strategic 
planning development and implementation to help ensure consistency across the agency.  
The strategic planning process begins with the Chief Executive developing strategy and 
plans in consultation with stakeholders, followed by the OFT’s Board, which functions 
similarly to a board of a public company, providing guidance on longer-term policy and 
strategy decisions, rather than specific enforcement decisions, which are taken by the 
Executive.  Each year, the Board approves an annual plan for the agency, providing a 
strategic steer and risk assessment that considers the agency as a whole (rather than at the 
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level of an individual case or project).372  The resulting priorities then strongly inform the 
decisions of division directors as they prepare annual program plans for their respective 
areas.  When the division directors submit proposals for resources, the Executive 
Committee, a group including the Chief Executive and senior executives, assesses the 
overall portfolio of bids against the strategic priorities when deciding how to allocate 
resources. 
 
Decisions to undertake new work are guided by four “prioritization principles,” 
which the OFT developed following consultation with external stakeholders, including: 
(1) impact, which includes considerations of the likely direct and indirect effects on 
consumer welfare, deterrence, and efficiencies; (2) strategic significance, which entails 
inquiries about whether the given matter fits within the OFT’s strategy or current 
portfolio and whether the OFT – or some other alternative, such as private enforcement 
or self-regulation – is best placed to act; (3) risk (i.e. the likelihood of a successful 
outcome); and (4) resources (i.e. the resource implications of pursuing a particular 
matter).373  Although these principles are neither exhaustive nor applied mechanically, 
they create a common descriptive language to assess and compare agency priorities.374 
 
Closely linked to the OFT’s prioritization principles is the agency’s so-called 
effective project delivery (“EPD”) framework.  Developed in response to criticism 
regarding the length of OFT investigations, the agency applies the EPD framework to 
significant projects and cases, in effect, to plan backwards from the desired outcome to 
achieve OFT’s strategic goals.  Key components of the framework include a clear 
definition of the project’s scope, deliverables, and deadlines; clarity in roles, 
responsibilities, and resource allocation; and the use of customized steering groups 
comprised of staff from across the agency to provide input on each project and to assess 
the fit of a particular project within the agency’s entire portfolio of matters.  The first 
phase of the EPD process, which involves the development of a substantive theory of 
harm and an estimate of the impact of agency action, in particular, is influenced by the 
prioritization principles driving the agency’s overall strategy.375 
 
The European Commission’s DG Comp uses an iterative, top-down—bottom-up 
planning process to prioritize its enforcement matters and allocate staff resources.  As 
such, cases are often generated by staff or complainants.  DG Comp applies several 
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prioritization criteria – including consumer impact, precedential value, and deterrence – 
in evaluating prospective cases.376 
 
One of the ways in which DG Comp attempts to implement its strategic planning 
is the use of a peer review system to foster intra-agency debate concerning a particular 
matter.  A peer review consists of a discussion among the case team originally assigned 
to a matter, a “fresh set of eyes,” often including a case manager and a sectoral expert, 
and an independent scrutiny officer responsible for submission of a written report to 
senior officials.  Although these reviews are highly resource-intensive, they allow DG 
Comp to engage staff in a meaningful way in implementing its long-term strategies.377 
 
René Jansen, a board member of the Netherlands Competition Authority, 
described the annual strategic planning process that has been in place at his agency for a 
few years.  The process begins with a broad policy framework – developed by the 
agency’s three-person executive board in consultation with the directors of the agency’s 
several offices – that addresses significant administrative and policy issues the NMa 
anticipates over the course of the coming year.  The next step in the process involves 
consultations regarding this framework with external stakeholders, including politicians, 
industry, the bar, and academia.  The final step of the process includes the development 
of a working plan – based on the broad policy framework – for use by the agency’s 
directors in the following year.  The working plan provides the directors with specific 
targets in all areas of the NMa’s work, including enforcement and other policy efforts, as 
well as internal, administrative areas.  Jansen expressed satisfaction with this planning 
process, but acknowledged that his agency is continually trying to improve it.378 
 
The Canadian Competition Bureau recently has engaged in a process involving an 
environmental scan that feeds directly into its agenda setting.  The Bureau reviews sector 
and marketplace developments to identify potential problems relevant to each of its 
branches.  The Bureau’s senior management team analyzes the results of this scan and 
drafts a high-level agenda, which a wider management group then develops in greater 
detail.  An operational plan is developed for each of the issues identified.  The plan may 
employ a variety of tools, including law enforcement and consumer education, and 
always includes a strategy for measuring success.  Finally, a process – managed by a 
steering committee – is in place to ensure that resources are matched to priorities and to 
identify and present to senior management significant issues in the marketplace that merit 
the Bureau’s attention.  Staff is able to submit issues and ideas directly to the steering 
committee, thus providing bottom-up input into the Bureau’s prioritization practices. 
Similar to the situation at the FTC, this process is better developed for the Bureau’s Fair 
Business Practices Division (analogous to BCP at the FTC) than it is for its competition 
sections.379 
                                                 
376 Consultation with DG Comp, Oct. 21, 2008. 
377 Id. 
378 Jansen, Paris Tr. at 102-05. 
379 Consultation with Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008. 
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* * * 
 
Any future evaluation of the FTC’s strategic planning efforts ought to consider 
the following issues.  First, what should dictate the agency’s strategic planning?  Should 
it be top-down planning through the budget process, bottom-up planning with issues 
originating with bureau management or at lower levels of the bureaus, or Chairman-
driven planning?  Should it be some combination of those means?  Second, what is the 
proper scope of the agency’s planning efforts?  Should strategic planning be done 
agency-wide, bureau-by-bureau, or at both levels?  Third, should there be a centralized 
locus – for example, a review board – for the agency’s strategic planning?  Fourth, should 
there be specific procedures or protocols in place to develop strategy?  Finally, how does 
the agency ensure that it is appropriately implementing its strategies? 
 
C. Policy Research and Development 
 
This section examines the important role of policy research and development at 
the FTC.  An agency that intends to be thoughtful and to consider its policy actions 
seriously must have some ability to analyze the trade-offs inherent in any policy choice.  
That capability can be developed through, among other means, academic-style research, 
information gathering and report writing, and conferences and workshops that bring 
together elements from business, government, consumer representatives, and the bar to 
discuss issues related to FTC policy and law.   
 
This section first defines the notion of policy R&D and then discusses the several 
goals served by engaging in policy R&D.  This section also examines how the agency 
sets a research agenda, including the way in which policy R&D topics have been chosen 
in the past, how they are currently chosen, and how the process might be improved in the 
future.  Finally, this section presents a set of specific suggestions for policy research and 
development provided in the course of external consultations. 
 
1. Defining Policy R&D 
 
Activities that reasonably could be called “policy R&D” take many different 
forms within the various organizations comprising the FTC.  To academic economists, 
“research” sometimes means pursuing the answer to an author-initiated research question 
using state-of-the-art techniques in the hope of publishing the work in a scientific journal.  
That is, however, not the bulk of research at the FTC, or even the bulk of research in the 
FTC’s Bureau of Economics.  The notion of policy R&D involves much more.  Policy 
R&D includes answering policy-relevant questions posed by Congress or agency leaders, 
as well as addressing issues required by specific statutes.  In addition, policy R&D 
includes workshops and conferences aimed at competition and consumer protection 
policy topics.   
 
Some of the FTC’s policy R&D work is highly analytical in nature; some of it is a 
compilation of academic and policy literature; and some is more largely descriptive of 
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various informed opinions on policy-relevant questions or the functioning of particular 
markets.380  Some research topics fall into a very specific FTC policy area or an active 
enforcement area – for example, the effects of a particular oil merger on prices.  Other 
topics are related to underlying “academic” questions – for example, scale economies in 
some particular industry of interest to the FTC.  Most FTC R&D efforts are narrowly 
related to the FTC’s competition and consumer protection missions, although a nontrivial 
portion of the agency’s work historically has been focused on policies of other 
government agencies that have had implications for competition policy, consumer 
protection policy, or consumer welfare.381 
 
Given that the FTC is a law enforcement agency with antitrust and consumer 
protection responsibilities, it is easy to think about all nonenforcement activity as policy 
R&D, but clearly that would sweep in too much by including conferences or workshops 
that bring together industry participants to hear the agency’s view of the state of a 
particular area of the law, reports on the agency’s various activities to Congress, and a 
host of other activities that have little research content or that clearly are not aimed at 
analyzing new policies or variations in current policy.  For example, some BCP 
workshops, reports, and presentations, such as the many “red flags” hearings, can be 
characterized as outreach to the business community and are not necessarily oriented 
toward specific policy alterations.  Many enforcement-related workshops on debt 
collection and international fraud prevention, as well as annually issued reports on 
various law enforcement activities, are so directly connected to specific areas of 
enforcement that they are probably better thought of as enforcement or enforcement 
R&D, rather than policy R&D.  However, almost all of these efforts have some R&D 
component in the sense that learning from the events might trigger some alteration in law 
enforcement policies.  Thus, for all intents and purposes, a clear division between 
enforcement efforts and policy R&D does not exist at the FTC. 
 
2. Goals Served by Policy R&D 
 
The FTC has a mandate to undertake certain forms of research based on Section 6 
of the FTC Act and the historical report-writing activity of its predecessor entity, the 
Bureau of Corporations.382  That mandate differentiates the FTC from most other 
antitrust or consumer protection agencies in the world in that it enables the agenc
compulsory process to gather data in a context other than law enforcement.  From its 
y to use 
                                                 
380 Former BE Director Michael Salinger argued that certain reports that mainly discuss the opinions of 
others, as is true of many FTC workshop reports, are not really research.  Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 139-40.  
That may be true in the narrow sense of the term research; such reports are policy R&D, however, in the 
sense that they are compiled with the intention of learning enough facts about a topic to alter policy in 
beneficial ways. 
381 For example, work on regulation topics involving communications, transportation industries, 
international trade restraints, and licensed professions were staples of FTC research programs in the late 
1970s and 1980s.  Several studies on the regulation of health claims for foods were undertaken in the 1990s 
and 2000s.  
382 See generally Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003). 
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inception, the FTC carried on a general investigative function that complemented its law 
enforcement activities.  The results of the investigations were compiled in reports that 
were intended to shed light on various questionable business practices of the day.  That 
activity was the precursor of what is now thought of as research and policy R&D at the 
FTC.  As explained below, apart from the primary purpose of answering specific research 
questions, the FTC, including its several components, undertakes research for a number 
of reasons. 
 
a. Support for Enforcement, Advocacy, and Other Agency 
Efforts 
 
Research and policy R&D is undertaken to improve agency decision making in 
specific areas, such as law enforcement, rulemaking, and competition and consumer 
protection advocacy.  FTC research today is seldom done with an eye toward direct use in 
law enforcement activities.  Some reports, however, have been generated in conjunction 
with antitrust-related activities or have led to follow-on legal activity.  The use of 
empirical research work to support a complaint in the case of a consummated hospital 
merger is an example of the use of research in enforcement.  Also, conceptual work by 
economists at the FTC has helped support the agency’s merger enforcement efforts in 
recent merger litigations.383  Research also has been done on the value of the Do Not Call 
list, when elements of that program were questioned.384  Empirical policy work on health 
claims for foods has provided a firmer basis for FTC policy and for advocacy in the area 
of nutrition labeling.  For example, several empirical studies done on food health claims 
during the 1990s and early 2000s provided the basis for FTC advocacy arguments that 
rigid regulatory bans on such claims are not likely to be in the best interest of 
consumers.385  Two consumer research studies of the mortgage market in 2004 and 2007 
were likewise important in providing the agency with insight into the problems that exist 
in the current federally required disclosures made to consumers about mortgage products 
and the terms and conditions of the mortgage debt they acquire.386  Such studies provided 
support for several recent advocacy comments in the consumer credit arena. 
                                                 
383 See, e.g., Daniel P. O’Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 161 (2003) (cited in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1048 (D.C. Cir.  
2008) (Tatel, J., concurring)). 
384 See, e.g., Keith B. Anderson, The Costs and Benefits of Do-Not-Call Regulations: A Comment on Beard 
and Abernethy’s “Consumer Prices and the Federal Trade Commission’s Do-Not-Call Program,” 26 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 144 (2007). 
385 For a discussion of those studies and their role in informing food regulatory policy, see Luke Froeb, 
Daniel S. Hosken & Janis Pappalardo, Economic Research at the FTC: Information, Retrospectives, and 
Retailing, 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 353 (2004). 
386 See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, IMPROVING 
CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE 
DISCLOSURE FORMS (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505mortgagedisclosurereport.pdf; FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, 
JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, THE EFFECT OF MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION: A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT (2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/030123mortgagefullrpt.pdf. 
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Further, to address the proliferation of spam email, the FTC compiled information 
about the problem and possible ways to address it and became a major participant in 
fashioning workable legislation.387  Additionally, the FTC used policy R&D to 
complement its recent enforcement efforts to stop anticompetitive conduct designed to 
delay entry of generic drugs.  This combined research and enforcement agenda also 
informed substantive changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act.388  This type of policy R&D 
also is necessary to ensure that FTC actions keep abreast of relevant scholarly learning.  
For example, several panelists discussed the role that the research into advertising in the 
1970s and 1980s played in informing the FTC’s advertising enforcement.389  This 
research also influenced courts and state policymakers on their approach to the regulation 
of advertising.  Workshops and research also can demonstrate intellectual leadership.  
The FTC’s workshops on green marketing and food advertising and obesity, for example, 
have helped to establish the Commission as an international leader in these areas.390 
 
 Policy R&D work also has been used as an adjunct to various self-regulatory 
efforts.  Bringing information and facts to bear on various policy issues is often an 
effective means of moving policy debates forward.  On occasion, firms are induced to 
alter their behavior in desirable ways if the evidence shows a real problem.  On the other 
hand, if the evidence indicates that the purported problem is small or nonexistent, then 
resources can be redeployed to more pressing issues.  For example, recent BCP projects 
addressing violence in various entertainment media,391 the placement of alcohol 
advertising,392 and food advertising aimed at children393 were an important means of 
shining factual light on topics of current policy interest. 
 
                                                 
387 The referenced legislation is the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing 
Act of 2003, or CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-
7713).  The area of food marketing to children presents another example of where the FTC has conducted a 
workshop, held a follow-up forum, and conducted a major study of promotional expenditures and activities.  
The Commission’s report, Marketing Food to Children and Adolescents: A Review of Industry 
Expenditures, Activities, and Self-Regulation, included not only a great deal of information not previously 
compiled and published, but also recommendations to advance the Commission’s policy goal of promoting 
strong self-regulation by both the food and entertainment industries.  See MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 169 
(citing 2008 FOOD MARKETING REPORT, supra note 203). 
388 See Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 776-78 (Muris noting how the 2002 generic 
drug study helped generate cases and reform of the Hatch-Waxman Act); see also Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 
118 (noting that the patent settlement cases were a “good example where there was a policy and then some 
enforcement cases that put meat on the bones”).  
389 See, e.g., MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 173-74.  
390 See MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 169; Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 170.  
391 FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATION AND 
INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES 
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 MEDIA VIOLENCE REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/vioreport.pdf. 
392 2008 ALCOHOL SELF-REGULATION REPORT, supra note 204. 
393 2008 FOOD MARKETING REPORT, supra note 203. 
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b. Tool and Skill Development 
 
To operate effectively, the FTC requires a highly skilled staff, who are able to 
take on research tasks that are sometimes ill-defined and may require inventive 
approaches to problems.  Research activities often allow the agency to develop ways to 
better analyze problems that can be used in antitrust or consumer policy settings.  Doing 
such analysis in a law enforcement or litigation environment often is difficult or 
impossible; doing it in a research environment is thus necessary.  For example, FTC 
economists have been doing research work on demand estimation that may pay off in the 
application of those techniques in competition cases, where demand estimation is 
occasionally a key element in market definition or in predicting the likely effects of a 
merger.394  As another example, empirical research allows the agency to keep up with 
data-moving and econometric techniques that are becoming increasingly essential as 
enforcement of the antitrust and consumer protection laws becomes more data-intensive.  
The ability to handle large data sets and understand how to derive useful implications 
from that data are often the keys to making fact-based decisions in such cases.  As 
confirmed by roundtable panelists, an in-house research capability is important to ensure 
that an agency can handle difficult issues that arise frequently in the cases that it 
pursues.395   
 
c. Development of Industry Expertise 
 
Research topics often allow the agency to gain a better understanding of 
industries, including those, such as energy and health care, which feature prominently in 
the agency’s law enforcement agenda.  For example, the agency’s gasoline and diesel 
price monitoring project allows the agency to track changes over time in price-cost 
margins and to notice anomalies in prices in various cities or regions.396  Although 
checking for such anomalies is now routine, this effort initially was a policy R&D 
project.  Policy R&D also has been in evidence at the FTC in the health care area for over 
30 years.  Recent examples include the 2003-2004 hearings that led to the report, 
Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition,397 as well as a 2006 BE workshop on the 
economics of the pharmaceutical industry.398  These R&D efforts are intended to help the 
agency understand whether and how markets can be part of the solution to vexing health 
care policy questions. 
 
Other R&D projects are designed to gain information about industries that the 
agency expects to be important in its future enforcement and policy efforts.  For example, 
                                                 
394 See, e.g., Steven Tenn & John Yun, Biases in Demand Analysis Due to Variation in Retail Distribution, 
26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 984 (2008). 
395 See, e.g., Waddams, Valentine, and Vickers, London Tr. at 75-78. 
396 See supra note 187. 
397 DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 228. 
398 FTC Bureau of Economics, Roundtable on the Economics of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/pharmaceutical/pharmaceutical.shtm. 
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the 1999 BE pharmaceutical report399 describing the industry and its idiosyncrasies was a 
precursor to much of the agency’s work in the area of pharmaceutical patent settlements, 
which have become a major component of the FTC’s competition law enforcement 
program.  Work by OPP likewise provided insights into aspects of industries with which 
the agency will be dealing for the foreseeable future.  These efforts include examination 
of the antitrust and consumer protection implications of broadband Internet access400 and 
investigation of the effects of government restrictions on entry into online retailing.401 
 
d. Improvements in Economic Learning Applicable across 
Markets 
 
Research projects additionally help agency personnel gain insight into the effects 
of practices that span many industries and product markets.  For example, various BE 
staff have undertaken a research project to examine dynamic oligopoly models.402  Such 
models lie at the intersection of both theoretical and empirical economic research on 
markets, and understanding such issues may help the agency untangle knotty problems in 
the dynamics of gasoline and refined products pricing (for example, the analysis of 
asymmetric price variations in gasoline markets).  A recent behavioral economics 
conference is another example of policy R&D at work.403  In that conference, the agency 
tried to learn from some of the top researchers in that field, while at the same time 
providing the researchers with some notion of work that the FTC undertakes in the 
consumer protection area that considers (implicitly perhaps) the principles of behavioral 
economics.404 
 
e. Horizon Scanning 
 
Policy R&D efforts at the FTC serve the important purpose of scanning the 
horizon for future competition and consumer problem areas.  As discussed in Chapter 
III.C, the agency gathers relevant industry and marketplace information by convening 
                                                 
399 FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, ROY LEVY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF 
COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE (1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmaceutical/drugrep.pdf. 
400 See FTC STAFF, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/tech/cable/broadband.htm. 
401 See FTC Workshop, Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on the Internet (Oct. 
2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ecommerce/anticompetitive/index.shtm. 
402 See, e.g., Michael R. Baye, Antitrust Economics and Policy: Some Suggestions for Research Agendas, 
Keynote Address at the Research Symposium on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy, 
Northwestern University Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, at 33-42 (Sept. 26, 
2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/baye/080926antitrustnw.pdf. 
403 See FTC Bureau of Economics, Conference on Behavioral Economics and Consumer Policy (Apr. 
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/index.shtml. 
404 Roundtable panelists discussed the FTC’s behavioral economics work.  Lee Peeler indicated that the 
Bureau of Economics should have moved sooner to take a leadership role on this topic to avoid an 
overemphasis on the area (Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 182-84), while Jack Calfee praised the reluctance of the 
FTC to jump into that area too early and with too much gusto (Calfee, 7/30 DC Tr. at 184-87). 
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conferences, workshops, and hearings to address current and emerging competition and 
consumer protection issues.  Such events have become an important means through 
which the Commission and its staff identify problems and develop appropriate responses.  
For example, since the mid-1990s, BCP has conducted dozens of workshops and 
conferences focusing on Internet and consumer privacy issues, keeping the agency closer 
to the frontier of a quickly changing marketing environment.  Similarly, OPP has chosen 
topics for workshops and reporting with an eye toward important future topics.  For 
example, a recent OPP effort along these lines was a conference on new methods of 
health care delivery that examined progress on electronic medical records and the advent 
of limited-service medical clinics.405 
 
f. Self-Assessment 
 
Another reason the FTC undertakes policy R&D is to examine the outcomes of 
certain policy choices and help the agency assess how well it has done.  The FTC, via its 
Bureau of Economics, has undertaken retrospective studies in the merger area,406 in 
resale price maintenance, and in the area of vertical restraints.407  Also in the competition 
realm, the 1999 study of the divestiture process by the Bureau of Competition stands ou
as a useful effort to determine whether the process passed at least a minimal standard 
efficacy.
t 
for 
                                                
408  As discussed below in Chapter VII.B.2, the FTC’s consumer protection and 
competition advocacy program is one of the most self-examined of all FTC activities.  
Through the work of one independent researcher and various internal surveys conducted 
by the Office of Policy Planning or its predecessors, multiple reviews have been 
conducted on the program to examine its value, as measured by surveys of the recipients. 
 
g. Intellectual Leadership and Learning from Others in 
the International Policy Arena 
 
As noted in Chapter IV.D, various Commission efforts – including the 
Commission’s participation in international policy-related R&D efforts – allow the 
agency to influence sound competition and consumer protection policies through the 
import and export of policy views and enforcement practices. 
 
405 See FTC Workshop, Innovations in Health Care Delivery (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/hcd/index.shtm.  Other nations are taking an even more direct route 
toward predicting future competition and consumer issues.  For example, the U.K. OFT recently 
commissioned a project to define the upcoming issues that will likely affect consumers.  See U.K. OFFICE 
OF FAIR TRADING, CONSULTATION ON EMERGING TRENDS: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE OFT BY GFK 
NOP (2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/about_oft/oft1000.pdf. 
406 Retrospective work in the merger area has been done since at least the early 1980s.  Several recent 
merger retrospectives have focused on various refined products markets in the oil industry and on hospital 
markets.  See hospital merger retrospectives cited infra note 718. 
407 For a discussion of several self-assessments undertaken by the FTC and certain other government 
agencies, see William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition 
Policy Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 505 (2006). 
408 See FTC STAFF, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999) [hereinafter 1999 
DIVESTITURE STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf. 
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 A good example of the FTC’s leadership efforts in international competition 
policy is the FTC’s work building consensus in the International Competition Network, 
an organization dedicated to facilitating dialogue and convergence toward sound 
competition policy and enforcement that includes as its members nearly all of the world’s 
competition agencies.  In the course of developing work product of practical utility to its 
members, the ICN collectively studies issues that are susceptible to multiple approaches 
so that its members can better understand their implications and seek consensus about 
how to address them.  The FTC was a founding member of the ICN and dedicates a 
significant portion of its international antitrust work to ICN activity.  Under FTC 
chairmanship, for example, the ICN developed recommended practices on merger 
notification and review procedures409 and today continues work related to their 
implementation.  These recommended practices, designed to reduce the costs and burdens 
of multijurisdictional merger review, have become the international benchmark in merger 
review, and more than 40 of the ICN’s members have introduced changes to bring their 
merger regimes into greater conformity with the practices since their adoption. The FTC 
also co-chairs the ICN’s group dealing with unilateral conduct, which is acknowledged to 
be the most controversial area of antitrust policy, and achieved consensus on 
recommended practices for the assessment of dominance and on the application of 
unilateral conduct rules to state-created monopolies.410  
  
A prime example of consumer protection work in a multilateral organization is the 
FTC’s work on various OECD Council Recommendations, which have had a substantial 
impact on the national laws in OECD countries.  The FTC took a leading role in the 
research and related work leading to the OECD Council’s adoption in 2003 of a 
Recommendation on protecting consumers across borders against fraud and deception.411  
The Recommendation was based in part on empirical input provided by the International 
Consumer Protection Enforcement Network, which FTC staff took a lead role in 
generating.  This work has had a substantial impact on national legislation: the 
Recommendation and underlying research served as the basis for both the United States 
and the European Commission to pass new laws governing cross-border information 
sharing and investigative assistance in consumer protection matters, including the U.S. 
SAFE WEB Act of 2006412 in the United States and the Consumer Protection 
                                                 
409 ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW 
PROCEDURES (2006), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/archive0611/mnprecpractices.pdf.  
410 See ICN UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER 
ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS: RECOMMENDED PRACTICES (2008), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/unilateral_conduct/Unilateral_WG_1.pdf. 
411 OECD, GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM FRAUDULENT AND DECEPTIVE COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICES ACROSS BORDERS (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/33/2956464.pdf.  This 
work was an outgrowth of the 1999 OECD guidelines in the area of electronic commerce.  See OECD, 
GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1999), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf.  The FTC also played a leading role in developing 
those guidelines. 
412 Pub. L. No. 109-455, 120 Stat. 3372 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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Cooperation Regulation413 in Europe.  Following the issuance of the Cross-Border Fraud 
Recommendation, the FTC played a pivotal role in developing the background research 
for the OECD Council’s adoption in 2007 of a Council Recommendation on Dispute 
Resolution and Redress.414  Like the Cross-Border Fraud Recommendation, the Dispute 
Resolution and Redress Recommendation is serving as a basis for strengthening 
consumer redress mechanisms in other jurisdictions.415 
 
Also within the OECD, the FTC has significantly contributed to work in the 
privacy and data security area.  For example, the agency worked closely with its 
counterparts within the OECD’s Working Party on Information Security and Privacy in 
an effort to promote greater cooperation among privacy regulators and law enforcement 
authorities to promote greater protection for personal information.  This effort, which 
began with research, a written report, and a roundtable discussion, led to the 2007 OECD 
Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting 
Privacy,416 which provides guidance on how to improve cooperation in this area.  
 
The same approach also has been used in the FTC’s bilateral relations with other 
nations.  Since the early days of their relationship under the 1991 EC-U.S. cooperation 
agreement, the FTC, DOJ, and the European Commission have jointly conducted studies 
– for example, of merger notification requirements, merger remedies, and retrospective 
reviews of merger remedies – to better understand each other’s rules and procedures and, 
thereby, foster cooperation and coordination in parallel merger reviews.  In 2001, the 
General Electric/Honeywell merger case exposed a significant divide between the U.S. 
and European approaches to nonhorizontal merger analysis.417  Rather than allow their 
differences to fester and possibly threaten other transactions, the FTC, DOJ, and the EC 
jointly embarked on a project to study their approaches to mergers, both substantive and 
procedural, with a focus on nonhorizontal issues (where there appeared to be the greatest 
potential variance). 
                                                 
413 Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R2006:EN:HTML. 
414 OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND REDRESS (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/50/38960101.pdf. 
415 The European Commission, for example, has focused on exploring individual judicial and collective 
redress mechanisms for consumers since the issuance of the OECD Dispute Resolution and Redress 
Recommendation.  A summary of the ongoing work on collective redress mechanisms is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm. 
416 OECD, RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS 
PROTECTING PRIVACY (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf. 
417 See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department 
of Justice, Conglomerate Mergers And Range Effects: It’s A Long Way From Chicago To Brussels, 
Address before George Mason University Symposium (Nov. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9536.htm. 
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h. Reporting on Agency Activity 
 
A portion of the FTC’s policy R&D work is focused on describing what the 
agency does.  Although this work is not always thought of as research, it increases the 
transparency of the agency’s processes and decision making.  For example, efforts at 
providing enforcement guidelines (on the antitrust side) and industry guides (on the 
consumer protection side) fall into this category, as do the occasional closing statements 
regarding FTC merger cases that are not pursued.418 
 
i. Fostering FTC-relevant Academic Research 
 
Finally, as discussed in more detail above in Chapter IV.G, by having an agency-
specific research agenda, the FTC can answer questions not necessarily addressed by 
academics, as well as potentially stir interest in such topics on the part of members of the 
academy. 
 
3. Setting a Research Agenda 
 
Given the prominent role of policy research and development at the FTC, having 
a systematic means for identifying and planning relevant research is imperative.  This 
section reviews historical and current approaches to selecting research topics at the 
agency, as well as considerations for setting a research agenda.  This section concludes 
with a review of research topics that were proposed in the course of external 
consultations. 
 
a. Historical Selection of Research Topics 
 
The FTC’s broad jurisdiction over industry implies a very broad array of possible 
research areas.  In its early years, most general investigations undertaken by the FTC 
were based on requests from the President or from Congress.  Even after the Commission 
began to initiate numerous studies on its own, many investigative reports continued to be 
undertaken based on congressional requests.  The pattern of external requests changed in 
the post-World War II era, when many more reports were begun under Commission 
auspices.  Whatever the cause,419 congressional requests decreased and the Commission 
                                                 
418 Guidelines and industry guides are discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.B.5; closing statements are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.B.1. 
419 At a 2003 BE history roundtable, two former BE directors discussed the decline of congressional and 
presidential requests for reports.  Michael Lynch argued that the decline was likely the result of competition 
in report writing from an increasing number of congressional staffers and from the advent of other 
organizations which operated in areas of traditional FTC focus, such as oil, meat packing, and agricultural 
products.  BE History Roundtable, supra note 125, at 175-77.  Organizations such as the Government 
Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, and the Energy Information Agency have economic 
analysts and other researchers who can undertake microeconomic research and are available to Congress to 
write reports.  An alternative theory for the decline in presidential and congressional requests, put forward 
by Willard Mueller, was that an increase in industry influence resulted in a reduction in such requests.  Id. 
at 177-79. 
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itself became a larger source of ideas for studies in the 1940s and the level of reporting in 
general fell. 
 
Ideas for research topics from within the FTC have come from many sources.  
Several studies have been essentially staff-initiated; many have been projects promoted 
by the agency Chairman or the Commission; and others have been sponsored by multiple 
bureaus.  It is often difficult to identify a single source of a research idea.  Often the 
specific ideas come from staff, but with encouragement from agency leaders who may 
have identified general areas for investigation.  Other times, ideas for studies follow from 
previous projects.  In other instances, congressional interest, if not a direct congressional 
request, might instigate a study. 
 
b. Current Approach to Research Topic Selection 
 
As was true historically, in more recent times FTC research ideas have come from 
a variety of sources.  One apparent change, however, has been a recent increase in the 
number of congressional mandates for research of various types.  During the past few 
years, a large portion of the research work has been generated by presidential or 
congressional requests for examinations of various competition and consumer protection 
issues.  Such work has included, for example, competition in the contact lens 
marketplace,420 the levelness of the playing field for the U.S. Postal Service and its 
private market rivals,421 grocery retail slotting allowances,422 and media violence.423 
 
Beyond these external requests, much recent FTC research has been initiated by 
the agency’s Chairs.  Such Chair-initiated work has included policy R&D efforts 
involving the implications of the state action doctrine for competition law enforcement 
and regulation,424 health care competition and information issues,425 and various efforts 
to improve the transparency of the merger review process by releasing data on recen
merger decisions and analyses of such data.
t 
                                                
426  The 1996 reports on competition and 
 
420 See FTC, THE STRENGTH OF COMPETITION IN THE SALE OF RX CONTACT LENSES: AN FTC STUDY 
(2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/contactlens/050214contactlensrpt.pdf. 
421 See FTC, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY DIFFERENTLY TO THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 
AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf. 
422 See FTC STAFF, SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE RETAIL GROCERY INDUSTRY: SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
IN FIVE PRODUCT CATEGORIES (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/slottingallowancerpt031114.pdf. 
423 See 2000 MEDIA VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 391. 
424 See FTC STAFF, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE (2003), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf. 
425 For a description of some of the FTC’s policy R&D efforts in the health care area, see 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/research/behealthcare.htm.  
426 See, e.g., FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER INVESTIGATION DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1996-2007 (2008), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/12/081201hsrmergerdata.pdf. 
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consumer protection policy in the twenty-first century in a global, high-tech marketplace 
were other notable Chairman-initiated endeavors.427 
 
Non-Chairman Commissioners also have participated extensively in the 
formulation of policy R&D projects, such as the examination of the municipal provision 
of Wi-Fi Internet connectivity technology,428 a recent workshop on the appropriate scope 
of the “unfair methods of competition” language in Section 5 of the FTC Act,429 and a 
workshop on vertical restraints currently in development.430 
 
As has been true throughout the history of the FTC, many recent agency research 
projects have been staff-initiated.431  A few recent examples include comparisons over 
time of television-based food marketing to children,432 the effects of various regulations 
on the provision of information in food advertising,433 and a customer survey of rent-to-
own transactions.434 
 
In the recent past, the research production process within the agency largely has 
been handled independently by each economic or legal organization.  The choices of 
topics and the approach to the research problem are generally decided within each group. 
For example, within the Bureau of Economics, research projects are sometimes initiated 
by economists who have been given small grants of time to undertake undirected 
research.  This research is monitored twice each year, but the review is intentionally 
light-handed.  As the projects within BE get larger and more formal, more review is 
undertaken.  For example, if an economist wanted the FTC to purchase relatively low-
                                                 
427 See FTC STAFF, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v1.pdf; FTC STAFF, 
ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL 
MARKETPLACE (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v2.pdf. 
428 See FTC STAFF, MUNICIPAL PROVISION OF WIRELESS INTERNET (2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/10/V060021municipalprovwirelessinternet.pdf. 
429 See FTC Workshop, Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute (Oct. 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/index.shtml. 
430 See FTC Press Release, FTC Announces Public Workshops for Next Year on Resale Price Maintenance 
(Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/10/rpmwksp.shtm. 
431 Staff-initiated projects are often influenced generally by overall agency preferences for research.  For 
example, without naming a particular research area or research question, a Chairman who indicates an 
interest in research in broad areas of policy can induce effort by the staff to find projects that fit in those 
policy areas. 
432 See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, DEBRA J. HOLT, PAULINE M. IPPOLITO, DEBRA M. 
DESROCHERS & CHRISTOPHER R. KELLEY, CHILDREN’S EXPOSURE TO TV ADVERTISING IN 1977 AND 2004: 
INFORMATION FOR THE OBESITY DEBATE (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/cabecolor.pdf. 
433 See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, ADVERTISING 
NUTRITION & HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977-1997 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/advertisingfinal.pdf. 
434 See FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, JAMES M. LACKO, SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN & MANOJ 
HASTAK, SURVEY OF RENT-TO-OWN CUSTOMERS (2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/renttoown/renttoownr.pdf. 
 102
cost data for a project, then the research would be reviewed by an ad hoc research 
committee prior to initiation of the project.  Parties outside BE, however, usually would 
not be consulted.  As projects increase in scope, the BE director and the Chairman’s 
office eventually get involved.  If data were to be obtained via compulsory process of 
some sort, the relevant legal bureau and the General Counsel’s office also would become 
immersed in that aspect of the project. 
 
Similarly, other agency units – such as OPP, the BC Policy and Coordination 
Office, and the General Counsel’s Policy Studies group – generate, monitor, and produce 
their own research products.  Even if the policy R&D projects are assigned to the 
organization rather than internally generated, the plans for the project are typically 
reviewed only within each organization (apart, of course, from informing the Chairman 
and any organization leadership).  The organizations typically do not turn to others for 
review of their proposals or methods.  Certain large projects might involve staff from 
other organizations – particularly economists if data manipulation or analysis is involved 
in the study – however, there would not typically be much cross-organization review of 
the study proposal or study methods.435 
 
c. Considerations for Setting a Research Agenda Going 
Forward 
 
There are several steps in the research process, including defining the broad topic 
areas of interest for research, generating interesting, policy-relevant, and achievable ideas 
within a topic area, and producing and monitoring the research.  As discussed in the 
previous section, in the recent past these tasks largely have been handled within each 
FTC bureau or office.  In principle, these tasks could be accomplished either in such a 
decentralized manner or through a more systematic, centralized process involving the 
simultaneous collection of research ideas from multiple sources, coordination of topic 
choices, and then monitoring of output.436 
 
The selection of an optimal research process likely depends on the type of work 
and output envisioned, as well as the effects on researcher incentives.  Those staff 
members who do research and have good research ideas typically are the most motivated 
to aggressively pursue those ideas.  Therefore, it is useful to allow staff members with 
                                                 
435 Top managers in each organization in the FTC learn about the existence and status of policy R&D 
projects from the materials produced for semiannual management retreats and through monthly and weekly 
reports prepared by the various organizations describing those activities. 
436 Those roundtable panelists addressing the issue of appropriate sources for research ideas seemed to 
think that good ideas might come from anywhere and that there is no reason to limit the sources of such 
ideas.  See, e.g., DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 128; Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 176.  The U.K. OFT recently used a 
Web-based moderated dialogue approach to determine areas of current policy interest among academics, 
business leaders, and others who might have useful ideas for pursuing policy R&D.  The EC’s DG SANCO 
also has recently undertaken extensive surveys in its Consumer Markets Scoreboard project to identify 
areas of consumer dissatisfaction across the EU, which effort may be useful as a means of defining areas 
ripe for policy R&D. 
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interesting and feasible research ideas to pursue such ideas.437  A process that solicits 
ideas that are then taken from the idea generator likely will produce only very general 
ideas.  Such a process might be useful, however, if it is not costly and if general ideas (as 
opposed to specific research plans) are the desired output. 
 
Some roundtable panelists discussed the policy R&D process and suggested rather 
different approaches.  Former BE Director Michael Salinger, for instance, argued that 
combining the agency’s policy groups might be sensible, but that the Bureau of 
Economics research work should remain independent of the legal policy shops and that 
the research process should remain decentralized.438  One rationale for such a view would 
be that the attorney-led organizations tend to produce top-down, workshop-intensive 
studies of a similar type, while BE tends to produce more academic products with a 
bottom-up orientation.  In contrast, two former heads of legal policy shops, Susan 
DeSanti439 and Joseph Kattan,440 favored a more centralized approach under which ideas 
from a wide variety of sources would be vetted early and production would be centrally 
controlled through an agency-wide committee (which presumably would report to the 
Chairman or the Commission).  The goals of such an approach would be to better control 
the chosen topics – for example, to select projects that relate more closely with current 
enforcement or advocacy priorities – and to coordinate resource deployment across 
several relatively autonomous groups. 
 
Two panelists independently described a staff/academic collaborative model of 
research that would pursue a systematic research agenda based largely on agency-
provided data on competition issues.441  The thrust of the argument in favor of this model 
was that the FTC could gain by inducing collaboration from academics and their graduate 
students through a data-provision scheme, in which academics gain access to the 
agency’s internal and external data for research purposes in exchange for their research 
efforts.  Such collaboration might be furthered through visits from academics during 
summers and sabbaticals.442  Former BE Director Luke Froeb also discussed the 
possibility of devising a general agenda by asking three questions:  (1) What do you want 
                                                 
437 At least one panelist argued that allowing bottom-up research to occur was essential to maintaining a 
research program.  See Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 176-77. 
438 Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 168-69. 
439 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 128-31, 153. 
440 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 167-68. 
441 See Nevo, Chicago Tr. at 277-88; Rose, Boston Tr. at 134-36.  Aviv Nevo’s general argument for 
stronger academic ties was also made by Nancy Rose, who suggested annual or biennial conferences with 
academics on topics of interest, such as retrospectives, as well as expanded use of visiting academics and 
developing ties with the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
442 The Bureau of Economics currently has some ties to the academic community through its seminar series 
and through its visiting scholars program – which brings in academics to the bureau for year-long visits – 
and occasional joint research projects.  BE also has recently joined with Northwestern University’s Searle 
Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth and Northwestern’s Center for the Study of Industrial 
Organization to co-sponsor an annual microeconomics conference to strengthen those academic ties.  See 
supra note 322. 
 104
the information for?; (2) What do you want to know? (And can we know the long-run 
effects?); and (3) What can we learn that will alter what we do?443 
 
On their face, these suggestions present very different notions about the best 
mechanism to produce research.  However, depending on which projects are included in 
the centralized scheme, these visions may not be as different as they initially appear.  If 
one is searching for policy ideas to be explored in workshops or hearings, then a 
formalized topic selection process and report production scheme may be feasible.  
Obtaining ideas from a large set of sources might provide a richer choice set.  Some level 
of coordination of the large externally and Commission-driven projects also might be 
appropriate.  Currently, those projects are controlled by an assigned group, but higher-
level coordination almost always occurs and centralization might make that process 
proceed more smoothly.  Whether such coordination needs to entail centralized control of 
production is a more difficult issue, as that may unfavorably alter incentives.  As 
discussed above, individual staff members and organizations may not devote substantial 
resources to developing good projects if those projects are then taken over by other 
organizations.  In addition, a centralized model would not make much sense for the 
smaller, bottom-up research projects because centralization would add little value and 
discourage development.  Central planning can identify broad areas of interest, but it is 
very unlikely to produce specific achievable project ideas.  The ideas for any interesting 
projects likely will have to be done on a less prescribed basis.  Furthermore, the impetus 
for some of the best policy-relevant economic research is often the recognition of a new 
data source or method of analysis that could be used to shed light on questions 
surrounding a particular policy.  A high degree of centralization may cause such 
opportunities to go unrecognized. 
 
Based on discussions with managers in various other governmental economic 
policy shops, research – particularly bottom-up economic or scientific research – seems 
to be a decentralized activity in many government organizations.444  For a segment of the 
research work, researchers tend to generate their own ideas within relevant bounds and 
pursue the topics with little oversight.  Another segment of policy R&D work is directed 
or top-down research and the production of those outputs is more heavily monitored.  
Even in that context, however, the monitoring appears to be handled within a relatively 
small group, rather than coordinated across groups.  
 
To generate useful policy R&D topics for large projects, without imposing 
unnecessary costs on smaller, more research-oriented projects, perhaps a review process 
that differs by level of resource commitment might be the best schema.  This might 
                                                 
443 Froeb, 7/30 DC Tr. at 214-17, 269.  Froeb ultimately, however, did not think a broad systematic agenda 
would be very helpful and suggested narrow efforts to examine opportunistically the outcomes of market 
events. 
444 Interviews regarding the research process and policy work at DG Comp, the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Congressional Budget Office, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the DOJ 
Antitrust Division’s Economic Analysis Group were conducted in June and September, 2008.  Each of 
those agencies makes use of economists and each produces some policy outputs.  However, the FTC 
appears to undertake more noneconomist research and policy work than do the other organizations. 
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maintain flexibility and reduce bureaucracy at the low end, while improving monitoring 
at the upper end.  Recent FTC Chairmen have used a combination of weekly and monthly 
reports and semiannual senior management retreats to review the progress of ongoing 
projects and to promote potential new ideas. 
 
For relatively smaller projects – such as those proposed by the economics staff 
that do not require significant data purchases and that have working papers or private 
publication in journals as the envisioned output – little review or monitoring is required.  
For instance, the Bureau of Economics currently handles such undirected research via a 
time grant process and periodic monitoring by managers in its recently established Office 
of Applied Research and Outreach.445 
 
Occasionally, staff propose projects that may require significant time and some 
data expense, but not require compulsory process or expensive data purchases.  For such 
projects, proposal preparation by the author and bureau/office review has been the norm.  
Managers within the organization have provided oversight of the project.  
 
Projects that require major data purchases or that grow directly from the agency’s 
agenda, projects requiring compulsory process, and congressionally requested projects 
may warrant more monitoring and control than do the smaller projects discussed 
previously.  Such large project proposals could be made subject to an intra-agency review 
process, if such a process would add value or allow for better resource allocation 
decisions.  The cost would be some loss of autonomy and responsibility for the individual 
group leading the project and perhaps for the individual authors, but that price may be 
offset by gains in coordination or in improved topic selection.446 
 
d. Selected Research Ideas Identified during External 
Consultations 
 
Roundtable panelists provided a wide array of specific suggestions for research 
topics.  The most frequently mentioned area for research was examination of outcomes 
following merger reviews – that is, merger retrospectives.447  As discussed below in 
Chapter VII, however, there was a significant divergence of opinion regarding the value 
of such work.  Related to the merger retrospective work, the testing of merger simulation 
                                                 
445 Each of the interviews with other government organizations indicated that offering at least some amount 
of this type of research time was important to meet the market for research-capable Ph.D. economists, 
especially for newly minted Ph.D.s. 
446 One approach to idea generation might entail use of a research staff person who occasionally (perhaps 
annually) collects general policy R&D ideas from across the agency and from informed outsiders, and culls 
that list down for further consideration.  Those general ideas that have the most merit could then be 
forwarded to organizations within the agency for preparation of specific project proposals.  The best 
proposals might then be chosen for action, with the specific shop that generated the chosen idea/proposal 
being given responsibility for production.  The staffer could monitor and report on progress, but would not 
necessarily control the production process. 
447 See, e.g., Ghosal, 7/30 DC Tr. at 242-43, 273-74; Picker, Chicago Tr. at 166-69; Scheffman, NY Tr. at 
79-80. 
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models also was proposed as a project.448  Such efforts would be aimed at determining 
whether any of the theoretical models of oligopoly behavior that drive the simulation 
results fit actual merger outcomes.  Some such work has been undertaken recently by two 
FTC economists, as well as an economist at DOJ.449 
 
Beyond merger retrospectives and simulations, several other competition topics 
were suggested.  Perhaps the leading topic currently among antitrust-focused academics 
is bundled discounts, including so-called “all units” discounts.450  The London roundtable 
produced suggestions for research on two-sided markets and the implications of 
behavioral economics for competition policy,451 as well as consumer goods and services 
monopolies that produce consumer “lock-in” in the aftermarket stage.452   
 
Studies of the effects of resale price maintenance and single-firm market power 
also were mentioned, although not everyone was confident such work could actually be 
done in a convincing fashion.453  Retrospective work on remedies also was proposed.454 
 
Several participants proposed studies of regulatory effects, particularly in the 
telecommunications arena.  Two economists described a previous BE staff study of the 
Federal Communication Commission’s must carry rules as a model for future efforts to 
find natural experiments to test theories of exclusion.455  The idea of looking for natural 
experiments (that sometimes occur in locally regulated industries) was a theme that 
reappeared several times during the external consultations in various guises.456 
 
Calls for generalized studies of industry also were forthcoming.  Salinger lauded 
such studies as being helpful to get to essential factual issues of conduct affecting an 
                                                 
448 See Wickelgren, Nevo, and Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 231-41. 
449 See Matthew C. Weinberg & Daniel Hosken, Using Mergers to Test a Model of Oligopoly (University 
of Georgia Department of Economics Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/microeconomics/docs/mweinberg.pdf; Craig Peters, Evaluating the 
Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2006). 
450 See Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 267-68. 
451 See Vickers, London Tr. at 78-79. 
452 See Fingleton, London Tr. at 61-62. 
453 Compare Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 247-50, with Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 255-57. 
454 See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 89-90; Leveque, Paris Tr. at 112; First, NY Tr. at 78.  
455 See Froeb and Hazlett, 7/30 DC Tr. at 259-60, 269-70.  The panelists discussed Michael G. Vita, Must 
Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. REG. ECON. 159 (1997).  The 
natural experiment in Vita’s paper was the elimination of the must carry rules in the late 1980s on First 
Amendment grounds.  This exogenous change in the regulatory regime gave cable systems discretion as to 
which (if any) local stations they would carry; it allowed clean testing of various hypotheses about the 
rationale for cable system carriage decisions.  Nevo echoed Froeb’s call for opportunistic use of data to test 
the effects of various competition policy choices.  Nevo, Chicago Tr. at 284. 
456 Two participants indicated that China’s new competition law may provide a fertile area for opportunistic 
examination of the effects of antitrust generally in that nation.  See Shapiro and Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 
208, 212. 
 107
industry.457  Sector studies were suggested, as were broad studies of issues that cut across 
sectors, such as entry.458  OFT Chief Executive John Fingleton discussed the importance 
of long-term sectoral studies as tools for relationship building, which can serve as 
effective means of both staying informed of industry conduct and providing a softer 
means of enforcement.459  Simon Pritchard of the OFT said that sectoral relationships 
built through ongoing studies are very important to achieving regulatory outcomes by 
preventing or deterring anticompetitive conduct in advance, which is a positive result 
reached at much lower costs to the agency.460  During the OFT consultation, staff 
discussed how a sector study enables the agency to obtain baseline data relevant to 
competitive conditions, which can prove useful in subsequent investigations.461  At the 
Tokyo roundtable, panelists discussed how, for the last 10 years, the JFTC has performed 
and published about 30 such sector studies, which have enabled the agency to better 
grasp the state of affairs in the marketplace.462 
 
One panelist proposed studies that would identify the types of evidence that 
appear to be persuasive to federal judges in antitrust litigations.463  Another participant 
suggested that the FTC examine the effects of the substantial changes in U.S. antitrust 
policy over the past 20 years.464 
 
On the consumer protection side, roundtable panelists mentioned advertising and 
the regulated professions as useful areas for re-examination.  Regarding advertising, 
suggested areas for study included an examination of how well disclosures in advertising 
really work – that is, are they seen, read, and comprehended, and how might one evaluate 
the meaning and message of ads without text?465  In addition, one participant noted the 
proliferation of anti-aging claims of various sorts aimed at the aging Baby Boomer 
generation, suggesting that those areas might provide fertile ground for studies.466 
 
                                                 
457 Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 139-40. 
458 See Leveque, Paris Tr. at 112; Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 94-95; Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 116-17; 
Consultation with DG Comp, Oct. 21, 2008. 
459 Fingleton, London Tr. at 55-56. 
460 Pritchard, London Tr. at 99. 
461 Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008.  OFT staff explained that by gathering the baseline data through 
a market study, the agency may obtain more information relative to the limited set of data that is obtainable 
through a particular investigation.  Id.    
462 Tokyo Roundtable, Oct. 7, 2008. 
463 See Swire, NY Tr. at 86. 
464 See Rose, Boston Tr. at 94. 
465 See Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 194-96 (addressing disclosures); Swire, NY Tr. at 198-99 (addressing ads 
without text). 
466 See Levine, NY Tr. at 197. 
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Similar to the calls for more advocacy-related research, examination of the effects 
of regulations by non-market-oriented regulatory agencies also was proposed.467  In 
addition, critically examining the implications of behavioral economics in market settings 
was discussed.468  Study of online behavioral advertising also was proposed as a useful 
addition to the FTC research agenda.469 
 
* * * 
 
Agency leadership must motivate the staff to pursue the agency’s mission, both 
by clearly communicating that mission to staff and by listening to staff’s input on how 
best to achieve the mission.  Strategic planning allows the agency to identify competition 
and consumer protection problems on the horizon, as well as determine which tool or 
tools with which to address such problems.  Policy R&D is a necessary foundation for 
tackling the challenging competition and consumer protection policy issues that the 
agency has been tasked with addressing.  The FTC’s efforts in these three areas – 
leadership, planning, and research – significantly impact the agency’s ability to deploy its 
resources in an effective manner.  The following chapter addresses how the agency 
currently deploys its resources, as well as how it might improve on such deployment in 
the future. 
   
 
                                                 
467 MacLeod (7/30 DC Tr. at 177-80) and Calfee and Rubin (7/30 DC Tr. at 171-76) argued that the best 
FTC research historically was that focused on policies of other regulatory agencies (for example, those 
involving restrictions in the areas of advertising, optometry, and legal services).  Supporting that view, a 
panelist at the Paris roundtable noted that the FTC study on the effects of advertising on the practice of 
optometry is over 20 years old but remains the best in its class.  Philips, Paris Tr. at 131-32. 
468 See Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 171-72, 187-89; Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 183; Calfee, 7/30 DC Tr. at 184-87.  
In addition, Peter Swire suggested that the FTC more thoroughly examine the connections between 
behavioral economics and experimental economics and their implications for online commerce.  Swire, NY 
Tr. at 198-99; Written Submission of Peter P. Swire, Oct. 29, 2008, at 6-7. 
469 See Swire, NY Tr. at 198-99. 
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VI. Deployment of Agency Resources 
 
This chapter discusses the FTC’s deployment of resources in pursuit of its 
competition and consumer protection missions, identifying considerations that might 
guide such deployment.  Section A addresses general issues involving the allocation of 
resources across the agency’s many functions.  Section B reviews the FTC’s resource 
deployment options, illustrating the many tools – such as enforcement, advocacy, 
research, and education – available to the agency. 
 
A. General Issues Involving Resource Allocation 
 
An agency’s allocation of its scarce resources undoubtedly is one of the most 
significant determinants of its ultimate success.  Once it identifies a desired outcome – 
for example, a reduction in the number of deceptive weight-loss claims – a successful 
agency will make optimal use of its tools to achieve that outcome 
 
Resource allocation, then, is to a large extent a matter of picking the right tool or 
tools from the FTC’s existing arsenal – or adding new tools to that arsenal – to best 
address the matter at hand.  At the Chicago roundtable, then-BE Director Michael Baye 
framed the analysis in terms of being at the right point of “a production possibilities 
curve that doesn’t have guns and butter on it but has all the different outputs that the 
Federal Trade Commission can produce.”470  A roundtable panelist suggested that, 
assuming the FTC seeks to deploy its resources in such a manner as to maximize 
consumer welfare, the agency should engage in efforts that produce “the biggest gain to 
marginal consumer welfare.”471 
 
Resource allocation decisions also should consider the potential costs, to the 
public as well as the agency, of pursuing particular activities.  A senior OFT official 
observed that an agency’s tools vary in terms of the risk and cost associated with each of 
them.  The OFT, he continued, is able to achieve certain outcomes at a lower cost by 
employing “softer enforcement,” such as building relationships with key stakeholders and 
other advocacy efforts, rather than “swinging heavy tools around at high costs.”472  
Another panelist cautioned that, when deciding where to devote resources, an agency 
should consider more carefully the cost of making a wrong decision in bringing a case or 
taking some other action.473 
 
                                                 
470 Baye, Chicago Tr. at 268. 
471 Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 25.  Another roundtable panelist maintained that the resource allocation issue 
should be framed more broadly, explaining that “the question should not be how the FTC can allocate its 
resources, it should be how the United States should allocate its resources.  You’re sub-optimizing if you 
simply look at what the FTC can do to make the best of the resources it has.”  Angland, NY Tr. at 26. 
472 Pritchard, London Tr. at 97-98. 
473 See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 110 (“If you had reason to believe that with some reasonable probability, 
maybe only 30 percent, permitting [a] merger could lead to wonderful things for the economy, in a 
circumstance like that, you might want to think twice before bringing the case.”). 
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 Tool selection, much like strategic planning, should include a certain amount of 
flexibility.474  It may be the case, for example, that business education and policy R&D 
efforts such as workshops are the best tools to address a relatively new and complicated 
issue in the marketplace.  However, if there is an insufficient response on the part of 
industry to such efforts, it may be that enforcement actions are necessary to more 
effectively accomplish the agency’s objectives on such issue. 
 
In addition to general praise for the FTC’s allocation of its resources,475 
roundtable panelists had specific suggestions for such allocation.  Most significantly, a 
fairly broad consensus formed around the idea that, although law enforcement is a 
primary function of the FTC, the Commission needs to remain more than just an 
enforcement agency.  As former Chairman Timothy Muris explained, on the antitrust 
side, to be recognized as really doing your job, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to bring 
cases.476  According to former BC Director Susan Creighton, the mission on both sides of 
the agency is to preserve the effectiveness of markets.  The overall priority of the agency 
thus is to determine where there are instances of market failure and to address those.  
Sometimes the best tool to do that will be enforcement; sometimes, however, 
enforcement is not the right tool.477  Former BC Director Richard Parker noted that in 
pursuing a particular policy, the agency cannot rely solely on law enforcement because 
the right cases may not present themselves; it may be that other tools, such as guidelines, 
for example, will need to be used to pursue the desired policy.478   
 
Panelists also offered various suggestions as to how the agency should make 
resource allocation decisions.  One panelist cautioned against focusing on a particular 
area or issue merely because it is novel.  According to the panelist, the FTC has focused 
                                                 
474 See, e.g., Pritchard, London Tr. at 105 (“We don’t hesitate to switch tools[;] . . . if we find that actually 
there is a nut that does not crack with some hammer then we are not wedded to sticking to the original 
tool.”). 
475 See, e.g., Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 98 (“I think that whatever their resources happen to be, they’re 
allocating them reasonably nicely.”) (complimenting specifically the agency’s efforts in the competition 
advocacy and international arenas); Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 114-15 (“I think that the things you 
choose to do are generally very well selected.  I think the way you allocate your resources is well done.”); 
Wilks, London Tr. at 37-38 (characterizing the agency’s nonlitigation efforts – including, for example, 
competition advocacy, consumer education, and competition R&D – as having been “extraordinarily 
productive and successful in building legitimacy and consen[sus]”). 
476 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 54.  See also Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement 
at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (2005) (“Another important change in 
the Commission’s approach to regulation, contributing to its enhanced status, involves the recognition that 
the FTC was not created solely as a law enforcement agency.  Rather, it was established in 1914 to work 
with the private sector, provide advice about possible violations, anticipate and study economic trends and 
developments, and anticipate and report to the White House, Congress, and the public likely economic 
problems.”). 
477 Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 75-76. 
478 Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 118.  See also T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 48 (arguing that, although law 
enforcement plays an “important part” in the agency’s mission, it should include more than just 
enforcement); Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 53 (suggesting that the agency ought to be “beating a drum at the 
ABA and elsewhere” about the agency’s accomplishments outside the litigation context). 
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resources on “new and burgeoning” areas, and there are benefits to that course, including 
“sending a message of deterrence right at the outset where you see the potential for 
fraud.”  He cautioned, however, that the agency should not address an area simply 
because it is new; it must be important as well.479  Another panelist suggested that the 
agency’s resources might be focused “more on what the FTC can do distinctively because 
that may be where the biggest marginal gains are.”480  In other words, asked the panelist, 
what can the FTC do that neither the DOJ nor private antitrust actions can do?481  
Similarly, another panelist asserted:  “In an era of limited resources, the focus of the 
agency should be where two criteria are met: (1) a topic has important effects on 
consumers; and (2) the FTC has a significant advantage in effectiveness compared with 
other possible ways to address the topic[, including, for instance,] state enforcement, 
enforcement by agencies in other countries, self-regulation, or reliance on market 
forces.”482 
 
Finally, former General Counsel Stephen Calkins complimented the simultaneous 
use of agency tools within a specific area.  Citing the example of recent FTC (and DOJ) 
actions in the real estate brokerage industry, Calkins argued that “that actually is an 
example of the whole process working well because the agencies are litigating and doing 
advocacy and doing [policy] R&D and using a whole panoply of their resources, which I 
tend to think is when things work best. . . .   My guess is that that linking together is what 
really works.”483 
 
B. The FTC’s Many Resource Deployment Options 
 
1. Law Enforcement/Litigation 
 
The FTC’s law enforcement authority encompasses both consumer protection and 
antitrust.  The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the Commission is Section 
5(a) of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”484  Drawing on a 1980 Commission policy statement, Congress in 
1994 defined “unfair” practices as those that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
                                                 
479 Brauch, Chicago Tr. at 59-60. 
480 Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 25. 
481 Id. 
482 Written Submission of Peter P. Swire, Oct. 29, 2008, at 3.  See also Swire, NY Tr. at 161-63 
(recommending that the agency “go after important issues and especially focus on things that other 
[enforcement agencies] aren’t going to do very well” and identifying forensics and new technologies as 
areas in which the FTC likely has a comparative advantage over local enforcers). 
483 Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 74.  See also Boast, NY Tr. at 31-32 (“[T]here are . . . wonderfully unique things 
about the FTC and the history of the statute and the agency that allow it to deploy multiple sets of tools to 
the advantage of consumers.”). 
484 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  The basic prohibition (though initially limited to acts or practices “in commerce”) 
was added to the FTC Act in 1938; previously, the Commission had challenged what would now be called 
“consumer protection” violations as unfair methods of competition. 
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outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”485  In addition, 
the Commission enforces a variety of specific consumer protection statutes – for 
example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Truth-in-Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, the Cigarette Labeling Act, the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
of 2003, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003 and others486 – that prohibit specifically defined trade practices and generally 
specify that violations are to be treated as if they were “unfair or deceptive” acts or 
practices under Section 5(a).  The Commission enforces the substantive requirements of 
consumer protection law through both administrative and judicial processes. 
 
The Commission enforces various antitrust laws, most significantly Section 5(a) 
of the FTC Act and provisions of the Clayton Act, through its Bureau of Competition.  
Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition.”487  Unfair 
methods of competition include any conduct that would violate the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.  The Clayton Act prohibits, among other things, corporate acquisitions that may tend 
substantially to lessen competition488 and certain forms of price discrimination.489  As 
with its consumer protection responsibilities, the Commission uses both administrative 
and judicial processes to enforce antitrust law.490 
 
Enforcement Goals.  In allocating resources to its law enforcement efforts, the 
agency should first consider the goals that underlie such efforts.  As discussed in more 
detail in Chapter VII.B below, among the most important goals of the FTC’s law 
enforcement mission are providing guidance to industry, developing sound law, and 
obtaining consumer redress.  Deterrence of unlawful conduct, however, is the lodestar of 
the agency’s law enforcement efforts.  Former BCP Assistant Director Paul Luehr 
expressed the view that the FTC’s role as an enforcer – particularly since the early 1990s 
– “has really given the agency added heft.  No longer [is it] considered just the nanny on 
Pennsylvania Avenue full of regulations, rules related to the frosted cocktail glass, and 
things like this.  But now [it is seen as bringing] real cases in federal court against real 
wrong doers and I think that has had a real deterrent effect and many other salutary 
effects on the market.”491  According to former BCP Deputy Director Lee Peeler, an 
                                                 
485 Id. § 45(n); FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, Appended to International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 
949, 1070 (1984). 
486 Links to various statutes enforced by the Commission are available at www.ftc.gov/ogc/stats.shtm.  
Some of these statutes include provisions for enforcement by other agencies; for example, the 
Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration can enforce the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
against credit unions. 
487 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
488 Id. § 18. 
489 Id. §§ 13-13b. 
490 Additional information regarding the FTC’s enforcement authority is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm. 
491 Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 25-26.  See also id. at 46-47 (“So in terms of allocation of resources, I don’t think 
that too much can be said about the effect of real federal cases.”). 
 113
active enforcement program provides the agency with credibility – “street cred” – when it 
goes to another government agency, a state, or a consumer group and advocates a certain 
approach to consumer protection.492  Another roundtable panelist explained that “the 
notion of demonstrating to the bar and the business community that the cop is really on 
the beat is a really important part of the agency’s enforcement mission.”493 
 
Caseload.  An important consideration in allocating resources to law enforcement 
efforts is the appropriate number of cases to pursue at any given time.  As former 
Chairman Muris has written, an agency that takes on commitments that significantly 
outrun its capabilities does so at its own peril: 
 
Agencies can create a serious problem by taking on so 
many matters that the agency lacks the human capital to 
execute them well.  Again the overambitious case load in 
the 1970s overtaxed the agenc[y’s] capabilities, thereby 
raising doubts about the FTC’s ability to handle the matters 
successfully.  The Commission would have been far better 
off choosing a smaller number of matters and handling 
them well.494  
 
 Resource allocation and caseload are also considerations when requests for 
cooperation are received from foreign counterparts.  Although it has not been a problem 
to date, as more and more FTC investigations and cases – for both missions – involve 
foreign elements, the agency as a whole may need to consider the resource implications 
of cooperation with foreign counterparts in investigations and litigation.  In a number of 
instances, the investment of FTC resources on behalf of a foreign government may 
encourage foreign agencies to invest their resources to support FTC enforcement matters.  
This ingredient of reciprocity warrants attention in deciding how to allocate FTC 
resources. 
 
Case Generation.  Another consideration in evaluating the agency’s law 
enforcement efforts is the amount and type of case generation in which the agency 
                                                 
492 Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 141-42. 
493 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 53 (“Most antitrust enforcement in this country, and I think around the world, 
actually doesn’t happen [at an antitrust agency] like this.  It happens in my clients’ boardrooms, in the 
conference rooms in our law firms, where we tell the clients the risks that attach to the conduct that they are 
proposing . . . .  And our ability to get the attention of the business people and have them take us seriously 
when we tell them, you are close to the line or you are over the line, is directly correlated to the things that 
do happen [at the agency] and in your enforcement mission.”).  See also Written Submission of Tim 
Kennish, Sept. 26, 2008, at 6 (“[G]uidance will not, it seems to me, engender the respect it deserves if it is 
not supported by enforcement actions in cases where the behavior in question constitutes a clear violation 
of FTC enforcement policy.  In essence, the agency cannot afford to shrink from putting its money where 
its mouth is.”); Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 85 (“To get companies and individuals to take seriously the impact of 
[the agency’s] prospective guidance, there has to be a cop on the beat and there has to be an ability to 
enforce and to go aggressively where somebody has overstepped the line.  You really need both [guidance 
and enforcement].”). 
494 Muris, Principles, supra note 17, at 181-82. 
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engages.  Former BC Director Richard Parker recommended that the agency be 
innovative in the area of case generation, citing trade press – particularly in fungible 
commodity industries with few sellers – and trade association bylaws as sources of 
potential cases.495  Former BCP Assistant Director Darren Bowie argued that an approach 
of generating cases and seeing which ones percolate to the top is not effective.  Instead, 
the agency fares better when everyone – including the Commission, managers, and staff – 
understand what the enforcement strategy is and why the agency is bringing the cases that 
it is bringing.496 
 
Case Selection.  Perhaps the most important consideration in evaluating the 
enforcement efforts of the FTC is its case selection.  Such evaluation should consider 
where the agency decides to focus its enforcement efforts.  For example, should that 
focus be where potential consumer benefits and/or redress are largest?  Should the focus 
be on areas involving the greatest amount of commerce?  How much of the agency’s 
enforcement efforts should be devoted to developing or clarifying competition and 
consumer protection doctrine?  Does the agency have the right mix of high risk/high 
reward or cutting-edge cases, on the one hand, and low risk/low reward or traditional 
cases, on the other?  Is the agency properly calibrating its litigation risk?  How should the 
agency incorporate investigative and case cooperation commitments to foreign 
counterparts consistent with resource constraints? 
 
External consultations confirmed the importance of focusing enforcement efforts 
on significant portions of the national economy, including health care, energy, and retail 
markets.  In deploying enforcement resources, according to former BC Director William 
Baer, it would be reckless not to take a hard look at what is important in the economy 
generally, such as health care, information technology, and Internet commerce.  He 
cautioned, however, that such a focus will not necessarily result in most of the agency’s 
cases being brought in those areas; rather, the agency has to go “where the money and the 
problems are.”497  Another panelist agreed that the agency ought to focus on significant 
sectors of the economy; however, he added that the agency needs to “use a number of 
different tests and see whether the result of applying more than one leads [it] to the same 
conclusion.”498 
 
Former BC Director Susan Creighton has remarked that the agency should “fish 
where the fish are.”499  Specifically, she cited two instances of market failure in which 
enforcement can be the right tool.  The first instance involves legal failure – that is, areas, 
such as the state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines, in which the development of 
                                                 
495 See Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 74-75. 
496 See Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 71-72. 
497 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 73. 
498 Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 70. 
499 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 42 (citing Creighton); see also Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 978 (2005) (“[W]hen fishing, the best place to fish is where the fish are plentiful, and 
the things you catch are likely to be fish.”). 
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antitrust law appears to be going in the wrong direction.  The second instance is where 
there are no other proper plaintiffs whose interests coincide with the public interest, 
perhaps due to a collective-action problem.500   
 
According to roundtable panelists, the agency also should consider focusing its 
law enforcement efforts in such a manner as to both leverage its resources and exploit its 
comparative advantages.  Baer recommended that the agency select areas in which the 
agency can leverage its resources by, for example, serving as a model for local and state 
officials to emulate, with the end result being “more cops on the beat than just the 
FTC.”501  Luehr suggested that the number of consumers injured – not just the amount of 
potential redress – should be taken into consideration because few entities other than the 
FTC can take on high-volume consumer cases.502  Similarly, another panelist observed 
that, unlike in Europe, the U.S. has a “parallel system” of private enforcement that may 
provide the FTC with the opportunity to forego certain cases that may be better suited for 
such private enforcement.503 
 
In addition to the more traditional leads for investigations (such as complaints or 
merger notifications), some foreign counterparts such as the U.K. OFT increasingly are 
adopting a more intelligence-led, proactive approach to case selection.  The OFT has 
committed significant resources to idea generation, establishing a horizon scanning team 
to coordinate generation of new project ideas within the office, as well as a monthly 
project ideas group that brings together individuals from across the office responsible for 
researching and developing ideas for new work.  All OFT investigations, independently 
of their source, are prioritized according to their likely impact and strategic significance, 
balanced against the risks and resources needed.504  This prioritization framework is 
applied at group and area management levels with escalation to the senior management 
team when necessary.505 
                                                 
500 Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 76-78. 
501 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 74. 
502 Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 92-93. 
503 Venit, Brussels Tr. at 14.  See also Heimler, Paris Tr. at 135 (stating that the United States is in a 
“privileged situation” because most cases “originate from private litigation, and I think this makes a very 
big difference, also, in terms of priority for the agency, in terms of cases that you take”). 
504 See supra Chapter V.B.3 for a discussion of these prioritization principles. 
505 Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008.  Other countries prioritize by subject matter areas (e.g., 
consumer credit, tourism and leisure, public service delivery), while others select cases based on particular 
industries or commercial sectors (e.g., mobile commerce).  Still others adopt a hybrid approach, focusing 
first on subject matter and then weighing various factors such as the cost of enforcement action.  For 
example, the Canadian Competition Bureau has developed a two-step formal approach to case selection: 
the first step involves identifying particular sectors worthy of the Bureau’s attention; the second step 
involves a triage approach to identify factors that would suggest that a specific case should be opened.  
Factors considered include: (1) specific deterrence (i.e. to stop a repeat wrongdoer); (2) the need for 
judicial interpretation of a specific legal principle; (3) prevention or correction of conduct; (4) general 
deterrence; (5) awareness/promotion of compliance; (6) addressing particularly flagrant or egregious 
conduct; and (7) meeting the Bureau’s obligations to law enforcement partners.  Consultation with 
Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008. 
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Another relevant factor in selecting cases is the litigation risk attendant to 
pursuing any given case.  In the various external consultations, there was a fairly uniform 
view that the agency ought to be less risk-averse in bringing cases.  Parker bluntly stated 
that “if you weigh the risk of losing too much, you are never going to bring a case.”506  
Former BC Assistant Director Joseph Kattan remarked that “the function of the agency as 
an enforcement agency is to get the right answer.  It is not to win cases for the sake of 
winning cases.”507  Another panelist argued that, although the agency has to win “a 
reasonable proportion” of the cases that it brings, “you also have to recognize that at least 
from time to time you’re going to have to bring cases to try to establish the law where 
either it seems to be wrong or it isn’t sufficiently clear or you want to push the 
boundaries, to some extent, and . . . you can’t guarantee [that you will] win cases of that 
kind.”508  A panelist at the Tokyo roundtable argued that the FTC would make the most 
of its human resources – particularly its economists – by pursuing difficult cases and not 
being overly concerned about winning or losing a particular case.509  Bruno Lasserre, the 
head of the Conseil de la Concurrence, noted that a well-reasoned opinion dismissing a 
complaint can be as valuable in developing legal standards as an opinion that finds 
liability.510 
 
Similarly, Bowie explained:  “The Commission’s reputation is strong enough that 
it can afford to take some risks in the right cases where there is a clearly defined 
consumer harm that the agency can articulate and that outsiders and insiders can 
understand.  In those cases, it is worth taking some risks and the Commission can afford 
to do more of that.”511  Former BE Director David Scheffman characterized the agency 
staff as “very conservative” in bringing cases, identifying as one of the causes the fact 
that litigation losses tend to be felt primarily by career staff, who continue to be at the 
agency when adverse decisions are rendered, rather than senior staff and the 
Commissioners, who may have departed the agency by such time.512 
 
                                                 
506 Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 80. 
507 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 158.  See also Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 119 (“I’m not saying [the FTC has] to 
litigate every case.  I just think the FTC’s tradition is not to litigate enough cases and not to go to court 
often enough.”); Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 97 (“I think that you don’t want to be in a position where every case 
you bring you win.  That suggests maybe you’re not bringing enough.  And I like the idea of pushing a bit 
and being in court more often. . . .  I began by saying I think the agency should try to be in court more.  It 
does have benefits, transparency, fashioning the doctrine.  War is inefficient, but sometimes you do go to 
war.”); Boast, NY Tr. at 52-53 (“I wouldn’t be troubled by a twenty percent win ratio. . . .  The losses are 
very important.  If you’re bringing frivolous cases, of course not.  But, . . . [it is] very important to know 
what the courts think about [the difficult cases].”); Angland, NY Tr. at 65 (“having a low winning 
percentage doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be bringing cases”). 
508 Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 39. 
509 Tokyo Roundtable, Oct. 7, 2008. 
510 Consultation with Conseil de la Concurrence, Oct. 23, 2008. 
511 Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 81. 
512 Scheffman, NY Tr. at 51, 53. 
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Fora.  The FTC is able to pursue its law enforcement mission through both 
administrative processes (in so-called Part III proceedings) and judicial processes (in 
federal district court).  The agency must make a determination as to the proper forum for 
the various enforcement actions that it pursues, and primary considerations may be that 
the Commission’s authority to obtain redress, disgorgement, and other equitable remedies 
is well established only in a judicial setting, while the agency has more opportunity to 
apply its expertise in an administrative setting.   
 
Remedies.  Another significant factor in making law enforcement decisions is the 
appropriate remedy that the FTC should seek in any given case; as noted above, this may 
be key to selecting a judicial or administrative forum.   
 
A relevant consideration is whether the agency is using its remedial powers – 
including conduct, structural, and monetary remedies – properly and effectively.  Several 
panelists commended the FTC’s 1999 merger remedies study513 for helping to refine the 
agency’s pursuit of appropriate remedies.514  Panelists also addressed the FTC’s authority 
to pursue disgorgement as a remedy for antitrust violations of the FTC Act.  One panelist 
touted the benefits of disgorgement, arguing that injunctive remedies, such as cease and 
desist orders, and even structural remedies, often are inefficient and ineffective; by 
comparison, disgorgement can take away the benefits of the unlawful conduct from its 
perpetrator, thereby providing much greater deterrence of those violations in a more 
efficient manner.515  Others, including former Commissioner Thomas Leary, argued 
against the imposition of such “retrospective consequences in the antitrust field.”516 
 
Whatever the remedy sought in any particular matter, such remedy should be 
identified as early as possible in the course of the matter.  If no workable remedy is 
possible, the agency might reconsider pursuing such matter.  As one panelist framed the 
issue, “[It is] very important, before ever taking an individual case on, . . . to ask yourself 
a question[:] if I had to put a remedy in place, what would it be and will it make things 
better or worse? . . .  [T]hat is a very important discipline to take on before one gets 
involved in an individual case.”517   
 
A larger consideration for the agency is whether its existing remedial powers are 
appropriate, given its competition and consumer missions.  As one example, the FTC has 
very limited authority to pursue civil penalties for violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
The Commission has testified before Congress that there are categories of cases in which 
“restitution or disgorgement may not be appropriate or sufficient remedies” and thus 
                                                 
513 1999 DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 408. 
514 See, e.g., McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 87; Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 89. 
515 See Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 61-63. 
516 Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 24. 
517 Venit, Brussels Tr. at 14-15.  See also Koponen, Brussels Tr. at 22 (“[O]n the Section 2 side of things, I 
think we’ve seen, not least here in Europe, some big question marks around remedies that have been 
imposed or have been considered in those types of cases.”). 
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“civil penalties could enable the Commission to better achieve the law enforcement goal 
of deterrence.”518  
 
Settlements and Closing Statements.  The vast majority of cases pursued by the 
agency – much like those pursued by private parties – are settled prior to or during 
litigation.  In addition, the agency recently has issued statements in connection with the 
closing of certain matters, generally discussing the reasons for not pursuing such matters.   
Consent decrees and closing statements are thus examined by industry and the bar for 
guidance as to the agency’s enforcement stance in a given area of competition or 
consumer protection law.  Relevant considerations in this area include whether the 
agency is making proper use of consent orders and closing statements and, more 
specifically, whether the agency can provide more information and reasoning in such 
documents than it currently does. 
 
Kattan explained that the public analyzes consent orders because “this is how the 
Commission broadcasts to the world what its enforcement priorities are.  So long before 
there was a Rambus case, there was a Dell case[,] . . . which was a consent order, [in] 
which the Commission laid out a policy regarding patent ambush.”519  Luehr claimed that 
FTC staff does not realize the extent to which companies look at final orders – bullet-by-
bullet – to determine what they need to do to ensure that they are in compliance with the 
consumer protection laws.520  Another roundtable panelist, however, questioned the value 
of FTC consent decrees – particularly in the merger context – characterizing them as 
“articles of surrender” signed by CEOs wanting to get their mergers approved and stuffed 
full of “exotic theories” held by the Commission.521 
 
Roundtable panelists consistently favored the concept of issuing closing 
statements, describing them as “very useful,”522 “excellent,”523 and “one of the great 
innovations of the last five or six years.”524  One panelist extolled the “transparency that 
comes from things like some of the very informative closing statements that the Federal 
Trade Commission pioneered a while back.”  He specifically cited the statement issued in 
                                                 
518 Federal Trade Commission Reauthorization: Hearing on the Federal Trade Commission 
Reauthorization Act of 2008 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 110th Cong. 10-11 
(2008) (statement of the Federal Trade Commission), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/P034101reauth.pdf. 
519 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 125 (citing Rambus Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9302; Dell Computer Corp., FTC Dkt. 
No. C-3658).  See also Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 126 (describing settlements as a “very useful” way for an 
agency to tell the public what its priorities are and where it thinks there are consumer harms); Bowie, 7/29 
DC Tr. at 86 (“[C]ases in litigation also play a hugely important role in providing guidance to the industry, 
particularly when the vast majority of Commission actions are settlements.”). 
520 Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 45-46. 
521 Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 108-09.  See also id. at 117 (questioning deterrence value of consent decrees). 
522 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 147. 
523 Pritchard, London Tr. at 41. 
524 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 144. 
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connection with the closing of the Cruise Line matter,525 saying that it was “very good 
because it not only informed people, . . . but it also allowed people to debate things 
publicly, and that is something that helps lead you towards a better answer.”526  
Similarly, former BC Scholar in Residence Joshua Wright observed that an agency may 
be more careful in its analysis of a particular matter if it anticipates issuing a closing 
statement in such matter.527  Another panelist made the point that closing statements are 
particularly important in highly visible matters, observing that “part of deterrence [is] to 
be out there showing how [the agencies are] thinking about cases that are visible and 
important[,] . . . [b]ut if you’re not bringing the visible case, maybe you should expla
528
in 
hy not.”  
 
r for 
plaining 
s 
tates, 
 particular, warned him of potential litigation over such closing statements.530   
 
2. Policy Research and Development 
ities 
rings, studies, reports, and ex post assessments of agency 
itiatives and actions. 
 
                                                
w
There are, of course, various concerns raised by the practice of issuing closing 
statements and agency transparency more generally.  Former BC Project Directo
Intellectual Property Hillary Greene identified the following concerns: resource 
constraints, confidentiality, undermining agency discretion in future cases, and ex
decisions that are based on administrative considerations or that involve “mixed 
motives.”529  A former Canadian competition official explained how he encountered 
significant resistance to his decision “to not only explain on the public record those case
where we were challenging but, in high profile matters, reasons why we decided in the 
end not to challenge the matter.”  As he explained, his counterparts in the United S
in
 
As discussed in more detail above in Chapter V.C, policy research and 
development at the FTC includes a broad array of activities designed to inform the 
agency’s pursuit of its competition and consumer protection missions.  These activ
include workshops, hea
in
 
525 The FTC press release announcing the closing of the Cruise Line matter, with links to statements by the 
Commission majority and the dissenting Commissioners, is available at 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/cruiselines.htm. 
526 Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 65.  But see, e.g., Levine, NY Tr. at 174-75 (recommending that the FTC include 
additional information and reasoning in its closing statements); Pritchard, London Tr. at 41-44 (same); 
Bloom, London Tr. at 168 (same). 
527 See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 130. 
528 Shapiro, Chicago Tr. at 264.  See also AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 150, at 187 (“The agencies 
should issue statements at the close of every prolonged or high-visibility merger investigation that results in 
no agency challenge. . . .  These statements should be more than perfunctory, describing not only issues 
involving definition of markets but also additional information, such as entry and efficiencies, whether 
favorable or unfavorable to the agency’s decision, that was considered in determining whether or not to 
challenge the transaction.”). 
529 Greene, Boston Tr. at 77-76. 
530 Goldman, Ottawa Tr. at 10-11. 
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Consultations with various outside parties and representatives from other 
competition and consumer protection agencies identified significant support for the 
FTC’s allocation of resources to its policy R&D efforts.  Former Chairman Muris 
characterized such efforts as “part and parcel of the [agency’s] mission.”531  Former 
Commissioner Leary described the policy R&D program as more than just a “support 
service of the Bureaus,” stating that he would make the program part of the agency’s core 
mission.532  Former OPP Deputy Director Jerry Ellig, who is involved in government 
agency review efforts at the George Mason University Mercatus Center, offered that he 
tells other government agencies that they can learn from what the FTC does in the policy 
R&D area.  He described such R&D as “a crucial input into the [FTC’s] good decision-
making.”533  Another roundtable panelist opined:  “The FTC’s special mission in the 
policy area, I think, has been extraordinarily valuable.”534 
 
In addition, the ABA Transition Report recently made the following 
recommendation:  “The U.S. agencies should devote substantial resources to providing 
intellectual leadership and increasing transparency through policy research and 
development. . . .  Although they can be resource-intensive, ‘policy research and 
development’ efforts such as empirical studies, hearings, reports, and literature surveys 
can play a vital role in the development of [antitrust] standards that strike the proper 
balance between under- and over-deterrence.”535 
 
3. Advocacy 
 
As an important complement to its law enforcement mission (and as a component 
of its relations with other domestic agencies, as discussed in Chapter IV.C), the FTC 
engages in competition and consumer protection advocacy before other policymakers, 
including state legislatures, regulatory boards, and officials; state and federal courts; 
other federal agencies; and professional organizations, such as bar associations.  In 
response to requests or where public comments are sought, the FTC issues advocacy 
letters, comments, and amicus briefs, providing policymakers with a framework to 
analyze competition and consumer protection issues raised by pending governmental 
actions or ongoing judicial disputes.  Advocacy can play a particularly important role in 
addressing governmentally imposed restraints on competition, where (unless a state body 
acts outside the proper confines of the state action doctrine), other tools may be 
unavailable.536 
 
                                                 
531 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 54. 
532 Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 27. 
533 Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 42-44. 
534 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 54. 
535 ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 46. 
536 See Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 830-31 (observations by Muris about the 
essential need to address, by advocacy and other means, governmentally imposed restraints on 
competition). 
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External consultations confirmed the important informational purpose served by 
the agency’s advocacy efforts.  Panelist Ken Heyer explained that “one of the reasons 
why regulations and laws that are harmful or anticompetitive in some way manage to 
flourish . . . is because the costs associated with them are not obvious to people who don’t 
spend their lives studying them.”537  Competition advocacy, Heyer continued, helps “to 
illustrate the costs associated with certain types of policies.  And, at that point, you have 
to leave things up to democracy to decide.  But at least you’re clarifying and highlighting 
what the costs of certain [policies] are.”538  Similarly, another panelist stated that 
advocacy letters to state legislatures are “quite useful” because often the only source of 
information regarding a particular bill is the advocates of such bill, including the 
industries that stand to benefit from the bill’s passage.539   
 
There was strong support among those consulted for the FTC’s advocacy efforts.  
Several panelists expressed the view that the agency’s advocacy efforts entail both 
relatively low costs540 and potentially significant benefits.541  As a result, advocacy tends 
to be on net a productive use of agency resources.542  Joseph Kattan described 
competition advocacy as “one of the more important things that the Commission 
does.”543  Another panelist opined that, in certain situations, effective advocacy can be 
more successful or productive than litigation.544   
 
                                                 
537 Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 75-76. 
538 Id. at 76. 
539 Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 160.  See also id. at 160-61 (mentioning successful FTC advocacy efforts to 
prevent passage of anticompetitive state legislation affecting the real estate brokerage industry). 
540 See, e.g., McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 155-58 (stating that in terms of resources, the demands imposed in 
doing competition advocacy are “fairly minimal”); Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 56 (“I would be inclined to think 
competition advocacy is probably some good bang for the buck in part because the cost seems relatively 
low of engaging in competition advocacy.”). 
541 See, e.g., Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 67 (asserting that advocacy can have “potentially large pay-
offs”); McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 69-70 (“[T]he effect of competition advocacy can be across an entire 
sector. . . .  I think that there is real bang for the buck in this area.”).  See also ABA TRANSITION REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 29 (“In its 1989 Transition report, the Section noted, ‘Because ill-advised governmental 
restraints can impose staggering costs on consumers, the potential benefits from an advocacy program 
exceed the [FTC’s] entire budget.’”). 
542 See, e.g., Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 271 (“I think you could have a tremendous value added by trying to 
comment on and influence other branches of government that don’t appreciate economics or economists as 
much as the FTC and DOJ.”); McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 154 (arguing that there is a “real comparative 
advantage” to having the personnel at the FTC, including both economists and attorneys, explain to other 
policymakers the competitive implications of their proposals). 
543 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 126.  In its Transition Report on Competition Policy, the American Antitrust 
Institute set forth the following recommendation regarding the antitrust agencies’ advocacy efforts:  “The 
agencies should continue to perform a policy advocacy role with Congress, state legislatures and other 
agencies, attempting to stop rules or laws with unintended or unacceptable anticompetitive effects from 
being enacted.”  AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 150, at 184. 
544 See Wilks, London Tr. at 38. 
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Roundtable panelists commented on the scope of, and the legal and economic 
theories underlying, the agency’s advocacy efforts.  Former OPP Director Susan DeSanti 
stated:  “I think that because your advocacy letters do not tend to be spread out all over 
the place, but rather they are focused and targeted, there is a better chance that you are 
actually having an impact . . . especially when you do it in conjunction with workshops 
and the reports that then come out of the workshops.”545  Joshua Wright argued that, in 
contrast to our understanding of certain areas of antitrust law, such as monopolization, 
our understanding of the harmful competitive effects of certain categories of state 
regulation is relatively strong.  As a result, the allocation of resources to competition 
advocacy in these areas is a “no-brainer.”546  Former BC Associate Director Fred 
McChesney stressed the importance and usefulness of having empirical data and analysis 
to back up the agency’s advocacy efforts.547 
 
Other panelists discussed the value of advocacy before certain policymakers.  
Susan Creighton asserted:  “[N]obody is going to be an advocate for markets with other 
government agencies like this agency can be.”548  Another panelist recommended that the 
FTC “press more to have a seat at the table and to be consulted more before other areas of 
the government take action that is truly anti-competitive . . . .”549  McChesney argued that 
in certain cases of regulatory capture at another agency, it is helpful to have a 
disinterested outsider, such as the FTC, provide input on proposed regulations.550  Former 
BC advisor Thomas Krattenmaker acknowledged, however, that there may be “a real 
political risk” in undertaking advocacy – particularly in front of other federal agencies.551  
This potential concern stands in sharp contrast with the situation in South Korea, where 
all government agencies wishing to implement a program or activity are obliged to 
submit the program or activity first to the Korean Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) for 
review based on competition considerations.552  Another panelist stressed the importance 
of FTC advocacy before Congress.  Specifically, the agency ought to reiterate to 
Congress that competition works and should not be supplanted by antitrust 
                                                 
545 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 152. 
546 Wright, Chicago Tr. at 161-63. 
547 See McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 197. 
548 Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 76-77. 
549 Fox, NY Tr. at 96. 
550 See McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 164. 
551 Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 68. 
552 Agencies are required by statute to consult the KFTC, but they are not required to implement the KFTC 
advice.  Consultation with Korean Fair Trade Commission, Sept. 4, 2008.  In Mexico, the government and 
regulatory agencies are required to consult with the Federal Competition Commission on draft legislation 
and regulations that affect competition, and if the agency offers formal advice, to follow it.  Mex. L. Fed. 
Econ. Competition, Art. 24, §§ 6-7.  Similarly, a Paris roundtable panelist contrasted the role of the FTC 
(and DOJ) with that of the Competition Commissioner in the European Union, who “is part of the cabinet 
and is involved and has some kind of say in every political decision that’s made in the EU about transport, 
energy, communications, et cetera[,] . . . rather than being some kind of outside advocate in a slightly 
remote agency, perhaps, who after the decisions have been made gets some sort of right to make a 
submission.”  Fels, Paris Tr. at 18-19. 
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exemptions.553  A panelist at the Tokyo roundtable recommended that the FTC and DOJ 
advocate the importance of competition before the U.S. International Trade 
Commission.554 
 
External consultations yielded several recommendations for the agency to 
consider in the advocacy area.  At least one roundtable panelist recommended increased 
advocacy efforts by the FTC, explaining that “there is enormous value in expanding the 
competition advocacy program.”555  Krattenmaker offered the following advice:  “I 
would like to see in the competition advocacy work more extensive and rigorous 
economic work being done right alongside the legal.”556  One panelist recommended the 
building of lines of communications between the antitrust agencies and other federal 
agencies involved in economic decision making but that do not have the economic staff 
that the FTC and DOJ do.557  Another panelist suggested that the FTC reconsider its 
invitation-only approach to advocacy, by which it typically issues advocacies only in 
response to invitations by other policymakers.558  Finally, a Canadian government official 
recommended that a greater proportion of the FTC’s advocacy efforts be conducted in the 
agency’s own name, as opposed to speeches and statements by individual officials which 
are disclaimed as representing only their own views.559 
 
4. Rulemaking 
 
Returning to questions of enforcement, the Commission’s strongest policymaking 
tool, in addition to litigation, is rulemaking.  Through rulemaking under the FTC Act, the 
Commission can prohibit or mandate actions to remedy unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices; through rulemaking under certain other consumer protection laws, it can 
prohibit or mandate actions to address other proscribed conduct.  Further, similar to its 
authority to seek civil penalties for violations of orders entered through administrative 
litigation (or settlements in lieu of such litigation), the Commission has had broad 
                                                 
553 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 70 (addressing then-current legislation creating an antitrust exemption to allow 
retailers to bargain collectively with credit card issuers).  See also Venit, Brussels Tr. at 30 (recommending 
that the FTC direct its advocacy efforts toward Congress to educate lawmakers on the complexities of the 
competition problems with which the FTC regularly deals); Crampton, Ottawa Tr. at 5 (recommending that 
the competition authorities “reach out to . . . people who are in a position to pass laws and pass very bad 
laws and do some real damage to our antitrust laws, to build a bridge to that community so that their ears 
are open when you then speak, and try to get them to better understand how markets work and what the 
consequences of their actions might be”). 
554 Tokyo Roundtable, Oct. 7, 2008. 
555 Langer, Boston Tr. at 51-56 (complimenting the FTC’s advocacy efforts “to ward off the most egregious 
anticompetitive behavior at state and local levels either in terms of legislation or some type of regulatory 
action”). 
556 Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 69. 
557 See Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 272. 
558 See Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 56. 
559 Consultation with Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008. 
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authority, since 1975, to obtain civil penalties for violations of rules issued under the FTC 
Act and many special statutes.560   
 
The Commission’s use of rulemaking has undergone significant changes through 
the course of agency history.561  From its early years until the 1960s, the Commission 
adopted a series of interpretive or advisory rules, known as Trade Practice Rules 
(“TPRs”).  These were formulated through procedures known as trade practice 
conferences, initiated by members of an industry, authorized by the Commission, and 
presided over by a Commissioner.  Typically, each TPR addressed in detail the products 
and practices of a particular industry, in effect setting standards for that industry.  TPRs 
were an effort to achieve compliance with the FTC Act by having industry members 
agree to eliminate specific practices considered to be unfair methods of competition.  
Rules that were approved by the Commission included Group I rules, which constituted a 
statement of intent by the Commission as to its interpretation of the FTC Act with regard 
to those industry practices.562  Most TPRs were rescinded by the 1970s.563 
 
 During the 1960s, the Commission began to exercise its rulemaking authority 
pursuant to Section 6(g) of the FTC Act.564  These Trade Regulation Rules (“TRRs”), as 
they came to be known, could be relied upon in an adjudicative proceeding to establish 
that a practice was unfair or deceptive, thus removing this element from the complaint 
counsel’s burden of proof.  Between 1963 and 1975, the Commission adopted more than 
20 TRRs.  Each addressed a discrete problem within a particular industry or service 
sector, often by requiring the disclosure of information to the consumer.  The majority of 
these TRRs became outdated and ultimately were repealed, a result of the Commission’s 
ongoing program of regulatory review and reform. 
 
 In 1975, Congress granted the Commission express authority to issue substantive 
rules, which included the ability to bring enforcement actions in federal court and to seek 
civil penalties up to $10,000 per violation.565  Magnuson-Moss rulemaking, as this 
authority is known, requires more complex procedures than those needed for rulemaking 
                                                 
560 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (providing for civil penalties for rule and order violations). 
561 See generally Lydia B. Parnes & Carol J. Jennings, Through the Looking Glass: A Perspective on 
Regulatory Reform at the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 989 (1997). 
562 Other rules (designated as Group II rules) were “received” by the Commission as expressions of the 
trade.  See FTC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 
JUNE 30, 1934, at 93-98 (1934), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1934.pdf. 
563 Some TPRs were replaced by industry guides, which are discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
564 15 U.S.C. § 46(g). 
565 Magnuson-Moss Warranty – Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 
2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a-b).  The remaining Section 6(g) TRRs were grandfathered in to 
the Commission’s new civil penalty authority.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).  The civil penalty amount 
subsequently was increased to $11,000 per violation pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 62 Stat. 974 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2461). 
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pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),566 including two notices of 
proposed rulemaking, prior notification to Congress, opportunity for an informal hearing, 
and, if issues of material fact are in dispute, cross-examination of witnesses and rebuttal 
submissions by interested persons.  A number of rulemaking proceedings were 
undertaken in the late 1970s as a result of this new grant of authority; only a few of them, 
however, ultimately resulted in a rule. 
 
 During the past 15 years, 17 rules have been promulgated by the Commission, 
and several existing rules have been amended.  In addition, three new rulemaking 
proceedings are in progress.  Most new rules have been enacted based on specific statutes 
that authorized the use of APA rulemaking procedures.  Many of these rules have been a 
response to issues generated by new electronic forms of consumer sales transactions – 
first telemarketing and later Internet sales – and by the personal information privacy 
issues that inevitably attend electronic marketing.  One of the most important and 
successful Commission rulemakings in the agency’s history established the Do Not Call 
Registry,567 whereby consumers can protect their privacy by electing not to receive 
commercial telemarketing calls.  Since the Registry was opened in 2003, approximately 
177 million telephone numbers have been registered, and compliance with the rule has 
been high. 
 
Rulemaking proceedings since the early 1990s often have used an innovative 
procedure known as the public workshop conference.  Such conferences bring together 
representatives of those who have a stake in the outcome of the proceeding, including 
affected industries, consumer advocates, and other federal or state government agencies.  
Moderated by a facilitator, the conferences enable roundtable discussion of the issues 
without the formality of an administrative hearing.  The discussion is transcribed and 
provides a useful supplement to the written record of comments. 
 
 While one significant question about rulemaking is when the agency should adopt 
a rule, an equally important question may be whether it should retain or modify a rule.  
During the past 15 years, the Commission has made regulatory review and reform a high 
priority.  Recognizing that over time some rules and industry guides may become 
obsolete or unnecessary or simply need updating in light of new technologies and 
marketing techniques, the FTC initiated a program to review its rules and guides at least 
once every 10 years.  As a result of this systematic review, more than 50 percent of the 
Trade Regulation Rules (i.e. those not mandated by statute) and guides have been 
rescinded.  Many of the rules and guides retained have undergone revision to streamline 
or update them. 
 
External consultations addressed the agency’s rulemaking efforts.  A roundtable 
panelist explained a potential perception problem associated with those efforts.  
According to the panelist, many outsiders do not understand the rulemaking process and 
requirements and thus expect the agency to issue rules very quickly.  Others understand 
                                                 
566 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
567 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(iii)(B). 
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the process, but believe that the FTC has failed to work with Congress in a more 
collaborative manner to try to address some of the constraints on the agency’s ability to 
be more aggressive in the consumer protection area.  This, according to the panelist, can 
lead to a perception of unresponsiveness on the part of the agency.568   
 
Panelists offered conflicting views regarding the agency’s use of rulemaking.  
Two former BCP senior staff members, Jodie Bernstein and Teresa Schwartz, 
commented that the agency should make greater use of its rulemaking authority.569  
Schwartz explained that, although the agency got into “trouble” during the late 1970s for 
engaging in rulemakings on particular matters, such as advertising to children, the agency 
today should be more willing to consider rulemaking because it is an effective means of 
enforcement and the agency has a good process in place to gather stakeholder input on 
proposed rules.570  Another former BCP staff member, however, argued that the FTC 
should wait for Congress to give the agency specific authority to issue rules in a given 
area because that approach not only provides political cover for the agency, it also results 
in “clearer direction” to the agency’s audience.571  In addition, Jerry Cerasale cautioned 
that rulemaking should be “a last resort” that is pursued only after other ways to address 
the problem at issue, such as self-regulation, are exhausted.572 
 
Roundtable panelists also made specific recommendations for future rulemaking 
by the FTC.  Data security, for example, was identified as one area in which the agency 
should consider rulemaking.573  Two panelists, including a former BCP Director, 
suggested that the agency consider doing rulemaking not just in the consumer protection 
area, but in the competition area as well.574  In addition, panelists confirmed the 
importance of periodically reviewing the agency’s rules and updating them to ensure that 
they take into account developments in the marketplace, such as new technology.575 
 
                                                 
568 See A. Schwartz, 7/29 DC Tr. at 180.  Schwartz did offer praise regarding the CAN-SPAM rulemaking:  
“I hear very little complaints in general from the industry or consumer groups about the decisions that were 
made.  Either people did not like CAN-SPAM or liked CAN-SPAM, but there were very little complaints 
about how the rules came out.”  Id. at 205. 
569 See Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 52-53; T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 68-69. 
570 T. Schwartz, Chicago Tr. at 68-69.  See also Feigenbaum, NY Tr. at 185-86 (recommending additional 
FTC rulemaking – particularly in the deceptive advertising area). 
571 Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 66-67. 
572 Cerasale, NY Tr. at 177-78. 
573 See Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 98-99 (stating that, given the multiplicity of state laws addressing responses to 
data breaches and the relatively ambiguous standard of “commercial reasonability” in the FTC’s consent 
orders in this area, additional guidance in the form of rules may be useful).   
574 See Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 53 (“[T]here are areas in both bureaus where there are opportunities for 
the use of rule-making.”); Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 25-26.  But see Greene, Boston Tr. at 38-39 (raising the 
question of whether the agency has statutory authority to do rulemaking in the competition area). 
575 See, e.g., Luehr, Chicago Tr. at 67-68.  See also Cerasale, NY Tr. at 159-60 (commending the agency 
for holding workshops and undertaking other information gathering efforts to better understand changes in 
technology prior to issuing new regulations). 
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5. Guidelines, Guides, and Advisory Opinions 
 
 In proposing a trade commission in January 1914, President Woodrow Wilson 
emphasized the guidance the Commission could provide to business:  “And the business 
men of the country desire something more than that the menace of legal process in these 
matters be made explicit and intelligible.  They desire the advice, the definitive guidance 
and information which can be supplied by an administrative body, an interstate trade 
commission.”576  Consistent with Wilson’s intent, the Commission’s tools include 
guidelines, guides, and advisory opinions.  Though none has the same force of law as a 
rule or order, all of these alert businesses to the legal standards the Commission intends 
to apply, or the modes of analysis that it intends to use, in analyzing possible law 
violations.   
 
Guidelines.  To promote transparency and encourage compliance with the law, the 
FTC issues guidelines, typically in conjunction with the Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division, to provide guidance regarding the application of the U.S. antitrust laws.  These 
guidelines explain competition policy in specific areas, such as horizontal merger 
review,577 collaborations among competitors,578 licensing of intellectual property,579 and 
health care.580  In the merger context, the agencies took the additional step of issuing 
commentary on their merger guidelines, providing examples of the application of the 
guidelines in specific matters.581 
 
During external consultations, Hillary Greene succinctly identified the various 
purposes and audiences served by such guidelines:  “Their express purpose is obviously 
to explain the reasoning and analysis underlying the agency’s exercise of the [its] 
prosecutorial discretion.”  For such purpose, the audiences of the guidelines include the 
agency staff, as well as businesses and their counselors.  The “implicit purpose” of 
guidelines is “to provide a commentary on the law, to be a sort of an ongoing editorial . . . 
on gaps and ambiguities in the law.”  For such purpose, the intended audience is the 
courts.582 
 
                                                 
576 H.R. DOC. NO. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1914). 
577 See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev. 1997), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/hmg080617.pdf. 
578 See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. 
579 See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf. 
580 See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/hlth3s.pdf. 
581 See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf. 
582 Greene, Boston Tr. at 17-18.  See also Hillary Greene, Agency Character and the Character of Agency 
Guidelines: An Historical and Institutional Perspective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005) (recounting the 
FTC’s historical approaches to antitrust guidelines). 
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Roundtable panelists expressed many differing opinions on the value of agency 
guidelines.  Several panelists questioned the usefulness of such guidelines, citing the fact 
that there are other forces, such as private plaintiffs and foreign antitrust agencies, that 
will counter or even overwhelm the influence of the agency issuing the guidelines.583  
Another failing of guidelines cited by panelists is the “bland and relatively 
uninformative” nature of the final product that is made public.  The perception is that, in 
an attempt to compromise, guidelines can strike a middle ground without clarifying 
doctrine.584  Yet another issue is the perception that in issuing guidelines the agency is 
concerned about “every last possible contingency” and what some party might be able to 
cite against the agency at some point in the future.585  Several panelists raised the 
legitimate concern that any agency guidelines could be subsequently used against the 
agency – particularly in litigation.586 
 
Notwithstanding disagreements with specific guidelines or provisions of 
guidelines, panelists maintained that “guidelines are an exercise in agency 
transparency,”587 and the “appetite of the private bar for guidance[ and] guidelines is 
inexhaustible.”588  Many expressed generally favorable reviews of the FTC and DOJ 
horizontal merger guidelines.  Given the dearth of Supreme Court and other case law in 
the merger area, the merger guidelines are viewed as necessary to provide interested 
parties with information regarding the agencies’ merger review process.589  As one 
panelist explained, “Merger law . . . is at best opaque and maybe completely and totally 
incomprehensible. . . .  [I]f you can avoid the coin flip that you often get in the district 
court and figure out ahead of time what the likely result of the enforcement agency is, 
you’re way ahead of the game.”590  Hillary Greene noted that the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
                                                 
583 See Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 146 (“[U]nless they can influence policy outside the FTC in a profound way 
– and that is a very difficult thing to do – it strikes me as an exercise in futility.”); DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 
148 (“[I]t is not like businesses are going to only look at what the FTC has to say.”). 
584 See DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 146-47 (“[T]oo many times they end up being bland and relatively 
uninformative.  No matter what people’s intentions were at the beginning to actually clarify things, 
inevitably disagreements arise and you go towards the middle rather than actually make progress in 
clarifying things.”). 
585 See Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 158-59. 
586 See Greene, Boston Tr. at 32-33 (identifying the concern that guidelines will be used against the agency 
in court, with judges giving the guidelines “undue deference”); Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 37 (echoing concern 
that the courts will use guidelines against an agency, for example, by assuming that that which is not 
prohibited in the guidelines should be allowed); Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 140-41 (arguing that a potential 
danger of issuing guidelines is the prospect of having defendants and even judges turning the guidelines 
into a kind of checklist, each step of which the agency must satisfy, even if it is not analytically meaningful 
to do so). 
587 Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 143. 
588 Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 220. 
589 See DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 147; Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 143. 
590 Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 137-38.  See also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 81-82 (“The framework that was 
established by the merger guidelines is applied almost universally today.”) (arguing that any specific 
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Index had been presented to courts before it was incorporated into the 1982 merger 
guidelines, but received a hostile reception until the guidelines were issued.591  Along 
with the publication of merger data,592 the guidelines are a valuable source of 
transparency to the outside world. 
 
Other guidelines received praise for various reasons.  The agencies’ IP licensing 
guidelines received praise from those generally critical of guidelines based on their 
inclusion of new thinking not yet reflected in the case law at the time of their issuance.593  
The health care statements, according to a former state enforcer, “provided enormous 
value to those of us who were advising our clients regarding the enforcement intentions 
of the agencies and had a spill-over effect upon the states in terms of what they were 
likely to do.”594  According to Stephen Calkins, the process of writing the competitor 
collaboration guidelines helped the agency respond to the California Dental595 decision 
and helped contribute to the ongoing discussion about how to evaluate competitor 
collaborations.  “This was an area where the agency was going to be bringing cases and, 
so, it did matter.”596 
 
A central issue involving agency guidelines is one of timing – including the 
appropriate times at which to issue and, if necessary, update any given set of guidelines.  
Greene identified the “central tension” in formulating guidelines as follows: waiting until 
there is a sufficient consensus in any particular area of the law, on the one hand, and 
providing certainty and guidance in such area of the law, on the other hand.597  Several 
panelists argued that guidelines are more valuable if there is a “strong consensus” in the 
area of the law addressed by the guidelines.598  Others argued that an agency should not 
                                                                                                                                                 
failings within the guidelines – for example, the lack of discussion of potential competition and vertical 
mergers – do not “undercut the value of the fundamental structure for thinking about how one analyzes a 
merger”). 
591 Greene, Boston Tr. at 20. 
592 Panelists expressed strong support for the agencies’ publication of merger review data as having 
“greatly enriched our understanding of what the agencies are actually doing and then greatly enriched the 
discussion about what the agencies ought to do.”  Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 86.  See also McDavid, 7/30 DC 
Tr. at 86 (“And those merger data are incredibly useful in walking a business person through the likelihood 
that their particular merger will or will not be challenged.”). 
593 See DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 147. 
594 Langer, Boston Tr. at 34. 
595 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
596 Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 84. 
597 Greene, Boston Tr. at 31. 
598 See, e.g., Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 79-80 (“I think there’s a stronger consensus behind horizontal merger 
policy, for example, and I think the guidelines there have been of value . . . .  To my mind, issuing 
guidelines on things like vertical mergers and . . . Section 2, which none of us fully understand anyway, 
have only limited value.  I think an understanding of those things needs to sort itself out better through 
academic work and through research that folks do internally and through proceedings in courts before we 
even think of issuing guidelines there.”); Wright, Chicago Tr. at 146 (arguing that a first principle of 
articulating guidelines should be a certain level of consensus regarding the competitive effects of the 
practice at issue); Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 147 (agreeing that agencies should not issue guidelines absent a 
 130
wait until there is consensus; otherwise, the guidelines will not achieve their primary goal 
of providing guidance.599   
 
Similarly, the proper timing of any necessary updating of guidelines is an issue 
that agencies must consider carefully.  As Greene explained, at some point, there exists a 
lag between a given set of guidelines and the agency’s current thinking on the subject of 
such guidelines.  It is a “very difficult balance” to know when that lag is sufficient to 
justify an updating of the guidelines.  “And we’ve seen instances in the past in which the 
gap between reality and the guidelines is [such] that the guidelines . . . should actually be 
abandoned.”600  Participants in the Tokyo roundtable recommended that the agencies 
revise their competitor collaboration and international guidelines.  More specifically, it 
was suggested that the agencies expand the collaboration guidelines to include additional 
examples of their application and to broaden them to apply to conduct among competitors 
that transcends joint ventures.601  Another panelist recommended that the agencies update 
their international guidelines to reflect the increased number of countries with 
competition laws, as well as the increasingly important roles of multinational 
organizations such as the ICN.602  Susan Creighton also cautioned against updating 
guidelines via specific enforcement actions, explaining that a more systematic approach 
is desirable.603 
 
External consultations yielded several suggestions regarding potential FTC 
guidelines.  Among the subject areas in which the agency was advised to issue or revise 
guidelines are: clinical integration,604 vertical mergers,605 mergers involving intellectual 
property,606 monopolization,607 interlocking directorates,608 resale price maintenance,609 
and “topics that are unique to the FTC,” such as unilateral conduct that is not necessarily 
a Section 2 violation.610  Finally, Greene suggested that, “because the guidelines are so 
                                                                                                                                                 
significant amount of experience in a given area); Drauz, Brussels Tr. at 12-13 (“I think you should never 
make a guideline before you have really sufficiently looked at individual cases.”) (noting that a reason why 
it took so long for the European Commission to issue Article 82 guidance was the lack of a sufficient 
number of “valuable precedents”). 
599 See, e.g., Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 37. 
600 Greene, Boston Tr. at 19-20. 
601 Tokyo Roundtable, Oct. 7, 2008.  Another participant at the Tokyo Roundtable asked the FTC to clarify 
what kinds of conduct or practices fall under unfair methods of competition.  Id. 
602 Id. 
603 See Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 88-89. 
604 See Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 142. 
605 See Valentine, London Tr. at 116-17. 
606 See id. 
607 See id. 
608 See Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 221. 
609 Tokyo Roundtable, Oct. 7, 2008. 
610 See Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 26. 
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clearly geared towards framing the terms of the debate and influencing courts among 
others,” it would be beneficial for agencies to identify and clarify within guidelines where 
they diverge from existing law.611 
 
 Guides.  With the rescission of most Trade Practice Rules in the 1970s,612 
industry guides, which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, or C.F.R., 
became a vehicle to inform businesses how the Commission would apply Section 5 of the 
FTC Act in specific situations.  Industry guides are advisory in nature – that is, they are 
not an independent basis for enforcement actions, and violations do not give rise to civil 
penalties.  However, they serve to inform businesses about practices that could be 
considered unfair or deceptive.  Industry guides typically focus on particular problematic 
practices in advertising, marketing, or labeling.  Promulgation of guides does not require 
formal rulemaking proceedings, but, in recent years, the Commission has solicited public 
comments, and may hold a hearing or workshop, before adopting or substantively 
amending guides.  Like rules, industry guides are subject to review every 10 years.   
 
The agency’s “Green Guides,” for example, are an important illustration of the 
use of industry guides to give advice to businesses making certain types of marketing 
claims.  Issued in 1992 and updated in 1996 and 1998, the Guides for the Use of 
Environmental Marketing Claims613 serve to help marketers avoid making environmental 
claims that are unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  The Green Guides 
are currently under review, and the agency has both requested comments and conducted a 
series of public meetings to discuss various green marketing issues.614 
 
Concerns were expressed by some roundtable panelists regarding the length of 
time involved in the review of some guides.  One participant noted the need for greater 
transparency in connection with these reviews, suggesting that the Commission publicly 
announce its next steps in the process or even an approximate time frame for completion 
of the review.615  Others stressed the importance of rescinding guides that the agency 
considers no longer relevant.616 
 
Advisory Opinions.  The FTC’s efforts at providing guidance to industry also 
include advisory opinions concerning proposed conduct provided in response to requests 
for advice.  On the competition side, BC staff render so-called advisory opinions, which 
often involve issues in the health care field.  On the consumer protection side, BCP staff 
                                                 
611 Greene, Boston Tr. at 76-77. 
612 See discussion supra Chapter VI.B.4. 
613 See 16 C.F.R. § 260. 
614 Additional information regarding this review of the Green Guides is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/energy/about_guides.shtml.  See also Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 88 
(noting the value of the Green Guides review process to businesses in that market); Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 
184 (same). 
615 See Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 183-85. 
616 See Levine, NY Tr. at 170-72. 
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render so-called staff opinion letters, which typically address proposed interpretations of 
FTC rules and regulations.  Commission advisory opinions, which are issued relatively 
infrequently, are intended to address substantial or novel questions of fact or law or 
subjects of significant interest.617 
 
The subject of advisory opinions did not garner as much attention during the 
external consultations as the subject of guidelines.  However, roundtable panelists did 
express support for the agency’s efforts at issuing such opinions.  According to one 
panelist, advisory opinion letters, much like safe harbors in guidelines, are valuable in 
that they provide industry with “some confidence” regarding proposed business 
arrangements or courses of conduct – particularly those that require confidence in their 
legality to succeed in the first instance.618 
 
Several panelists, however, called for the Commission – rather than staff – to 
issue more advisory opinions.  Stephen Calkins recommended that the Commission issue 
more formal advisory opinions, explaining that, although staff advisory letters can be 
useful in narrow areas in trying to understand “hopeless” laws, such as the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, an advisory opinion from the Commission is extremely valuable because 
it entails a discussion and consensus reaching among the Commissioners.  Thus, 
according to Calkins, the agency should establish a system for providing more 
“collective, official Commission advice” in the form of formal advisory opinions.619  
Other panelists remarked that the general public likely does not appreciate the fact that 
advisory opinions typically come from staff and are not issued by the Commission.620 
 
6. Consumer and Business Education 
 
Like guidelines, guides, and advisory opinions, business education is yet another 
way to facilitate compliance with the law by firms that want to comply with the law.   
Consumer education is a way to alert consumers to their rights and help them avoid harm, 
including harms from fraudulent operations with little interest in complying with the law. 
 
During the past 20 years, educating consumers and businesses about their rights 
and responsibilities in the marketplace has become an increasingly important part of 
fulfilling the agency’s consumer protection mission.  Enforcement efforts to combat fraud 
                                                 
617 See generally 16 C.F.R. § 1.3. 
618 See Picker, Chicago Tr. at 145 (citing example of patent pools).  See also Langer, Boston Tr. at 35 
(stating that advisory opinions have been valuable in providing businesses with certainty regarding their 
proposed courses of conduct).  The Commission does reserve the right to revisit any advice, see 16 C.F.R. § 
1.3(c), although, where the Commission itself gave the advice, the rules provide assurance that “[t]he 
Commission will not proceed against the requesting party with respect to any action taken in good faith 
reliance upon the Commission’s advice under this section, where all the relevant facts were fully, 
completely, and accurately presented to the Commission and where such action was promptly discontinued 
upon notification of rescission or revocation of the Commission's approval.”  Id. § 1.3(b).   
619 See Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 85.  See also DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 149 (recommending that the 
Commission issue an advisory opinion regarding clinical integration). 
620 See Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 148-49; DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 149-50. 
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are enhanced by informing consumers how to recognize and avoid becoming victims of 
fraudulent marketing practices.621  For example, educating consumers not to respond to 
emails that “phish” for financial account information can be a more effective tool to 
combat this practice than bringing successive enforcement actions against numerous 
perpetrators.  The Commission also integrates enforcement with consumer and business 
education.  Law enforcement actions often are partnered with an education component 
that is announced at the same time and, when the Commission works with other 
enforcement agencies on a sweep, the Commission also works with its law enforcement 
partners to develop the educational component.  Information for consumers might include 
how to recognize, avoid, and report a similar scam; for businesses, it might include how 
to avoid running afoul of the law. 
 
Educating businesses about their legal obligations under a variety of FTC rules 
enhances compliance, and to that end, the Commission issues clear, plain-language 
guides – in print and on video – that pose numerous examples of required or prohibited 
conduct.  For example, when the dietary supplement industry began to grow and 
advertise heavily as a result of new legislation (the Dietary Supplements Health and 
Education Act of 1994), industry representatives requested and received specific FTC 
guidance regarding substantiation for advertising claims.622 
 
  The Commission’s increased recognition of the importance of consumer and 
business education has resulted in the transformation – within the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection – of a small office to a Division of Consumer and Business Education 
(“DCBE”) with a staff of 19.  DCBE plans and implements public education campaigns 
for consumers and industry through communications and outreach programs that involve 
the use of print, broadcast, and electronic media, special events, and partnerships with 
other government agencies, consumer groups, industry and professional associations, 
businesses, and other organizations.    
 
More recently, the Bureau of Competition has initiated consumer education 
campaigns designed to inform consumers about the value of competition and the antitrust 
laws generally.  Issued in March 2007, the publication Competition Counts informs 
consumers about the benefits of competitive markets, including lower prices, higher 
quality, and greater choice of goods and services.  BC’s Guide to the Antitrust Laws 
contains an in-depth discussion of competition issues for those with questions concerning 
the antitrust laws.623 
 
                                                 
621 See Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 778 (Pitofsky describing how, in the area of 
misleading health and safety claims, the FTC “combined law enforcement with a multifaceted education 
program – including brochures, special Web sites, public service announcements, news articles, and 
bookmarks – to give consumers the basic information they need to make sound decisions and to protect 
themselves from misleading marketing practices”). 
622 See Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 17-18. 
623 These competition guides are available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/guidance.shtm. 
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External consultations yielded widespread expressions of support for the agency’s 
consumer and business education efforts in the consumer protection area.624  Several 
roundtable panelists agreed that such efforts can be more effective than enforcement 
actions.625  In order to maximize the impact of such efforts, however, it is important to 
convey consumer education messages to outside entities that are in turn able to amplify 
such messages to a wider audience.  Lee Peeler, former BCP Deputy Director and current 
President and CEO of the National Advertising Review Council, stressed the importance 
of amplifying the agency’s consumer and business education messages by, for example, 
reaching out to consumer groups and self-regulatory organizations, respectively, and 
having those entities spread the messages to their constituencies.626   
 
Panelists also offered several recommendations regarding the agency’s education 
efforts on the consumer protection side.  One panelist identified two issues that the 
agency should take into account in preparing consumer education materials.  First, 
according to the panelist, the types of media to which consumers will be most responsive 
going forward are not necessarily going to be text-based, as they have been in the past.  
As a result, consumer education should be delivered via video and audio, as well as 
text.627  Second, the panelist recommended that the agency’s education efforts take into 
account the latest learnings from the area of behavioral economics in determining which 
mechanisms are most useful in changing consumer behavior.628  Another panelist 
suggested that business education be targeted at small businesses, which may be less 
sophisticated and unable to hire legal counsel to help oversee their compliance efforts.629 
 
At the U.K. consultations, some consumer representatives recommended 
consumer education efforts that are targeted and provide information to consumers at the 
time they need it.  The consumer representatives further noted that much consumer 
education does not work for consumers because “people don’t go out seeking information 
until things go wrong, and businesses don’t like to talk about things going wrong.”  They 
                                                 
624 See, e.g., DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 162 (remarking that, on the consumer protection side, the FTC has 
“really made its mark” in the area of consumer education); Marsden, London Tr. at 120 (stressing the 
importance of the consumer education initiatives that the FTC and other agencies pursue to “reach out and 
try to have an impact directly and explain their messaging”). 
625 See, e.g., Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 195 (citing in particular the area of phishing, where the agency has tried 
to change consumer behavior, not just bring cases against phishers); Wilks, London Tr. at 38 (noting that 
consumer education can have more of a “societal impact” than individual law enforcement actions). 
626 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 194-95. 
627 See Swire, NY Tr. at 197-98.  See also Brendler, NY Tr. at 236-38 (touting video on phishing and 
auction scams created by Consumer Reports WebWatch and noting that younger consumers increasingly 
want their news or information to “come through organic means,” such as through social networking sites, 
games, and mobile phones); DeMarrais, NY Tr. at 276 (recommending that the FTC consider repackaging 
its existing education materials in such a way as “to reach high school students, who are uneducated on 
consumer issues”). 
628 See Swire, NY Tr. at 197-98. 
629 See Cerasale, NY Tr. at 201-02. 
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suggested that insights into consumer behavior, through social marketing and behavioral 
economics, might assist in developing new types of consumer education.630 
 
Panelists disagreed as to the proper role of FTC consumer education on the 
competition side.  Susan DeSanti recommended that the agency consider how it might 
better convey to its various constituencies the value of competition, which may not be 
well understood.  “If there is an agency that has a mandate that would include education 
on that subject, it is this agency.”631  Others, including former BE Director Michael 
Salinger, however, raised concerns regarding the agency’s expenditure of scarce 
resources on such efforts, suggesting that the agency “think about getting others to do this 
for the Commission rather than having the Commission devote a lot of resources to it.”632 
 
7. Encouragement of Appropriate Industry Self-Regulation 
 
Meaningful self-regulation is an important complement to the Commission’s law 
enforcement efforts – particularly in the area of deceptive marketing practices.  For 
example, the program administered by the National Advertising Division/National 
Advertising Review Council (“NARC”) arm of the Council of Better Business Bureaus 
(“CBBB”) has worked well to obviate the need for Commission action in some instances.  
In cases where the process does not reach a successful conclusion, the matter is referred 
to the Commission with much of the underlying investigative work already 
accomplished.  The Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program – established under the 
auspices of NARC in 2004 to handle allegations of deceptive advertising in TV 
“infomercials” – has served as an important adjunct to this program. 
 
In addition, self-regulatory programs have been helpful in areas where the 
Commission has advocated seller restraint in promotions directed to children.  In 2006, 
the CBBB launched the Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative to 
encourage major food marketers to impose voluntary limitations on their advertising to 
children.  This effort followed a workshop and report by the FTC, which strongly 
encouraged self-regulation to address the childhood obesity problem.633  The marketing 
of violent entertainment products (such as movies, music, and video games) to children is 
another area in which companies have been encouraged to adhere to industry codes by 
                                                 
630 Consultation with U.K. Consumer Organizations, Sept. 12, 2008. 
631 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 163.  See also AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 150, at 186 (“To increase 
support for the antitrust mission, the agencies should endeavor to educate the public on competition policy 
and its underlying rationale.  The next administration should coordinate with NAAG to add antitrust 
education to high school curricula.”). 
632 Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 163. 
633 See FTC & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PERSPECTIVES ON MARKETING, SELF-
REGULATION & CHILDHOOD OBESITY: A REPORT ON A JOINT WORKSHOP OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (2006), available at 
http://www2.ftc.gov/os/2006/05/PerspectivesOnMarketingSelf-
Regulation&ChildhoodObesityFTCandHHSReportonJointWorkshop.pdf. 
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successive FTC reports documenting the results of self-regulation.634  As former 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky has observed, industry self-regulation can be particularly 
suitable in areas, such as advertising, in which governmental restrictions raise substantial 
First Amendment concerns.635 
 
External consultations revealed little, if any, objections to the FTC encouraging 
industry self-regulation.  As former BCP Director William MacLeod asserted, asking 
whether it makes sense for the Commission to encourage self-regulation is “like asking 
the cop on the street if it makes sense to encourage people to abide by the law.  Of 
course, it does.”636  Another panelist opined that “the FTC’s done an amazing job of 
recognizing what a valuable tool self-regulation is in enhancing and complementing [its] 
role in terms of consumer protection.”637  Implicit in the support expressed for the 
agency’s promotion of self-regulation is the notion that it is a complement to – not a 
substitute for – the agency’s law enforcement efforts.638 
 
According to roundtable panelists, the precise role of the agency in encouraging 
self-regulation matters.  Former BCP Assistant Director Darren Bowie argued that that 
role should be a limited one, with the agency setting forth “broad objectives,” while 
leaving it up to industry to devise the implementation of such objectives.  If the agency is 
too prescriptive, according to Bowie, it tends to defeat the purpose of self-regulation, 
which is to allow industry to come up with the best way to accomplish certain 
objectives.639  Addressing advertising self-regulation, another panelist attributed the 
success of that program to both the FTC’s support and its measured involvement.  In 
other words, “[t]he FTC understands that you need to keep the ‘self’ in ‘self-
regulation.’”640 
 
Roundtable panelists provided commentary on efforts by the FTC to initiate and 
support self-regulation in specific areas.  Lee Peeler praised the agency’s efforts in the 
                                                 
634 See, e.g., FTC, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A FIFTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF 
INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/070412MarketingViolentEChildren.pdf. 
635 See Conversation with Muris and Pitofsky, supra note 27, at 788 (Pitofsky stating:  “I have long 
believed that ‘real’ industry self-regulation could be a realistic, responsive, and responsible approach to 
many issues raised by underage drinking.  It can deal quickly and flexibly with a range of advertising issues 
and can bring an industry’s accumulated experience and judgment to bear without the rigidity of 
government regulation.  It can be particularly suitable in this area where government restrictions, especially 
if they involve partial or total advertising bans, raise very substantial First Amendment issues.”). 
636 MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 190. 
637 Levine, NY Tr. at 164-65. 
638 To the extent that self-regulation raises competitive concerns in the industry at issue, the FTC – given 
the dual nature of its mission – is in a unique position to balance the competing interests and promote self-
regulation that fulfills the consumer protection need without doing harm to competition. 
639 See Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 114-15. 
640 Levine, NY Tr. at 168. 
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area of advertising self-regulation,641 while William MacLeod identified the area of food 
marketing to children as an example of effective self-regulation.642  Another panelist, 
however, criticized the agency’s efforts in the area of behavioral advertising, in which the 
agency’s efforts are sending “a very confusing message” to industry: behavioral 
advertising is a new and emerging area, in which the agency has brought some cases, 
implying that it may bring more; yet, the agency is issuing self-regulatory guidelines, 
implying that it believes industry should self-regulate.643  This concern was echoed by 
some consumer representatives at the U.K. consultations.  They emphasized, however, 
that self-regulation is an important tool if regulators use it in a timely and proportionate 
manner – that is, if they do not use a graduated approach such as voluntary guidelines 
followed by a mandatory code of conduct when there is significant consumer detriment in 
the market that can be stopped by government action – and view it as one of a mix of 
tools that will produce good outcomes for consumers.644 
 
8. Partnership and Outreach with Domestic Agencies 
 
 Another important tool available to the FTC is outreach to domestic agencies.  
The Commission’s engagement with domestic agencies involves efforts at the policy 
level, including advocacy.645  It also encompasses enforcement cooperation, facilitated by 
the Commission’s broad authority to share with domestic law enforcement agencies 
nonpublic information otherwise subject to prohibitions on disclosure.646  Enforcement 
cooperation can facilitate the Commission’s own investigation, where a federal or state 
agency shares expertise or provides investigative assistance.  It also can leverage the 
Commission’s limited resources, by enlisting other agencies in undertaking efforts that 
advance the FTC’s mission. 
 
 The FTC often seeks to maximize its enforcement impact on the consumer 
protection side by coordinating “sweeps” – multiple legal actions filed at or near the same 
time by multiple authorities.  Cooperation with domestic (and foreign) enforcement 
agencies is an integral component of these sweeps.  In 2008, for example, the 
Commission announced “Operation Tele-PHONEY,” the agency’s largest sweep 
targeting telemarketing fraud.  More than 180 cases were filed by the FTC and law 
enforcement partners that included more than 30 federal, state, and local law enforcement 
                                                 
641 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 166 (“One of the things the FTC has done [is to] encourage[] the 
development in the advertising area of a self-regulatory system where competitors can go and get those 
cases resolved very quickly, and that system wouldn’t exist except for the encouragement of the FTC when 
it was being developed and the support of the FTC as it was being implemented.”).  See also Greenbaum, 
NY Tr. at 148 (“[T]o say that [advertising] self-regulation is working is just an incredible 
understatement.”). 
642 See MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 191. 
643 See A. Schwartz, 7/29 DC Tr. at 205-06.  Encouraging self-regulation in a particular industry, of course, 
does not in and of itself preclude the agency from pursuing cases in such industry. 
644 Consultation with U.K. Consumer Organizations, Sept. 12, 2008. 
645 See supra Chapters IV.C and VI.B.3. 
646 See supra Chapter III.C. 
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agencies, as well as Canadian authorities at both the national and provincial level.  These 
telemarketing cases were both civil and criminal, targeting various kinds of fraudulent 
schemes that had snared thousands of consumers and resulted in losses of many millions 
of dollars.647  An earlier 2006 sweep, denominated “Project FAL$E HOPE$,” was 
directed at fraudulent business opportunity and work-at-home schemes.  That effort 
included more than 100 law enforcement actions filed by the FTC, the Department of 
Justice, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and agencies in 11 states.648  Consumer 
education constituted an important component of both sweeps. 
 
9. International Partnerships and Outreach 
 
As discussed in Chapter IV.D, and for reasons discussed therein, the FTC 
recognizes that a competition and consumer protection agency cannot limit its activity or 
vision to its own borders; the FTC devotes significant efforts to international activity, 
coordinated by its Office of International Affairs.  As with the Commission’s dealings 
with domestic agencies, these efforts include engagement on policy initiatives and 
practices as well as enforcement cooperation.  An important component of the policy 
engagement, discussed in Chapter IV.D, is the FTC’s technical assistance program.    
 
To obtain the best results from its engagement with foreign enforcers, both in 
bilateral and multilateral contexts, an agency with an effective international program 
develops short-, medium-, and long-term strategies that guide participation in these fora, 
with a clear idea about when the agency wants to take a leadership role and when the 
agency plans to take a more passive or “importing” role.  The best-designed program 
identifies areas for teaching, and those for learning, recognizing that the two roles are not 
mutually exclusive.   
 
Some examples of the FTC’s cooperation on enforcement matters are discussed in 
Chapter IV.D.  As examples of the FTC’s efforts to engage in policy matters in bilateral 
settings, the FTC (together with DOJ) regularly forms working groups and holds high-
level and staff-level discussions with the EC’s DG Comp on a range of issues.  The U.S. 
agencies also have participated in working groups with competition agencies in Mexico, 
Canada, Korea, and Japan on issues including intellectual property and conduct by 
dominant firms.  The international consultations confirmed the importance of these 
bilateral initiatives, and also suggested that more efforts could be directed toward the 
development of additional working groups,649 joint sponsorship of workshops and 
conferences,650 and better sharing of research agendas.651  In the consumer protection 
area, the FTC engages in bilateral policy-related dialogue with counterparts on a wide 
                                                 
647 See supra note 272. 
648 See FTC Press Release, Federal, State Law Enforcers Complete Bogus Business Opportunity Sweep 
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/12/falsehopes.shtm. 
649 DC Consultation on International Issues, Nov. 6, 2008.  
650 Consultation with Irish Competition Authority, Nov. 27, 2008. 
651 See Waddams, London Tr. at 68. 
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range of issues, including fraud, consumer redress, privacy, and data security.  This 
dialogue includes face-to-face consultations, as well as telephonic, video, and written 
exchanges.  For example, the FTC routinely comments on both policy and legislative 
proposals from other jurisdictions on various consumer protection-related issues.652  
 
At the multilateral level, several organizations facilitate dialogue and doctrinal 
and procedural convergence, including the International Competition Network, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International 
Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network.653  Many agencies, including the FTC, 
dedicate many, if not the majority, of their international efforts to activities in these fora.  
Because of the costs of participating in multilateral organizations and meetings,654 the 
consultations stressed that a good international program must prioritize its multilateral 
efforts.  The agency must first decide what percentage of resources will be devoted to this 
activity, and then the agency must give careful consideration to where or on what topics 
resources will be spent.655 
   
To obtain optimal results from agency-to-agency technical assistance programs, 
the consultations suggested that such programs are most effective when the focus is on 
the practical aspects of law enforcement.  More specific indicators offered by panelists 
focused largely on program design.  For example, a good technical assistance program in 
competition either is part of a larger technical assistance program or otherwise clearly 
contributes to the improved performance of an economy.656  It is provided on a 
cooperative and consensual basis657 and appropriately tailored to the recipient’s needs,658 
and the advisors have a working knowledge of the local conditions.659   
                                                 
652 A recent example of a submission by the FTC to another jurisdiction is a comment submitted to the 
European Commission relating to draft radio frequency identification policy principles.  See FTC Staff 
Comments to the European Commission on its “Draft Recommendation on the implementation of privacy, 
data protection and information security principles in applications supported by Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID)” (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/commentsrfid.pdf. 
653 Other significant multilateral organizations include the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, regional organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and a number of 
specialized networks that deal with specific aspects of consumer protection.  For example, a number of 
international multilateral networks focus on consumer privacy and data security, including OECD’s 
Working Party on Information Security and Privacy, the International Working Group on Data Protection 
in Telecommunications, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, and 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Data Privacy Subgroup.  In the area of spam and other online 
threats, there are several networks that focus on both policy and enforcement cooperation, including, for 
example, the London Action Plan and the European Union’s Contact Network of Spam Authorities.   
654 Former Chairman Muris has remarked that achieving success in international consensus building efforts 
“cannot be done on the cheap.”  See Timothy J. Muris, Competition Agencies in a Market-Based Global 
Economy, Annual Lecture of the European Foreign Affairs Review (July 23, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723brussels.shtm. 
655 See Whish, London Tr. at 144-46. 
656 See Korsun, NY Tr. at 129-31.  See also FTC and U.S. Dep’t of Justice, International Technical 
Assistance Workshop: Charting the Future Course of International Technical Assistance (Feb. 6, 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/oia/wkshp/index.shtm. 
657 See Whish, London Tr. at 149; Consultation with Canadian Competition Bureau, Sept. 17, 2008. 
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On the enforcement side, the Commission’s work with its foreign counterparts 
facilitates its ability to obtain meaningful and timely cooperation from foreign 
counterparts for FTC-generated investigations and litigation matters.  Another critical 
dimension is the agency’s ability to influence the enforcement agenda and priorities of 
foreign agencies through notifications, consultations, and other bilateral mechanisms.  A 
third dimension is the FTC’s capacity to provide assistance, in appropriate cases, to 
foreign authorities when they request the FTC’s assistance or refer complaints involving 
U.S. businesses.   
 
10. Other Innovative Approaches to Addressing Specific Problems 
 
The FTC pursues other innovative approaches to address specific problems.  As 
an example, an innovative approach to business guidance has been to enlist the help of 
the media to ensure that deceptive advertising claims are not disseminated.  A survey of 
ads for weight-loss products revealed that about half of them contained at least one claim 
that was facially false.  In response, the Commission published a guide – appropriately 
titled Red Flag Bogus Weight Loss Claims – describing seven claims for nonprescription 
weight-loss products that should raise red flags because they are always false.  FTC 
Commissioners met with members of the media and asked that they “do the right thing” 
by refusing to run ads containing these false claims.  Although many initially resisted this 
request, it appears that some have complied.  In a follow-up survey, FTC staff found that 
the incidence of “Red Flag” claims had declined significantly.  Thus, the Red Flag project 
essentially combined business education with promotion of self-regulation.660 
 
Former Commissioner Leary characterized this approach as “innovative,” 
discounting the notion held by some that it was legally risky under the antitrust laws.   
Leary emphasized that this tactic does not violate the antitrust laws, properly construed.  
He further commended the program for attacking the supply side (i.e. the advertisers) of 
the fraud equation, not just the demand side (i.e. consumers).661 
 
11. Using Multiple Tools to Address a Problem  
 
In pursuing outcomes that benefit consumers, the FTC can use multiple tools to 
address a particular problem.  For example, the agency has used such a multifaceted 
approach in dealing with the issues of rising obesity rates and false or deceptive 
advertising claims about weight-loss products.  In addition to the innovative Red Flag 
project mentioned above, the agency has conducted or co-sponsored several public 
workshops to address: the impact of advertising for weight-loss products and programs; 
the information consumers need to evaluate such products; and food marketing to 
                                                                                                                                                 
658 Consultation with Agencies at the OECD Latin America Competition Forum, Sept. 10, 2008. 
659 See Korsun, NY Tr. at 130. 
660 Additional information regarding the Red Flag project is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/redflag/. 
661 See Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 31-32. 
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children.  The FTC has issued reports on these topics; conducted surveys of weight-loss 
advertising; engaged in multimedia education directed to both consumers and businesses; 
and encouraged industry self-regulation and international cooperation.662  Of course, the 
FTC conducts litigation as well, having sued companies that promote their products with 
false or deceptive claims.663  As in other areas of FTC enforcement, often several weight-
loss cases are announced simultaneously in order to maximize the deterrent effect of the 
enforcement activity. 
 
The FTC also has used an integrated approach to preventing anticompetitive 
increases in the price of petroleum products, including oil, gasoline, and diesel.  Given 
the crucial role that the petroleum industry plays in consumers’ lives and the U.S. 
economy generally, that industry receives the highest level of scrutiny from the FTC.  
Utilizing its law enforcement authority and resources, the FTC has filed actions to enjoin 
petroleum mergers deemed to be anticompetitive.664  The FTC’s enforcement work in 
this area also includes challenging possibly anticompetitive conduct by firms in this 
sector of the economy,665 aided in significant part by the gasoline and diesel price 
monitoring project that was begun 666in 2002.  
                                                
 
In addition to enforcement, the FTC engages in significant policy R&D efforts in 
the petroleum area, holding workshops, engaging in relevant research, and drafting 
congressionally requested reports.667  Another tool used by the FTC in this area is 
outreach to domestic agencies and consumers, as exemplified by the agency’s efforts 
following the September 2008 landfall of Hurricane Ike in the U.S. Gulf Coast.  In the 
aftermath of the storm, the FTC established a task force comprising staff from throughout 
the agency, with the mission of closely tracking gasoline price trends and supply 
 
662 Information regarding FTC workshops, guides, reports, and other efforts in the weight-loss area is 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/menus/resources/guidance/health.shtm.  Weight-loss-related consumer 
education materials are available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/menus/consumer/health/weight.shtm. 
663 See, e.g., FTC Press Release, Marketers of “Ab Force” Weight Loss Device Agree to Pay $7 Million for 
Consumer Redress (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/01/telebrands.shtm. 
664 See, e.g., FTC Press Release, FTC Dismisses Administrative Complaint Challenging Acquisition of The 
Peoples Natural Gas Company from Dominion Resources, Inc.: Parties Abandoned Proposed Transaction 
after Commission Challenge (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/dom.shtm; FTC 
v. Equitable Resources, Inc., No. 07-2499 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 2008) (order granting motion to vacate district 
court decision against the FTC). 
665 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., FTC Dkt. No. 9305 (involving allegations that Unocal illegally acquired 
monopoly power in the technology market for producing certain low-emission gasoline for sale and use in 
California; the settlement in 2005 resulted in savings to California consumers of about $500 million per 
year). 
666 See supra note 187.  In addition, pursuant to Section 811 of the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, the Commission is conducting a rulemaking proceeding addressing 
petroleum market manipulation.  Information regarding this rulemaking is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/rules.htm. 
667 See, e.g., reports cited infra note 809. 
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information, and developing ways to be as responsive as possible to state authorities and 
to individual consumers who might need the FTC’s assistance.668 
 
     * * * 
 
As discussed above, the FTC has many tools in its arsenal with which to pursue 
its competition and consumer protection missions.  Identifying the appropriate tool or 
tools with which to address each of the many challenges facing the agency in its pursuit 
of those missions is crucial to the agency’s effectiveness.  In many instances, law 
enforcement will be the most useful tool; in many other instances, nonenforcement tools 
will be more effective.  In some instances, the simultaneous or serial use of several tools 
will yield the best results for consumers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
668 See, e.g., FTC, Consumer Complaints about Hurricane Ike, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/recovery/hurricane/hurricane-ike-complaints.shtml (website 
allowing consumers to submit complaints about gasoline prices or questionable business practices).  
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PART 3:  MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FTC ACTIONS 
 
VII. Measuring Agency Effectiveness 
 
As noted in Chapter I, there is widespread agreement about the agency’s core 
mission, as set forth in its strategic plan: 
 
To prevent business practices that are anticompetitive or 
deceptive or unfair to consumers; to enhance informed 
consumer choice and public understanding of the 
competitive process; and to accomplish these missions 
without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.669 
 
For assessing agency performance, as also explained in Chapter I, there should be a close 
nexus between what is measured and fulfillment of an agency’s mission.  Further, 
performance measurement should focus on outcomes for consumers rather than agency 
output.670  In any event, metrics chosen should ideally answer the question:  “what would 
have happened in the absence of [FTC] intervention and in the absence of [FTC] 
activity?”671  If the answer is that consumers are worse off in the hypothetical world of 
no FTC action, such action can be said to have affected consumers positively.672   
                                                
 
With an understanding of the value of particular FTC actions, agency heads can 
evaluate whether the resource costs of undertaking certain activities – which are known – 
justify the benefits achieved for consumers or whether the FTC could have achieved 
these benefits more efficiently.673  Further, given scarcity of resources, understanding the 
value of competing programs can help identify the full opportunity cost of forgone 
alternative actions.  Knowledge of opportunity costs can help prioritize actions both 
within the FTC and across government agencies.   
 
Unlike agencies that produce a readily measurable output directly to 
consumers,674 the vast majority of FTC actions are not aimed at consumers directly, but 
rather toward parties – typically business and sometimes government – in an effort to 
stop conduct that threatens to harm consumers.675  For example, the FTC sues businesses 
 
669 2006 FTC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 26, at 1.  
670 See Sidney Shapiro & Rina Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1741, 1770 (2008).   
671 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 24-25. 
672 Of course, FTC inaction also can create value for consumers.  For example, to the extent that the FTC 
opts not to challenge a merger or nonmerger conduct that is likely to improve welfare, its inaction improves 
consumer welfare.   
673 See Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 24. 
674 For example, the United States Postal Service delivers mail, and the Social Security Administration 
assures beneficiaries receive their benefits on time.  See WILSON, supra note 16, at 34-36.  
675 Consumer education is an exception to this characterization.  Unlike in the case of antitrust violations, 
consumers can take actions to reduce the probability of becoming a victim of fraud and deception.  Thus, 
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for taking actions that violate the consumer protection and competition laws and engages 
in advocacy with governments to discourage anticompetitive regulation.  Thus, there is an 
indirect link between FTC action and changes in consumer welfare: the FTC helps 
consumers primarily through its ability to reduce the occurrence of conduct that violates 
consumer protection or antitrust laws or otherwise reduces consumer welfare.  Ideally, 
one could measure the direct impact of FTC actions on consumers.676  When this type of 
direct measurement is not feasible, however, it is necessary to look for proxies for the 
impact of FTC actions on consumers, such as the outcomes of enforcement actions and 
the influence of nonenforcement activity on courts and government policymakers.  
 
This chapter considers a range of possible measurement metrics that are or could 
be used to assess the FTC’s performance.  Section A addresses the possibility (and 
challenges) of measuring directly the impacts of the Commission’s actions, as well as the 
possibilities (and challenges) of accounting for impacts that may be less direct but more 
important, such as the deterrent and precedential effects of agency litigation. 
 
Section B discusses several proxies for measuring the degree to which FTC 
actions further its mission.  Specifically, this section describes some of the metrics the 
FTC currently uses in its annual Performance and Accountability Report and also 
examines other performance metrics, including the outcome of enforcement actions, the 
deterrent effect and precedential value of these actions, the FTC’s intellectual leadership, 
the agency’s transparency and guidance (which can facilitate compliance with the law 
without the costs of litigation), and the burdens the FTC places on industry. 
 
Section C addresses the agency’s relations with its core constituencies.  In 
addition to outcomes that are directly or indirectly measurable, having a reputation as an 
agency that can solve problems is important, although not usually readily measurable.  To 
maintain its relevancy, a successful agency needs to understand and take action – 
consistent with its mission – on the issues on which the public, Congress, and the White 
House are focused – areas of political value.677  As one panelist explained, organizations 
that are “deaf” to these issues, find themselves “as part of the problem, and not really part 
of the solution.”678 
                                                                                                                                                 
targeting messages directly to consumers to inform them of these actions can reduce the occurrence of 
fraud and deception.  
676 See, e.g., Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 28-29 (“without that focus on outcomes, you’re likely to be spending 
your time on a lot of activity that may or may not be critical to achieving the real purpose and the real 
objective of the Commission”); Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 119 (“you can say that you’ve done all sorts of 
different things and it only begins the discussion about whether those are things that have made the world 
better or worse”).  A participant in the external consultations noted that the 1993 Hilmer Commission 
report, Effectiveness of Competition Policy, was particularly effective because of its quantitative character.  
Melbourne Consultation with Private Sector Stakeholders, Oct. 2, 2008. 
677 See Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 12.  
678 Id. at 34.   
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A. Direct Measurements of Welfare 
 
Given widespread acceptance of the FTC’s consumer-focused mission, direct 
measurement of the increase in consumer welfare as a result of FTC actions would be 
ideal.679  There was broad consensus among roundtable panelists that the FTC should aim 
to measure its benefits by assessing welfare and avoid incorporating improved or 
increased “fairness” as a goal or an objective that should be counted as a benefit of FTC 
enforcement.680  Others opined that such decisions between welfare and other objectives 
(fairness or otherwise) were better left to the political process and elected officials rather 
than government agencies.681 
 
Although there is general recognition that welfare is the appropriate measure for 
evaluating the benefits of FTC actions, how best to define “welfare” remains subject to 
much debate.  This debate falls along familiar lines of “total” welfare (producer plus 
consumer surplus) versus “consumer” welfare (consumer surplus alone).682  Some argue 
that total welfare is the appropriate standard because it focuses attention on maximizing 
societal welfare.683  Further, producers ultimately are consumers as well (although of 
                                                 
679 See ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 28 (“As in the merger review context, a key means of 
increasing confidence in the agencies’ non-merger civil enforcement efforts is to conduct a rigorous 
empirical analysis of whether these efforts are enhancing consumer welfare.”).  
680 See, e.g., Bloom, London Tr. at 23; Humpherson, London Tr. at 24. 
681 See Pritchard, London Tr. at 29; Bloom, London Tr. at 31.  Indeed, one commentator has noted that if 
fairness “trumps” welfare, then some individuals will be made worse off and, in some circumstances, 
everyone will be made worse off than if fairness considerations were omitted.  See LOUIS KAPLOW & 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52 (2002); see also Peter Freeman, Chairman of the United 
Kingdom Competition Commission, Is Competition Everything?, Address before Law Society European 
Group, at 10 (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/our_role/speeches/pdf/freeman_law_society_210708.pdf (“The idea that competition is 
just another policy to be weighed in the balance against others is insidious and potentially dangerous to the 
functioning of the economy.”). 
682 Although the term consumer welfare is understood differently depending on the observer, see, e.g., 
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 26 n.22 (2007) [hereinafter 
AMC REPORT] (“Debate continues about the precise definition of ‘consumer welfare.’”), current usage 
generally favors defining the term to mean the welfare of end consumers.  See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, 
Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare 
Standard, Comments Filed with the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Nov. 4, 2005), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public_studies_fr28902/exclus_conduct_pdf/051104_Salop_Mergers.pdf
.  As a technical matter, total welfare is the area under the demand curve above marginal cost, and 
consumer welfare is the area under the demand curve above equilibrium price.  In instances where price is 
equal to marginal cost and marginal cost is constant, total welfare is equal to consumer welfare.   
683 See Jenny, Paris Tr. at 63 (arguing that a focus on consumer welfare is detrimental to an agency’s ability 
to persuade other policymakers because “it seems to pit the suppliers against the consumer”); Dennis W. 
Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?, at 2 (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. 
EAG 07-3, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/221242.pdf.  
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other goods),684 and in the long run, gains to producers eventually may accrue to 
consumers in the form of lower prices.685  Others argue that a consumer welfare standard 
is most consistent with the antitrust laws and helps ensure consumers are protected by the 
antitrust laws.686  Some suggest that a middle ground is appropriate – that is, a 
“weighted” surplus standard that would ensure consumer welfare is increased, but not at 
the expense of preventing significantly larger gains to aggregate welfare.687  No panelists 
suggested that the welfare standard used to evaluate FTC actions should differ depending 
on the nature of the action at issue.  Likewise, none of the panelists suggested that the 
standard should differ depending on the industry at issue or other characteristics of the 
given matter.  Although the debate is an important one, in the vast majority of instances, 
consumer welfare and total welfare align.688  As a result, there only infrequently is a 
conflict between advancing each goal. 
 
As a practical matter, direct measurement of welfare effects entails comparing 
price and output in the relevant markets before and after the FTC action.689  For example, 
consumers pay higher prices and purchase fewer goods or services than they otherwise 
would in the case of an antitrust violation.  As a result, consumers suffer direct financial 
losses, and also forego the satisfaction they could have received from additional 
purchases, had the price been set at the competitive level.  Calculating the magnitude of 
                                                 
684 See, e.g., Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why not the Best?, at 3 (Economic 
Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 06-8, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/221880.pdf. 
685 See Padilla, Brussels Tr. at 68.  
686 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 516 
(2006); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, 
(Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 07-9, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/225696.pdf; see also Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 23-24 (arguing that the 
FTC should focus on consumer welfare; anything that benefits total welfare also can be made to benefit 
consumer welfare; and total welfare is harder to coordinate nationally because nations have different 
incentives to favor producers or consumers, depending on whether they are importers or exporters).  Others 
argue that a consumer welfare standard is appropriate because it helps rebalance a bias toward producer 
welfare, and setting enforcement “preferences” more strictly than ideal helps compensate for “cheating” 
around the edges.  See Vickers, London Tr. at 11, 25. 
687 See, e.g., Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an 
Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, at 20 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1075265. 
688 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 686, at 521 (“The welfare dispute has limited practical importance because 
harm to consumers and harm to aggregate welfare tend to go hand-in-hand.”); Carlton, supra note 683, at 4 
(arguing that, although total welfare is the preferable standard, “[f]or most situations there is unlikely to be 
a different outcome regardless of the standard used.  The reason is that actions that achieve efficiencies 
should be expected to help consumers.”).  There are some circumstances in which the two standards result 
in different outcomes.  See Baker, supra note 686, at 516-18 (describing five circumstances). 
689 See Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 139-40; see also Philip Lowe, The Design of Competition Policy Institutions 
for the 21st Century – The Experience of the European Commission and DG Competition, 3 COMPETITION 
POL’Y NEWSLETTER 1, 9 (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2008_3.pdf (“[I]n order to really know whether we 
achieve our ultimate objective of making markets work better, we need to measure the impact of our 
decisions on those markets.”). 
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these two types of loss – and thus the benefits from FTC action – requires an estimate of 
the shape and position of the demand and marginal cost curves for the product, as well as 
an estimate of the equilibrium price and quantity absent the anticompetitive conduct.   
 
 Turning to consumer protection, deceptive advertising makes consumers willing 
to buy more at any given price than they would had they not been misled about the 
quality of the product or the level of substantiation for performance claims.690  
Consequently, unlike in the case of anticompetitive conduct, deceived consumers are 
harmed because they generally will buy more of the product (and may pay a higher 
price691) than they would if they knew the product’s true attributes.  Calculation of 
consumer injury from deception is straightforward in the extreme case of outright fraud, 
where a seller claims performance capabilities for a product that is in reality worthless.  If 
consumers knew the truth before purchase, they would be unwilling to pay any price for 
the product, and all of the expenditures they actually make can be considered injury.  In 
addition, scarce resources have been diverted from genuinely productive uses, with a 
resulting loss to society equal to the value of those resources.  Therefore, the short-run 
economic benefit from the Commission’s fraud program, for example, can be measured 
directly as the quantity of money consumers would have continued to spend on products 
that FTC enforcement action effectively has removed from the marketplace.692  Further, 
any restitution for consumers that the FTC is able to secure from fraudulent sellers also 
enhances consumer welfare.   
 
Assessment of consumer injury and the immediate benefit of Commission 
intervention is generally much more complex in cases where there is not outright fraud 
but rather where firms do not substantiate advertising claims or where they omit 
information important to a purchase decision.  Although the advertising claims may 
exaggerate the effectiveness of the product, or tout capabilities that do not exist, many 
consumers might continue to purchase the product in the absence of deceptive claims, 
albeit in smaller quantities (and possibly at a lower price).  The gap between the demand 
for the product with accurate information and the demand fueled by deceptive claims 
would, in most cases, be extremely difficult to estimate with any precision.  A fully 
rigorous analysis would have to take into account the magnitude of the reduction in 
consumer demand if consumers obtained accurate information about product 
performance.  Further, if consumers erroneously view a product as having fewer 
substitutes than it actually does, they will be less sensitive to price increases than they 
otherwise would.  Finally, as in the case of fraud and anticompetitive conduct, any study 
would have to construct the market price and quantity absent the deception. 
 
                                                 
690 Technically, anticompetitive conduct causes a movement along the demand curve to a higher price and 
lower output level, whereas deception causes the demand curve to shift outward, causing output to rise and, 
depending on the shape of firms’ cost curves, price perhaps to rise.  
691 The extent to which the price for a product rises with an increase in demand depends on the shape of the 
underlying marginal cost curves of the relevant firms.  
692 The primary longer-term benefit, as discussed below, is deterrence. 
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Of course, events unassociated with FTC actions also affect cost and demand 
conditions and, hence, observed prices.  To isolate welfare changes resulting from the 
FTC’s competition and consumer protection actions, it is important to control for other 
factors that also affect market outcomes and that occurred during a similar time frame.693  
This exercise requires constructing a hypothetical control market that is identical to the 
one in which the FTC intervened.  One way to construct a control group is to identify 
markets – similar geographic or product markets not subject to the FTC action – to serve 
as benchmarks and then to control statistically for any remaining differences between the 
treatment and control groups.  Panelists noted that this type of before-and-after study may 
not be feasible for broad national actions because there would not be an adequate control 
group to serve as a benchmark.694  Such studies, however, may be feasible for narrow, 
targeted efforts concentrated in a single geography or industry.695   
 
Several panelists addressed the promise and problems associated with direct 
measurement of market outcomes after FTC action in the context of merger 
retrospectives.  Because mergers make up a large portion of the FTC’s competition 
caseload, the ability to evaluate the effect of mergers on consumers would go a long way 
toward direct evaluation of the FTC’s competition program.  The Government 
Accountability Office recently released a report that calls for more retrospective work on 
the oil industry.696  These discussions, moreover, are illustrative of the methodological 
issues surrounding direct measurement of welfare effects from FTC actions more 
generally.697   
 
There generally was widespread agreement that reviewing merger enforcement 
decisions ex post potentially could shed light on the value of FTC merger enforcement to 
consumers.698  Panelists, however, also spoke extensively about the limitations of such 
                                                 
693 See Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 19 (noting that to evaluate how the FTC’s activities contributed to observed 
market outcomes, the focus should be on outcomes relative to a control rather than just examining a trend).  
694 See Rose, Boston Tr. at 93-94; Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 139. 
695 See Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 139.    
696 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY MARKETS: ANALYSIS OF MORE PAST MERGERS COULD 
ENHANCE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081082.pdf.   
697 As discussed above in Chapter VI.B.7, the FTC promotes industry self-regulation where appropriate.  
Professor Chris Hoofnagle submitted an online comment recommending that the FTC “develop standards 
for evaluating the efficacy of self-regulation.”  In doing so, Hoofnagle recommended that the agency define 
how long self-regulation should take to solve the problem at issue and what an acceptable solution is.  
Online Submission of Chris Hoofnagle, Aug. 27, 2008. 
698 See, e.g., Wright, Chicago Tr. at 171; Carlton and Nevo, Chicago Tr. at 216-17, 220-22.  Perhaps the 
most positive voices regarding retrospective work were Ghosal (7/30 DC Tr. at 242-44, 273-74), who sees 
such work as one of many ways to get potentially useful information about antitrust effects, Picker 
(Chicago Tr. at 166-69), and Scheffman (NY Tr. at 79-80).  In addition, Padilla (Brussels Tr. at 80-81) 
noted the ease and low cost of doing stock market-based event studies as a means of evaluating the 
effectiveness of mergers, although some DC roundtable participants derided stock market-based studies.  
See, e.g., Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 227.  Much merger retrospective work has been done in the U.S. and in 
Europe.  Some of that work has been funded by governments, but other studies have been done 
independently.  For a recent survey of several merger retrospectives focused on pre- and postmerger price 
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studies.699  For example, it can be hard to devise controls for the counterfactual (“but-
for”) world for allowed and blocked mergers, which can affect the inferences that can be 
drawn from merger retrospectives.  Further, studying only challenged mergers is likely to 
lead to conclusions that the agency makes more errors than it actually does, because 
liability in those matters tends to be the least clear cut and therefore most prone to agency 
error and, moreover, may result from aggressive enforcement intended to enhance 
deterrence.700  One commenter, however, noted that retrospective results can be valuable 
especially if they indicate that prices rose after the parties consummated an unchallenged 
merger, because this result would run counter to this “selection bias.”701  The extent to 
which any retrospective could be generalized beyond the merger (or mergers) evaluated 
is also unclear, given that each merger is unique both factually and analytically.702  One 
also can criticize selective self-assessment work due to potential researcher bias, which 
may be one reason to have assessments conducted by those outside the FTC.703   Finally, 
participants noted that the retrospective approach cannot measure the most important 
aspect of antitrust – the value of deterrence.  The benefits of deterrence, moreover, may 
be dispersed through many markets, making their measurement even more difficult.704  
 
Dennis Carlton proposed that a more effective way to conduct a merger 
retrospective may be to use internal agency predictions as the benchmark rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
effects, see Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
433 (2008).  For an example of work done on 10 horizontal mergers for the U.K. OFT, see Eric Morrison & 
David Elliott, PwC Economics, Ex Post Evaluation of Mergers: A Report Prepared for the Office of Fair 
Trading, Department of Trade and Industry, and the Competition Commission (OFT Economic Discussion 
Paper, 2005) [hereinafter OFT/PwC, Ex Post Evaluation], available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft767.pdf.  For a broader description of pre-2002 
work on merger retrospectives, see Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 119, 166-84 (2003). 
699 See Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 218-22; Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 88-89; Krattenmaker, 7/30 DC Tr. at 94-95; 
Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 212-13, 228-29, 252-55.  See also Dennis W. Carlton, The Need to Measure the 
Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 07-15, 
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/228687.pdf (calling for ex ante predictions from 
the antitrust agencies regarding postmerger effects on price, output, and dimensions of quality or 
innovation). 
700 See Wickelgren, Chicago Tr. at 209-10.  Providing a cautionary note on self-assessments, Damien 
Neven and Hans Zenger recently have argued that such ex post assessments might be misleading to 
regulators and may cause agencies to choose the wrong strategies.  See Damien Neven & Hans Zenger, Ex 
Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective (DG Comp Discussion Paper, 2008), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/ex_post_evaluation.pdf.  
701 Chicago Tr. at 291-92 (audience member Joe Farrell). 
702 See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. 88-89. 
703 Several panelists mentioned that assessments of outcomes (particularly merger retrospective work) 
might best be done by those outside the agency to avoid such potential bias problems.  See Salinger 7/29 
DC Tr. at 143-44; Crandall 7/30 DC Tr. at 203, 271; Werden, 7/30 DC Tr. at 272.  Consultation 
participants also indicated that the ex post evaluation of DG Comp projects is occasionally done, and it is 
typically contracted out.  Consultation with DG Comp, Oct. 21, 2008. 
704 See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 135 
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merely to rely on pre- and postmerger data to construct a hypothetical but-for market.705  
This approach would require the agency to make more explicit predictions about the 
likely outcome of mergers, as well as explain the basis for those predictions, and it would 
permit the agency to determine not only whether its predictions are accurate but also 
whether particular economic modeling techniques are accurate or whether there is bias.706  
In Carlton’s view, such an approach would result in more robust conclusions than merely 
taking a sample of mergers to determine whether competition seems to have been harmed 
or improved.707 
 
The Office of Fair Trading recently has pursued retrospective work by performing 
an ex ante analysis that results in estimates and baselines for the assessment of 
mergers.708  The ex ante estimates assist in any ex post evaluations.  Although it has not 
frequently performed ex post evaluations, OFT usually uses external parties to conduct 
those evaluations in order to avoid possible bias.709  For example, OFT, along with the 
Competition Commission, commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”) to review 
mergers cleared by the Competition Commission to determine whether the clearance 
decision was correct.710     
 
Other proponents of merger retrospectives argued that they need not all be price-
focused, state-of-the-art empirical projects, but rather they can be useful if they provide 
replicable measures of postmerger performance on any of several dimensions.  For 
example, former BE Director David Scheffman noted the relative ease of doing merger 
retrospectives based on customer surveys.711  In addition, Nancy Rose and former 
Commissioner Dennis Yao proposed doing more merger retrospective work focused on 
the attainment of predicted merger efficiencies.712   
 
Apart from the conceptual concerns with merger retrospectives, several panelists 
highlighted the difficulty of obtaining useful data as a constraint on any efforts to perform 
                                                 
705 Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 220-21. 
706 Id. 
707 Id. at 228. 
708 Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008. 
709 See supra note 703. 
710 See OFT/PwC, Ex Post Evaluation, supra note 698.  PwC looked at economic indicators such as entry 
and innovation and conducted interviews.  PwC determined that in one case it was too early to tell if the 
enforcement decision was correct; in the other nine cases, the decision was found to have been correct.  Id. 
at 2. 
711 Scheffman, NY Tr. at 79-80. 
712 Rose and Yao, Boston Tr. at 118-21.  Presumably these efficiency-focused retrospectives might follow 
the mold of that done for the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific rail merger.  See Denis A. Breen, The Union 
Pacific/Southern Pacific Rail Merger: A Retrospective on Merger Benefits (FTC Bureau of Economics 
Working Paper No. 269, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp269.pdf.  Ghosal (7/30 
DC Tr. at 273) also suggested a focus on efficiency retrospectives following the Breen case study model.  
That study may have been unique, however, because the author had access to extensive records of the 
Surface Transportation Board as well as to information voluntarily provided by the merging firms. 
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retrospective studies.713  As one panelist explained, “as an academic to get data, and 
especially these days, is very difficult. . . .  [T]he conditions under which private parties 
hand academics data is an enormously controversial subject these days.”714  Further, 
although the FTC may have the ability to obtain information before the merger and turn it 
over to academics for analysis in some circumstances,715 this does not alleviate the 
problems with obtaining postmerger data.  As Carlton noted, “even if you can get the 
DOJ and FTC economists to give you data, it’s not obvious you can get it from the 
industry after the merger has closed. . . .  I think that’s been one of the difficulties with 
doing retrospective studies.”716  Some suggested that conditioning access to data as part 
of resolving an inquiry may be one way to obtain useful information for a retrospective 
study.717 
 
 Although reliable data for merger retrospectives is difficult to obtain, getting the 
data is possible if one is willing to bear (and impose) the substantial acquisition costs.  
For example, the FTC recently released three economic working papers that examine the 
after-effects of four hospital mergers in three areas: (1) the east bay area of San Francisco 
in 1999; (2) the northern Chicago lakeside area in 2000; and (3) Wilmington, North 
Carolina in 1998.718  Each paper measures price effects of the merger based on 
information from local insurers who pay for the hospital care and uses econometric 
modeling and multiple different control groups of hospitals to obtain reliable 
comparisons.  The results across the markets are quite diverse and, therefore, of interest. 
 
As can be seen from the discussion above, directly measuring the change in 
consumer welfare from FTC actions is fraught with difficulties.  Even if done perfectly, 
moreover, these techniques probably would fail to capture the full deterrent and 
precedential effects from competition and consumer protection enforcement.  As 
                                                 
713 See, e.g., Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 242; Heimler and Leveque, Paris Tr. at 120-21 (discussing the 
possibility of conducting such reviews in the European Commission context). 
714 Picker, Chicago Tr. at 175.  
715 See supra note 326. 
716 Carlton, Chicago Tr. at 242-43.   
717 See Picker, Chicago Tr. at 175 (“you guys obviously have a mechanism for getting access to information 
and can do this as part of a consent decree that I don’t begin to have”); id. at 176 (suggesting a 
retrospective version of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act).  Another panelist argued that “the FTC actually might 
have leverage to say, well, instead of closing this investigation, how about we agree to close it on the 
condition that you turn over data so that we can study the effects in the future?”  Wickelgren, Chicago Tr. 
at 243.  Carlton agreed that this is a good idea, generally, but indicated that, in his experience, the 
enforcement agencies disfavor this approach, especially the Department of Justice.  See Carlton, Chicago 
Tr. at 243 (“I think the question [for the agencies] is does it impinge on you getting something that is above 
and beyond what your charge is that you’re entitled to.”). 
718 Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction 
(FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 293, 2008); Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, 
Two Hospital Mergers on Chicago’s North Shore: A Retrospective Study (FTC Bureau of Economics 
Working Paper No. 294, 2009); Aileen Thompson, The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A 
Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 
295, 2009).  These working papers are available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econwork.shtm. 
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discussed in more detail below, these benefits are likely to be more important than the 
direct impact of stopping particular anticompetitive, unfair, or deceptive conduct.  For 
example, accurate measures of the price and quantity effects of a successful antitrust 
action will capture the direct impact of preventing the particular anticompetitive conduct 
in question, and depending on the time frame, it also may capture some of the deterrent 
and precedential effects (to the extent there are any) flowing from FTC enforcement.  
This measurement, however, would fail to capture improvements in consumer welfare 
from deterrent and precedential effects that spill over into different product and 
geographic markets.  To capture fully such improvements in consumer welfare would 
require identifying the spillover markets and then measuring price and quantity effects in 
each of these markets. 
 
Directly measuring the change in consumer welfare due to research and advocacy 
is likely to be even more difficult than measuring the full impact of enforcement actions.  
These important FTC tools affect consumer welfare in subtle ways, and often in diffuse 
markets.  For example, past research on optometric business practices and the real estate 
brokerage industry likely has influenced state laws regulating these industries.  To 
capture fully the welfare effects of this research, however, would require isolating both 
the marginal impact of FTC research on state regulation and the impact of positive 
regulatory changes on price and output in the relevant markets.  Further, as with 
enforcement actions, research and advocacy are likely to have spillover deterrent effects 
in related markets.  For example, successful advocacy in one state may prevent other state 
regulatory bodies from entertaining similar restrictions on competition, and research 
often can have applications beyond the industry on which it is focused.   
 
 Finally, the FTC provides guidance to parties in an effort to prevent antitrust and 
consumer protection violations in the first instance.  It also tries to minimize the costs it 
imposes on parties, both in terms of direct compliance costs and errors in case selection.  
That there is likely to be a far more attenuated link between these FTC actions and 
market outcomes than between enforcement and market outcomes exacerbates the 
measurement issues discussed above. 
  
B. Proxies for Direct Welfare Measurements 
 
As discussed above, there are inherent difficulties associated with the direct 
measurement of the change in welfare from FTC actions.  Although it may be possible to 
measure the direct benefits of specific FTC actions in some circumstances, more often the 
agency must rely on proxies – often focused on agency outputs or intermediate outcomes 
– to gauge welfare effects. 
 
The FTC currently undertakes an annual performance evaluation and submits a 
Performance and Accountability Report (“PAR”) 719 in accordance with several statutes, 
                                                 
719 FTC, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008) [hereinafter FTC PAR], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/2008parreport.pdf. 
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including the Government Performance and Results Act (“GPRA”).720  Congress 
designed GPRA to improve government efficiency, and it requires agencies to develop 
strategic goals, define plans to achieve these goals, and develop means to measure agency 
performance relative to these goals.  In the PAR, the FTC broadly sets out four objectives 
for its strategic goals to protect consumers and maintain competition: (1) identify fraud, 
deception, unfair practices, and anticompetitive conduct; (2) stop this conduct; (3) 
prevent consumer injury through education; and (4) engage in research, reports, 
advocacy, and international cooperation.721  The PAR does not measure changes in 
welfare directly, but instead uses a combination of output and outcome measures to 
assess the FTC’s fulfillment of its mission.722  Below is a discussion of metrics used in 
the FTC’s PAR as well as other indirect measurements of the FTC’s success in fulfilling 
its mission, such as the outcome of enforcement actions, the deterrent effect and 
precedential value of those actions, the FTC’s intellectual leadership, and the burdens the 
FTC places on industry. 
 
1. Enforcement Success 
 
The FTC primarily is an enforcement agency.  Antitrust and consumer protection 
enforcement provides benefits to consumers directly in the form of arresting welfare-
reducing conduct.  The benefits of enforcement also accrue in ways that are hard to 
measure in a systematic, empirical manner.  Cases that deter future welfare-reducing 
conduct or that clarify or move legal doctrine toward a more welfare-enhancing rule also 
provide an important benefit.  This section examines the strengths and weaknesses of 
using certain metrics to measure the success of FTC enforcement.  
 
a. Number of Cases and Win Rates 
 
As discussed in Chapter VI.B.1, panelists generally agreed that focusing on the 
number of cases filed in a given year is not likely to provide a good indication of the 
extent to which the FTC is fulfilling its mission to promote consumer welfare.  As 
discussed in Chapter I, the agency ideally should define its mission in terms of ultimate 
outcomes for consumers, not agency output.  Accordingly, agency assessment should 
focus on actual outcomes, rather than agency output, unless there is a strong 
demonstrated link between the output, such as number of cases brought, and consumer 
welfare.723  Although at one level bringing cases can demonstrate that “the cop is really 
                                                 
720 Some commentators have been critical of such GPRA reports issued by agencies, although not the 
FTC’s specifically, describing them as typically containing “a sunny set of invented statistics designed to 
reassure their overseers that they are doing fine.”  Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 670, at 1744.  The result, 
they argue, is that GPRA “has generated a mind-boggling whirlwind of reassuring statistics, cheerful 
narrative, and assurances that all is well at whichever regulatory agency is justifying its performance.”  Id. 
at 1760.  Nonetheless, these commentators offer several principles for improving these types of reports, 
including a focus whenever possible on “outcomes[s], rather than output[s],” which is consistent with the 
FTC’s long-run objectives for its PAR.  Id. at 1770. 
721 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 36-40.  
722 See id. at 34. 
723 See Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 25-26. 
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on the beat,”724 and thereby boost deterrence, unless there is an empirically demonstrated 
nexus between consumer welfare and the sheer number of cases brought (including 
merger challenges), this measure alone is unlikely to capture the FTC’s impact on 
consumer welfare.725  Further, counting cases is not a completely reliable measure of 
deterrence benefits because the absence of enforcement activity could signal either 
significant deterrence or none at all.726  One panelist starkly explained, for example: 
“Economists would never say number of cases is a good measure of anything, in 
particular.”727  Similarly, another panelist stated with respect to consumer protection 
enforcement that “the mission of the FTC is not to bring cases.  The mission . . . is to stop 
deception, stop unfairness.”728  
 
 Although less problematic than counting case filings, primarily focusing on the 
number or percentage of cases won also would likely fail to provide meaningful 
information on the effectiveness of the FTC’s enforcement activities.  An agency must 
win some percentage of its cases to preserve credibility,729 but as one panelist noted, “the 
function of the agency as an enforcement agency is to get the right answer.  It is not to 
win cases for the sake of winning cases.”730  A similar point was made with respect to the 
evolution of the FTC’s approach to advertising – from merely looking for deception cases 
that could be won in court to considering ways to “get at whatever we think may be 
deceptive about [the advertising in question] without interfering with or dismantling the 
benefits of the advertising.”731  Clearly, winning cases that do not advance, or even 
hinder, consumer welfare does not further the FTC’s mission.   
 
Further, to the extent that only the closest cases are brought, the agency should 
not expect to see a near-perfect win rate; a high win rate may signal that the FTC is only 
challenging easy-to-win cases and thus underdeterring bad conduct.  For example, two 
former Bureau of Competition directors noted the value of the FTC’s actions in the patent 
settlement area, although they have not met with uniform success.  As William Baer 
noted: 
 
                                                 
724 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 52. 
725 Indeed, if a particular case harmed consumer welfare, its deterrent effect might actually cause further 
harm. 
726 See Wilks, London Tr. at 33-35. 
727 Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 139.  But see Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 136 (acknowledging that the number of cases 
the FTC brings “can mean anything,” but advocating its use as a measure of FTC performance because “my 
experience is year-in and year-out, at the end of the year, people want to know how many cases you 
brought”).  
728 MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 142-43. 
729 See Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 39 (“You, obviously, have to win a reasonable proportion of them or 
your reputation will suffer.”).  
730 Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 158.  
731 MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 179.  
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The Schering case also stands for the notion, you can do a 
lot of good and lose the case.  Even though the standard 
adopted by the Commission was rejected by the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Supreme Court refused to grant cert, the fact of 
the matter is that settlements now are scrutinized more 
carefully by the parties to figure out is this defensible from 
a competitive point of view by light years over the way 
they were 10 years ago.  The sunlight is on.  The spotlight 
is on.  It means that behavior has changed.  Even though 
people perhaps are not going as far as the Commission 
today thinks is appropriate, the fact of the matter is some of 
the stuff that was largely indefensible just ain’t happening, 
and it is because the Commission was the cop on the 
beat.732 
 
Susan Creighton echoed this point, explaining that “win, lose, or draw, I think the 
Commission has done a huge amount of good work in bringing those series of cases.”733   
 
 Panelists observed that the reason behind a string of losses is likely to be a more 
important indicator of performance than a low win rate itself.734  As noted above, if the 
FTC is losing tough cases involving complex and unsettled areas of law, losses are not 
likely to be a signal of poor performance.735  If, however, the FTC is losing easy cases, 
this would signal a need to improve performance.  Further, if losses occur in cases that 
are “frivolous” to begin with, or cases that rest on legal or factual premises that 
consistently have been rejected by courts or are out of step with current economic 
learning, then a high loss rate may signal a need to reassess internal thinking on the type 
of conduct that violates the FTC Act.736 
 
Currently as part of its PAR, the FTC reports the positive outcomes from 
investigations and cases.  Specifically, for consumer protection enforcement, the PAR 
includes the number of orders or other direct interventions with business that result in a 
change in business conduct.737  For competition enforcement, the PAR includes the 
percentage of positive results for cases the FTC brings, including a win in court, a 
consent agreement, or abandonment of an anticompetitive transaction after the FTC has 
                                                 
732 Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 118-19.  
733 Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 119.  
734 See Angland, NY Tr. at 65 (“[A] low winning percentage doesn’t necessarily mean you shouldn’t be 
bringing cases. . . .  It depends on why you’re losing.”).  
735 See id.; Boast, NY Tr. at 53.   
736 See Boast, NY Tr. at 52-53 (arguing that the FTC should be more troubled by a hypothetical 20 percent 
win rate if it were bringing frivolous cases than if it were bringing novel cases like Rambus and Unocal); 
Angland, NY Tr. at 65 (“[If losses are because] you say, oh no, entry is hard here and time and again courts 
say, no, entry is possible here, then I would want to at least think really hard about whether I’m analyzing 
properly.”).  
737 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 48.   
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raised antitrust concerns.738  Importantly, the PAR target for positive outcomes is not 100 
percent.  Rather, it is set at 80 percent to reflect the fact that if the FTC is selecting cases 
properly, as discussed above, it is unlikely to achieve a positive outcome in all 
instances.739  At the same time, if the FTC carefully chooses when to issue second 
requests or to open a nonmerger investigation, it also should be expected to win a 
substantial majority of the cases it ultimately prosecutes.  The FTC also measures the 
percentage of merger and nonmerger investigations that result in one of the following 
outcomes: Commission authorization of a complaint in federal court or an administrative 
complaint; a consent agreement; resolution of antitrust concerns without enforcement 
action; or closing an investigation without subsequent events indicating that the conduct 
in question harmed competition.740  Again, this measure is designed to provide an 
indication of whether the FTC is effectively identifying merger and nonmerger conduct 
that is likely to cause consumer harm.741    
  
b. Deterring Misconduct 
 
By demonstrating that it can detect, and will prosecute, violations of the antitrust 
and consumer protection laws, the FTC reduces the future level of such violations.742  As 
several panelists noted, deterrence should be the key criteria when choosing enforcement 
priorities because the value of deterrence – the discounted present value of all future 
harmful conduct that does not occur – is likely to swamp the one-time cost of stopping 
illegal activity.743  The stronger the deterrent effect, moreover, the larger the avoided 
damage.  Thus, the extent to which particular FTC actions deter future conduct is likely 
to be a more relevant metric to measure the quality of outcomes than the amount of 
redress in a particular case.744  Indeed, one panelist argued that deterrence “should be the 
holy grail of enforcement[;] enforcement should be operated as far as possible to 
maximize deterrence.”745  Although cases implicating large markets can provide large 
immediate benefits, when the FTC challenges conduct in a small case, the action 
                                                 
738 Id. at 69.   
739 Id. at 67 (“Some cases involve very close issues, on which reasonable minds can and do differ. . . .  
[T]he agency inevitably must bring cases that pose litigation risks – especially where there is no clear 
precedent and the FTC is seeking to establish a new legal principle.”).  
740 Id. at 62-63. 
741 See id. at 60-61.  
742 See Angland, NY Tr. at 40-41 (discussing how the FTC’s lack of ability to fine has a negative impact on 
the ability of the FTC to deter anticompetitive conduct); Mundt, Paris Tr. at 134-35 (explaining that when 
selecting cases, a competition agency should never leave a particular market alone or it would leave 
anticompetitive conduct in such markets undeterred).  
743 As one panelist noted, “The antitrust system, like much of the legal system in this country, is 
fundamentally a deterrent system.  Assuming that works, then the largest effect is in discouraging firms 
from taking actions that we’ve deemed to be illegal or hopefully deemed them to be illegal because they’re 
not in the public interest.”  Rose, Boston Tr. at 93.  See also Rubin, 7/30 DC Tr. at 139; Picker, Chicago Tr. 
at 132-33; Shapiro, Chicago Tr. at 204; Wickelgren, Chicago Tr. at 262; Jenny, Paris Tr. at 64. 
744 See Rubin, 7/29 DC Tr. at 139.    
745 Wilks, London Tr. at 33. 
 157
nevertheless may have a large deterrent effect if it prevents similar conduct in many other 
small or large markets.746 
 
Unlike investigating a bank robbery, where it is clear that the law has been 
broken, antitrust investigations often involve determining whether the law has been 
broken in the first place.747  When designing and implementing an enforcement agenda, 
an agency should recognize that in areas where the line between what is legal and illegal 
is uncertain, enforcement is likely to deter both desirable and undesirable conduct, and 
the agency should strive to strike the optimal balance between the costs associated with 
both under- and overdeterrence.  As one panelist explained, “[W]hat you really care 
about is not just how much you punish bad behavior.  What you care about is how big the 
difference is between the expected penalty for good behavior and bad behavior.”748  
When implementing an enforcement program in areas where it may be especially difficult 
to distinguish procompetitive or neutral conduct from anticompetitive conduct, sensitivity 
to these types of error cost concerns can militate toward selecting cases involving 
relatively small markets.749  
 
 Currently, the FTC does not directly measure the deterrent effect of its actions, 
noting that it is “difficult, if not impossible, to measure precisely the value (in monetary 
terms or otherwise) of deterrence . . . .”750  It does, however, count the number of print 
media articles (and the circulation of the print media) related to competition and 
consumer protection activities and also monitors hits on the FTC’s website related to 
business guidance for FTC enforcement of the competition laws.751  It is reasonable to 
assume that deterrence of misconduct (or facilitation of lawful conduct) is a positive 
function of the extent to which potential lawbreakers are informed about the probability 
of FTC action or advised of ways to avoid such action.  Thus, although not a direct 
measure of deterrence, these PAR metrics likely are positively related to deterrence in 
some manner.752  As the PAR notes in regard to competition activities, “[b]y using these 
mechanisms to signal its enforcement policies and priorities, the FTC seeks to deter 
would-be violators of the law. . . .  The FTC seeks to make its law enforcement presence 
visible and its enforcement policies transparent in order to serve its objectives through 
                                                 
746 See Wickelgren, Chicago Tr. at 262.  See also Ind. Fed’n of Dentists v. FTC, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) 
(involving quick-look application of the rule of reason to dentists’ agreement to withhold X rays from 
insurers); S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 138 F.T.C. 229 (2004), appeal dismissed, 455 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 
2006) (involving rejection of state action immunity for regulation that prohibited hygienists from 
performing certain services in school settings in the absence of dentist involvement). 
747 See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 189-90. 
748 Elhauge, Boston Tr. at 43.  See also Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 106.  
749 See Wickelgren, Chicago Tr. at 262; Wright, Chicago Tr. at 135-36. 
750 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 33.  
751 Id. at 49-50 (BCP); id. at 74-77 (BC).   
752 A large portion of consumer protection media is aimed at consumers in an effort to better educate them 
in ways to avoid fraud and deception.  Although consumer education surely reduces harm to consumers, 
only the media mentions of enforcement actions or that otherwise signal the FTC’s enforcement posture are 
likely to have a deterring effect.   
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deterrence.”753  Following is a discussion of some possible direct and indirect means for 
measuring the extent to which FTC enforcement actions deter unlawful behavior as well 
as for measuring whether current levels of deterrence are appropriate.   
 
Direct Measurement of Deterrence.  Ideally, the deterrent effects of Commission 
actions (as a proxy for welfare effects of those actions) would themselves be measured 
directly.  However, as with the direct measurement of welfare effects, direct 
measurement of deterrent effects is necessarily difficult because it entails measuring 
conduct that did not happen.754  Some outside academics and FTC staff, however, have 
conducted several studies that attempt to measure the general deterrence effects of the 
Commission’s advertising substantiation and fraud programs.  The methods and results of 
these studies may be instructive for other attempts to measure (directly or through 
proxies) the welfare effects of FTC actions. 
 
BCP staff also has attempted to assess the Commission’s general deterrent impact 
in one area of fraudulent activity: deceptive weight-loss claims.  Staff compared the 
frequency and content of weight-loss advertising in a sample of magazines published in 
both 2001 and 1992.  Although the Commission brought more than 80 cases during this 
time period, the quantity of weight-loss claims doubled, and claims were much more 
likely to contain unsupported promises of rapid, dramatic, and permanent weight loss.  
Staff concluded that the Commission’s prior actions, primarily law enforcement actions, 
were not sufficient to deter deceptive weight-loss claims (and it urged the media to 
monitor advertisements for blatantly deceptive “red flag” claims).755 
 
 Additionally, stock market information can be used to measure directly the 
deterrent power of an FTC advertising enforcement action against a publicly traded 
company.  Stock market “event” studies compare the movement in the stock price of an 
FTC defendant – before and after the announcement of a complaint, consent agreement, 
or final litigated order – with movements in a portfolio of stocks with similar risk over 
the same time period.  This methodology attributes systematic differences in the 
performance of the target company’s stock value vis-à-vis the benchmark portfolio to the 
impact of the FTC action on company good will and the effectiveness of its future 
advertising.  In this manner, these event studies test whether a Commission action affects 
the cost of engaging in deceptive advertising, and hence the deterrent power of FTC 
enforcement.   
 
The first study examined the stock behavior of 23 companies that were the targets 
of FTC deceptive advertising complaints (either litigated or settled by consent) from 1962 
to 1975, and it found a three percent mean loss in stock value associated with the 
                                                 
753 Id. at 74.  The same would apply to consumer protection activities as well, including enforcement and 
business education literature.   
754 See supra Chapter VII.A; see also Padilla, Brussels Tr. at 80-81; Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 77-78.  
755 FTC STAFF, WEIGHT-LOSS ADVERTISING: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TRENDS 28-30 (2002), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/reports/weightloss.pdf.  See supra Chapter VI.B.10 for a discussion of the Red 
Flag project. 
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announcement of an FTC complaint.756  Two subsequent event studies found similar 
results.757  Despite a general assumption that FTC administrative cease and desist orders 
provided little, if any, deterrent impact because they provided firms with a penalty-free 
“first bite of the apple,”758 the size of the effect on the stock suggests that stockholders 
take an FTC order very seriously and that publicity surrounding the order, or perhaps the 
possibility of future monetary penalties for order violations, was expected to affect future 
consumer purchase behavior.  Thus, these studies suggest that FTC advertising 
enforcement is likely to have a strong deterrent effect. 
 
 At least one study also tested the hypothesis that the FTC’s “reasonable basis 
doctrine” for advertising substantiation, which the Commission enunciated in its Pfizer 
decision,759 deterred both harmful and beneficial advertising.  The ultimate goal of the 
reasonable basis doctrine articulated in Pfizer is to raise the credibility that consumers 
can attach to objective claims in advertising without imposing evidentiary burdens that 
discourage the dissemination of useful information.  If the ad substantiation program 
works as intended, firms that possess a reasonable basis for performance claims will find 
advertising a more productive mechanism to increase sales.  Thus, a correctly set 
substantiation standard may lead to more advertising.  Alternatively, if the FTC has set 
the substantiation requirements too high, informative advertising may decrease overall. 
 
The study provides a direct test of the extent to which the Pfizer decision deterred 
beneficial advertising, by examining advertising intensity (advertising outlays as a 
percent of product sales) in all media before and after Pfizer for 20 firms selling “search” 
or “inexpensive experience” goods and 18 firms selling “credence” or “expensive 
experience” goods.760  The authors found that, following the introduction of the ad 
                                                 
756 Sam Peltzman, The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1981).  The author 
describes the magnitude of this impact as “astounding” given that advertising for the relevant product was 
at most only one percent of total company sales.  Peltzman concludes:  “The story the stock market appears 
to be telling is that an FTC complaint implies essentially a wiping out of the brand’s advertising capital.”  
Id. at 418. 
757 Sauer and Leffler examined the stock market performance of 31 firms that were the targets of ad 
substantiation cases between 1972 and 1985 and again found that a 3 percent decline in stock value 
followed announcement of an FTC complaint.  Raymond D. Sauer & Keith B. Leffler, Did the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Advertising Substantiation Program Promote More Credible Advertising?, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 191, 192 n.5 (1990).  Mathios and Plummer examined 122 advertising cases brought by the 
Commission between 1963 and 1985.  Stock market losses ranged from 2.5 percent for negotiated consent 
agreements to a cumulative loss of 3.2 percent for litigated cases.  FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF, 
ALAN MATHIOS & MARK PLUMMER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING: CAPITAL MARKET EFFECTS 37-40 
(1988), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/reports/MathiosPlummer88.pdf.  In 
contrast, the authors found much smaller or no losses for firms that were the subject of decisions under the 
self-regulatory program established by the Council of Better Business Bureaus or that were the result of 
private actions brought under the Lanham Act.  Id. 
758 See 1969 ABA REPORT, supra note 152, at 41. 
759 Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).  
760 Any increase in advertising credibility from ad substantiation requirements should favor claims that 
consumers cannot easily evaluate for themselves, either by prepurchase inspection (in the case of so-called 
“search” goods) or, for inexpensive products, by postpurchase experience (“inexpensive experience” 
products).  Presumably, market forces would police the truthfulness of claims that readily can be evaluated 
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substantiation program, advertising intensity for the 18 firms in the latter category 
increased significantly relative to the 20 firms in the former category.761  The study also 
gauged the impact of Pfizer on entry by new firms; because advertising is of particular 
value for new products, heavy substantiation burdens could impede entry and slow the 
growth of new entrants.  The authors examined sales data for all new products entering 
the over-the-counter drug market during the 1967-69 and 1973-75 periods and found that 
new entrants grew faster and attained their mature sales level faster in the post-Pfizer 
period.762  This result provides a direct measurement of enforcement effects and suggests 
not only that Pfizer increased advertising credibility, but that it did so without a 
disproportionate increase in substantiation costs. 763   
 
Although these studies have some obvious limitations, the results have been 
interesting and even striking, often running counter to the expectations of the 
investigators.  Further, although acquiring data and identifying the proper benchmark can 
be difficult, these studies may provide templates for direct measurement of the deterrent 
effect of other FTC programs.   
 
Indirect Measurement of Deterrence.  Panelists observed that the deterrent effect 
of enforcement actions often is seen most vividly in the course of counseling clients,764 
and other agencies have pursued additional, indirect methods of measuring deterrence.  
One possibility is through survey data.  In this vein, the OFT engaged an outside 
consultant to survey senior U.K. competition lawyers on how many clients abandoned or 
changed initiatives due to concerns about OFT investigations.765  The survey revealed 
                                                                                                                                                 
by consumers, as there would be little gain from making a fraudulent claim that consumers could detect 
almost immediately.  In those situations, presumably, sellers would either make accurate claims about 
objective characteristics or engage in “puff” advertising intended to grab consumer attention.  As a result, 
the introduction of the ad substantiation program in 1972 might have had little impact on advertising 
content or intensity for those products.  The opposite would be true for products that are expensive and 
infrequently purchased, or for “credence goods” with performance characteristics that consumers cannot 
evaluate easily through experience.  In such cases, consumers might rely heavily on credible performance 
claims, and a perception by consumers that such claims have become more credible could encourage firms 
to advertise more heavily. 
761 Sauer & Leffler, supra note 757, at 193. 
762 Id. at 198. 
763 It could be fruitful to use whatever historical data are available on advertising content and expenditures, 
by media and product category, to determine whether there have been any significant changes in the impact 
of the Commission’s ad substantiation program over the past two decades.  Specifically, questions for 
analysis might include the following:  (1) Is there any indication that advertising credibility has suffered 
over the past 20 years? (2) Have there been any shifts in advertising intensity by type of product? (3) Has 
there been any reduction in the use of objective performance claims in national advertising? (4) Is it 
feasible to study the practical effects of particular Commission cases in recent years (analogous to the 
merger retrospectives performed in the antitrust field)? and (5) Could such analysis yield useful qualitative 
information on how firms respond to specific advertising substantiation and disclosure requirements?  
764 See, e.g., McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 52-53. 
765 See DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT BY THE OFT: 
A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE OFT BY DELOITTE (2007), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft962.pdf. 
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that many companies had altered or abandoned mergers or other conduct because of the 
concern about possible OFT action.  The study concluded that for each merger 
enforcement action, another merger was deterred.766  For nonmerger conduct, such as 
cartel activity and abuses of dominance, the study concluded the ratio was four-to-one or 
higher.767  The study has its limits, however.  As it notes, the deterrence figures it 
provides were generally lower bounds because of self-policing that prevents companies 
from reaching a point at which it becomes appropriate to consult with counsel about the 
potential illegality of particular conduct.768  The sample size was small, meaning the data 
might have significant limitations.769  Further, the benefits of the deterrent effect of 
agency actions obviously depend on whether the underlying actions were themselves 
beneficial – yet another reason for agencies to undertake ex post evaluations and test the 
benefits of the underlying actions.    
 
 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission also has employed 
survey data to measure the extent to which its antitrust laws deter illegal conduct.770  The 
data collection was divided into two groups: qualitative interviews and quantitative 
responses.  The ACCC interviewed 39 current and former staff of the ACCC to establish 
ways in which businesses reacted to ACCC enforcement activity and its impact on 
business compliance.  It also collected survey responses from 999 Australian businesses 
(with a 43-percent response rate) across all industries, filled out by the most senior person 
responsible for trade practice compliance.  The survey revealed that larger businesses 
exhibited more of the characteristics associated with a higher degree of compliance as 
they have a greater capacity to comply, feel vulnerable to regulatory enforcement, and are 
more likely to have had past ACCC interactions.  Deterrence levels varied little by 
industry, with the primary agricultural industries having the lowest levels of compliance.  
Those with past ACCC interaction saw the cost of compliance as outweighing 
compliance gains, were more aware of their Trade Practices Act (“TPA”) obligations, and 
were more likely to rate themselves as higher on their compliance and compliance 
management activity.  Those who admitted TPA breaches perceived the gain of 
noncompliance as greater than the costs, even if these actions were investigated by the 
ACCC. 
 
One panelist suggested additional indirect indicators that competition enforcement 
is having a deterrent effect.  For example, the money that companies spend on 
compliance programs, the size of law firms’ antitrust groups, and the number of business 
schools that offer programs in antitrust likely are correlated with a deterrent effect on 
business.771  On the consumer protection side, some roundtable panelists suggested that 
                                                 
766 Id. at 6-7. 
767 Id. at 8. 
768 Id. at 6, 17. 
769 Id. at 11. 
770 See VIBEKE LEHMANN NIELSEN & CHRISTINE PARKER, THE ACCC ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
SURVEY: REPORT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (2005), available at 
http://cccp.anu.edu.au/projects/CCCPReport%20Final.pdf. 
771 Bavasso, Brussels Tr. at 81-82.  
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the level of consumer complaints could act as a proxy for the level of deterrence.772  For 
example, observing a downward trend in certain types of complaints in the Consumer 
Sentinel database following an FTC enforcement action or education campaign may 
provide some evidence of a deterrent effect.  One must be careful about inferring a causal 
relationship from such trends, however, because complaints are likely to have a self-
reporting bias.773  Further, as discussed above in the context of merger retrospectives, it 
may be difficult to identify a proper benchmark level of complaints with which to 
compare the number of observed complaints.774 
 
c. Direct Impact from Enforcement Actions 
 
As noted above, panelists generally agreed that deterrence should be the primary 
goal of enforcement, but it is also clear that stopping conduct that is causing immediate 
harm to consumers is welfare-enhancing.  Thus, focusing on cases with large consumer 
harm is likely to be beneficial to consumers, thus furthering the FTC’s mission.775  For 
example, several panelists explained that emphasis on enforcement in large sectors of the 
economy, like supermarkets, health care, and petroleum markets, is appropriate because 
of the large role these industries play in consumers’ lives.776  Bringing large cases (which 
is correlated to certain PAR measurements777) also can enhance the reputation of the 
agency, providing, for example, enhanced leverage in negotiations with other parties.778   
 
The EC’s Directorate General for Competition focuses primarily on cases with 
large consumer harm.779  This focus, however, is in part due to the very limited private 
rights of action in the EU; because private individuals cannot vindicate their own rights, 
they rely on DG Comp to bring suit to stop the conduct at issue.780  Given the vibrant 
market for private litigation in the U.S., however, consumer redress may not be as 
important a metric for evaluating the success of the FTC.781  The marginal impact of an 
                                                 
772 See Cerasale, NY Tr. at 190-91; Feigenbaum, NY Tr. at 191.     
773 See Greisman, NY Tr. at 211-12. 
774 See supra notes 699-710 and accompanying text for a general discussion of difficulties in constructing a 
hypothetical benchmark.  The OFT recently issued a report that looked at whether the complaints lodged in 
their Consumer Direct database are truly representative of the universe of complaints that consumers have.  
The report concluded that the database was largely accurate in identifying the biggest areas of consumer 
harm.  Consultation with OFT, Sept. 11, 2008. 
775 See, e.g., Wickelgren, Chicago Tr. at 261-62; Shapiro, Chicago Tr. at 263-64. 
776 See, e.g., Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 136; Drauz, Brussels Tr. at 14; Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 63.  
777 PAR measure 2.2.3 provides:  “Take action against mergers likely to harm competition in markets with 
a total of at least $125 billion in sales over a five-year period, $25 billion in sales each year.”  Measure 
2.2.5 provides:  “Take action against anticompetitive conduct in markets with a total of at least $40 billion 
in annual sales over a five-year period, $8 billion each year.”  FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 39. 
778 See Shapiro, Chicago Tr. at 263-64. 
779 Consultation with DG Comp, Oct. 21, 2008.  
780 Id. 
781 See, e.g., Heimler, Paris Tr. at 135 (explaining that the existence of private litigation gives the FTC the 
luxury of being more selective in the types of cases it takes).  
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FTC action in a case that implicates a large amount of consumer harm may be small to 
the extent that there are already strong private incentives to bring antitrust or consumer 
protection actions.  As one panelist noted, when the FTC selects cases, it should prefer 
“doctrine rather than dollars because if there are a lot of dollars, probably private 
plaintiffs are going to be ready to do it.”782  If the harm from conduct that would violate 
antitrust or consumer protection laws accrues to one or a small number of parties, there 
may be sufficient incentives for private parties to bring legal action.  When a large 
amount of harm is dispersed over a large number of consumers, however, it may not 
make financial sense for any single consumer to bring an action, and class actions may be 
an insufficient tool to vindicate consumer harm.783  This situation may be especially 
likely to obtain with respect to consumer protection enforcement.784  
 
Currently, the PAR reports an estimate of the savings accruing to consumers from 
both competition and consumer protection actions.785  Although the estimated monetary 
value of harm to consumers that is avoided due to FTC enforcement – necessarily a rough 
estimate in light of all the issues discussed above – represents an increase in consumer 
welfare, it does not capture deterrence or precedential effects.  Additionally, it does not 
capture the relative efficiency of the enforcement effort.  As discussed above, if a private 
party (or perhaps a self-regulatory body) were likely to bring a comparable challenge to 
the conduct in question, agency resources may be better invested elsewhere. 
 
d. Precedent 
 
Another benefit of enforcement actions identified by panelists is that they provide 
guidance and precedent on legal doctrine and the agency’s enforcement approaches.786  
                                                 
782 Angland, NY Tr. at 64.  
783 See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Consumer 
Protection Policy, Remarks at the Aspen Summit, at 3 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.shtm. 
784 Id. at 4. 
785 The savings to consumers are based on estimates from staff of the value of goods and services that 
otherwise would not have been sold due to fraud or deception in the case of consumer protection 
enforcement and, in the case of competition enforcement, the likely price increases in relevant markets had 
the conduct been allowed to continue.  See FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 47 (BCP); id. at 70-71 (BC). 
The OFT uses a similar methodology to estimate the consumer savings from the direct impact of its 
competition and consumer protection enforcement programs.  See U.K. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, POSITIVE 
IMPACT 07/08: CONSUMER BENEFITS FROM COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT, MERGER CONTROL, MARKET 
STUDIES AND MARKET INVESTIGATION REFERENCES, AND SCAM BUSTING (2008), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1007.pdf.  To estimate the impact of 
blocking some mergers, the OFT employs a merger simulation to estimate equilibrium prices and output 
had the blocked merger occurred.  Id. at 18.  For nonsimulated mergers, it estimates the consumer savings 
as a weighted average of simulated savings multiplied by the size of the relevant market.  Id. at 20-21.  To 
estimate the impact of actions that stop anticompetitive conduct, the OFT multiplies the actual or estimated 
price increase from the conduct by the size of the market, then estimates the likely duration of the conduct 
absent OFT intervention.  The cost of the estimated future harm is discounted to present value.  Id. at 26-
28.  The OFT uses a similar methodology to estimate savings from its “Scambusters” team.  Id. at 14-15. 
786 See, e.g., McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 54. 
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Cases involving unsettled areas of law are likely to be more risky, and thus associated 
with lower win rates, but can have large payoffs if they move the law in a direction that 
enhances competition.  Former Chairman Timothy Muris, for example, touched on the 
Commission’s experience in bringing state action and Noerr-Pennington cases, which 
implicate state-imposed restrictions on competition.  Specifically, he pointed to staff’s 
understandable reluctance to bring the Unocal case because it has “Noerr problems,” but 
explained that “[e]veryone across the antitrust spectrum agrees [that state action and 
Noerr-Pennington cases] are good cases.”787  Although such exemption cases may be 
more difficult to win than those involving purely private conduct, given the size of likely 
welfare losses from state-imposed restraints on competition, it is likely that pushing the 
law in a direction that makes obtaining and imposing state restraints on competition more 
difficult is likely to provide consumers with significant welfare gains.788  Further, 
valuable cases may be brought when direct consumer redress is relatively small.  For 
example, the Three Tenors decision laid out a flexible approach to the rule of reason, 
which the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed.789  
 
One panelist, however, cautioned that the precedential value of many FTC 
decisions and prosecutions is limited where they are resolved through consent decrees, 
rather than litigated cases.790  Particularly in cases where parties are anxious to avoid 
litigation, consents may contain theories that would not succeed if litigated.791   
 
Court decisions that clarify a murky area of law are valuable to businesses in the 
form of increased predictability.792  Accordingly, even an FTC loss that provides clarity 
to the business community in an unsettled area of law likely provides a benefit.793  As 
one panelist noted with respect to the FTC’s standard-setting and Hatch-Waxman cases, 
“It was very important to know what the courts think about them.  That is really a service 
to consumers and business as well.”794  Further, if important precedential cases do no
involve large markets, there may be little incentive for private enforcement to move the 
t 
                                                 
787 Muris, 7/29 DC Tr. at 42 (referring to Union Oil Co. of Cal., FTC Dkt. No. 9305); see also id. (“I 
understand . . . the reluctance of the staff lawyers to go into these exception issues.  But why other people 
in the leadership refrain from going there is a mystery . . . .”).  
788 See Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 994-95 (2005).  
789 See Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003), aff’d, Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
790 See Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 118-19.  Another panelist noted that private cases and those brought by 
the Department of Justice also are usually resolved by settlement or consent decree.  Harrop, Chicago Tr. at 
119-20.   
791 See Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 128.  See also supra Chapter VI.B.1. 
792 See Drauz, Brussels Tr. at 12 (noting that setting precedent for the purposes of enhancing predictability 
provides important benefits).  
793 See Vickers, London Tr. at 16-17.  
794 Boast, NY Tr. at 53.  
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law in the correct direction.795  Thus, FTC action may be necessary to effect the desired 
improvement in consumer welfare. 
 
 Currently, the PAR does not attempt to measure the benefits from establishing 
better or at least clearer legal rules.  Nor did panelists offer any possible metrics.  To 
measure the welfare effects from changes in legal rules directly likely would require 
methods similar to those used to measure the change in firms’ advertising after the Pfizer 
decision.796   
 
2. Intellectual Leadership 
 
 Intellectual leadership broadly refers to the FTC playing a leading role in shaping 
sound competition and consumer protection policy.  The FTC’s role as an intellectual 
leader in competition policy can be traced back to its origins.  Congress intended the FTC 
to guide the courts and the business community at large about what the antitrust laws 
prohibit and allow, and, to fulfill this mandate, it provided the FTC with broad 
investigatory powers and intended the Commission to be populated with expert attorneys 
and economists.797  As one panelist noted, the FTC is “part of the think-tank of antitrust 
and competition policy.”798   
 
Thus, one desirable quality of FTC output is that it demonstrates intellectual 
leadership,799 and it can do so in various ways.  Commission adjudicative decisions can 
provide leadership in developing antitrust and consumer protection jurisprudence.800  The 
agency can focus attention on new threats to consumers and ways to approach them.  For 
example, although not met with universal success, the FTC’s cases involving competition 
in the pharmaceutical industry demonstrated to policymakers that the type of conduct at 
                                                 
795 But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (upholding finding of price fixing against 
bar associations that published and enforced minimum-fee schedule and declining to create exemption from 
the antitrust laws for a “learned profession”). 
796 See supra Chapter VII.B.1.b.  
797 See Kovacic, Quality, supra note 72, at 919-20. 
798 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 115.  
799 There was considerable debate at the international consultations about whether the U.S. was “losing” 
influence to Europe.  For example, a number of panelists talked about the growth in competition laws based 
on the European model, attributed in large part to the exportability of its entire legal framework and the 
ease of transplanting an administrative system.  The area in which the U.S. agencies’ influence was viewed 
as strongest, however, was in intellectual innovation, including, for example, the use of economics and 
analysis of competitive effects.  William Bishop explained:  “Where the US has continued to succeed and 
continued to have enormous influence is that it is the source of nearly all the intellectual innovation in the 
area.  If we think of what has happened in the last few years the shift towards economics-based antitrust 
that is now taken for granted everywhere began in the United States and was first put into practice in the 
United States.  Leniency programs, clarifications of unilateral effects versus coordinated effects, use of 
simulations in merger and other contexts and nearly all quantitative effects.  Nearly everything has come 
from the United States.”  Bishop, London Tr. at 153. 
800 For example, as noted in the previous section, the Three Tenors decision laid out a flexible approach to 
the rule of reason.  See supra note 789. 
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issue in these cases deserved close antitrust scrutiny.801  Several panelists also expressed 
support for the FTC’s recent work in identifying and addressing privacy issues,802 and, 
more broadly, panelists suggested that the FTC has demonstrated leadership through its 
market-based approach to consumer protection enforcement.803  As discussed in Chapter 
V.C, research is necessary for intellectual leadership, both internally to guide FTC 
enforcement decisions in a direction that is likely to improve consumer welfare,804 and 
externally for the FTC to use to educate policymakers and courts.805  As discussed in 
Chapter VI, the FTC also can exert intellectual leadership through guidelines, advocacy, 
speeches, and other domestic and international outreach that inform the relevant external 
constituencies about the FTC’s current thinking in certain areas.806     
 
A final tool with which to exercise intellectual leadership is the education of 
policymakers and consumers about the value of competition.  For example, former OPP 
Director Susan DeSanti explained that in her experience the public and Congress often 
look at competition in terms of “whether things are fair or not,” rather than understanding 
the “value of competition in terms of growing the economy, lowering prices, producing 
innovation, [and] improving quality.”807  She noted that, “if there is an agency that has a 
mandate that would include education [on the importance of competition], it is this 
agency.”808  In this context, consumer education and formal or informal advocacy 
demonstrates leadership when it provides consumers and policymakers with answers that 
may be unpopular, but ultimately are in the best interest of consumers.  For example, 
although proposals aimed at perceived price gouging in the oil and gas industry have 
been considered by Congress in the past, through reports and congressional testimony, 
the FTC consistently has demonstrated leadership by advocating against such measures 
because they ultimately are bad for consumers.809  Further, by carefully explaining to 
                                                 
801 See Boast, NY Tr. at 33-34, 53; Angland, NY Tr. at 64-65; Parker, 7/29 DC Tr. at 118; Baer, 7/29 DC 
Tr. at 118-19; Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 119; Heimler, Paris Tr. at 98; Stoffel, Paris Tr. at 126; Jansen, 
Paris Tr. at 137.  
802 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 161; Swire, NY Tr. at 180, 204; Feigenbaum, NY Tr. at 214. 
803 See Peeler 7/30 DC Tr. at 133-34.  One panelist contended that the FTC needs to play a leadership role 
in creating greater uniformity in enforcement of state consumer protection laws.  See Butler, Chicago Tr. at 
19-20, 57-58. 
804 Of course, there may be tensions between litigating cases and conducting research that could undermine 
those cases.  See Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 157-58 (discussing how research on grocery store mergers or 
petroleum markets may affect enforcement in these areas). 
805 See, e.g., Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 116-17; Kattan, 7/29 DC Tr. at 140-41.  
806 See, e.g., Boast, NY Tr. at 33-34. 
807 DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 162. 
808 Id. at 162-63.  
809 See Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 27-28 (“[T]he role that the Federal Trade Commission – the lonely role that 
the Federal Trade Commission has played in recent years, in urging Congress not to do something stupid, 
like control the prices of gasoline, is a very proud moment.”); see also FTC POST-KATRINA REPORT, supra 
note 202; FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES: THE DYNAMIC OF SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND COMPETITION 
(2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/gasprices05/050705gaspricesrpt.pdf. 
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consumers and other external constituents the rationale behind certain FTC actions, the 
FTC can maintain support for its mission.810   
 
 Although any measure of intellectual leadership necessarily will be subjective, 
several proxies for leadership lend themselves to objective measurement.  Currently, in 
its PAR, the FTC measures (1) the number of workshops or hearings it holds,811 (2) the 
number of reports and advocacy filings it issues,812 (3) the number of amicus briefs it 
files,813 and (4) the number of consultations with foreign authorities.814  These measures, 
however, are all focused on FTC output rather than outcomes.815   
 
Panelists suggested some additional outcome-oriented measures for intellectual 
leadership.  For example, the influence of research and competition advocacy can be 
measured by examining the extent to which these outputs have affected outcomes.816  
Further, the extent to which courts adopt FTC legal theories likely is a useful proxy for 
FTC leadership in antitrust and consumer protection enforcement.  FTC research cited in 
court decisions or other scholarly work likely is a reflection of the degree to which this 
output has had a positive effect on consumers.817  These metrics could be used to 
determine whether there are problems in the process for developing policy R&D projects, 
such as producing too few or focusing on the wrong issues. 
 
In evaluating the FTC’s work in the international arena, consultation participants 
proposed a variety of specific indicators for measuring success, including, among others, 
the quality of contributions to multinational fora (as well as the dissemination of other 
agencies’ contributions to such fora throughout the FTC),818 the quality and quantity of 
                                                 
810 See Venit, Brussels Tr. at 30 (“I think one practical thing may be to begin your educational policy not 
directed at the [populace] at large, but directed at the politicians themselves, the lawmakers, and try and 
educate them [as to] the complexities of the problems, what the agency’s mission is and why it may not be 
able to respond to certain [populace] demands and try and deal with it at that level.”).  
811 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 54 (BCP); id. at 79 (BC). 
812 Id. at 55 (BCP); id. at 80 (BC). 
813 Id. at 55 (BCP); id. at 81 (BC).  
814 Id. at 56 (BCP); id. at 83 (BC).  This measure focuses on cases in which the FTC cooperated with 
foreign authorities, consultations or comments filed with foreign authorities, written submissions to 
international fora, international events attended, and leadership positions in international competition 
organizations held by FTC staff.  
815 See, e.g., Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 72 (arguing that measurement of number of competition advocacies is 
not a particularly good means to determine their effect on consumers).  
816 See id. at 117-18. 
817 See id.; Ennis, Paris Tr. at 128; Greene, Boston Tr. at 47.  
818 Consultation with the Israeli Antitrust Authority, Aug. 19, 2008.  Members of the Israeli Antitrust 
Authority stated that their agency’s international efforts are strengthened by the willingness to involve staff 
from outside of the international department in international discussions and by the dissemination of 
information from the international meetings across the agency.  In the area of contributions to multilateral 
fora, there was a recommendation that, to get more substantive contributions, agencies’ delegations include 
more staff who are working on cases.  See Reindl, NY Tr. at 104-05. 
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cooperation received on specific cases,819 and the willingness of the agency to consult 
private sector actors and academics in creating best practices.820 
 
One panelist also noted that one can measure the extent to which competition 
advocacy has influenced policy outcomes in directions favored by the FTC through 
surveys.821 One study that attempted to assess the FTC advocacy program’s impact on 
regulatory outcomes from 1985 to 1987 found that 39 percent of comment recipients 
reported that the comments were at least “moderately effective,” meaning that “the 
governmental entity’s actions were totally or in large part consistent with at least some of 
the FTC recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of 
those recommendations.”822  The author concedes, however, that this “does not establish 
that the FTC effect on those decisions improved them; that is what cannot be 
measured.”823   
 
A more recent survey concerning advocacy filings from 2001 to 2006 by the 
FTC’s Office of Policy Planning sought to improve on the methodology employed in the 
1985-1987 survey.  For example, the survey solicited input not only from the advocacy 
requestor but also others involved in the decision-making process, including those 
opposed to the position articulated in the FTC advocacy.  Further, the survey included 
questions designed to assess the extent to which the FTC affected the outcome of the 
legislative or regulatory process.  This survey found that 53 percent of respondents 
agreed that the outcome of the regulatory process was largely consistent with the FTC 
position, 94 percent of respondents said that the FTC comment was considered, and 54 
percent of respondents (and 79 percent of those respondents who had an opinion) 
believed that the FTC comment influenced the outcome.  Further, 81 percent of 
respondents answered that the fact that the comment came from the FTC caused them to 
give it more weight than they otherwise would have.824  
                                                 
819 Consultation with ACCC, Oct. 2, 2008.   
820 DC Consultation on International Issues, Nov. 6, 2008; Korsun, NY Tr. at 139.  The FTC was 
commended by one roundtable panelist for its work with nongovernmental advisors.  See Blechman, NY 
Tr. at 136. 
821 See Ellig, 7/30 DC Tr. at 27-28.  In fact, the FTC is considering whether to measure the outcome of 
advocacies as part of future PARs.  See FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 34.   
822 Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade Commission’s Competition and Consumer Advocacy Program, 
33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 379, 391 (1989).  Another 11 percent of the survey respondents found the comments to 
be “slightly effective,” meaning that “the governmental entity’s actions were to a small degree consistent 
with at least some of the FTC recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of 
those recommendations.”  Id.  Additionally, the author found that 47 percent of respondents gave the 
comments “substantial weight because it came from the FTC.”  Id. at 392.  In 1989, a virtually identical 
survey was sent by the Director of the FTC’s Advocacy Office to recipients of comments dated June 1, 
1987 through June 2, 1989.  The responses to this second survey were consistent with those from the first. 
823 Id. at 400. 
824 United States, Note for OECD Roundtable on Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of Competition 
Authorities, at 13-14 (May 25, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/evalauth.pdf.  
See also Deborah Platt Majoras, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Applying a Cost/Benefit Analysis to the 
FTC’s Advocacy Program, Keynote Address, Current Topics in Antitrust Economics and Competition 
Policy, Charles River Associates (Feb. 8, 2005), available at 
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3. Transparency and Guidance to Business and Consumers  
 
 Several panelists noted that the business community greatly values prospective 
guidance from the Commission on its current enforcement views in the conduct and 
merger areas.825  Providing guidance, moreover, is consistent both with President 
Wilson’s original vision for the agency826 and with the FTC’s “special mission in the 
policy area,”827 which is to act as the preeminent competition and consumer protection 
policy authority.828  This guidance comes not only from formal guidelines and industry 
guides, but also from speeches, advisory opinions, and closing statements, and it can 
reduce total societal costs by allowing businesses to “get it right” in the first instance, 
rather than having to engage with the Commission.829   
 
As noted in Chapter VI.B.5, notwithstanding criticisms levied against agency 
guidelines, many roundtable participants urged the Commission to produce more formal 
business guidance in the form of guidelines and guides.830  As one panelist put it, the 
“appetite of the private bar for guidance[ and] guidelines is inexhaustible.”831  Others 
generally lauded the Commission’s use in recent years of its complaints and settlement 
agreements to provide information to the business community and other enforcement 
agencies as to why certain practices were violations of the FTC Act.832  As one panelist 
explained: 
 
The value of the FTC has not just been as catalyst to 
legislative change, advocacy, promoter of removal of 
government restrictions on competition, but also it has just 
made the law work better by bringing cases, clarifying its 
view of the law, getting some wins, occasionally losing – 
but that is all part of the process – but indirectly making it 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050208currebttopics.pdf (describing selected advocacy successes and 
comparing substantial benefits to limited costs of advocacy program).  
825 See, e.g., Leary, 7/29 DC Tr. at 13-14; Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 17; Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 85; Bowie, 
7/29 DC Tr. at 86; A. Schwartz, 7/29 DC Tr. at 204-07; Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 220; Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 
182-83.  See supra Chapter VI.B.5 for a discussion of some of the principal means by which the FTC 
provides guidance.  
826 See supra text accompanying note 576. 
827 McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 54. 
828 See Kovacic, Quality, supra note 72, at 918 (noting the original Congressional intent that the FTC be the 
preeminent competition policy authority).  
829 See Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 85.  See also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 54-55; Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 17-18. 
830 See, e.g., Cerasale, NY Tr. at 201-02 (suggesting that there be more guidance for small businesses); 
Greenbaum, NY Tr. at 204-05. 
831 Fenton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 220. 
832 See, e.g., Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 86-87. 
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much easier for others, including private parties themselves 
to enforce the law.833 
 
Transparency, or the ability of the outside to look into the FTC’s decision-making 
process and the FTC’s ability to communicate to the public, also promotes the FTC’s 
ability to provide guidance to the business community.  A careful explanation of why 
certain FTC actions are in consumers’ interests can provide valuable information to the 
business community and can build external support for these policies.834  As one panelist 
noted, “guidelines are an exercise in agency transparency.”835  A clear understanding of 
how the FTC is likely to treat a transaction or business practice increases predictability, 
which is likely to reduce firms’ costs by making it easier for them to plan for 
compliance.836  It also is likely to economize on agency enforcement resources by 
promoting deterrence and voluntary compliance with the antitrust and consumer 
protection laws.837    
 
Panelists also observed that transparency in decision making can force agencies to 
produce better outcomes than they otherwise would:  “If you’re committed to having to 
explain yourself publicly in any kind of detail, you’re going to do a better job ahead of 
time.”838  Similarly, another panelist observed that an agency may be more careful in its 
analysis of a particular matter if it anticipates issuing a closing statement.839  Further, 
transparency can have the indirect effect of improving policy by allowing a public 
discussion on a complex issue.840  Finally, transparency also can have international 
benefits by providing guidance to foreign competition and consumer protection 
authorities.841 
 
When assessing the FTC, it is appropriate to examine the extent to which its 
actions have provided guidance both to the business community and to fellow 
                                                 
833 Vickers, London Tr. at 16-17.  
834 See Temple Lang, Brussels Tr. at 39-40; Boast, NY Tr. at 33-34.  
835 Campbell, Chicago Tr. at 143. 
836 See Lowe, supra note 689, at 2; see also ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 8; AMC REPORT, 
supra note 682, at 65.  Lowe notes the tradeoff between providing greater predictability and the need to 
deal with each case on its particular facts:  “Based on empirical evidence, some structures or conducts have 
almost always produced outcomes which are harmful to competition and consumers.  As a result it may be 
possible to establish some clear ex-ante rules which offer a high level of predictability.  However, where 
past evidence is mixed, the most that can be done to provide a degree of predictability is to indicate what 
assessment methodology will be used.”  Lowe, supra note 689, at 2.  
837 See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 689, at 9 (“Communicating effectively about [DG Comp’s] work has a 
preventive effect.  We can explain the law and highlight the penalties for not respecting the law.”).  
838 Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 109-10.  See also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 111; AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra 
note 150, at 210. 
839 See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 130. 
840 See Heyer, 7/30 DC Tr. at 64-68, 109.  
841 See ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.  
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enforcement agencies and private parties enforcing the antitrust or consumer protection 
laws.  Currently, the PAR measures the extent to which the public accesses relevant 
consumer protection and competition information from the FTC’s website.842  Although 
no panelists offered a way to measure transparency, one possible metric would be to 
count the number of FTC outputs (for example, speeches, advisory opinions, and closing 
statements) that provide the external community with an insight into how the FTC arrives 
at its decisions.  Although this metric clearly is focused on output rather than outcome, in 
the case of transparency, output and outcome largely merge – the focus of transparency is 
on FTC output.   
 
 The FTC also provides guidance to consumers to reduce the incidence of fraud 
and deception.  This type of consumer protection education is distinct from that related to 
competition.  Unlike in the case of antitrust violations, consumers can take actions to 
reduce the probability of becoming a victim of fraud and deception.  Thus, targeting 
messages directly to consumers to inform them of these actions can reduce the 
occurrence of fraud and deception.  Consumer education has evolved over the past 20 
years from a relatively minor adjunct to the consumer protection program to a major tool 
in addressing consumer protection issues.843  This change reflects the recognition that, in 
some areas, changing consumer behavior may be more effective than bringing 
enforcement actions.  For example, the fraudulent practice of “phishing” for financial 
account information becomes less lucrative to the extent that consumers opt not to 
respond to such emails or telephone calls.844  To address the problem of identity theft – 
where the fraud may be a criminal act perpetrated by one individual – the Commission 
has prepared an array of educational materials designed to assist not only the victimized 
consumers, but also the entire network of entities that may play a role in deterring, 
detecting, and defending against the fraud; these include law enforcement agents, 
businesses, and organizations in a position to educate their membership. 
  
Currently, under its PAR the FTC tracks the number of consumer protection 
messages accessed online or in print (both in English and in Spanish) and the number of 
times print media publishes articles referring to FTC consumer protection activities and 
the circulation of the media that publish those articles.845  A more outcome-oriented 
metric that captures the extent to which these materials actually lead to beneficial 
changes in consumer behavior would be preferable, but likely very difficult to implement 
in all cases.846  However, perhaps a few discrete case studies that examine the incidence 
of certain types of fraud or deception – using survey data and data from the Consumer 
Sentinel database – following the implementation of a consumer education program 
could establish the relationship between consumer education and fraud and deception for 
                                                 
842 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 50-51 (tracking access to consumer and business education concerning 
consumer protection matters); id. at 82 (tracking access to competition-related materials).  
843 See Baker, Chicago Tr. at 60.  See also supra Chapter VI.B.6. 
844 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 195. 
845 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 50-51.  
846 See id. 
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evaluation purposes.  Further, former Commissioner Yao suggested that the FTC could 
evaluate the effectiveness of consumer education through a field examination.  
Specifically, his proposal involved the FTC running a mock false advertisement and then 
introducing a consumer education campaign directed at this specific type of deceptive 
advertising.  A reduction in the number of consumer inquiries about the product after the 
education campaign would serve as a measure of its effectiveness.847 
 
4. Burdens on Industry and Timeliness 
  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, the FTC mission calls for it to prevent business 
practices that are anticompetitive or unfair or deceptive without “unduly burdening 
business activity.”  Thus, FTC actions also should be assessed by the extent to which they 
saddle industry with unnecessary monetary and time costs.  Panelists, for example, 
commented on the burdens that FTC investigations placed on their clients in terms of 
document production.848  Several panelists also addressed the length of time it often takes 
the FTC to conduct an investigation.849  While dilatory tactics by respondents may 
account for some delays in Commission investigations,850 delays at the agency can place 
unreasonable burdens on the business community and can adversely affect the FTC’s 
credibility.851 
 
In addition to the direct costs associated with lengthy investigations, there are 
indirect costs.  First, if investigations into whether certain conduct violates Section 5 
linger without resolution (either issuance of a complaint or closing of the investigation), 
the uncertainty is likely to chill what may be procompetitive conduct.852  Second, there 
may be a negative relationship between the quality of work involved in a case and the 
length of the investigation.  As one panelist explained, “When things just bog down and 
drag on, the quality of the fact finding and the quality of the legal analysis, I think 
declines as well.”853 
 
                                                 
847 See Yao, Boston Tr. at 126. 
848 See, e.g., Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 96-97, 109; Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 110-11.  
849 See, e.g., Creighton, 7/29 DC Tr. at 94; Bowie, 7/29 DC Tr. at 94-95. 
850 A target of an FTC investigation has an incentive to let such investigation go on indefinitely – 
particularly if the target has reason to believe that the investigation likely will not result in any enforcement 
action on the part of the agency. 
851 See Baer, 7/29 DC Tr. at 91; see also McDavid, 7/30 DC Tr. at 112-13 (explaining that allowing a 
nonmerger investigation to last five years is “certainly not good government”); ABA TRANSITION REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 9-10 (noting the burden associated with long investigations and suggesting that the 
agencies commit to a time line).  
852 See Wright, Chicago Tr. at 190 (“the idea that keeping these investigations open, doesn’t have some sort 
of chilling effect on what could be procompetitive conduct strikes me as not plausible and it’s at least a 
factor that should weigh into these determinations”).  
853 McChesney, Chicago Tr. at 124.  This deleterious effect may arise because as cases drag on, there is 
often turnover in staff, which leads to “an awful lot of things [having to be] started over again both on the 
fact-finding side and to the extent that there has been any legal work completed, reviewing that again.”  Id. 
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Although the FTC currently provides no measurement of costs imposed on the 
business community, one possibility suggested by a panelist would be to report estimates 
of the financial burdens of second requests and other investigation demands as well as the 
time spent investigating matters or litigating in Part III.854  As one panelist noted, if the 
FTC were to begin regularly reporting the length of case investigations, it not only would 
apprise the public of the FTC’s performance but also likely would create pressure to 
resolve issues more quickly than they are currently.855  
  
C. Responsiveness to Core Constituencies  
 
 The FTC has several constituencies; chief among them are Congress, consumers, 
and business.  As discussed in Chapter I.C, lack of external support from core 
constituencies can jeopardize the legitimacy of the agency.  Part of maintaining 
constituency support involves paying close attention to the views of external stakeholders 
to calibrate the FTC’s approach to protecting consumers and markets.  For example, in 
periods when the FTC was unresponsive to congressional and business concerns, it lost 
its ability to operate effectively.856  One panelist also noted the growing importance of 
reliance on networks of government agencies and external stakeholders to “share and be 
involved in activities” to solve problems.857  More generally, the ability of an agency to 
understand the problems that are garnering political attention and to demonstrate that the 
agency is “part of the solution” rather than “part of the problem,” is a key component to 
long-term success.858 
 
Currently, the FTC measures its responsiveness to consumer protection 
complaints in the PAR.859  It also measures the holding of, and substantial participation 
in, workshops that involve both competition and consumer protection issues.860  In a 
broader sense, workshops are a means by which the FTC demonstrates a willingness to 
respond to, and learn from, constituencies about pressing issues.  Although there likely is 
no objective measurement of responsiveness to constituencies in most areas, internal 
evaluation of the extent to which the FTC communicates with constituencies also may be 
a useful metric.   
 
                                                 
854 See Peeler, 7/30 DC Tr. at 137-38.  
855 See Calkins, 7/30 DC Tr. at 113.  
856 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 16, at 207-08 (explaining that Chairman Pertschuk’s activism in certain 
areas failed in part because it “aroused the opposition of broad segments of the business community”); 
Kovacic, Quality, supra note 72, at 922-23 (explaining that Pertschuk “misjudged the changing political 
character of Congress, which grew increasingly conservative in the late 1970s, as the FTC pursued an 
unprecedented collection of ambitious antitrust and consumer protection measures”). 
857 Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 41-42.  See also Bernstein, 7/29 DC Tr. at 56-57 (noting that communication and 
consultations with outside constituencies was helpful in anticipating controversies).  
858 See Breul, 7/30 DC Tr. at 34-35. 
859 FTC PAR, supra note 719, at 45.   
860 Id. at 54 (BCP); id. at 79 (BC). 
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Some panelists raised concerns that constituents do not always demand welfare-
enhancing action from the FTC.  For example, as noted above, some panelists observed 
that neither consumers nor policymakers necessarily fully appreciate the dynamics of, 
and benefits from, competition in complex markets.861  Further, as one panelist noted, 
interest groups “are not representing the interest of consumers generally.  They’re 
representing a particular interest.”862  Thus, before taking actions in response to requests 
from interest groups, the FTC must “calibrate[] what its mission is and recognize[] 
whether what is being requested of the Commission is consistent with stopping fraud, 
stopping deception, or stopping unfairness.”863   
 
Accordingly, taking actions to satisfy the policy demands of constituencies may 
not necessarily provide a good measure of whether the FTC is taking actions that advance 
consumer welfare.  Constituencies may ask for outputs that suit their self-interest, which 
does not necessarily correlate to consumers’ interest.  Because the FTC cannot operate 
effectively without external constituent support, however, there can sometimes be a 
tension between intellectual leadership – which may require taking positions that are 
unpopular with political overseers and consumers, but are based on agency expertise of 
what is in consumers’ best interest – and responding to the desires of core constituents.  
As one panelist noted, when these circumstances arise, it is essential for a competition 
agency to bring along its constituencies as it acts to ameliorate this tension.864  Part of 
this exercise involves being accessible and willing to entertain a constituency’s particu
policy demand.  It does not, however, require acquiescence to every such demand.  As 
noted in Chapter I.C, it is important to distinguish between long-term support for the 
agency’s mission – which is necessary – and unanimous support for every agency action 
– which is not.
lar 
                                                
865  
  
* * * 
 
 When assessing the characteristics of agency output, the FTC should stay focused 
on how its actions impact consumer welfare.  In some instances, welfare changes can be 
measured directly, but in most cases direct measurement will be impractical.  
Consequently, evaluation of FTC actions often will focus on some mixture of output and 
outcome measures to proxy for direct consumer impacts. 
 
 
861 See, e.g., DeSanti, 7/29 DC Tr. at 161 (“we operate in a society where the value of competition is not 
well understood”); Salinger, 7/29 DC Tr. at 163 (with regard to gasoline prices, “the public . . . did not 
understand the workings of [a] competitive marketplace and they were writing their congressmen”); Davis, 
7/29 DC Tr. at 175-76 (noting that one of the challenges the FTC faces is educating congressional 
stakeholders on the value of the agency’s competition mission).  
862 MacLeod, 7/30 DC Tr. at 144. 
863 Id.  
864 See Hill, Paris Tr. at 107.  See also Venit, Brussels Tr. at 35-37. 
865 See Muris, Principles, supra note 17, at 167 (having support of external constituencies for an agency’s 
mission “does not mean that the agency’s mission must be ‘popular’ or that the constituents must support 
every particular agency action”). 
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Some proxies, however, have a closer nexus with welfare changes than others.  
The raw number of cases brought is at best a limited metric to evaluate FTC enforcement 
actions.  Further, a focus on the number of wins is likely to be similarly uninformative – a 
large number of wins is likely to signal that the Commission is bringing only easy cases 
and that more problematic conduct remains underdeterred; a smaller number of wins 
could mean that the agency was doing a poor job of litigating, but also could mean that 
the agency was bringing challenging cases.  Thus, evaluators should pay attention to the 
extent to which the FTC is bringing the proper mix of cases to maximize its positive 
impact on consumer welfare.  This mix will include cases in large markets that vindicate 
substantial consumer interests in the short run, but also cases that are likely to have large, 
long-run deterrent and precedential value.  Determining the optimal mix of cases to use 
as a benchmark for the actual mix of cases is likely to be somewhat subjective.   
 
Empirical study of the relationship between FTC enforcement (and other) actions 
and market outcomes may guide this endeavor.  For example, evaluating the deterrence 
effects of enforcement actions targeting anticompetitive conduct may yield useful 
information to guide future enforcement efforts.  Because consumers can take actions to 
reduce the incidence of fraud and deception, consumer education can be an effective 
adjunct to enforcement in promoting consumer protection.  Evaluating the success of 
consumer education in reducing fraud and deception may be difficult in every 
circumstance, but a few carefully designed studies may provide valuable information.   
 
 FTC actions also should be evaluated to determine whether they demonstrate 
intellectual leadership in the areas of competition and consumer protection policy.  
Commission cases can lead the way in developing legal norms.  Further, it is important 
for the FTC to engage in competition and consumer protection policy R&D to calibrate 
the fit between FTC actions and consumer welfare and to inform courts and policymakers 
in their decisions.  The extent to which courts, policymakers, and academics follow the 
FTC’s lead in these areas is an important evaluative criterion.  Educating the public and 
policymakers on the benefits of competition also is important.  Thus, any evaluation 
should measure the extent to which consumers use FTC competition-promoting materials 
and the extent to which FTC advocacy influences policy outcomes.   
 
The external community values guidance from the FTC, and the agency should 
strive to make decisions more transparent to improve policy determinations.  Any 
evaluation of FTC actions should ask, for example, whether the FTC adequately 
publicizes its actions and whether it effectively conveys policy norms to industry and the 
courts. 
  
Evaluations of FTC output also should measure the extent to which FTC actions 
place unreasonable costs on the business community, both in terms of money and time.  
Such measurement will inform Congress, industry, and the public and also likely will 
enhance internal incentives to reduce burdens the FTC places on businesses.  When 
developing a metric, it is important to develop appropriate benchmarks for both financial 
and time burdens, which are likely to vary by action.  Potential timeliness metrics might 
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focus on the appropriate time to process investigations or from filing an administrative 
complaint until a final Commission decision. 
 
Finally, being open and responsive to core constituencies’ concerns is crucial.  
Absent external support for its mission over time, the FTC cannot operate effectively.  At 
the same time, it is important to distinguish between cultivating external support for the 
mission by demonstrating a willingness to take seriously constituency concerns, and 
attempting to garner unanimous support for every agency action.   Further, the agency 
should be cognizant of the potential tension between intellectual leadership and 
responsiveness to constituency demands.  When these circumstances arise, the FTC can 
ameliorate this tension by engaging in outreach to develop support from its constituencies 
for its policies.  
 
Answering the fundamental question of how to determine whether the FTC is 
successful requires understanding the agency’s mission, the tools it can employ, how it 
uses those tools, and how it should measure success.  Measurements and metrics are 
useful and should be carefully designed and routinely applied.  It is also important to 
recognize, however, the intangible nature of the perception of success.  As one roundtable 
panelist offered, “[W]hen you are trying to estimate how well you are doing, there are 
things that count that can’t be counted and there are things that you can count that don’t 
count.”866  This project’s deep inquiry into how the agency should examine itself and its 
actions is meant to identify and examine the quantifiable and the intangible 
characteristics of success and serve as a guide for the FTC as it approaches its one 
hundredth anniversary in 2014. 
 
                                                 
866 Marsden, London Tr. at 121. 
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PART 4:  CHAIRMAN’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Based on the preceding discussion of the institutional arrangements by which the 
Commission performs its responsibilities (in Chapters I-VI), as well as the means for 
measuring the effectiveness of the agency’s performance (in Chapter VII), following are 
recommendations for consideration by future leaders of the Federal Trade Commission.  
These proposals are offered with the expectation that many measures will require 
continuing effort over a number of years.  A larger objective is to build a cultural norm 
that sustains regular, substantial investments in long-term agency capacity.  In all of the 
matters addressed below, the FTC should use a combination of self-study, consultation 
with external organizations, and benchmarking with other competition authorities. 
 
Mission 
 
With internal and external constituencies, the FTC should continue to build a 
consensus that the core purpose of the agency is to promote the well-being of consumers.  
The Commission should assess each proposed initiative by its capacity, among other 
ends, to improve the range of goods and services available to consumers and to 
strengthen the capacity of consumers to make well-informed choices among those 
alternatives. 
 
In its Annual Report and in other statements, the Commission regularly should 
state its goals and the means with which it intends to achieve such goals.  Where possible, 
the Commission should define its aims in terms of desired outcomes (such as 
enhancements in economic performance or consumer welfare) rather than in terms of 
outputs (such as the number of new law enforcement matters). 
 
The Commission should engage in regular, periodic consultations with external 
constituencies – including legislators, other public agencies, consumer groups, business 
organizations, academic institutions, and legal societies – about the aims that should 
motivate the agency’s choice of programs and about the interpretation of its authority.  
Useful means to this end would include: 
 
x Workshops, seminars, and hearings that focus on the conceptual framework for 
applying the agency’s authority.  One recent illustration is the workshop the 
Commission conducted in October 2008 on the use of the agency’s power to 
challenge unfair methods of competition under Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
 
x Increased use of blogs and similar tools to foster a conversation about the 
agency’s aims and programs.  
 
The Commission should engage in regular internal consultations with its 
administrative professionals, attorneys, and economists to discuss the agency’s objectives 
and the selection of measures to accomplish its goals.  In addition to measures already  
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taken, the agency should: 
 
x Expand the use of policy review sessions in which the Commission meets in 
plenary sessions with the agency staff to examine specific issues. 
 
x Hold regular town hall meetings, which enable the agency’s entire staff, or major 
operating units, to gather as a group to discuss the agency’s aims and programs. 
 
x Increase the use of internal protocols that help guide the staff with respect to the 
agency’s aims and the formulation of projects to achieve them. 
 
The Commission should continue its dialogue with Congress about the utility of 
existing limits on its jurisdiction.  For example, the sensibility of exemptions governing 
common carriers, not-for-profit entities, and financial services warrant close examination.  
To leave existing restrictions in place will undermine the capacity of the agency to 
deliver effective, integrated policy solutions to important competition and consumer 
protection problems. 
 
 
Agency Structure and Operations 
 
The Commission should engage in regular assessments of whether its structure 
and operational procedures can be modified to improve its delivery of effective programs. 
 
The Commission should augment existing efforts to improve communications 
across the agency generally and among its operating units.  These efforts might include: 
 
x Providing a clear statement of the agency’s aims and explanations about how 
individual programs are linked to the attainment of those aims. 
 
x Expanding efforts, through small group discussions and larger meetings, to 
discuss policy initiatives with the agency’s staff. 
 
x Creating an internal “wiki” or similar tool for accumulating knowledge about past 
and present agency activities. 
 
The agency should explore ways to integrate knowledge and expertise more 
effectively across bureaus.  This would include: 
 
x Deeper integration of economic analysis into the formulation of competition and 
consumer protection initiatives. 
 
x More extensive development of integrated competition and consumer protection 
responses to specific issues. 
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The agency should expand existing efforts to manage litigation and nonlitigation 
initiatives by measures such as: 
 
x Setting and reviewing timetables for the completion of all major projects. 
 
x Refining internal electronic databases to determine the status of each project. 
 
 
Resources 
 
The Commission should explore additional ways to preserve and enhance its 
human capital.  Means to this end might include: 
 
x Intensification of existing efforts to devise personal development plans for each  
employee. 
 
x Expansion of internal and external training opportunities. 
 
x Greater movement of staff across operating units as a way of expanding the range 
of experiences within the agency. 
 
The Commission should continue to develop a capital budget that provides 
periodic increases in outlays for information management and communications systems.  
The purpose of these increases is to ensure that the agency has state-of-the-art capability 
to address the full range of its technology needs. 
 
The agency should continue to engage Congress in a discussion about the 
possibility for augmenting the existing federal pay scale to enable the FTC to make 
salary-based departures to the private sector less frequent.  There is serious question 
about whether the Commission’s capacity, and that of other public agencies in the United 
States, can be sustained at acceptable levels if compensation levels are not increased 
substantially. 
 
 
Relationships 
 
The Commission should expand its efforts to share expertise and develop 
common programs with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.  Specific 
measures might include: 
 
x Development of working groups that will meet regularly to share experience and 
discuss superior techniques for responsibilities such as merger review. 
 
x Devising a regular program of staff exchanges for attorneys and economists. 
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x Preparation, in consultation with congressional committees, of a new agreement 
to govern the clearance of law enforcement matters. 
 
The Commission should expand its formal and informal efforts to build networks 
with other public institutions within the United States.  Means to this end might include: 
 
x Formulation of working groups with individual federal agencies with related 
policymaking responsibilities whose exercise affects the attainment of the 
Commission’s competition policy and consumer protection goals.  Memoranda of 
understanding might be prepared to structure these and related measures. 
 
x Expansion of the scope of cooperation with state competition and consumer 
protection authorities.  Focal points for expanded cooperation might include 
common training exercises, broader collaboration on case development, and the 
pooling of experience in areas of shared responsibility. 
 
x Establishment of a domestic competition network and a domestic consumer 
protection network that would provide a forum for discussion and cooperation for 
officials in public agencies in the United States. 
 
The Commission should continue and refine its commitment of resources to 
cooperate with foreign competition and consumer protection authorities in the context of 
bilateral, regional, and global networks.  Focal points for cooperation might include: 
 
x In the context of bilateral relationships, greater common efforts to cooperate on 
merger and nonmerger cases, to devise and carry out research projects of common 
interest (such as the evaluation of enforcement decisions taken in matters 
reviewed by both jurisdictions), to prepare workshops and seminars, and to 
conduct routine exchanges of staff.   
 
The Commission should continue to develop links to academic research 
institutions whose work is related to the agency’s responsibilities. 
 
The Commission should designate FTC officials to serve as liaisons to 
nongovernment bodies such as consumer groups and industry associations. 
 
 
Strategic Planning 
 
The Commission should consider refinements to the existing collection of 
mechanisms by which it sets priorities and chooses programs.  The agency should 
progress toward the refinement of a framework that analyzes proposed FTC litigation and 
nonlitigation matters according to their likely benefits for consumers, their potential 
impact on doctrine or other aspects of public policy, their cost in resources and time, and 
their risk.  The agency should view all of its matters as part of a portfolio that should be 
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balanced across low-, medium-, and high-risk activities.  Means to this end might 
include: 
 
x Expansion of the role of the Office of Policy Planning (an office outside the major 
bureaus) to serve as a focal point for the preparation of materials that the 
Commission can use to establish the agency’s strategic plan. 
 
x Regular, periodic public consultations to obtain views about the appropriate 
choice of the agency’s competition and consumer protection programs. 
 
x Development within the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics of a 
formal planning framework comparable to the mechanism used by the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection. 
 
 
Policy Research and Development 
 
The Commission should consider the refinement of existing processes for 
formulating and carrying out its research program.  Measures to this end might include: 
 
x Formal consideration, as part of the annual budgeting process, of the amount of 
FTC resources to be dedicated to theoretical and applied research projects. 
 
x Replication within the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection of a 
research planning committee now used by the Bureau of Economics. 
 
x Use of an agency-wide mechanism – such as the Office of Policy Planning – to 
serve as a clearinghouse for agency research activities. 
 
The Commission should make the use of its Section 6(b) authority a routine 
element of its research program, including the initiation in each annual budget cycle of 
one or more studies that employ this policy tool. 
 
The Commission should continue to devote substantial resources to public 
consultations as policymaking tools.  In its role as a convener of hearings, workshops, 
seminars, and town hall meetings, the Commission has considerable capacity to learn of 
important legal and economic phenomena and encourage useful public discussion about 
important issues. 
 
 
Resource Deployment 
 
The Commission’s main operating units should devise principles that spell out the 
criteria the staff should use in assigning priority to different enforcement and 
nonenforcement projects. 
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The Commission should consider setting internal, bureau-specific deadlines for 
investigations and regularly should hold meetings to discuss progress achieved in 
individual matters. 
 
The Commission should strive to issue a statement that explains why it has closed 
a matter that involved a significant investigation. 
 
 
Measuring Effectiveness 
 
The Commission should continue to improve the measures by which it can assess 
its effectiveness with respect to all areas of its operations.  The agency’s goal should be 
to imbed an ethic of self-assessment and continuous improvement.  Focal points for this 
effort should include means for assessing the agency’s use of enforcement and 
nonenforcement tools, the completeness and quality of information it provides about its 
activities, its guidance to external constituencies, the timeliness of its operations, the 
justifications for burdens that it imposes on business operators, and its openness to 
proposals offered by constituencies outside the Commission. 
 
Commission staff should identify in memos recommending agency actions how 
the effectiveness of those actions, if they came to fruition, might be evaluated. 
 
The Commission should prepare publicly available data sets that report on its 
activities over time. 
 
The Commission should continue to refine its GPRA performance measures to 
focus on outcomes directly and, as a second-best solution, to devise output measures that 
are likely to serve as good proxies for desired outcomes. 
 
The Commission should maintain datasets that track the time taken to perform 
routine administrative tasks. 
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APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF FTC AT 100 ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Washington, D.C. Roundtable (July 29-30, 2008) 
 
William Baer Partner, Arnold & Porter  
    Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Michael R. Baye  Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
Joan Z. Bernstein Of Counsel, Bryan Cave  
    Former Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection 
 
Darren A. Bowie  Legal Director, North American Markets, Nokia  
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman Timothy Muris 
Former Assistant Director, Division of Financial Practices 
and Division of Advertising Practices, FTC Bureau of 
Consumer Protection 
 
Jonathan D. Breul  Partner, IBM Global Business Services 
Executive Director, IBM Center for the Business of 
Government 
 
Jeanne Bumpus  Director, FTC Office of Congressional Relations 
 
John E. Calfee Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute  
Former Special Assistant to the Director, FTC Bureau of 
Economics 
     
Stephen Calkins  Professor, Wayne State University    
    Former FTC General Counsel 
 
Robert W. Crandall  Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution 
 
Susan A. Creighton  Partner, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati  
    Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Anna H. Davis Executive Director, Government Relations, National Board 
for Professional Teaching Standards  
Former Director, FTC Office of Congressional Relations 
Former Director, FTC Office of Public Affairs 
 
Susan S. DeSanti  Partner, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal  
    Former FTC Deputy General Counsel for Policy Studies 
    Former Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
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Jerry Ellig Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center  
Former Acting Director and Deputy Director, FTC Office 
of Policy Planning 
 
Kathryn M. Fenton  Partner, Jones Day  
    Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman James Miller 
 
Rebecca Fisher Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Section, Office of the 
Texas Attorney General 
 
Luke M. Froeb Professor, Owen Graduate School of Management, 
Vanderbilt University  
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
Vivek Ghosal Professor, School of Economics, Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
 
Eileen Harrington  Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection 
 
Thomas W. Hazlett  Professor, George Mason University School of Law 
 
Andrew J. Heimert Office of Policy & Coordination, FTC Bureau of 
Competition 
 
Ken Heyer Economics Director, Economic Analysis Group, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 
 
Nancy N. Judy  Director, FTC Office of Public Affairs 
 
Joseph Kattan Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher  
Former Assistant Director, Office of Policy & Evaluation, 
FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
William E. Kovacic  Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
Former Advisor, Office of Policy & Coordination, FTC 
Bureau of Competition 
Former Assistant Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer 
Protection 
     
Thomas B. Leary  Of Counsel, Hogan & Hartson  
    Former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Gregory P. Luib  Assistant Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
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William C. MacLeod  Partner, Kelley Drye  
    Former Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection 
    Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman James Miller 
 
Janet L. McDavid  Partner, Hogan & Hartson 
 
Timothy J. Muris Of Counsel, O’Melveny & Myers 
Foundation Professor, George Mason University School of 
Law 
Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
 
Richard Parker  Partner, O’Melveny & Myers  
    Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Paul A. Pautler  Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
C. Lee Peeler President and CEO, National Advertising Review Council 
Executive Vice President, National Advertising Self-
Regulation, Council of Better Business Bureaus 
Former Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer 
Protection 
 
Paul H. Rubin   Professor of Law and Economics, Emory School of Law 
    Professor of Economics, Emory University  
    Former FTC Director of Advertising Economics 
 
Michael A. Salinger Professor, Finance and Economics Department, Boston 
University  
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
Ari Schwartz Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, Center for 
Democracy and Technology 
 
David P. Wales Acting Director, FTC Bureau of Competition  
 
Gregory J. Werden Senior Economic Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division 
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London Roundtable (September 12, 2008) 
 
Alden Abbott   Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
David Aitman Co-Head, Global Antitrust, Competition, and Trade 
Practice Group, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
 
William Bishop  Vice President, Charles River Associates International 
Professor of the Economics of Competition, College of 
Europe in Bruges 
 
Margaret Bloom  Visiting Professor, King’s College, London 
    Senior Consultant, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
 
Maria Coppola Tineo Counsel for International Antitrust, FTC Office of 
International Affairs 
 
John Davies Chief Economist and Former Director of Economic 
Analysis, United Kingdom Competition Commission 
 
John Fingleton  Chief Executive, United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading 
 
Peter Freeman Chairman and Former Deputy Chairman, United Kingdom 
Competition Commission 
 
Edward Humpherson Assistant Auditor General and Director of Regulation 
Studies, United Kingdom National Audit Office 
 
Valentine Korah Emeritus Professor of Competition Law, University 
College London 
 
Jeremy Lever Fellow and Senior Dean, All Souls College, Oxford 
University 
 
Philip Marsden Director and Senior Research Fellow, Competition Law 
Forum, British Institute for International and Comparative 
Law 
 
Maureen Ohlhausen Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
 
Simon Pritchard Senior Director of Mergers, United Kingdom Office of Fair 
Trading 
 
Debra Valentine  Global Head of Legal, Rio Tinto plc  
Former FTC General Counsel 
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John Vickers Warden and Drummond Professor of Political Economy 
and Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford University 
 
Catherine Waddams  Professor, Norwich Business School 
 
Richard Whish  Professor of Law, Kings College, London 
Non-Executive Director and Former Member of the 
Director General of Fair Trading’s Advisory Panel, United 
Kingdom Office of Fair Trading 
     
Stephen Wilks Professor of Politics and Former Deputy Vice Chancellor 
(Research), University of Exeter 
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Ottawa Roundtable (September 18, 2008) 
 
Anthony Baldanza  Senior Partner, Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP 
 
John Bodrug    Partner, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP 
 
Paul Crampton  Partner, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP 
 
Russell Damtoft Associate Director, FTC Office of International Affairs 
 
Calvin Goldman Chair of the Competition Group, Blake, Cassels & Graydon 
LLP 
 
Tim Kennish Counsel and former Co-Chair, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt 
LLP 
 
William Kovacic  Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Margaret Sanderson  Vice President, Charles River Associates International 
 
 
A. Neil Campbell  McMillan LLP (consultation held Sept. 17, 2008) 
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Chicago Roundtable (September 25, 2008) 
 
Alden F. Abbott  Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
C. Steven Baker Director, FTC Midwest Region 
 
Michael R. Baye  Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
William L. Brauch Special Assistant Attorney General and Director, Consumer 
Protection Division, Office of the Iowa Attorney General 
 
Henry N. Butler Executive Director, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and 
Economic Growth at Northwestern University 
    Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law 
 
Thomas Campbell  Partner, Baker & McKenzie LLP 
 
Denis W. Carlton  Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon 
Professor of Economics, University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business 
 
Blake L. Harrop Senior Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Bureau, Office 
of the Illinois Attorney General 
 
Paul H. Luehr Managing Director and Deputy General Counsel, Stroz 
Friedberg, LLC  
Former Assistant Director, Division of Marketing Practices, 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection 
 
Fred M. McChesney Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law 
Former Associate Director, Office of Policy & Evaluation, 
FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Aviv Nevo Professor, Department of Economics and Kellogg School 
of Business, Northwestern University 
 
Randal C. Picker Professor of Commercial Law, University of Chicago Law 
School 
 
Teresa M. Schwartz Professor Emeritus of Public Interest Law, George 
Washington University School of Law  
Former Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer 
Protection 
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Commissioner Mary 
Gardiner Jones 
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Carl Shapiro Professor of Business Strategy, Haas School of Business, 
University of California at Berkeley 
Director, Institute of Business and Economic Research, 
University of California at Berkeley 
 
Abraham L. Wickelgren Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law 
School 
    Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law 
Former Economist, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
Joshua D. Wright Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University 
School of Law 
    Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law 
Former Scholar in Residence, FTC Bureau of Competition 
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Tokyo Roundtable (October 7, 2008)  
 
Alden F. Abbott  Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Yasuhisa Abe    Director, Economic Policy Bureau II, Nippon Keidanren 
 
Toru Aizeki  Deputy Secretary General of International Affairs, Japan 
Fair Trade Commission 
 
Kei Amemiya    Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP 
 
Robert Grondine   Partner, White & Case 
 
William Kovacic  Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Mitsuo Matsushita  Advisor, Nagashima, Ohno & Tsunematsu 
Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University 
 
Masahiro Murakami  Professor, Graduate School of International Corporate 
Strategy, Hitosubashi University 
 
Hideo Nakajima Deputy Secretary General, Trade Practices Department, 
Japan Fair Trade Commission 
 
Deirdre Shanahan Competition Counsel for Asia Pacific, FTC Office of 
International Affairs 
 
Shozo Takahashi  Director, General Affairs Division, Secretariat, Japan Fair 
Trade Commission 
 
Kazuhiko Takeshima  Chair, Japan Fair Trade Commission 
 
Jiro Tamura    Professor, Keio University 
 
Akinori Uesugi  Senior Consultant, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
Professor, Graduate School of International Corporate 
Strategy, Hitotsubashi University 
 
Kimitoshi Yabuki   Head, Yabuki Law Offices 
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Boston Roundtable (October 14, 2008) 
 
Alden F. Abbott  Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Einer R. Elhauge Caroll and Milton Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
School  
 
Hillary Greene Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut 
School of Law 
Former FTC Project Director for Intellectual Property 
 
Andrew J. Heimert Office of Policy & Coordination, FTC Bureau of 
Competition 
 
Keith N. Hylton Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law and Professor of Law, 
Boston University School of Law 
 
Robert M. Langer  Partner, Wiggin and Dana 
 
Nancy L. Rose Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
Director, National Bureau of Economic Research Program 
in Industrial Organization 
 
Michael A. Salinger Professor and Everett W. Lord Distinguished Faculty 
Scholar, Finance and Economics Department, Boston 
University 
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
Dennis Yao Lawrence E. Fouraker Professor of Business 
Administration, Harvard Business School 
Former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission 
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Brussels Roundtable (October 21, 2008) 
 
Alden Abbott   Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Antonio Bavasso  Partner, Allen & Overy 
Professor of EC Competition Law and Founder and 
Director of the Jevons Institute, UCL 
 
Hendrik Bourgeois Senior Counsel, Competition, Regulation and Government 
Relations for Europe, General Electric Company 
 
Rachel Brandenburger Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
 
James Cooper Acting Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
 
Götz Drauz   Partner, Howrey 
 
Luc Gyselen   Partner, Arnold & Porter 
 
Jonas Koponen  Partner, Linklaters  
 
William Kovacic  Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Jorge Padilla   Managing Director, LECG 
    Research Fellow, Center for Economic Policy Research 
 
John Temple Lang  Consultant, Cleary Gottlieb 
    Senior Visiting Research Fellow, University of Oxford 
    Visiting Professor, Trinity College, Dublin 
     
James Venit   Partner, Skadden, Arps 
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Paris Roundtable (October 24, 2008)  
 
Alden Abbott   Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
James Cooper    Acting Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
 
Sean Ennis Senior Economist, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
 
Allan Fels Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of 
Government 
 
Alberto Heimler Central Director for Research and International Affairs, 
Italian Competition Authority 
 
Nicholas Hill   Chief Executive, New Zealand Commerce Commission 
 
Rene Jansen Member of the Board, Netherlands Competition Authority 
(NMa) 
 
Frederic Jenny   Member of the Cours de Cassation, France 
Chairman, Competition Committee, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
William Kovacic  Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
 
Csaba Kovacs   Head of Section, Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) 
 
Markus Lange  Head of the International Section of the Bundeskartellamt, 
Germany  
 
François Lévêque  Professor of Law and Economics, Ecole des Mines de Paris 
 
Francisco Marcos Fernandez Professor of Law, IE Law School 
Director General of the Defence Competition Service, 
Madrid Regional Competition Court  
 
Andreas Mundt Head of Section, General Competition Law Issues, 
Bundeskartellamt, Germany 
 
Zoltán Nagy    President, Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH)  
 
Bernard (Joe) Phillips Head of the Competition Division, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
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Simon Roberts Divisional Manager of Policy and Research, South African 
Competition Commission  
 
Jacques Steenbergen  Director General, Belgian Competition Authority 
 
Walter Stoffel   Chairman, Swiss Competition Commission 
Professor of Economic Law, University of Fribourg 
 
Monica Widegren Head of International Section, Swedish Competition 
Authority 
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New York Roundtable (October 24, 2008) 
 
Joseph Angland  Partner, White & Case 
 
Michael D. Blechman  Partner, Kaye Scholer LLP 
 
Molly S. Boast Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP 
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Competition 
 
Beau Brendler Director, Consumer Reports WebWatch, Consumers Union 
 
Daniel Brenner   Senior Vice President, Law and Regulatory Policy, 
    National Cable & Telecommunications Association 
 
Jerry Cerasale Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Direct 
Marketing Association 
Former Attorney Advisor to FTC Chairman Janet Steiger 
 
Kevin G. DeMarrais Senior Business Writer/Columnist, The Record (Bergen 
County, NJ) 
 
Joy Feigenbaum Chief, Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection, Office 
of the New York Attorney General 
 
Harry First Professor of Law and Director, Trade Regulation Program, 
New York University School of Law 
 
Eleanor M. Fox Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University 
School of Law 
    Of Counsel, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett 
 
Leonard L. Gordon Director, FTC Northeast Region 
 
Jeffrey A. Greenbaum Partner, Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, PC 
 
Lois C. Greisman  Associate Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection 
 
Michael Kaiser  Executive Director, National Cyber Security Alliance 
 
Georges G. Korsun Director, Economic and Statistical Consulting, Deloitte 
Financial Advisory Services, LLP 
 
Cynthia L. Lagdameo Counsel for International Antitrust, FTC Office of 
International Affairs 
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Andrea C. Levine  Director, National Advertising Division 
    Senior Vice President, Council of Better Business Bureaus 
 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen Director, FTC Office of Policy Planning 
 
Andreas P. Reindl Adjunct Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fordham 
Competition Law Institute, Fordham University School of 
Law 
 
David T. Scheffman  Director, LECG 
Adjunct Professor, Owen Graduate School of Management, 
Vanderbilt University 
Former Director, FTC Bureau of Economics 
 
Peter P. Swire Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of 
Law 
    Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress 
 
 
 
 198
APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF AGENCIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS 
PARTICIPATING IN FTC AT 100 EXTERNAL CONSULTATIONS 
 
 
Israeli Antitrust Authority, August 19, 2008 
 
Korean Fair Trade Commission, September 4, 2008 
 
Latin American Competition Agencies and International Organizations, 
September 11, 2008: 
 
Superintendent of Companies, Bolivia 
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), Brazil 
Secretariat of Economic Law, Brazil 
National Economic Prosecutor’s Office, Chile 
Superintendent of Commerce, Colombia 
Commission to Promote Competition, Costa Rica 
Ministry of Economy, Ecuador 
Superintendent of Competition, El Salvador 
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Competition, Honduras 
Federal Competition Commission, Mexico 
Authority for Consumer Protection and Competition Defense, Panama 
Competition Authority, Portugal 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
 
United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading, September 11, 2008 
 
United Kingdom Competition Commission, September 12, 2008 
 
United Kingdom Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 
September 12, 2008 
 
United Kingdom Consumer Organization Representatives, September 12, 2008: 
 
 Citizen’s Advice 
 Consumer Focus (formerly National Consumer Council) 
 Privacy International 
 Trading Standards Institute/European Citizen’s Centre 
 
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, September 17, 2008 
 
Canadian Competition Bureau, September 17, 2008 
 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, September 17, 2008 
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Ontario Ministry of Small Business and Consumer Services, September 17, 2008 
 
Japan Fair Trade Commission, September 19, 2008 
 
Japanese Cabinet Office, September 19, 2008 
 
South African Competition Tribunal, September 19, 2008 
 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, October 2 & 6, 2008 
 
Melbourne, Consultation with Private Sector Stakeholders, October 2, 2008: 
 
Andrew Christopher  Partner, Baker & McKenzie 
Linda Evans  Partner, Clayton Utz 
Aymon Guigus  Partner, Blake Dawson 
Dave Poddar  Partner, Mallesons Stephen Jaques 
William Reid  Partner, Blake Dawson 
Simon Uthmeyer Partner, DLA Phillips Fox 
 
Latin American Consumer Protection Agencies and International Organizations, 
October 8, 2008: 
 
 Subsectariat for Consumer Protection, Argentina 
 National Consumer Service, Chile 
 Superintendence for Consumer Protection, Colombia 
 Directorate for Consumer Protection, Costa Rica 
 Office for the Defense of the Consumer, El Salvador 
 Directorate for Consumer Protection, Guatemala 
 Attorney General for Consumer Protection, Mexico 
 Directorate for Consumer Protection, Nicaragua 
 National Institute for Defense of Competition and Property Protection, Peru 
 National Institute for Consumption, Spain 
 
Buenos Aires, Consultation with Private Sector Stakeholders, October 14, 2008: 
 
Marcelo Calliari Partner, TozziniFreire Advogados, Brazil 
Miguel del Pino  Partner, Marval, O’Farrell & Mairal, Argentina 
Marcelo den Toom  Partner, M. & M. Bomchil Abogados, Argentina 
Mauro Grinberg Partner, Barcellos Tucunduva Advogados, Brazil 
Ubiratan Mattos Partner, Mattos Muriel Kestener Advogados, Brazil 
Julian Peña  Partner, Allende & Brea, Argentina 
 
Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs, European Commission, 
October 20, 2008 
 
 200
 201
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (independent advisory group to European 
Commission), October 20, 2008 
 
Directorate General for Competition, European Commission, October 21 & 23, 2008 
 
Representatives from several member and observer consumer agencies and governmental 
ministries to the OECD Committee on Consumer Policy, October 22, 2008 
 
Conseil de la Concurrence, France, October 23, 2008 
 
Washington, DC Consultation on International Issues, November 6, 2008: 
 
Donald Baker   Baker & Miller 
Terry Calvani  Of Counsel, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
   Former Acting Chairman and Commissioner, FTC 
Andrew Gavil  Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law  
(consultation held Nov. 20, 2008) 
R. Shyam Khemani Principal, Microeconomic Consulting & Research 
Associates, Inc. 
Ilene Knable Gotts Partner, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz 
William Kolasky  Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP  
Abbott (Tad) Lipsky Partner, Latham & Watkins, LLP (consultation held  
Nov. 20, 2008) 
Deborah Platt Majoras General Counsel, Procter & Gamble 
Former Chairman, Federal Trade Commission 
Janet McDavid Partner, Hogan & Hartson LLP 
James Rill  Senior Partner, Howrey LLP 
Mark Whitener Senior Counsel, General Electric Company 
 
Irish Competition Authority, November 27, 2008 
 
Australian Communications & Media Authority (via written correspondence) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 

